Training to Prevent Fratricide

by Captain Jeffrey S. Wltse "As American units wheeled and manewed to aecute the huge flanking movement that was to encircle and destroy Iraqi ground forces, the fringes of two US. Army corps became entangled. An armored cavalry unit, spotting the combat engineers on its perimeter, grew convinced that they were Iraqis; the-engineers thought the same of the cavalry. What followed was chilling and tragic. "2?u troopem i s s d a radio challenge, followed by a warning in Arabic. 7hey 3rd shots over the engineem' he&. zhen the cavalry advanced. l?re engineers ran. From a pursuing Bradley Fighting Vehicle came a machine-gun burst... One soldier &ad, a fellow engineer badly wounded - victims of the oxymoron known as mfiendlyfire. The view that fratricide, or friendly fire casualties, always have and always will be a tragic but inevitable part of the controlled chaos of war must be more closely examined. On today's highly fluid and lethal battlefield, better ways and means of managing friendly forces and identification of friendly vehicles can help prevent the occurrence of fi:- ti id 1, fnena or roe prri, ma systems still under development will all assist in reducing the scourge of "friendly fire" from the next battlefield. n In past wars, fratricide was not as serious a problem, mainly due to the size of the armies involved, circumscribed battlefields, and lin-f- sight weapons. However, in this age of large and mobile armies, massive battle areas, and "high-tech" weapons of greater range and lethality, the possibility of fratricide has increased. In World War 11, the rate of fratricide was two percent of U. S. casualties. In Vietnam it was 2.85 percent. It rose to 4 percent of all deaths in

CAUSE.* The numbers for OPERATION DESERT STORM are still unclear, but Armed Forces Journal International reports 10 U. S. soldiers killed and eight wounded in action from friendly fire.3 Due to the low number of U. S. casualties, this could work out to a percentage of fratricide close to 20 percent. what can be done to prevent fratricide in future wars and lower this increasingly grim statistic? There are two basic areas that will be addressed for the answer to this question, the first being the doctrine and tactics with which we train to fight, and the second, the equipment we have to command and control the fight. AirLand Battle doctrine is discussed in FM IW5, Operations. It is based on securing or retaining the initiative, and exercising it aggressively to accomplish the mission. In instilling this initiative and aggressiveness into the force, the very nature of the doctrine may create a certain level of unavoic result ' beuna assist' in lowering the incidence of fratricide. There is no training initiative that will eliminate fratricide completely, but some areas need to be re-emphasized to reduce fratricide. Generally, they fall under the headings of command and control, fire distribution and control, vehicle and aircraft recognition, and land navigation. Training to prevent fratricide starts at the option order. Paragraph lB, Friendly Situation, is the commander's chance to "paint the picture" of the battlefield, to describe in words the disposition and mission of the units around him. From this paragraph, the implied task of flank coordination begins. The unit will know the forces arrayed around it, and will not be sutprised when a friendly unit comes up on its right or left flank. By using this paragraph properly, the commander increases his units' awareness of the friendly forces around them. As it applies to fratricide, fire distribution and control refers to everything from the basics of range cards and sector sketches and the planning and rehearsal of the direct fire plan to the integration and rehearsal of the indirect fire plan. The key to prevention of fratricide is the rehearsal. The fog of war will still creep in and confuse the actual execution of the ugh rehearsal will IS in the plan and from Wig in the

PI the wrong time. Range cards and sector sketches must bble risk, and that risk may in fratricide. While this may voidable, there are a number plan, but a thorn weed out probleu prevent someone I C -.-:-:-- Z"..,." 4l.-6 -..- L, -I..--.* of speclrlc 11aUllng 1muw U I P L LaIl m stressed, practiced, and followed to 46 ARMOR - be standardized and exact, starting with the individual tank up to the company, so that the final fire plan incorporates all assets, as well as a final check to ensure proper placement of these assets to prevent fratricide. One of the biggest problem areas in fratricide prevention is the identification of friendly forces. This is particularly difficult when allies and enemy use the same vehicle types. During

STORM, for example, both the Syrians and the Iraqis used the T-72 and some other types of vehicles. It is therefore important that identification of both ground vehicles and aircraft be directed at the specific vehicle type and the country using it, not just whether or not it is friend or foe. Crews need to practice vehicle recognition both through regular optics and thermal sights. The UCOFT is a good system for practicing this, and the Armor School has also put out a video on thermal identification characteristics of U. S. vehicles to assist in this training.4 One of the stations of the Tank Crew Gunnery Skills Test (TCGST) is vehicle. identification. This is a good opportunity to test the soldier’s skills, but the test must be realistic and thorough. Reemphasis on land navigation, at the individual tank, platoon and company level, is another training area that will help reduce fratricide. It is imperative that these elements know exactly where they are on the battlefield. All flank unit coordination and tracking of the battle rely on the units’ ability to report where they ARMOR - P 47 are. Land navigation is one of the more important factors in the prevention of fratricide, and one that technology is starting to help us solve. SLGRs (Small Lightweight Global Position Receiver) gives the individual the ability to know exactly where he is, day or night, to the nearest meter. coordinated, and the system is fully integrated into the combined arms team. Other aids include field expedient methods and available equipment, such as the VS-17 panel for better air identification of friendly vehicles and front lines, specific markings, such as the inverted "V" that was used during

STORM, and the use of directional blinking IR or thermal lights (called "Bud Lights") to aid in nighttime air identification. Additionally, a number of systems using new technology are now becoming available. They will greatly enhance our ability to identify friendly forces, track their locations, and communicate with them at a greater distance. The greatest gains - and perhaps the area with the greatest potential for future technological development - is in command and control. These systems decrease fratricide by controlling the problems associated with command and control and misidentification of friendly forces as enemy.

(Single Channel Ground & Airborne Radio System) provides the communication base for other advanced systems to transfer information. The SINCGARS improvement over the current radio system is its increased range and secure frequency-hopping capability. The IVIS (inter-vehicular information system) transfers information on the vehicle to other like-equipped vehicles, allowing for better tracking of friendly forces. The PodNav (position navigation) system displays the vehicle position and heading references to the driver and commander, giving them the correct ground location at all times. Additionally, there are a number of proposed systems designed to aid in the prevention of fratricide in the Block HI future tank. These systems integrate the sights of the vehicle with an IFF system. This "sensor fusion" provides for the positive identification of combat vehicles as the target is identified. This is done through both a passive (non-responsive) system and an active (responsive) system. The passive system examines a target and compares its characteristics with an on-board library of known vehicle characteristics (i.e. the number of road wheels, type of track, engine sounds, etc.) to identify the vehicle type. The active system then "interrogates" the vehicle, much in the same way that an aircraft transponder system works, to identify it as friendly or unknown. These systems can work on both ground vehicles and aircraft. The incident described at the beginning of this article involves the three leading causes of fratricide; loss of command and control, lack of planning and coordination, and misidentification of the target.' There is nothing new or mysterious about the causes of fratricide. The use of new high-tech equipment would have aided in preventing some of the problems that occurred in this inci-. dent, however, it must be remembered that it is training, not technology, that will ultimately reduce fratricide. The best equipment, with untrained and undisciplined crews, cannot accomplish its mission. The new technology will enhance the prevention of fratricide, provided the soldiers are adequately trained, the operation is properly planned and Notes 'Jebl, Doughs, "War Analysts Delving Into What Went Wrong," Los Ang818S Times, Mar 24, 1991, p. 1. Galloway, Archie, LTC., fietfiCid8: Inevitable Condition Of The SWA Bat- t18t781d7 Army Initiatives Group, Feb 1991. 2 3Goodman. Glenn W. Jr., "Air Force Leaves Mk XV Industry Partners Twisting in the Wind," Armed firces Journ8l International, May 1991, p. 58. 4PAN A 0 515-89-0067, "Thermal Identification of U. S. Tracked and Wheeled Vehicles." %chrader, Charles R., LTC., Amicicide: The &oblem Of Fiiendty fire In Modem w8r, U. S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute, Dec 1982. 48 ARMOR - JUly-AUgUSt 7997 Captain Jeffrey S. Wiltse received his Regular Army commission as a Distinguished Military Graduate from the University of Washington. A graduate of and AOAC, he has served as tank platoon leader and company XO in 2-72 Armor, Korea; and HHC XO, battalion S-1 and brigade S-1 for 3-68 Armor and 1st Brigade, Ft. Carson. During

STORM, he served as the Asst S-3 2/2 ACR. He is currently assigned to Command and Tactics Branch, U. S. Army Armor School.

Continued from Paoe 5 Badge has been jealously maintained. The fact remains that we are a "combined arms" Army. Why then do we continue to ignore the combat achievements of every branch except the Infantry? The composition of American forces in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations was based on heavy tank units: 1st Armored Division, 2d Armored Division (Forward), 3d Armored Division, 1st Cavalry Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Why should the accomplishments of so many tankers not be recognized with a combat badge? And what about the tankers in the mechanized infantry divisions, such as the 24th and 1st Infantry? Why should the Bradley crew who rode next to them receive a Combat Infantryman's Badge, while they receive nothing? A combat patch is not enough. Tank crews deserve recognition with their own distinctive badge. The criteria for the award should be very simple. If a soldier served on a tank in direct fire combat, he should be eligible for the award, regardless of his MOS. Consequently, the turret mechanic pressed into service as a loader or gunner would be eligible for the badge. The massive armor advances of Desert Storm are the first of their kind since the Allied sweeps through North Africa and Europe in World War II. If there was ever a time to adopt a Combat Tanker's Badge it is NOW. The justification for it lies in the burned-out hulks of hundreds of Iraqi tanks and the thousands of tank tracks that criss-cross the Iraqi Desert. We must strike while the iron is hot and before the memory fades.

1LT. Armor Erlangen, FRG Scouts Must Train Reconnaissance by Fire Dear Sir: The official start of the ground war was still four days away. Somebody neglected to inform the 1st Cavalry Division. Deceiving the enemy along the Wadi al Batin, the First Team continued to hold the attention of the dug-in Iraqi forces. In support of the deception, the scouts of Task Force 1-32 Armor used an old technique that is often neglected during today's MILES wars - reconnaissance by fire. Just after nightfall on 20 February 1991, both three-vehicle sections of M3 CFVs occupied turret-down positions along the east-west sand berm that distinctly separates Saudi Arabia from Iraq. Atop the berm, scouts with shovels cleared fields of observation under a dark, clear sky. Patiently, 20 M l A l sand the task force mortar platoon waited for targets. After several hours of uneventful observation, Alpha, the western section, acquired six enemy soldiers laying a hasty minefield. Clearly observed through the MTlS (a recently fielded Israeli night sight) at a range in excess of five kilometers, the enemy remained out of mortar range. Continued observation revealed the perimeter of the minefield, but the enemy moved no closer. Frustrated scouts watched the enemy finish his work and link up with a truck, which sped north. Hopefully, more would return. Scanning. More scanning. Then a target. The Delta Company tankers engaged several trucks with 120-mm HEAT. The Iraqi survivors fled southeast toward a trenchline. Unknowingly, the enemy stood out clearly in the reddish haze of our ISUs. Days and nights training at Fort Hood and the NTC were about to pay off. The great irony was that our first shots would support a technique that we had never really used before. The concept of reconnaissance by fire is explained well in FM 17-98 and the scout platoon leader's course, but in the world of MILES it is often neglected. Even that night, our baptism of fire, it was not a deliberate decision as much as merely the next logical step in developing the situation. With illumination already falling, the initial call for high explosive mortar fire quickly resulted in a "Shot, over," on the command net. Reconnaissance by fire in action. In retrospect, starting with indirect fire was a good choice. The enemy remained deep in the trenchline as two subsequent adjustments produced a solid "fire for effect" mission. To our benefit, reconnaissance by indirect fire never revealed our OP or vehicle positions, and allowed our M3s (those not on flank security) to focus on a known enemy position. The prime disadvantage of indirect fire is the fear of unresponsiveness from the firing unit. In our case, this was resolved by exceptional mortarmen, and speaking directly to the mortar platoon leader on the command net. Furthermore, while mortars are great for suppression of area targets, a great deal of skill is required to drop around in a trenchline. The mortars served their purpose. As soon as the fire for effect ended, four Iraqi soldiers emerged from the trench and raced to a small, concrete storage building. It was now time for reconnaissance by direct fire. The building was 1000 meters from my eastern section. The Iraqis thought they had reached refuge. Since we were still undetected, there was no rush to engage. My wingman and I slowly pulled forward, unmasking our guns, and my gunner efficiently began destroying the building with concentrated 25-mm HE rounds. As large chunks of concrete flew away from the structure, my previously silent wingman engaged and killed the first two fleeing enemy soldiers with 25-mm fire. The other two Iraqis, witnessing the fate of their companions, sought cover behind chunks of the destroyed building. With my vehicle providing security, my wingman, SSG Ted Carlin, engaged the remaining two enemy until they either escaped or died. Reconnaissance by direct fire has several inherent advantages. For one, direct fire can quickly hit a point target and then swiftly shift to secondary targets. The platoon leader has absolute control of the engagement. Second, either in tanks or CFVs, a choice of weapons and ammunitions are on hand to suit the tactical situation. The key disadvantage, especially at night, is the unmasking of your vehicle types and positions. Also, using your own direct fire weapons obviously reduces your internal ammunition supply. In conclusion, reconnaissance by fire is an effective means of identifying and destroying enemy forces. I imagine that many of us have previously tried this technique in training, but due to the properties of the MILES laser, it was abandoned. As we all know, there is no effective mortar MILES, and the laser beam meets with much less success than 25-mm HE against a concrete wall. Remember, train to win, but do not concentrate on MILES gunnery alone. The tricks of killing and escaping the flashing yellow light are practiced by our Army in training areas all over the world. MILES is a great help for realistic training, just do not let the training aid become the focus. Reconnaissance by fire, indirect or direct, is simple, effective, and must be trained in peace because it will be used in war.

LT, Armor 1-32 Armor, 1 st Cav Div Ft. Hood, Tex. ARMOR - July-AuguSt 7997 49