Tanks in the Division Cavalry Squadron

Tanks in the Division Cavalry Squadron The commander of a division cavalry squadron argues the necessity of tanks, based on experiences during the Gulf War by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Wilson Offloaded M1 A l s await issue at the port of Jubail, Saudi Arabia. First Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry (Quarterhorse), 1st Infantry Division (Mech) was alerted to deploy to SWA on November 8,1990. The squadron’s combat elements consisted of Bravo Troop (19 Bradleys, three mortars) and Charlie and Delta Troop (six OH- 58s, four AH-1s each). On 9 November, the formation of the second ground troop (Alpha Troop) was approved. On 22 November, we learned that the squadron would receive 40 M3A2 Bradleys and nine MlAl tanks upon our arrival in SWA. Integrating the tanks and the second ground troop into the squadron’s organization were key to our success in combat: Getting them was nc: easy, and keeping the tanks after the war was not possible. The following is a brief account of how we built the organization and its effectiveness in combat. Background In the fall of 1990, MG Thomas G. Rhame, commander, 1st Infantry Division (Mech), wrestled with the problem of where 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry would get its second ground troop. Would it come from the drawdown of either the 1st Infantry Division (Forward) or 2d Armored Division (Fort Hood), or would he requisition it? On November 8, 1990, when the division was alerted for deployment to SWA, he made his decision; he would requisition it. The plah was to pick up as much equipment as possible in CONUS and draw the remainder of the equipment in Saudi Arabia. Alpha Troop received three M106 mortars and one M577 at Fort Riley, Kansas, on 21 November. On 22 November, I received a telephone call from the G3, Lieutenant Colonel Terry Bullington: “Bob, the division is going to draw 249 MlAl tanks in SWA. This is nine more than we were expecting, and I am wondering if nine tanks might be directed to the squadron. Does this track with anything Fort Knox has been working on?” I informed him that, at the direction of commander, FORSCOM, Fort Knox had been working on a couple of options to test tanks in the division cavalry; one of those options included nine tanks per cavalry troop. The test was to occur in USARJZUR and FORSC0M.I told Terry that I would get the specifics from Fort Knox and ask them to express mail the information to him. We called the Documentation Branch at the Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort box, and asked for assistance. It mailed the test M’IOE to the squadron and the division. After review of the MTOE, the division informed force development, FORSCOM, of its requirement for 249 tanks. This included division floats and nine tanks for the cavalry squadron. We planned to organize the tanks into three 3-tank sections and integrated them into three of the squadron’s scout platoons. There were no excess tankers in the division, so we requisitioned 36 19Ks. Because of the short predeployment training period, we elected to assign sergeants first class instead of second lieutenants as tank section leaders. I called Colonel J.W. Thurman, Director of the Command and Staff Department at Fort Knox, and asked him for training assistance. Could he send a cadre to Fort Riley within the next three weeks to teach an accelerated Scout Platoon Leaders Course to a newly organized ground cavalry troop and tankers? He was very receptive and, thanks to a break in the SPLC schedule during the Christmas holidays, the training occurred in December. We manifested Alpha Troop and the tankers on the last airplane in order to take advantage of this golden training o p 6 ARMOR - July-AUgUSt 1992 portunity. The training was superb, and instilled confidence in both the scouts and the tankers. The Preparation The squadron deployed to SWA in two groups: HHT and B Troop on 30 December, and A, C, D, and E Troops on 10 January. On 5 January, at the port of Dammam, Bravo Troop received 20 M3A2 Bradleys (one for the troop XO) and six MlAl tanks. Since Bravo Troop was the more mature troop, with an experienced commander (Captain Mike Bills) and at approximately full strength, we assigned it six of the nine MlAl tanks. Three each were integrated into two scout platoons (see Figures 1 and 2). Alpha Troop, commanded by Captain Ken Pope, deployed on 10 January with 97 of 140 authorized personnel. Thirty-six additional personnel (19D, 19K, 11M) joined the troop at the port of Dammam. On 13 January, Alpha Troop received 20 M3A2 Bradleys and three MlAl tanks. The organizational charts show how Alpha Troop organized for combat. Due to the lack of NCOs, four Bradleys were kept in the HQ recon/sxurity platoon, located in the squadron combat trains. Several Alpha Troop scouts were not qualified on the Bradley, and many of the tankers had not been trained on the MlAl tank Colonel Dave Bird, Chief, Armor Systems Modernization, ARCENT, and Lieutenant Colonel Dale Ross, Force Development, HQDA, DCSOPS, bent over backward in the fielding and training of our soldiers on their new equipment. Commanders of 3-37 AR and 4-37 AR cross leveled a few of their more experienced tank gunners for some of our privates. Colonel James L. Mow-ery, commander, 4th Brigade; BG J.R. Rutherford, ADC(S): and BG William

G. Carter 111, ADC(M) were instrumental in acquiring critical equipment to fill shortages. On 14 January, we deployed Bravo Troop, and on 2 1 January, we deployed Alpha Troop to tactical assembly area Roosevelt. I

ALPHA TROOP

I DESERT SHIELD / DESERTSTORM

- -:6 -loo

Y I C W

21 U1Al 5 MlW 3 usn 1

MIY)

I

FIST-V

M9 ACE

12 Ml13 1

M113QSR

U113 WUI

4 Figure 1 ~ - - 7 -in mCFv P

MIA1

6 U106 3 u5n 1 M113 1

MACE

5 us¶ 1 U113o(IR 3

FIST-V

1 M113paR 4 STmOERSEETDN 1 Figure 2 Soon after our arrival, we had the o p portunity to fm all of our weapon systems at Jayhawk range. On 24 January, Alpha Troop received the last of its critical equipment (M60 MGs, GVS-Ss, CVCs, flak vests). MG Rhame had told me from the very beginning that he would not commit Alpha Troop to combat until I informed him that it was trained and ready to survive the rigors of war. We both agreed that soldiers lives would not be risked because of haste. The division had made contingency plans to employ Alpha Troop in the division rear. Would there be time? Security of Logbase Echo VII Corps and 1st Infantry Division were prepositioning CSS assets to forward assembly area (Junction City), vicinity of Logbase ECHO, some 127 kilometers to the northwest of TAA Roosevelt. MG Rhame ordered the cavalry squadron commander to provide the logbase security for the VII Corps and division assets. Bravo ARMOR - JUly-AUguSt 1992 7

Movement of the 1-4 Cav In Iraq and Kuwait Troop, with attached GSR and ADA, deployed to Junction City on 24 January and assumed a stationary screen. On 25 January, we deployed the air troops and placed the squadron(-) under the command of the squadron S3, Major John Burdan. On 27 January, the squadron’s remaining element, Alpha Troop, arrived at FAA Junction City. Due to the distance from division, FM communications were sporadic. Topographical maps were incomplete, with only selected map sheets available for planning. We added blank sheets of paper to our operations maps and drew NS-EW grid lines for reference. This was adequate, considering the lack of terrain features in the area. The CG filled Alpha Troop’s 19D shortages by sending the squadron 25 infantrymen (11M). On 28 January, the squadron’s screen was extended east to the 1st Cavalry Division’s boundary. The 45 kilometers sector required that the eastern 15 kilometers be covered by air cavalry. Bravo Troop was tasked to link up twice daily (usually by air) with 1-7 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division’s westernmost element. In the early morning of 1 February, 52 Saudi border guards entered our sector from the north. They had been attacked the night prior, in the town of Markaz Samah Al Jadid, by an Iraqi ground force. After processing them through intelligence channels, we escorted them out of our sector. At 0630 hours, a Bravo Troop GSR detected four enemy dismounts moving toward its observation post. A nearby ground scout section, overwatched by tanks, moved forward and visually acquired the enemy patrol. After firing a burst of coax on each side of the patrol, the Iraqis displayed a white flag and surrendered. A search of the immediate area found hand grenades buried in the sand. On 2 February, an air troop scout weapons team destroyed an Jraqi engineer vehicle, a radar tower, and two buildings just north of the berm. Combat Command Carter The CG increased the size of the security force on 3 February by moving 3-37 AR and 1-5 FA to AA Junction City. He placed these assets and the “Quarteharse” under the command of BG William G. Carter III, ADC(M) and designated the forward combat element “Combat Command Carter.“ On 4 February, a Delta Troop scout weapons team (SWT) destroyed an AML reconnaissance vehicle north of the benn with a TOW missile. After receiving numerous reports of enemy activity in the town of Markaz Samah AI Jadid, the squadron planned a raid on the town. On 6 February, a AH-1s) reconnoitered the town by fm. After fing 20-mm cannon and 2.75-in. rockets into the town, an Iraqi soldier rushed out of a building displaying a white fig. I directed a Bravo Troop Bradley section to move to the building, secure the prisoner, and conduct a thorough search of the facility. Bravo Troop tanks remained in overwatch as the Bradley section moved forward. The scout section evacuated the prisoner and several pieces of communications equipment to the squadron rear. During the period 8-10 February, RPVs overflew cently observed building antennas were controlling the RPVs, BG Carter authorized the AH-1 Cobras and AH- 64 Apaches to take them out. All known antennas along the border were destroyed. On 11 February, SWT (two OH-% and two OUT positions. Hypothesizing that re- a ARMOR - July-August 1992

More than 2,000 prisoners of war taken near the Kuwait City-Basra highway. Bravo Troop captured an additional seven EPWs. On 13 February, the “Quarterhorse“ became OPCON to the 3d Brigade, 2AD forward (TF IRON). From 27 January to 13 February, Alpha Troop matured into a magnificent armored cavalry troop. On 14 February, I informed the brigade commander and the division commander that Alpha Troop was ready for combat. Task Force iron On 15 February, the squadron, as part of TF Iron, cut ten 20-meter holes in the border berm and pushed north several kilometers into Iraq. We used the Cobras and Bradleys in aver-watch, while the tanks punched through the gaps created by the ACES. Contact was relatively light; the squadron destroyed a communications outpost and a sand fort, and captured the first Iraqi flag. These cuts in the border berm, along with others cut by 1-41 (Mech) Infantry, would provide the lanes for the division’s attack on the 24th. The tankers embraced cavalry from the very beginning. They had confidence in themselves, their equipment, and their leaders. The tanks enabled the squadron to increase its reconnaissance momentum, operate with more independence, and provide a greater degree of security for the division. duct the forward passage of VI1 (US) Corps’ forces: on order, continue the attack in zone’ to destroy the RGFC. The “Quarterhorse” was OPCON to 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Lon E. Maggart, for the initial phase of the operation. Our mission was to follow 1-34 AR through the breach of the enemy’s trench lines and secure Objective 15K. The squadron, thereby, would protect the division’s northem flank from a counterattack. Intelligence had reported an enemy tank company in the vicinity of our objective. We again led with our tanks, destroying three antitank guns, two AMLs, four trucks, and numerous bunkers, and captured 145 prisoners of war. The tanks were indispensable in accomplishing this mission. On 25 February, we extended our screen line northwest, and the division began passing the 1st UK Division. On the 26th. the CG ordered the squadron east to conduct a zone reconnaissance and establish contact with the 2d ACR. Unfortunately, adverse weather precluded our use of the air troops. We led with Bradleys, tanks providing overwatch, and destroyed one T-62 and one ZSU 234. After we made contact with the 2d ACR, the CG instructed us to coordinate for the division’s night passage of lines. Securing the Division’s Flank The Breach G-day, February 24, 1990. The division’s mission was to attack as VI1 Corps main effort to penetrate Iraqi defensive positions, defeat the enemy first tactical echelon, and con-Four hours after the passage had begun, (270130 Feb) the squadron, under division control, moved to screen the division’s northern flank along the 1st Infantry Divisiofld Armored Division boundary. In the process of inspecting the screen line, the command group encountered three tanks and dismounted infantry. We could observe the dismounted infantryman and the tanks through our thermals. They could hear us, but could not see us. After getting assistance from a Bravo Troop tank, we maneuvered to their right flank and destroyed all three tanks. Their dismounted infantry went to ground. During a sweep of the area, Bravo Troop acquired and destroyed an additional five tanks. All enemy tank engagements were at 150-500 meters. We apparently had discovered an enemy pocket between the two divisions. The ground troops attacked 10 kilometers from west to east in order to clear the area of any remaining enemy. We attacked with two ground troops abreast, leading with tanks, destroying ll tanks, three artillery pieces, and a platoon of dismounted infantry. Additionally, we took hundreds of EPWs. The enemy position turned out to be an Iraqi log base, secured by a tank company (+), a mech infantry company, and an artillery battery. The Bradley’s 25-mm cannon penetrated T-55 tanks and portions of T-72s. The TOW penetrated whatever it touched, often blowing off tank turrets. The MlAl tank’s 120-mm gun destroyed T-72 tanks in rapid succession. Blocking the RGFC Retreat At 0930, 27 February, the division resumed its movement NE towards Objective Norfolk. The ground troops moved with the Bradleys, providing the flank orientation and the tanks in depth, acting as a reaction force. The ARMOR - JUIy-AUgUSt 1992 9

An Iraqi tank maneuvers under the sights of a 1-4 CAV Bradley at Safwan “stand-off”. air troops provided aerial reconnaissance forward and to the flank of the ground troops. The squadron destroyed 26 tanks and 25 PCs (many which were abandoned) and captured 193 prisoners during the movement. The division secured Objective Norfolk at 1230 hours. The CG ordered the attack to resume at 1430. The division commander’s intent was to prevent the Iraqi Army’s escape from Kuwait to Iraq. He would accomplish this by assigning squadron and brigade objectives astride the Kuwait CityBasra highway. The squadron’s mission remained unchanged - screen the division’s northem flank. The squadron’s objective was astride the Kuwait CityBasra highway in the extreme north, 12 kilometers from the Iraqi border. As we approached the highway (1630 hours), we observed several armored vehicles moving north along the highway toward the Iraqi border. Alpha Troop destroyed the lead T-55 tank and BMP, temporarily blocking the mad. We attempted to send a situation report to the division commander, but could not reach him nor the DTAC. We called the nearest brigade (2d Brigade) but again could not establish communications. Knowing the division commander’s intent, I ordered the squadron to attack. Alpha Troop was ordered to block the road, establish a screen three kilometers to the east of the highway, and destroy enemy movement north. I gave Bravo Troop an identical mission, but to the west of the road. Alpha and Bravo Troops destroyed several Imqi armored vehicles as they attempted to move north. The burning oil fields darkened the sky, silhouetting the exploding vehicles. Prisoners were moving across country in mass. We had taken more than 450 EPWs by 1830. Because of darkness, and fearing a counterattack from either direction, I ordered the ground troops to collapse their screen lines and set up defensive positions with all-around security. What was initially armed reconnaissance and a screen turned into a hasty attack and a night defense. The squadron’s tanks made this possible. I set my command post on the road next to the EPW site and established contact with 2d Brigade. We learned some very discouraging news from Colonel Moreno, commander, 2d Brigade - the attack had halted 30 kilometers east of PL Berlin - and there were no division combat elements within 25 kilometers of our position. I explained our situation and asked for assistance. Could 2d Brigade send us a tank company, a mezh infantry company, and some artillery support? Colonel Moreno said he would do everything humanly possible, but needed the CG’s approval. Within minutes, he called back and informed us that no movement was authorized in zone. By that time, we had taken more than 1,OOO prisoners and stockpiled more than 700 weapons. The mass of prisoners was siphoning off our combat strength, so we instructed the squadron combat trains, with aid station, to move to the EPW collection point and take over the guarding and treatment of the prisoners. With the assistance of Kuwaiti doctors, we treated more than 350 casualties. Twenty-five prisoners were seriously wounded, 19 of which required air evacuation the next morning. The squadton chaplain and UMT also operated out of the EPW collection point. Secondary explosions and enemy activity kept us alert all night. By morning, the squadron had taken 2,098 prisoners and stockpiled more than 1,400 weapons. We did not have adequate food, water, or blankets‘ to care for the prisoners, and had a near riot when someone threw a handful of MREs into the crowd. Only the f ~ n g of machine guns over the heads of the prisoners quieted the situation. The division resumed its movement east in the early hours of 28 February and secured its objectives along the Kuwait City/ Basra highway. The cease fire went into effect at 0723 hours. Additional prisoners were directed toward the squadron from an Apache team working in the division area. Second Brigade sent us an infantry company to assist in guarding the EPWs. ACES from the 1st Engineer Battalion arrived to build a berm around the prisoners in order to ease our security requirements. The prisoners raised quite a ruckus when they saw the ACES. They actually believed that we were going to bury them. We spent the remainder of the day clearing the highway of debris and burying enemy KIAs. The tanks were indispensable in this operation, not only for their killing power but as a deterrent to a would-be attacker against an isolated force. Securing Safwan On 1 March at 0240 horn, I E- ceived an urgent query from the CG “How long until you can move your squadron north 15 kilometen into Iraq and secure Safwan airfield?” I told him we could move one ground troop in 20 minutes and the squadron in 45 minutes. He told me to p r e p to move ASAP and call him PCM. After tmnsfemng to PCM communications, I learned that Safwan airfield was the selected site for the coalition peace talks and it was thought to have been ~ 10 ARMOR - JUIy-AUgUSt 7992 in U.S. hands prior to the cease fue. The CG told me that the enemy situation was unclear, and placed an Apache company OPCON to the squadron. He instructed us to move as a squadron and secure the airfield, if possible, without breaking the cease fire agreement. I issued an oral FRAGO, mounted up, and prepared the squadron for movement. We were then informed to delay our LD until 0615 hours. We elected to bypass the town of Safwan and the border check point to the west in order to avoid attention. We moved directly to the airfield. The squadron moved with an air screen forward followed by two ground troops abreast with tanks. The Apache company moved to a location in the vicinity of the squadron TOC and remained on standby. Enroute to the airfield, we passed through an enormous number of vacated enemy positions. The aeroscouts then reported many tanks, MTLBs, A M X s , and ZSU-23-4s in prepared positions north of the airstrip. The command group moved to the location of several Iraqi armored vehicles and personnel, dismounted, and confronted a group of Iraqis. It was obvious from their pressed uniforms, discipline, and equipment that they were a Republican Guards unit. They asked “What are you doing in Iraq?” We informed them that 1st Infantry Division was moving into the area, that this would be the peace negotiation site, and that they would have to move five miles north by noon today or that the 1st Infantry Division would attack. The Iraqi colonel became upset and told us that he would talk to his general. He then repositioned four T-72 tanks within 50 meters of our position. We repositioned to the rerrr about 300 meters to ease the tension. The ground troop commanders also confronted Iraqi commanders and received similar responses. I instructed the ground troop commanders to reposition their tanks forward and show more combat power. We also had the Cobras overfly the Iraqi positions. I received an FM call from the ADC(M) to meet him on the runway for a conference. We learned that the CG was moving 2d Brigade to our east to secure the town and that we should continue to press the Iraqis to evacuate the area. We also learned that the peace talks may be delayed until 3 March. The commander, 4th Brigade landed his helicopter, Confronted the Iraqi colonel again, and told him that if they did not leave the area they would be destroyed by nightfall. At 1100 hours, the Iraqi armored brigade, Hammurabi Division, Republican Guards, began moving Out of the area We counted more than 200 armored vehicles moving north along the road to Basra. The squadron became OPCON to 2d Brigade and remained at Safwan to assist in securing and preparing the area for the coalition peace talks. Without tanks in the squadron, the division commander may not have felt comfortable sending the division cavalry on such an important mission with so little enemy intelligence. The squadron tanks gave us greater confidence in our ability to accomplish the mission and deal with the uncertainties of War. Relief of the 2ACR On 19 March, as part of 4th Brigade, we moved 100 kilometers west to a division assembly area (AA Allen). On 6 April, the 4th Brigade moved 90 kilometers NW to relieve the 2d ACR along the Euphrates River. The rest of the division remained in the south. We manned three checkpoints along the demarcation line and processed several thousand refugees and EPWs. Additionally, we provided medical treatment to several hundred Iraqi men, women, and children. The tanks were placed at each checkpoint and were absolutely essential to this operation. On April 15, 1991, we started our movement south (220 kilometers) to rear assembly area Huebner, to prepare for redeployment. We were directed to turn in our tanks at Huebner and our M3A2 Bradleys at the port of Dammam. Conclusion The second ground troop and tanks were critical to the squadron’s success during Operation DESERT STORM. Activating the second ground troop shortly before the war was difficult, but absolutely essential in providing the division commander with a credible reconnaissance and security capability. The air/gmund cavalry mix was very effective, and enabled the squadron to move rapidly and cover a large area of operations. The squadron’s tanks were used in all cavalry mis-. sions. Having them organic to the squadron and integrated into the scout platoons was clearly an advantage. Operating as a cavalry team, they easily responded to “actions on contact.” Additionally, having the tanks in the squadron gave the division commander more options and greater flexibility in employing his division cav-Several Army studies recommend that tanks should be organic to the division cavalry squadron. Many division commanders routinely attach or OPCON one or more tank companies to their cavalry. Should we not organize our squadrons in peacetime like we will employ them in war time? I think the answer is YES! alry. Lieutenant Colonel Bob Wilson has sewed in a variety of command and staff assignments in 2d Armored Division, 25th Infantry Divi sion, and 1st Armored Divi sion. He was Chief, Cavalry Branch, Fort Knox, Kentucky and, during

DESERT,

STORM, was Commander of 1st Squadron, 4th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Riley, Kansas. He is currently the G3, 1st Infantry Division (Mech). 11