The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: Would It Work in Central Europe?

The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: Would It Work in Central Europe? A by Captain Gregory W. Grist OMG doctrine sounds formidable, But actually making it work Would prove an uphill fight ... In the early 19SOs, thc Soviets unveiled their counter to the NATO doctrine of active defense in Central Europe. The concept, ostcn-sibly a resurrected and expanded version of the World War I1 Red Army Mobile Group, was called (he Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) when it appeared in Polish military literature in 1982.' This dramatic disclosure produced flurries of literary activity from academic observers and critics, as well as professional military authors on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Although experts focused considerable analysis and speculation on this topic, several problems remained unresolved.

These problems indicate that present OMG doctrine is seriously flawed, and that NATO over-response presents a greater threat than the OMG itself.

This issue is important to NATO because it affects the assumptions analysts make whcn predicting the probable strength, disposition, and intentions of of Warsaw Pact forces in case of war. For example, if the Soviets hold back a third of each first echelon army (with proportional tactical air sorties) to form OMGs, this will have an impact on our intelligence estimates at the start of hostilities.

On the other hand, if the Soviets actually have no intention of forming OMGs at the outset, the change in the force ratio could be even more significant.

With the military balance already precarious i n Central Europe, an intelligence failure to properly assess this problem before to hostilities could prove decisive.

Background

Definition -An Operational Maneuver Group is a unit specifically tailored from operational forces to assist in accomplishing operational missions. In Soviet military usage, operational refers to front' and army-level. It is an intermediate stage between tactical (divisions and regiments) and strategic (TVD3 and national-level) echelons. But a closer look is warranted because the OMG mentioned in Warsaw Pact military literature is not so much a specific organizational entity, but a unit existing wholly in the context of the current operation. It is a riierliod of achieving operational goals by accomplishing specificd missions. This distinction will become clearer in the discussion of probable OMG missions.

Historical Development As I mentioned, the OMG is a direct descendant of the Red Army Mobile Group.

In operations against the Welimiaclrt, and later against the Japanese Army in the Manchurian Campaign, the Red Army effectively used Mobile Groups to exploit the success of their lead echelons. In both cases, though, the Red Army was operating at its wartime peak strength and efficiency against largely defeated enemies.

ARMOR - July-AuguSt 1989 Following the end of the war, the Soviets de-emphasized conventional tactics in favor of exclusively nuclear warfare. They resurrected Mobile Group doctrine after the Khrushchev era, and frequently employed it during Warsaw Pact military exercises. Then, in the 1970s, they established the OMG doctrine. Firmly based on the experiences of the Red Army, most doctrinal changes appeared in the areas of targeting and support, jux-taposing Soviet strengths against NATO weaknesses.

4 depending on political and strategic objectives. For example, if the final political objective is the reunification of the Germanys, the strategic military objective may be the capture of Bonn. In this case, the crossing sites over the Rhine River would, perhaps, then be designated operational objectives.

If the neutralization of French nuclear capability is the political objective, “operational depths” would then extend a few hundred kilometers to the west.

Composition and Support The size of an OMG is less difficult to describe. The nucleus for an army’s OMG is a reinforced tank division? Supporting units may include an air assault brigade, a helicopter regiment, an army artillery group, reconnaissance and intelligence units, air defense units, engineer units, command and control elements, and a number of fied-wing aircraft!

The obvious strain this ungainly organization would place on the Soviet’s current command, control, communications and intelligence (c31) system is one of the unresolved problems.

Purpose and Missions At the most fundamental level, the purpose of the OMG is to ensure the rapid and total collapse of NATO’s defenses before NATO can 7 execute the tactical nuclear option. Soviet doctrine is, however, clearer on what the OMG is expected to do than on how it should be done. Warsaw Pact writers describe various missions for the OMG, all involving objectives in the operational depths ol the enemy’s defenses. The term “operational depths” is inexact, and can mean anywhere from 40-350km into the enemy rear, One OMG mission, described in great detail by Warsaw Pact writers, is the destruction of enemy operational reserves. Since NATO has no operational maneuver reserves, I choose to interpret this as destruction of logistical reserves and, perhaps, blocking the approach (or destroying the prepositioned supplies) of REFORGER units before they take up their defensive positions.

The OMG in Action The following scenario illustrates only a small sample of the problems of complex inter-unit coordination, space management, logistics and battlefield leadership the OMG commander would face during his first few hours in combat. Assuming at least partial failure of the various NATO deep interdiction systems, and effective (if not total) strategic surprise, the operation would run roughly along the following lines. For the purpose of this scenario, the commitment of the OMG through the breach in NATO’s defensive lines would begin at H Hour.

H minus 6 Hours - Initially, the OMG must hover somewhere between the parent army’s first two operational echelons during the breakthrough phase, with the following restrictions: It must be close enough behind the first echelon (composed of at least two sister divisions) to immediately exploit a breakthrough anywhere along the front. 0 It must be far enough from the close-in battle to avoid premature acquisition and engagement by enemy short- to medium-range interdiction weapons (lor example, tube artillery and small-scale cross-FLOT attack helicopter strikes.) It must be far enough forward of the second operational echelon to avoid traffic congestion and over-concentration (a sure invitation to nuclear targeting).

H minus 1 Hour to H Hour - At the order of the army (or more likely, front) commander, the OMG commander orders his forward detachment (a heavily reinforced tank battalion) through the breach to reconnoiter and clear his two primary approach axes. The OMG commander then (and on!v then) launches the attached air assault brigade to seize critical bridges and highway interchanges along his route. 8 About an hour later, he passes his unit’s main body through the breach. With the addition of army-and front-level reinforcements, his main body has now swollen to the size of nearly two divisions. A single division in march column stretches for 150km, so splitting the OMG along two approaches would still leave columns 75km long when approaching the breakthrough area. There is 110 possibility of moving cross-country and hitting the objectives on time. With the passage complete, the OMG careens toward NATO’s operational rear area, oriented on one or more objectives 40-100km distant.

ARMOR - July-AUgUSt 1989 H pIus 1 Hour to H plus 3 Hours -While attempting to control the rapid movement of over 300 tanks, 300 other armored vehicles, and well over 1,500 wheeled vehicles along an enemy-controlled road network, the OMG commander now starts to deal with enemy forces. Contact with various types of NATO units, usually inadvertent, occurs constantly as the OMG drives deeper. The subordinate unit commanders must evaluate each contact report quickly, not allowing their units to deploy and engage the enemy, as is their natural reaction. As the OMG approaches its objectives, the commander must now sufficiently concentrate his forces for more traditional offensive operations. At this point, all units are in desperate need of POL" and ammunition resupply. Due to operational (as well as mechanical) losses, radio contact may have been lost with many of his organic units (and ritosr of his attached units). The tactical picture, especially concerning the enemy situation, is unclear. At this moment, when the OMG is most vulnerable, the most difficult tasks of the entire operation loom ahead. The commander: must gather his forces, far from most traditional means of support, and assault an objective, which may be strongly defended.

We now leave the OMG to its fate and turn to two questions that will serve to further illustrate issues raised in the scenario and other basic inadequacies in this doctrine as it now stands: 0 Can current Soviet dr technology and practice adequately control and support far-flung OMG operations?

0 Is the OMG main body overly vulnerable to NATO counterattacks from both the ground and air?

Discussion

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence ( 0 1 ) Soviet e1 has long relied on high-level, centralized planning and control to sidestep serious doctrinal and technical problems. This solution has undeniable advantages in many situations, but the execution of an OMG mission is one of the most significant C31 challenges imaginable. As the example reveals, numerous problems will arise, any one of which could prove decisive. Charles Dick" cites two excellent examples of the frictions that exist in current Soviet C31 doctrine.

Centralized Planning Versus Initiative and Flexibility. The comprehensive need for centralized planning and control. versus the requirement for initiative, flexibility, and fast reactions, is not purely a Soviet problem. But the Soviets are unusual in that they rely on battle drills" at higher levels than other armies. For example, the Soviet division commander depends on his regiments to behave in a predictable manner in most situations. The regimental commander, in the absence of orders, will proceed to his last identified objective, and attempt to perform his assigned mission. Acting with initiative at this level is not practiced in peacetime, and is not expected in combat because the Soviet system more often rewards caution rather than boldness.12.

Inevitably, OMG radio communications will be degraded and sometimes lost. rhis will seriously impact the ability of the subunit commanders to assume the highcr commander's missions.

Skip echelon communicationsU are a tenuous method of sending intelligence and information to units deep m enemy territory.

Requirement for Speed Versus Realistic Planning. The Soviet tactical intelligence system strives to be effective in conducting reconnaissance and in gathering near-term, combat (targeting) information. Its shortcoming - in the processing and dissemination of intelligence while on the move - is, in theory, counterbalanced by the Soviets' meticulous planning process. The problem the OMG faces is the requirement to acquire, track, and predict enemy movements while removed from the information mainstream. Complete. detailed planning will not be feasible for many of the unexpected actions an OMG would face. The Soviets do not practice this on their maneuver fields, so their ability to suddenly acquire these skills in combat is suspect.

The radio network necessary for the success of an OMG appears to be extensive and complicated - not "Soviet" at all. Thc absolute minimum number of stations the OMG commander and his chief of staff would be required to monitor include a link dedicated to the air assault brigade, a link to his forward detachment, an emergency call-for-fire artillery channel, higher command's reconnaissance and intelligence channel, army-level command link, as well as a skip-echelon capability, and, of course, the usual internal command and operations networks. Due to the distances involved, most of these networks would have to be high frequency. The very nature of OMG operations wouId preclude many of the usual communications security precautions against direction-finding (no dummy networks, remoted antennas, or land lines.) Once again, one of the most critical areas for the OMG is also one of its most vulnerable.

Vulnerability to Air and Ground Counterattack.

As the OMG penetrates deeper into enemy territory, and farther from higher level support, air defense and open flanks become the most significant tactical vulnerabilities. According to Warsaw Pact doctrine, a considerable amount of air defense equipment must accompany the OMG. While moving rapidly in linear formation, the maneuver elements will be vulnerable to NATO tactical air attack. The Soviets plan to overcome this challenge with "local air superiority." A safe air corridor will ostensibly be maintained to, from, and over each OMG. the larger SAMs. This translates to about three kilometers for modem Soviet air defense system.'^ This "dead zone" is well within the maximum effective range of most helicopter-launched, heavy antitank guided missiles in NATO's inventory, making this zone an ideal engagement area for aerial counterattacks.

Considering the large number of attack helicopters available to both sides," forces outside operational and strategic-level air defense missiles and fighters will be in considerable jeopardy.

Since

NATO's advantage in ground attack fighters is offset by the Warsaw Pact's advantage in air defense fighters in Central Europe. rough parity exists.I4 Local air superiority over each OMG. therefore, becomes impossible if multiple OMGs are committed. as current doctrine indicates. The equation becomes even more imbalanced when Warsaw Pact air power is further diluted. due to the excessive num-her of high-risk. deep, ground-attack sorties the OMGs would require. As a result. the greatest share of the air defense burden falls on the OMG's organic and attached surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Two considerations now become crucial to the OMG's survival. As the OMG drives deeper into the enemy's rear, it moves farther from Warsaw Pact forward air bases and closer to NATO aircraft bases. This increases the already considerable risks the Soviet fighter pilot faces in protecting his ground-based comrades, and simplifies the NATO pilot's mission.

The othcr considcration is, perhaps, even more significant. The most vulnerable area in a tactical SAM belt is thc zone between the maximum range ol' the hand-held weapons and the minimum range of Flank Security. Soviet units on the march designate forward, flank, and rear guards. For a division-sized unit (such as our OMG), the normal flank guards would be companies (of the same typc as the parent unit) from subordinate regiments. The reconnaissance battalion forms the forward security, along with the forward detachment and advance guard (augmented battalion and reduced strength regiment, respectively). with another line company forming at the rear guard. This practice is carried out at lower levels. Within the division, regiments send out advance guard battalions and flank guard platoons. Battalions, in turn, send out advance guard companies and flank guard squads. These deployed forces act to hreak up small-scale enemy attacks and warn the main body of more significant threats. In tank and motor rifle divisions (TD and MRD), specialized engineer assets bury mines across the advance of any significant enemy flank attack. The MRDs also receive antitank battalions to cover these minefields."

This highly structured system would secm to make Soviet flanks invulnerable, but the effectiveness of the flank guard is directly related to the adequacy and extent of the road network upon which the division is traveling. Since an OMG is required to maintain an extremely high movement rate (25-40 kilometers per hour), flank guards are road-bound as well. If the number of roads along the OMG's approach is limited, the flank guards would be unable to maintain their doctrinal distance from the main body. In mountainous, forested terrain with numerous water obstacles (as in Central Europe), thc ability to maintain a quickly moving flank guard may well become impossible. The U.S. Cavalry's solution. using scout and attack helicopter units as a rapidly moving flank guard. may sound attractive to the Soviets, but serious problems cmergc with this tactic, as well. Rapid movement by the OMG would soon outrun the range of the helicopters, flying from fived bases in East Germany. The Soviets do not often rehearse establishing forward rearming and refueling bases and, are not likely to quickly acquire this skill in combat. Also, the further the OMG penetrates into the defenses. the more NATO air defense aircraft gain an advantage. These factors combine to render the OMG's flanks (and rear) rather porous. With a serious threat from NATO ground attack aircraft, antitank helicopters, and ground forces, the ability of the OMG to race through the German countryside is suspect. Even small NATO units with only modest antitank capabilities would be able to significantly hinder elements of the OMG moving in column along the few road networks that support their approach.

Conclusion

The violent, pro-active, movement-based nature of the OMG appears to fit well into the overall Soviet concept of offensive operations.

Against a weakened enemy, 'on open terrain, and with the army's "Even small NATO units with only modest antitank capabilities would be able to significantly hinder elements of the OMG moving in column along the few road networks that support their approach." most capable leaders commanding the tanks, an OMG could well prove itself as ellective as an old Mobile Group. The current situation in Central Europe. however. fails to support the bilsic rcquirc-ments for employing the modern lor-nintion. The cxaniplcs ol' C"I problems aid the threat of effccrive countcrattacks arc only saniplcs of the vulnernbilities this doctrine fails to adequatcly address.

Soviet military learlcrs arc cerhin-Iy aware of this situation. If NATO plans call for withholding significant lorces from the main battlc arc to counter inevitahle OMGs. howcvcr. ii portion o f the Soviet plan mu\; have already heen accomplished. No military operation is ever planncd without acccpting an appropriate level of risk. In the case of the OMG. the risks to the Soviets appear to outwcigh the bcnclits. Since thc rltrm of an OMG scenis to offer greater advantages than its actual employment. NATO should plan accordingly.