The Abuse of Paragraph 3A or, What Commander's Concept Is Not

The Problem It is midnight in the Valley of Death. The tank company commander gathers his key leaders. It is time to issue an operations order. One by one, the lieutenants and sergeants climb through the back door of the company FIST track and jockey for space in the cramped confines of the M113. They are tired, for it is Day 6 of a tough NTC rotation. Nonetheless, they are attentive because they know the task force has a difficult mission ahead of it. From a WARN0 they already know the task force has been ordered to attack at 0500 the next morning to seize a small, but militarily significant terrain feature called Hill

466. The tank company is to play a key role in the attack. It must provide the suppressive fues that will allow the remainder of the task force to maneuver onto the objective. As expected, the company commander begins the order by reviewing the friendly and enemy situation. He speaks briefly of the task force mission and then describes the expected disposition of the OPFOR motorized rifle company defending Hill 466. He then gives the company mission statement to "attack in support of TF 's seizure of Hill 466." The orders group scribbles furiously on its notepads, pressed to keep up with the pace of the captain'swords. But then the captain pauses. He has reached a crucial part of the OPORD, Paragraph 3, Execution. As the initial element of Paragraph 3, he must provide his "commander's concept," otherwise known as commander's intent. The captain furrows his brow in concentration. There is silence in the track. "Gentlemen, my intent is to reach the line of departure at 0400 hours." The orders group dutifully records these words, and the captain proceeds into other schemes of maneuver and the remainder of the operations order. The reader, at this point, is probably shaking his head in dismay. "What an inadequate description of concept! Surely, no commander at any level w')*ild give such poor guidance to his subordinates. Certainly, no commander would shoot so wide of the mark in providing his commander's concept." If the key to the task force mission was the suppressive fires of the tank company, then clearly the commander must identify this point to his key leaders. Alas, it is true. The vignette is drawn from an actual mission conducted at the National Training Center and serves as an extreme example of a larger problem. This little story illustrates vividly how poorly the idea of "concept" and "commander's intent" is understood at the tactical level. And, even if the example is an extreme case, it is nonetheless representative of the difficulty that company, task force, and even brigade commanders, are having in expressing their commander's concept of the operation. When we at the NTC compare what Leavenworth wants in the commander's concept paragraph with what actual commanders are writing, we see a huge disparity. We feel it is something worthy of concern, both in the school system and the field army. Originally, the idea of "commander's intent" was developed as a command and control tool to help us implement AirLand Battle doctrine. By defining the limits of independent action and allowing our subordinates to understand the part they played in the big picture, we would improve the agility, initiative, etc., we needed to win future battles. Then, a couple of years ago, we rolled commander's intent back into the traditional OPORD format under subparagraph 3a, concept. The name had changed, but the idea had not. The AirLand Battle commander must give us the criteria for victory, and his vision of what victory would.look like. Now he would do it in subparagraph 3a. In the meantime, however, the field army was still trying to wrestle commander's intent to the ground - wrestling, unfortunately, with only mixed results. And now we changed the name of this elusive idea. There is little wonder the concept of "concept" is so poorly understood. The Consequencm The result of this misunderstanding is perhaps best seen in the regimental-brigade meeting engagements conducted at the NTC. These meeting engagements are wild, freewheeling affairs taking place over hundreds of square kilometers amid great clouds of dust and smoke. Communications across the vast battlefield are tenuous at best. The keys to victory in these confused melees are aggressiveness and initiative at the platoon and company levels. Almost always, the victory goes to the OPFOR regiment. Why? Because each leader within the regiment understands perfectly the role he must play. The well-drilled CRP commander understands he must find the enemy. The well-drilled FSE commander understands he must fm some significant portion of the enemy force. The well-drilled advance guard commander understands he must respond to the success or failure of the FSE and open the way for the main body of the regiment. The commanders within the regimental main body exploit the actions of these lead elements. The key is that each subordinate leader, down to platoon level, understands how his element contributes to the accomplishment of the regimental mission. The BLUFOR, by contrast, appears slow, tentative, and awkward in its actions. The reports of the subordinate task force commanders indicate their attention is consumed by the fights taking place on their particular fraction of the battlefield. Their communication with other task forces is minimal. Their efforts to influence the battle often show little concern for the overall requirements of brigade mission. The same is true at company level. As the brigade flounders for survival in a sea of BMPs and T- 72s, it is every man for himself. In these battles, the crucial difference between the OPFOR and BLUFOR is that the OPFOR leader knows what to do when a change in plan is required. He can adjust rapidly to a fluid situation. The BLUFOR commander is, by contrast, hard-pressed to respond correctly to changes in the situation. He must repeatedly request new guidance. The OPFOR subordinate leader understands his commander's concept and, thus, the commander's intent, while his BLUFOR counterpart does not. Almost invariably, the OPFOR commander operates well within the decision cycle of his BLUFOR counterpart. For this reason, the OPFOR is almost always the final master of the battlefield. A Proposal Thus far, I have suggested how poorly lower levels understand concept. In my discussion of brigade-regimental meeting engagements, I have indicated what consequences this has in our battles at the NTC. What can we do? Well, obviously, the idea of commander's concept must be carefully integrated into our manuals and the instruction at our service schools. Senior commanders must include discussion of commander's concept in their professional development programs, and they must provide powerful, positive examples of paragraph 3a in their own orders. In the long term, we ought to be able to solve the problem. In the short term, however, we expect to continue to see company, battalion, and brigade commanders come to the NTC unprepared to provide their subordinate leaders with well-conceived expressions of concept. Therefore, I offer some guidelines for the correct expression of commander's concept. I do not propose to rehash the definitions and guidance provided by Fort Leavenworth. Instead I would offer some tips on what commander's concept is I &

In doing so, I hope at least to provide the limiting stakes for those who take aim at the problem. I offer, in the process, some examples of poor concept statements taken from actual NTC orders. (The unit designations are deleted for obvious reasons.) What Commander's Concept (Paragraph 3a) Is NOT 77te corttritander's concept is not a restatentent of the sclterne of ntanaiver or mission. This is the most common mistake we see. Commanders, at a loss about what to put in paragraph 3% decide to summarize, in first person, the scheme of maneuver or the mission. Thus, we are told not once, but twice, in paragraph 3 how we are going to accomplish the mission. We are not told the "why." An example of this mistaken expression of concept comes from a defensive mission: "INTENT: I intend to use standard battalion formations and breach drills to conduct three successive breaches in order to permit us to exploit to COWBOY." 44 ARMOR - July-AUgUSt 7990

In this example, a task force commander is telling how we will get to the objective, not the purpose for going there. He has not told us the reasons the objective is important. What the commander has given us is abroad-brush and unnecessary preview to the scheme of maneuver paragraph. Tlte conrritander's concept is not a mtictive C O I N I I nieasrire. This admonition is tied very closely to the one above. The concept is to provide scope for initiative. Thus, as one C&GS instructor told me, the commander must "describe how the battlefield will look when the smoke clears." He states his desired results. However, in paragraph 3a he does not tell the specifics of how we arrive at these desired results. A violation of this principle is in the following example: "I want to allow two MRBs to attack in the north, and one MRB in the south. We will separate and disrupt the timing of the lead two MRBs with obstacles and indirect fires. The lead MRB in the north will be engaged at max range by E Co from BP50 and then destroyed by Tm C from BP30. The MRB in the south will be allowed to close to the east side of the lake and then engaged by Tm D from BP40. The third MRB in the north will be delayed by Tm E, while Tm C destroys the first. Tm C will then destroy spillover in EA FLY. I want to separate echelons and then destroy them piecemeal." Not a. bad description of scheme of maneuver, but this is not a concept statement. Too much "how" and not enough "why" and "to what end." A dead giveaway that the commander is wandering from the realm of what is properly commander's concept is discussion of subordinate elements. If, in paragraph 3a, we start talking about how Tm A will support Tm B, as Tm C moves to the objective, then we have strayed off course. The commander's concept must address the unit as a whole, not its component elements. Difficulty also ensues when a commander attempts to describe the role of each battlefield operating system. We see commanders using paragraph 3a to give priority for air defense protection, to provide intent for fire support, to describe intelligence-gathering requirements. This is too much. Logically, the rest of OPORD paragraph 3 will flesh out the details for how each battlefield operating system contributes to the general goals provided in the commander's concept. Para 3A provides the focus for synchronization, and the rest of paragraph,

FIRES, etc., describes how the battlefield operating system supports that focus. llte concept is not a weighty tonie. Some commanders think if they write in first person at great length, the concept wiU reveal itself to their subordinates. If some command guidance is good, then perhaps a lot must be better. Thus, we have seen at least one commander go on for three pages in the discussion of his intent. In such a torrent of words, the concept is lost. The guidance from Leavenworth is to l i t the concept paragraph to five or six sentences. Clearly, this is sound guidance. If the commander cannot state his concept of operation crisply and concisely in a short paragraph, then perhaps the commander should rethink the mission. Anything more than a short paragraph blunts the impact of the intent statement. Commanders must discipline themselves to be brief and to the point. llte coniriiander's concept is not an ahortation. AI1 too frequently commanders see the concept paragraph as an opportunity to insert a pep talk into the operations order. Take this example: "Commander's Intent: I want to lead with two tank COS in order to mass fires on the OBJ. I want the two Mech COS to aggressively secure sites and protect engineer breaching efforts. The armor companies must violently attack with force; and Mech COS must aggressively conduct dismounted operations at obstacles and on the OBJ." Or this one: "Commander's Intent: TF must suppress and SEAHAWK with neutralizing effects of a synchronized combat arms attack. TF must violently attack

In these examples, the authors seem to believe that if they attach enough macho adjectives and ad-verbs to the concept it will inspire the unit to success. Bold, decisive language should lead to bold, decisive action. However, such language is better suited for oral expression on the back ramp of an M577. It does nothing to clarify the purpose of the mission or establish criteria for success. Another variation of this problem is when a commander attempts to cram all the doctrinal tenets and buzzwords applicable to a mission into the concept paragraph. Take this example from a movement to contact: "(TO be successful)... we must move fast, make contact with the minimum force forward, quickly mass ARMOR - 45 combat power by fire and maneuver and maintain the momentum of the attack." This paragraph serves as a nice reminder of the fundamentals of a movement to contact, but it is not an expression of intent. The paragraph reminds us how we should proceed but tells us none of the things we look for in a concept paragraph. a n t e concept paragraph is not devoted exclusively to the operation of the coriuiiander'sown unit. The concept paragraph should tie the operation of the unit to the mission of the higher headquarters. It should also tie the current mission to future operations. Thus, in the case of a battalion task force, the OPORD's concept paragraph should indicate how the task force's attack contributes to the success for the brigade mission. This gives company/team commanders the "big picture" they need to exploit opportunities, which might affect the whole brigade fight. Unfortunately, more often than not, commanders focus exclusively on the mission of their particular unit. They look no further than the present operation. Here is an example from a defensive mission: "Commander's Intent: I intend to defeat the enemy in EAs IRON, STEEL, and remnants in GOLD. We will mass the frres of three companies in EA IRON to destroy the two northern battalions. In the south, we will use CAS, artillery, and obstacles along with fires of one company. Our southern (mech) company will destroy remnants in EA GOLD. We will be successful if B, C, D co/tms destroy up to 40 enemy vehicles with no more than 25 percent losses. Co A and scouts, if necessary, destroy all remaining elements allowing no larger than a In this example, the construction is sometimes awkward, and the commander gives us more of the scheme of maneuver than we want to see in paragraph 3a. Nonetheless, he does give us his specific criteria for success and that is good. Unfortunately, nowhere does he tell us that the reason the brigade wants us to destroy the attacking enemy is to create conditions favorable to our own immediate offensive operations. The brigade and division concept for this same operation called for the defending forces to inflict heavy losses on the attacking enemy in order to establish a favorable combat power ratio, which would allow a rapid counterattack. The brigade and division order suggest the defenders should poise themselves to exploit the destruction of the enemy in the defensive battle. However, nowhere in the task force commander's concept is there any indication of offensive intent. To understand the higher's concept allows subordinates the opportunity to exercise initiative in ways that support the higher unit's mission. In our example, if the company/team commanders understood the concept of their higher headquarters they would have their combat power postured to exploit defensive success. They would be ready for a quick transition to the offense. Meanwhile, the task force S4 would have a resupply of fuel and ammo well forward, and the task force engineer would avoid planning FASCAM on the counterattack routes the task force is likely to use. But, if they have only the task force commander's flawed concept from the example, the subordinate leaders will be satisfied with destroying the attacking enemy short of the task force rear boundary. After stopping the enemy, they will settle back in their holes and wait for further instructions. a llte expression of conaitaiider's concept is not Iirnited to paragraph 3a. The commander makes his intent known in a variety of ways. One form of expression, obviously, is operational graphics. A commander can speak volumes about the goals of an operation by where he puts his boundaries, phase limes, objectives, and other control measures. For example, the tank company commander, in our introductory vignette, could have vividly shown the role of his company in the task force attack on Hill 466 by using an appropriate symbol. A commander may also express intent through his actions. He puts himself with the main effort. He personally surveys the ground where he wants his main engagement area. As a former commander of Operations Group used to say, "There is no purer expression of commander's intent than the commander himself personally putting in the target reference point stake at the point where he want to mass fves to kill the enemy." The commander also expresses his concept orally during various stages of mission preparation. He does it early on, during the estimate process, when he gives his initial guidance. This initial guidance should include the commander's first cut at an expression of concept. By expressing this embryonic intent statement, the commander provides essential focus to the efforts of his staff. He aids synchronization by describing the desired outcome of the mission. During the presentation of the order, the commander may amplify the content for the concept paragraph, clarify the purpose, and emphasize the key points. He will use the oral presentation te fm his platoon to get through." - intent in the minds of his subor- 46 ARMOR - dmates. And, finally, in the briefbacks and rehearsal leading to mission execution, the commander will refine the commander’s concept and verify that all key players understand. 0 nie coriiriiander’s concept is not Iiriiited to a standard foniiat. Herein lies the rub. We soldiers are comfortable with guidelines and SOPS. We felt safe with the old, standard, five-paragraph operations order. It was based on a rigid, standardized format we all understood. With the addition of the concept paragraph, the doctrine-writers have given us something that does not fit a written formula. What have they given us? They tell us what paragraph 3a is supposed to do. They recommend to write the concept in the first person and limit it to five or six sentences, but that’s damn skimpy guidance. We do not have any good examples. (Which of us, when first attempting to write an OPORD or similar military document, has not fallen back on the examples provided in Fh4 101-1-5 or some other field manual?) No, for the most part we are left to our own devices with paragraph 3a. The commander must rely on his own style and mode of expression when giving his concept, and he must tailor the concept statement to the appropriate level of command. (A brigade commander for example, may need to address the battlefield framework in his concept and provide goals for his deep fight and rear fight. By contrast, the task force and company commander must focus their attention on the requirements of the close fight.) a llie coiiiiiiander’s concept is riot a cure-all. A final warning: If a Unit is not adequately trained, if the scheme of maneuver is unsound, if the key staff coordination has not been made, then even the most eloquent expression of concept will not rescue the mission. Commander’s concept is an important command and control tool, but it will not, by itself, lead us to victory. 466, while the defenders, unchallenged by BLUFOR overwatching fires, shifted and massed their fires to destroy the task force. Conclusion Perhaps, in closing, we should return to the vignette that began this article. Our tank company commander had indicated how it was important for him to reach the line of departure at O400. He did, indeed, reach the LD by O400, and then sat there for an hour in sight of the enemy’s OPs. The task force line of departure was 0500. At 0500, with the sun rising over the Avawatz Mountains, the tank company crossed the LD. Its movement was initially ragged, for many of the vehicle crews had fallen asleep during the long wait at the start line. Eventually, the entire company was aroused and the approach march to Hill 466 began. Just short of direct fire range, the tank company became the target of an artillery strike. The company commander, in an effort to avoid the enemy’s fire, took evasive action and was killed in a cleverly sited OPFOR minefield. At this point, the platoon leaders were left to their own devices. Lacking sufficient guidance to exercise initiative, the lieutenants pressed on into the defensive fire sacks of the enemy motorized rifle company. Within ten minutes, the company was annihilated. The results for the task force were very much the same. Without the tank company’s supporting fmes, a crucial element of the plan was missing. The task force proved incapable of adjusting to the suddenly changed circumstances of the battle. The three remaining companies attempted to maneuver against Hill The battle, like so many others at the NTC, demonstrated the depth and the consequences of our problem with commander’s concept. Our doctrine suggests the commander’s concept is an essential command and control tool in fighting AirLand Battle. I have discussed the difficulty commanders are having in understanding and using this tool. I have also indicated the potentially dire consequences that result when the concept is not understood. Clearly, I have not given a comprehensive ”how-to” lesson on how to write the concept paragraph. I haven’t solved the problem, but I have suggested some of the pitfalls to avoid. In doing so, I hope I have simulated the kind of thought and discussion the problem deserves. Commander’s concept has the potential to serve us well. The challenge is to understand it and discipline ourselves to use it properly. Major Scott Stephenson is a U. S. Military Academy graduate and received his masters degree in history from Syracuse University. He has served as a platoon leader and XO in 4th Infantry Division; company commander, BMO, and S3 in 8th Infantry Division; with the department at Syracuse University; as Chief, Plans, Operations Group, and Live Fire Plans and Operations, NTC. He is currently assigned as Live Fire Task Force S3 Trainer, NTC, and is scheduled to attend the C&GS 90-91. ARMOR - 47