and Captain Vincent C. Schmoll Light Cavalry in the 10th Mountain Division

Light Cavalry in the 10th Mountain Division by Captain Jeff Witsken and Captain Lee MacTaggart As the armor force examines the use of HMMWVs in its scout platoons, the cavalry troops of the light infantry divisions (LID) are refrning tactics and doctrine incorporating HMMWVs into the unique structure and missions of LIDs. The light cavalry troops play the same role as their counterparts in other divisional cavalry squadrons, yet, because of the unique demands of Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) and the structure of units within the division, the LID cavalry troops must evaluate tactics and organizations against both insurgent forces and mobile, armor-protected formations. The LID was structured for rapid deployment and fighting in a LIC scenario. The unpredictable nature of future conflict, combined with the rapid modernization of the armies of developing countries, has caused the Army to examine the use of light infantry in mid- and high-intensity conflict. The LID can handle better equipped, organized enemy forces, if properly reinforced and task-organized. Regardless of the type of enemy, light infantry attempts to operate against the enemy in a widely dispersed, highly mobile fashion during limited-visibility periods in rough terrain. This structure and employment has caused the light cavalry to organize and train for its missions under conditions and standards far different from those faced by armored cavalry units. The wide variety of missions of the five LIDs causes a varied approach Figure 1 Ground Cavalry Troop TOE 17187Looo

I. o m 0. 0 -1[””;rh

I to mission accomplishment in each division. We will examine the current structure and mission profile of light cavalry within the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), stationed at Fort Drum, New York, to describe one direction in which light cavalry is moving. Table of Organization and Equipment 17187LOOO sets the organization of the l i t cavalry troop into a troop headquarters, two scout platoons, and two TOW platoons (see figure 1). The specific MTOE used by the 3-17 Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division has been further modified into an organization of a troop headquarters and four scout platoons (see figure 2). Each scout platoon is a hybrid scout/TOW HMMWV mix of five vehicles (see figure 3). Internal equipment transFigure 2 3d Squadron - 17th Cav - A Troop fers within the squadron have given all members of thc scout platoon an MI6 rifle or M203; improving the dismounted firepower of the scouts. Platoon and troop formations and movement techniques are the same as those used by armored cavalry. Modifications were made to allow the four-platoon structure of the troop and the five-vehicle structure of the platoons, but these changes do not alter the function of the movement techniques or the formations. With the changing political climate in Europe, conventional conflict involving heavy forces becomes less likely. However, turmoil is still a distinct possibility in other parts of the world. Because this turmoil may be LIC, or demand immediate deployment, an LID will be a prime candidate as the Army’s participant. Therefore, a very brief primer on LIC is in order. The enemy in a LIC scenario will probably be a politically-organized insurgency using long-term operations and widespread hit-and-run tactics to further its goals within the country. Avoiding contact unless forced to, or under favorable odds, they will often be indistinguishable from the general population. Most operations will only occasionally involve combat, even over an extended period of time. Ambushes, mines, and booby traps represent the most frequent forms of contact. The follow-up operations during Operation JUST CAUSE are representative of the actions that will occur in a LIC scenario. The challenge is to find this enemy without suffering excessive casualties from his tactics. This challenge will be greater with rules of engagement that restrict the scouts’ ability to use firepower or maneuver. These rules are meant to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties, yet scouts must understand that these same rules may place them at great risk. For example, LIC scenarios often forbid laying friendly minefields (to avoid civilian casualties), or require positive identification before returning fire. Contact with the local population might Current A/3-17 Cavalry Organization

CPT Commander) 1 SPC Armorer) 1 SPC i Personnel Admin Spc)

SSG (Supply SGT)

LT PA Ldr) 1 SGt (crew Ldr) 1 SPC (Driver) 1 SSG Sec Sgt 1 SGT Crew LJr) 1 SPC i Driver) 1 SGT Sqd Ldr 1 SGT [crew d r ) 1 SPC (Driver) 1 1 lSFC PSG) 1 SGT [Gunner) 1 SPC (Driver) Figure 3 1 SSG Section Sgt) 1 SGT [Gunner) 1 SPC (Driver) ARMOR - 37 be forbidden. Light cavalry must adopt new tactics that minimize the effect of prescribed rules of engagement. 3-17 Cavalry has operated under constraints similar to those above during training exercises, developing and modifying operating techniques to meet the situation. The troop operates primarily in its mounted role conducting reconnaissance and screening for the division, of which area reconnaissance is the predominant mission for the light cavalry. Past operations have stressed dismounted patrols at night to accomplish reconnaissance, inserted and extracted by a combination of foot, HMMWVs, and helicopters. These missions have included maintaining continuous surveillance of the objective after completion of the area reconnaissance. The reconnaissance is usually oriented toward obtaining detailed terrain information, and can include sustained surveillance to determine evidence or patterns of enemy activity. Zone reconnaissance missions use the same methods and tactics outlined in FMs 17-95 and 17-98, with an emphasis on slow, extremely detailed reconnaissance, oriented mainly on potential or suspected enemy positions, assembly areas, and cache sites. Detailed knowledge of the terrain in the zone is more important than enemy information. Route reconnaissance is also conducted conventionally, although many routes reconned in low intensity situations are more primitive than found in more developed countries. The troop may find itself repeatedly reconning the same route to ensure mines or ambushes have not been placed along the route. Again, the reconnaissance effort is on terrain and suspected or potential enemy positions. Screening operations present special challenges to the cavalry troop, which must prevent dismounted infiltration of the screen line and avoid detection of its observation posts by dismounted forces. This is done through continuous observation and aggressive patrolling, which places great strain on a 15-man platoon to operate at least two observation posts. The need to maintain the screen usually prevents any effective sustainment operations because the scouts are all patrolling or manning the observation posts/night observation devices. The need for noise discipline often requires that vehicles be left several hundred meters behind the actual line of observation posts. The commander must often compensate for this by leaving one platoon out of the initial screen line and establishing a rotation to allow each platoon to rest/sustain while it is off the screen for a few hours. To maintain contact presents a real challenge to the troop. Tracking skills are often needed to maintain contact with a dismounted enemy. The close terrain and poor visibility inherent to LID operations makes it more likely that the screening force will be discovered. Close engagements are very likely as the troop tries to maintain contact. The troop has executed guard or cover missions, usually as part of economy of force operations. These missions are often executed by the troop and squadron without other augmentation. As a result, the troop often finds itself conducting high-risk attacks or defending in an attempt to execute its mission. These missions are often successful against primarily dismounted forces, because the troop and squadron can use their superior mobility to frustrate the enemy. There are several unique considerations to combined arms operations in the LID. Artillery consists primarily of 105-mm howitzers with a 12-km range, resulting in cavalry operations outside the range of available supporting artillery. Infantry, engineers, or GSRs provided to the troop are dismounted, so the troop commander must accept a slower pace of operations or ferry his attachments around the battlefield in available vehicles. The greatest advantage of the light cavalry troop is its flexibility. The troop’s ability to perform its missions mounted, dismounted, or with airmobility provides the division reconnaissance or security regardless of terrain or weather. When needed, it can bolster the maneuver brigades for certain missions. It routinely provides dismounted patrols or reconnaissance and surveillance teams inserted by helicopter to check out areas of interest to the division. The maneuver brigades can be very interested in the TOW firepower of the troop to stiffen their anti-armor defenses. If needed, the troop engages in close combat to accomplish its attack or defense missions. The cavalry troop is the only 100 percent mobile ground maneuver force in the division. Its mobility allows execution of missions at a greater tempo and rapid maneuver against opponents. This mobility also makes the cavalry troop the force to reach for in an emergency. The troop’s mobility compensates for shortcomings in firepower and armor protection. 38 ARMOR - July-AuguSt 7990

Figure 4 (top) and Figure 5 (bottom).

3. VEHICLE Bll (UNDER SEAT) ra i I l l l r - t 1 2 I 15

19. ANms-2

PYROTECHNICS, MISC.

31. AN/WSd (2 EA.)

4. VEHICLE Bll (UNDER SEAT)

PYROTECHNICS. MISC.

11. MGS BATTERY ASSY (2 EA).

ARMOR - July-AuguSt 7990

Even with those shortcomings, the troop presents a potent combination of firepower compared to other elements of the LID. It has more M60 machine guns than a LID battalion, and has as many TOW missile launchers as two LID battalions. This comparative wealth of firepower helps the widely spread elements of the troop complete their missions, but it also makes the troop a prime candidate for "augmenting" maneuver brigades with greater firepower. As noted before, there is a great emphasis on airmobility in the 10th Mountain Division. The amount of training conducted in rappelling and air assault missions gives the division much of the capability that the old "blues platoon" gave to the "H" series division. This flexibility and extra capability help overcome terrain that the HMMWV cannot negotiate. The drawback is the troop has to park most of its vehicles to provide a sizable airmobile force. One light cavalry troop is inadequate for sustained division-level operations. The reconnaissance squadron has only one cavalry troop with a total strength of 65 personnel. Even in the reduced sector that a LID would occupy, one cavalry troop cannot cover the entire area. Close terrain only increases the problem. With 15-man platoons, it is difficult to execute missions around the clock. The troop is the only all-weather, day-and-night force available to the squadron, and must bear the burden of accomplishing the entire squadron's mission when conditions prevent air cavalry employment. Command and control present a unique challenge, with no executive officer authorized, the troop commander must deleaate duties to the senior platoon leader when needed. The commander is often deluged with spot reports and must choose between following the battle or communicating with squadron, and the senior platoon leader is unable to monitor the squadron, troop and platoon nets simultaneously. An XO who could assume the duties of the commander would be an enhancement. Combat service support presents a continuous challenge. The troop headquarters section cannot divide into separate troop trains and field trains, forcing the troop commander to manage the trains, while the first sergeant pushes supplies up from the rear. This problem gets worse with the meager CSS assets of the squadron, brigade, and division. The troop must often take resupply into its own hands and carry as much as possible to avoid shortfalls later. Figures 4 and 5 show the current load plans used by the troop for most missions. If any future force structure changes are to be made to the light cavalry, there are many changes to consider to improve the combat performance of the troop. Four-man scout crews would give the troop an adequate ability to conduct dismounted patrols and to conduct sustained operations. The troop HQ section needs an XO and separate vehicles for the CO, XO, first sergeant, and supply sergeant. Consideration should be made to adding MK-19 grenade launchers, mortars, and snipers. The troop has no mortar section or FIST assigned, so there must be constant training on call-for-fire procedures, and special coordination must be made for tire support channels. The squadron needs a second mound troop to better conduct operations across the division sector and to improve the squadron's 24- hour reconnaissance capability. The squadron could also use the addition of its own support platoon, because it rarely operates with the aviation brigade. The l i t cavalry performs the same missions as other cavalry units, yet accomplishes its missions under different conditions, using modified operations and tactics. Interaction with combined arms remains vital, considering the limited protection and sustainability of the troop. Despite all the problems noted above, the troop is a valuable asset to the division, given its mobility and flexibility. In the 10th Mountain Division, cavalry upholds its tradition of being the eyes and ears of the division commander. Captain Jeffrey R. Witsken is a 1981 distinguished graduate of Xavier Univer-shy. A graduate of AOBC, AOAC, and CAS3, he has served as a tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, and battalion S4. He has commanded DE-12 Cavalry and N3-17 Cavalry, and is currently assigned as S3. 3-17 Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division (Li). Captain Lee MacTaggart, a 1982 graduate of the University of Georgia, has served as a platoon leader, troop XO, and BMO. He is currently assigned as assistant S3, 27th Brigade

10th Mountain Division (LI)

ROUNDOUT.

ARMOR - July-AuguSt 7990