Passing Through the Eye of a Needle: Breach and Defile Operations

by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas V. Morley and Captain Anthony J. Tata Introduction When an attacking force encounters a defile or obstacle network controlled by the enemy, it will usually attempt to bypass it, but there will be instances when the seizure of an objective requires an attacking unit to secure a complex obstacle or heavily guarded defile. What actions must take place at task force level in a contested breach or defile operation? And what should the company team do to accomplish the actual breach? Battle of Velddorf Pass The balanced task force received the mission to create an opening through a heavily guarded pass, destroy the defending enemy forces, and pass through the remainder of the brigade to seize a deeper objective.

The enemy had been preparing for two days, and the task force commander knew he had blocked the defile through the pass with a formidable series of obstacles. Before the task force crossed the line of departure, the battalion scouts confirmed the templated enemy defense. In the 800-meter depth of the defile was a tank ditch and belts of wire and mine obstacles. Dense minefields and areas of chemical contamination peppered every trail suitable to armored vehicles. Behind the defile were wire obstacles to deny lateral movement across the objective. A motorized rifle company was dug in 1,OOO meters behind the defile. Every enemy vehicle could mass its fires on the minefield at the rear of the pass.

The task force plan had the two infantry teams leading abreast through the rugged terrain east of the road leading from the assembly area to the pass. In the left column, the engineers and a tank team followed, while the right column had a tank team following.

The left column mech team was to secure the obstacle area, and assist in the breach. The right column mech team was to conduct a supporting attack over the steep ridge east of the pass. This team would have to dismount to move over the ridge, because the only mounted avenue was through the pass. The two tank teams were the assault force, with the subsequent company objectives to the rear of the enemy positions holding the east end of Velddorf Pass.

The original intent was for the task force commander to control the actual breach operation. However, as we will see, this was a flawed. plan, and lacked sufficient detail to be successful.

The task force crossed the line of departure at 0030 hours. From the start, artillery harassed movement to the objective, and two enemy ambushes blocked the task force routes. Enroute to the objective, the right mech team destroyed five BMPs, a BRDM, and 35 of 40 dismounts, while losing one tank to artillery. This team’s success allowed the task force to reach the defile with nearly all of its combat power. The left side mech team secured the near side of the obstacle, and assisted the engineers as the breach began. The right side mech team moved dismounted over the ridge and destroyed two platoons of dismounted infantry covering the back side of the defile.

At this point, the task force attack began to unravel. Because of the complex nature or the obstacle, the breach was taking more time than anticipated. The dismounted engineers and infantrymen were in MOPP IV, while enemy artillery was harassing the breaching effort. The breaching teams had to cut concertina, lay charges on successive minefields, and shovel dirt into a tank ditch. These tasks were time-consuming, especially in limited moonlight. The tank-heavy teams were locked up at the obstacle, suffering casualties to artillery. Fortunately, enemy CAS and HINDS were not a factor because of darkness.

The task force commander, on a terrain feature away from the breach, was unable either to understand the slowness of his operation or influence the action. The task force S3 was with the tank team, awaiting word that the breach had been made. The mech team commander actually conducting the breach faced an overwhelming range of tasks compounded by the difficulty of command and control of numerous dismounted elements in the dark.

His relationship to the engineer company had been vague in the plan, and began to disintegrate in the darkness.

He mistakenly reported to the task force commander that the breach was clear. Unfortunately, he had failed to expand his recon and gain control of the far side of the breach site. I At the order to resume the attack, the first tank team charged through the defile, began its sweep toward the objective, and drove into an undetected minefield. Enemy direct fire engaged the tanks as they attempted to bypass. Artillery began to fall at the obstacle, breaking apart the first assault. After a renewed breaching effort, the second assault force finally made it onto the objective. The right side mech team continued its attack to the rear of the pass, and was able to assist the assaulting tank team in the destruction of the enemy vehicles. Enemy remnants held out in isolated positions until destroyed by infantry and tank teams. Although the task force was successful, the enemy had mauled it. By daylight, less than 10 tanks and two understrength infantry platoons remained. The task force had accomplished its mission, but was now combat ineffective.

Some clear lessons learned in this operation were: The task force used no obscuration, either at the breach sites or on the enemy positions covering or overlooking these obstacles. 0 Obstacle reconnaissance was flawed, and lacked sufficient detail. No one was tasked to recon the entire objective area, especially the far side.

No artillery suppression supported the assault of the tank teams.

Command and control of the breach was ineffective.

The task force commander and S3 were too far back and not in control.

The mech team commander had too much to do, resulting in little actual control.

The engineer company commander focused solely on the actual mechanics of establishing the initial breach.

There was no expansion of infantry security on the far (enemy) side of the breach.

The unit did not commit its tank teams based on the actual battlefield conditions; the obstacle network had not been breached. A Technique for Clearing Breaches and Defiles Similar drills are used to breach obstacle belts and to clear defiles. In each case, a large number of vehicles must pass safely through a narrow gap. It is irrelevant whether the gap is constrained by terrain or man-made barriers. FM 5-101, Mobility, gives us an adequate framework to establish effective techniques for dealing with defile/obstacles. In both instances, you must suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce the enemy and obstacle complex. Both require a breach team, a security team and an assault force to clear the obstacle. With the addition of an obstacle reconnaissance team, a unit can clear defiles and breach obstacles with minimal casualties.

The conduct of a breach or defile operation, with its eventual passage of forces, is the sole responsibility of the task force coyander because he alone has the C- apparatus to control the entire operation from start to finish. The complexities of such an operation require the synchronization of all elements of the task force, and every combat multiplier available. Obviously, the commander or S3 must be physically present at the breach to control, and. if necessary, to personally take charge, to get the task force through as quickly as possible.

One company/team commander is normally assigned to physically create the breach. This breach team commander has a monumental task, requiring the active assistance of the task force commander. The task force commander or S3 must be with the breach company, overseeing the execution of the breach. To delineate responsibilities is the first key to a successful operation. To ensure that the company commander does not get more responsibility than he is physically able to control is just as critical. A miscon-ceived common practice is to give this company additional platoons, leading to a team of six or seven separate units. This further reduces the effectiveness of the breach company commander. The task force commander can better control most of these assets - ADA, engineers, smoke platoon - channeling them into the actual breach site as needed. This frees the breach company commander to focus solely on his task, and not the entire operation. The breach company commander should be responsible for: 0 Finding the obstacle.

Locating an adequate breach 0 Providing near- and far-side 0 Overwatching with tanks on the near side.

Conducting reconnaissance to the back side of the obstacle preparatory to expanding the breach.

Expanding the far-side security zone with tanks or TOWS, and infantry teams.

Reducing the obstacle and marking lanes.

Establishing initial antitank ambushes to destroy enemy counterattacks. site or bypass. security.

The task force commander should be responsible for: ARMOR - July-August 7989 “Templating doctrinal enemy positions to cover the breach will further assist in providing requirements for the scouts to either confirm or deny” Providing additional overwatch 0 Controlling the breach. 0 Massing forces for assault. 0 Determining when to pass the lead assault companies through the breach.

Controlling the remaining task force elements’ passage through the lanes.

Controlling the assault on the main objective.

Positioning ADA to protect the breach.

Controlling smoke vehicles and indirect smoke.

Controlling the engineer company to execute the expansion of the initial hasty breach. 0 Coordinating indirect fires and CAS.

from other teams.

When planning an attack or movement to contact involving passage through a defile or obstacle, consider it in phases.

PHASE I: Planning and task organization.

Naturally, METT-T determines the requirements of the attack. Of particular importance in this METT-T analysis is the obstacle area or defile. The magnitude of the defile or obstacle area may overshadow the ultimate task force objective. Consider the size of the obstacle or defile in comparison to the ultimate objective.

Which requires the greater weight of your force? The enemy forces defending the obstacle or breach might be a greater challenge for the task force than its main objective.

The task force commander must first concentrate upon specific intelligence requirements. Using organic or other means, he must develop all unavailable information on the obstacle or defile. Scouts must understand that the precise dimensions and locations of all parts of the obstructions are critical, for ignoring a tank ditch placed behind a minefield will lead to disaster. Templating doctrinal enemy positions to cover the breach will further assist in providing requirements for the scouts to either confirm or deny, and in a breach reduction, the reconnaissance must detail individual enemy positions. The task force commander must task-organize his unit to guarantee its success in breaching the defile or obstacle zone, to destroy the enemy force, while preserving his own force. A typical task force organization would be a mech company/team to breach the obstacle, with a tank company/team providing overwatch during the breaching/defde clearing. If possible, the commander should designate another mech company to go dismounted over rough terrain to strike deeper in the defile, destroying enemy vehicles overwatching the defile or its exit. He needs to designate a tank company/team as an assault force, sending it through the enemy defense once a breach has been created. The breach company should have some engineer assets -perhaps a platoon. If more are available, they should be under task force control for commitment as needed.

A typical task organization for a breach companyheam might be a mech-pure team with an attached tank and engineer platoon. This company could be organized as follows: Mech platoon: Near-side securityhack-up breach team. Mech platoon: Far-side securityhack-up recon team. Mech platoon: Recon teamback-up far-side security team. Tank platoon: Assault team/suppression on near side.

Engineer platoon: Breach teamback-up far-side security team. The infantry platoons can secure the near and far sides of the defile, clearing enemy direct-fire systems. The overwhelming imperative for this team must be the constant, aggressive expansion of the far side of the breach or defile. Recon and security elements, either assault or ambush teams, must be constantly on the move to add even more security to the site.

Clearing the far side is key, and should not begin at the completion of the breach; it should occur simultaneously, so that the far side is secure at about the same time the lane opens. Also, a thorough reconnaissance of the entire defile or obstacle is critical. Again, it does no good to clear nine-tenths of the obstacle only to have the assault force die in an unexpected and unseen belt of mines.

One platoon-size team, in addition to the task force scouts, should be dedicated to reconnoitering the obstacle, and looking for bypasses along the route. This platoon should make personnel breaches through the wire and mines, moving as quickly as possible to the templated backside of the obstacle. They must be prepared to conduct hasty antitank ambushes to defeat any vehicular counterattack against the obstacle clearing site. As enemy positions are encountered, this platoon must destroy the individual vehicles or dug-in infantry. The second infantry platoon assists the lead platoon as the clearance of far side begins. The tank platoon makes an excellent assault force because of its survivability, rapid-fire capabilities, and thermal sights. The obvious breach team is the engineer platoon. However, the infantry and tank platoons must be prepared to breach if the engineers falter. The breach commander, as well, must plan for replacing or reinforcing teams as he attacks the defile.

Movement to the defile/obstacle.

Movement to the defie/obstacle area must be rapid and obscured. The suppression and obscuration of the defile/obstacle must begin during this phase, with indirect fires and air support. Ideally, smoke is obscuring enemy direct-fire systems, and artillery is creating enemy casualties at the same time the breach company/team is approaching the defile.

The task force commander must make the decision whether to smoke the enemy covering the obstacle or to obscure the obstacle itself. If he obscures the enemy, only his weapon systems with thermal sights can provide direct-fire suppression. If he smokes the obstacle, then all of his direct-fire systems can provide effective sup pression. He should dedicate a mortar section or two to provide smoke. He should alter this section's basic load to provide as much smoke ammunition as possible.

Artillery smoke would be the primary means, with his dedicated 4.2-in. mortar section as a totally reliable augmenta-tionbackup.

The enemy will naturally target the obstacle with direct and indirect tires. The enemy will allow the attacking forces into the obstacle, and then begin to mass his fires on the slowed attack. Thus, artillery, HE, and smoke must mask potential enemy artillery observer sites, as well as positions for dired-fire systems.

The attacking unit will surely encounter enemy combat outposts or ambushes enroute. The task force commander must decide either to rapidly destroy these forces or bypass them. Tank sections could pin the enemy outpost while the task force bypasses. Regardless of method, the plan must preserve the breach company/team for the bteaclddefile actions.

In some METT-T conditions, a company team other than the breach team should lead to the defilebeach site. PHASE 111: Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance begins with the scout teams attempting to confirm the location of every obstacle in the hours prior to the task force attack. We can never assume, though, that they have seen everything. Many times, the enemy will deliberately add new obstacles during darkness. The scout platoon must continue to recon the defilebeach site until the arrival of the task force. The breach company/team must execute its own reconnaissance effort upon arrival at the defilehreach site. The designated reconnaissance platoon must dismount as close to the obstacle as possible, executing a series of man-sized breaches through each obstacle belt. This platoon should have a system of recording, reporting, and marking the type, size, and location of every obstacle it en- 'counters.

A reliable technique is to have a numbering system that is common to the task force. For example, obstacle number one is the first belt encountered at the main network. The platoon leader could then report the next obstacle belt as, "number two, 150 meters from the back of number one, minefield, 75 meters deep." Trying to use grid coordinates will only confuse everyone, because it is not easy to translate the distance between obstacles into six-digit coordinates. Scouts should label harassing obstacles enroute to the defilebeach site using a different system, perhaps with letters, to.prevent confusion. As the breach team's recon platoon moves through the obstacle series, the scouts should already be reconnoitering in the vicinity of the main ob.jective area and establishing OPs overlooking the most likely counterattack axis. The enemy understands that complex obstacles work, and the day of the single strand of concertina is over. A thorough reconnaissance of a deep obstacle network is essential.

PHASE W. Securing and reducing the defileiobstacle The breachhite commander should designate a release point where each of his platoon teams moves independently to execute its mission. The point should be close enough to the defile so that his forces are not piecemealed, yet far enough away to allow freedom of maneuver. This point could also be a dismount point for his infantry and engineers. From this stage on, all concerned need to understand that securing and clearing the defile/obstacle is deliberate, methodical, and slow by its very nature.

Patience must be the watchword for the task force commander. A too-early commitment of the tank-heavy assault companies will result in high casualties as they are pinned on uncleared deeper obstacles. Premature commitment also quickly results in confusion and loss of control at the breach site. This may be the most difficult task for an awessive task force commander who wishes to rapidly accomplish his mission. However, if the plan is adequately thought through, tenacity in following the plan will generally provide the desired results. A synchronized supporting attack with indirect fires and dismounted forces can prevent the enemy from concentrating his combat power on the main effort. The dismounted supporting attack should be initiating direct fire on the enemy as the task force has begun closing on the obstacle/detile. The breach company must rapidly clear the near side of the breach site/defile. The platoon(s) create infantry breaches to get through the obstacles and begin establishing security on the far side. To destroy any enemy vehicles or infantry positions within direct-tire range of the breaching effort, use overwatching tanks and ITVs, in coordination with dismounted infantry. The thermal capabilities of these vehicles permit easier detection and destruction of enemy vehicles and personnel. They can vector dismounted infantry elements to concealed enemy vehicles or positions. If radio communication is lost between the infantry and tanks, M85 or coax tracers can mark enemy locations. The near- and far-side security teams must establish fire superiority to allow the breach team to begin its work. At this point, an infantry platoon is probably securing the near left and right flanks, another is reconnoitering along the defile or obstade, identifying belts by using bypasses or personnel breaches in the obstacles.

A third infantry platoon, if available, may be moving in conjuction with the reconnaissance team, or better yet, is using a more rapid avenue to the templated backside of the obstacle. There it will establish a security zone. This platoon should probably carry the majority of the antiarmor weapons available to its parent company. Logically, the recon and near side security teams either do not need these weapons or have tanks in support. The far side security platoon should establish a series of ambushes protecting against enemy counterattacks to close the lanes. This platoon will establish security in three stages: Stage 1: Local antiarmor ambushes and destruction of enemy vehicles and positions within 500 meters of the backside of obstacle network.

Stage 2: Antiarmor ambushes 1,OOO meters from the local ambushes. These ambushes should be in position along major avenues of approach into the back side of the obstacle. Hunter-killer teams continue to destroy enemy vehicles that threaten the breach site/defile or the exit axis that the task force will use.

Stage 3: The breach company’s tank platoon has now assaulted through the lanes and should be able to expand the security zone out to 3,000 meters. The infantry platoon will work in conjunction with this platoon of tanks to destroy any enemy positions or vehicles. Meanwhile, the engineers are breaching and marking lanes, ensuring they never get ahead of the reconnaissance team. The tank platoon has provided local suppression of the near side, while finding cover from enemy artillery so that it can assault through the breach when committed. The tank platoon can also vector the breaching teams through the obstacle or defile using their thermals. If the task force commander has decided to smoke the obstacle, the tank thermals will prove invaluable.

The company and task force commanders are with the breach team, ensuring every obstacle is breached properly. This is probably the most difficult phase of the drill, because the breach team is most likely in MOPP IV, with backpack radios, the leaders using hand and arm signals. The process is decentralized by its very nature, enemy artillery is bursting everywhere, and, above all, the task force commander wants to get through the defile now! As the process nears completion, the task is not to commit the assault force prematurely. When the brcach company commander has seen the lanes, knows that they are there, and can see that no more obstacles exist, only then should he call his own assault force tank platoon through. The tank platoon can move through rapidly, suppressing deep into the main objective area, and enlarging the breachhead. At this time, the task force commander sees that the security zone has been established, and realizes he can now commit his company-size assault forces onto the main objective. Phase V: The task force assaults through the obstacle.

While the task force commander has been orchestrating the breach, his S3 should be fvred at the entrance point of the defile, preventing commitment of forces through the lanes, and controlling the traffic once the vehicles are moving. Visual signaling devices - star clusters, smoke grenades - supplement radio control of the task force movement through the breach. A system of panel markers on six- to eight-foot poles can direct the teams to the breach site, which is usually hard to find. These markers can make the approach march to the breach site much easier because they are more visible. Tight control of the task force is essential for the rapid movement through the breacWdefi1e. The task force command group must control this passage. The team commander who has made the breach does not have the resources to control the movement of the task force.

The task force commander must use artillery, smoke, CAS, or helicopters, and the manuever of his own forces, to keep the enemy from assaulting the vulnerable passage area by forces or indirect fire. The effort must be to expand the far side of the breach/defile continually. The task force overwatch elements -tanks or ITVs - must be prepared to repel any counterattacks. Since most breaches or defiles prohibit spread formations, the task force must move one or two vehicles abreast through the breach. If there is protected terrain beyond the obstacle, the task force assault team can use that area to organize from its single-file formation to its attack formation quickly. If there is no such protection, the assault force needs to break through the lane using preassigned sectors of fire that cover the full 360 degrees. The far-side security, and assault teams from the breach company, should provide effective overwatch and suppression of enemy direct-fire weapon systems in the area of the continually expanding breacwdefde site.

A companyheam passing through the site must rapidly mass its combat power into platoons. The task force commander then commits this cohesive combat power to subsequent objectives, expanding his control over the site, while blocking any counterattacks at ever-increasing distances from the vulnerable breach. When he is satisfied that his task force is through the constriction in sufficient mass, and reorganized into cohesive units, then the task force can continue its attack to seize its ultimate objective. He should not make a piecemeal commitment of individual platoons and companies.

Conclusion The breachhiefile operation is a complex, incredibly demanding one. The task force must focus all of its resources to create the breach, expand the breach, and regain its combat organization at the far side, before continuing attacks to seize its ultimate objective. The demands of this operation require the focus of the task force’s command group at each stage. The task force commander must be forward, assisting the team commander of the breach site. The S3 must be an active participant in moving the task force and regaining its combat formation. Companyheam commanders milst be as far forward as possible. With aggressive, dynamic leadership, the task force can secure a breacwdefile rapidly, allowing the task force to preserve its combat power for use on the ultimate objective.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas V. Morley enlisted in the Army in 1969 and was commissioned in Infantry from OCS in 1971. He served as a Infantry platoon leader with the 1Olst Airborne Division in Vietnam. In 1972 he was assigned to Fort Hood as a scout platoon leader, company XO, and an Infantry company commander in the 2nd Battalion, 41 st Infantry. After receiving a Regular Army commission in Armor, he served as the S3 air, adjutant, and C Company commander in the 1 st Battalion, 66th Armor. He graduated from Texas A&Min 1978 with a BA in history and political science. From 1979 to 1981, he was Assistant Professor of Military Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Assigned to 1st AD, he served as S3 air and executive officer of the 3rd Battalion, 35th Armor, S3 of 3rd Brigade, and Chief of G3 Training. He is a 1985 CGSC graduate. In 1986, he served as Chief, G3 Plans, 4th Infantry Division and is currently commander of 2d Battalion, 35th Armor. He has been selected to attend the Army War College.

Captain Anthony J. Tata is a 1981 USMA graduate. His previous assignments include Commander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry; Task Force, 2-35 Armor; S3 Air, 2-35 Armor; and adjutant, XO, and platoon leader in 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 25th Infantry Division (Light). Captain Tata has participated in two NTC rotations -as company commander and 53 Air. He has attended IOBC, IOAC, and the Airborne, Assault, and Ranger Courses. He is currently serving as the Secretary of the General’s Staff, 4th Infantry Division.