The Ten Lean Years (Part IV)

Cavalry troopers from Fort Knox demonstrate their equipment at the New York World’s Fair in 1939. For many civilians, this was their first look at the new force and its tanks and motorcycles. TheTen Lean Years From the Mechanized Force (1 930) to the Armored Force (1 940) by Major General Robert W. (Ed. Note: This is the fourth and final part of a serial on the evolution of mechanization within the United States Army.) Grow, USA, Retired In June 1936, I was assigned to the Supply and Budget Section of the Office of the Chief of Cavalry, a post which I would hold for four years. During my tour with the Chief of Cavalry, there was an undercurrent which came to the surface very briefly from time to time - a fundamental issue - which could be stated several ways but always boiled down to the question of whether or not Cavalry could, or would, furnish our Army’s mobile mechanized combat units. Van Voorhis, Chaffee, and others pushed for the creation of an independent armored force. In my effort to be loyal to Cavalry and in the sincere belief that only Cavalry was capable of carrying out the role, I took every opportunity to urge the Chief of Cavalry to grasp mechanization as the only way, not only

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Aerial photo taken in July 1939 reflects the emerging shape of modern Fort Knox. Housing is completed along Fourth and Fifth Avenues, foreground, and new brick barracks are being built for 13th Cav. and 68th FA. ~ ~~ to save our arm, hut to give the Army its badly needed mobile combat forces. On my first day in my new post, a conference on combat vehicles was held with my predecessor, Colonel Charles Scott, and Bruce Palmer, who flew in from Fort box. I was encouraged to find that their idcds on the military characteristics of combat vehicles coincided almost exactly with what we had proposed three, four, and even five years before. The next day we drove to Aberdeen to look over automotive equipment. We were decidedly un-impressed by the two-man tank, the T3, which we thought had no tactical value for cavalry. At this stage we were still favorably inclined toward motorcycles. This fceling persisted through 1940, until the advent of the quarter-ton truck. One of my first actions was to expedite delivery of thirty-three of them to Fort box. In July, the Chief of Cavalry directed that the new cavalry division organization include a squadron of two armored car troops and a motorcycle troop. Another interesting piece of equipment arriving at Fort Knox at the same time were football helmets, the forerunner of continuing helmet development. Research and development issues and budget debates occupied much of my time. The Ordnance Committee, with representatives of all branches, met weekly. At the 23 July meeting, a project to build a new experimental tank was approved. The infantry requested more armor and were willing to accept less speed. That proposition sounded correct to me, since the infantry needed an infantry, not a cavalry, weapon. Later that day, Adna Chaffee, who worked in the War Department Budget Section, showed me the 1938 budget in which new mechanized equipment was authorized, but no replacements were provided. The next year, 1 was alert to see that a regular replacement program, on a percentage basis, was funded. The horse-mechanized confrontation continued to crop up with ever-increasing regularity. On 2Y July 1936 I noted in my diary. Lininger (the new Assistant Corti-mandant at Fort Riley) flew in for a conference wifli the CliieJ.. He was told to coordinate all rttecliariized problertis witli Knos. .. Sooner or later we must come to a showdown 011 a mechanized school. I recorninended a scliool at Knos, w'fh oflicers sent there for four years, the Fst year at scliool. But R i l q mist teacli tactics, too. Later I was to change my mind, fearing that a separate school at Fort Knox would only widen the split and bring about the loss of mechaniiation in the cavalry arm. I always favored a school at Fort Knox, but not an independent service school. In August 1936, 1 attended the Fort Knox - Michigan maneuvers. It was my first visit back to Knox in two years. I had a tine reunion with many old friends and even had the opportunity to look over the new gold vault then under construction. The exercises started on 5 August with the largest assemblage of fighting vehicles ever made in the United States. The forces assembled near Elizabethtown included the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized), 201st Infantry (Motorized), the 68th FA, and the 19th FA. Some of the notes 1 recorded in my diary include: lntpmsions: Cornbat cars cannot operate with closed ports. Wiat to do? Half-tracks did well biit dire to wheels the are not fast across coiintgp. We cannot affonifiill track. Four times the advance pard was met by surprise fire and each tinre piled iip 011 its head placing all halftracks tinder jire while still ittoiiitted. ..Hay@cks are too fmgile. Part of my time at Fort Knox was also spent in researching equipment needs for the units there. There were many conferences on equipment, radio, and vehicular design prior to the march to Michigan, which began on 11 August. After many conferences with Palmer and Scott, our report recommended a modified scout car (M2) be provided to the 13th Cavalry for the reconnaissance troop, machine gun troop, command vehicles, and possibly for use as a mortar mount. This recommendation did away with armored cars and, temporarily, with half-tracks. We also recommended some thirty-odd modifications to the M1 combat car. The Michigan "Allegan" maneuvers were confined largely to roads and I did not consider them particularly valuable to us, except as an equipment testing ground. I was greatly disturbed that the mechanized cavalry was continually broken up and used piecemeal, instead of as a coordinated force in the attack. "U7tat will people think Cavalni is good for?" I wrote in my diary. 'Apparently delay and harass-big on!\).'' The critique after the maneuvers also pointed out the lack of antitank guns in our current organization. The 13th Cavalry was reassigned to Fort Knox and the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) and finally arrived from Fort Riley in Seplem-ber, 1936. Brigadier General Van Voorhis reported to Fort Knox and took command of the brigade, which now included the 1st and 13th Cavalry (Mechanized), with the 68th FA attached. The variety of problems pertaining to mechanization that were handled in our section of the Chief of Cavalry's office during the Fall of 1936 are illustrated by the following notes taken from my diary: Miist try to get cost of anttarttent mdiiced. For one scoiit car it is now over $3000, which is entireljp too ittii~lt. Land mines for Knox to ty on old Otristies. Started a project for small bridges by engineers to help Cavahy across 21)-30fr. stream. A paper to ffiar on a device for training gwuters and driven willtout driving cars all over the resenpation. TAG disapproved oiir request for recoiisideratiwt of the prio@v scliediile on prodiictiori of combat cars per nioritli so that the 13th would be able to take part in Ittaneiivers next siiitiitter. (Afer a conference with the G4): Zf the General Staff want.s to awie and fight about each cornbat car from now on, I giess we will have to con-fonti. Sent letter to TAG asking for 12- 112% replaceittents per year in all combat vehicles stading in FY 1939. Dmfed tcsearrli pmgraitt for Ordnance. Principal ileitis: Ani-pltibioiis and convertible combat car, smoke and grenade discliuwrs, ari-titank and arrriaircraft grins, light ItIOF-tur, individiial wheel siispertsiori on all wheeled vehicles ... Tiinied in a memo to the Chief advocating a nrecltanized division. We have to grab this now or the Cavaln) will lose otit. (The following dav): Gem m i n e r accepted my peconiineii-dation for itiecltaniied cavalnp division as a starter and is going to write Bliss, k3io.v and Riley about it. (On oj3ice.s for Kiiox): h i t t e r er-pects to give tlierti more oj3icem biit 11111 "combat cars" of Troop C, 1st Cavalry, at First Army maneuvers, Plattsburg, N.Y. in August, 1939. r 36 will be iiriable to firr tlierii iri lieuteriarit grade. His polic?, is that all new lieiiteriarifs riiiist serve a tow with horse cartalg, arid take the school coiirse before they go to niecliariized cavalnl. These and other issues kept us very busy until the end of the year. On 28 January 1937, General Kromer read us a report from the Cavalry School Board on the desirability of going after a mechanized cavalry division. I was overjoyed with the report, which not only recommended one but TWO mechanized divisions. I recorded in my diary: l'i'iey said to begin to talk 'ritillioris: to let the folks or1 the Hill wake tip to a real cavalr?, reqiirernertt ... I don't think the present niecliariized cavaln, caii beat the present horse cava@ biit it sooii caii arid there is no doubt of the wqi the wind is blowing. We will breed better iron homes arid iri the riiearitiriie, we riiiist build for the fii-him of Cavalry. 1 was optimistic that the Cavalry Branch was finally riding the wave of the future. After many meetings with the General Staff on division organization, all components of which had received the concurrence of the several arms and services, we met with General Hughes on 9 April

1937. He read us a memo from General Krueger (War Plans Department) opposing the proposed division on the grounds that "it was too big and too much of a fighting unit, whereas the mission of Cavalry was reconnaissance and security." I was afraid thdt the committee was going to take the teeth out of the cavalry division. I was more determined than ever, therefore, to push the mechanized division and ask for a commitment to form at least two of them. In a memo to the Executive of the Committee, Colonel Miller, on 19 April, I stated, 'The only hope for Cavalry is to get astride the iron horse and dig in our spurs." In May I attended tests at Aberdeen of German, French, and American antitank guns. There was general agreement that the gun should be 37mm, weigh eight-hundred to one-thousand pounds, with a penetration of one inch at eight-hundred yards. I was surprised that the Infantry did not want more penetration. Our interest in the Cavalry Branch was in mounting the gun on a vehicle. With souped-up ammunition and a forty-five inch barrel, the best penetration we could get with the S O caliber machine gun at the time was one and one-quarter inches at one-hundred yards. We needed something heavier. General Van Voorhis had repeatedly expressed his preference for a small two-regiment mechanized cavalry division. When he came to Washington in June 1937 we went round and round on both the division and regimental organiza- ~~ July-August 1987 tion. General Kromer supported a three regiment division with stronger regiments, but he could not sway Van Voorhis. Van Voorhis and I were on very close personal terms and finally one evening after dinner at my quarters he told mG that my division "was OK, but that Cavalry couldn't handle that much." I thought then, and it was confirmed later, that he sincerely felt that the Cavalry Branch would never accept and really support mechanization and that a separate mechanized force under the War Department would be required. We constantly studied all the attache reports. I felt that we were way ahead of the French and, in the doctrine of employment, ahead of all except, in some respects, the Ciermans. Shortage of funds for both development and procurement kept us in a constant struggle with both the General Staff and the services, often for a single vehicle or a few rounds of ammunition for testing. There was progress, however, and equipment was developed and improved. Fortunately, excellent cooperation existed between Fort Knox, Fort Riley, and the supply services, with the Chief of Cavalry's office being the middleman as well as the initiator in many cases. General Kromer's address to the War College on 29 September 1937 brilliantly expressed the thoughts of our office. It included a strong statement as to the combat mission of cavalry. "Cavalry welcomes mechanization," he stated," and will abandon the horse as fast as machines prove their worth and can be supplied." General DeWitt and Colonel Gruber said that General Kromer "hit the nail on the head" when he stated that as opposed to the European armies of the day, the cavalry of our army was not only designed for combat, but was the only more mobile combat arm. I was quite taken hack, therefore, when a few days later I received a study by Colonel Gruber which recommended that a separate mechanized force be established. 1 felt that any separate mechanized force would result eventually in a separate arm and the consequent loss of the Cavalry Branch. There seems to be no question but that the fate of Cavalry as a combat arm was in jeopardy and that General Kromer realized it and was trying desperately to rally support for mechanization, even at the expense is the lift line of Cavaly. Gruber came in each of the two following days and discussed his memo with the whole office. He agreed to change it slightly, making it more palatable to us. During my two years with General Kromer, who retired on 25 March "The next Chief of Cavalry, General Herr, was not as willing to support mechanization at the expense of horse cavalry units ..." of horse cavalry, whose advocates stubbornly refused to give up. There were many conferences on the "Gruber Study" on the develop ment of a separate mechanized force. A revised edition of the study came to the Office of the Chief of Cavalry with a note by General Craig, Chief of Staff, which read in part: Cavaln, and il4ecltaniied Cavahy are entirelv diflerent as to tactical ertiployttertt. General Kromer sent in a nonconcurrence on the study and took occasion to demand an early decision "on horse and mechanized divisions." Colonel Gruber then sent General Kromer a copy of his proposed War Department policy and doctrine of mechanization. I spent all day preparing comments on it: I want to enipitasiie the fact that riiecliartiied cavalry is cavaly arid not soriietliirig foreign to cavalry. His (Colonel Gniber's) nieiiio dis-coiiriied defensive arid holding power while failirtg to eriipliasiie offensive power - more or less a Eiiropeati or recormaissame fontt of Cavalty .. drafted a revision wliicli I have little hopes of going tltmiigli brit I fintt!~ believe in it ... since the riioriteritoiis decision was made at Eiistis in '31. It 1938, I could sense the development of an ever-growing feeling that the problem of mechanization was too big for the Cavalry arm. General Kromer had been won over and possibly could have made the Cavalry Branch the "Mechanized Arm," but he backed support from the General Staff and from some senior officers in his own branch. His tour expired at a critical time. The next Chief of Cavalry, General Herr, was not as willing to support mechanization at the expense of horse cavalry units. His attitude concerning mechanim-tion was to prove fatal to Cavalry as a branch. Major General John K. Herr was "inaugurated as the Chief of Cavalry on 26 March 1938. From the beginning, General Herr expressed himself for one Cavalry. It turned out that this meant that he accepted mechanization in Cavalry, but not at the expense of losing or converting any horse units. General Herr brought Major Gilbert Cheves with him from Fort Bliss to be my assistant. It was generally thought in the office that Herr had brought him in to "balance" our office since Cheves had been "indoctrinated" in horse cavalry. It proved to be an idea arrangement as far as I was concerned, for Cheves was very familiar with the horse problems and very sympathetic to mechanization. ~ 38

"...General Chaffee came to Washington in late November with a complete TO&E for a mechanized cavalry division ...'I In April we received a directive from the War Department to prepare TO&Es for use "in planning and instruction" for a mechanized division consisting of a HQ and HU Troop, Reconnaissance and Support Squadron, a brigade of three mechanized cavalry regiments, and supporting troops. It is interesting to note (1) that the Chief of Cavalry and not Fort Knox was asked to do the job and (2) that it was called a "Mechanized Division" and not a "Cavalry Division." We were also working on a revision of TO&Es for the mechanized cavalry regiment. Without increasing personnel strength, we cut the head and tail, charging the division with distant reconnaissance and supply and thereby increasing the combat strength of the regiment. General Herr attended the 1st Cavalry Division maneuvers in May and, on his return, approved the TOBEs of the mechanized cavalry division that Karl Bradford and I had worked on. General Herr added that he would like to see the division exist, but that the War Department "would take a single horse soldier away over his dead body." He wanted a mechanized cavalry unit at Fort Riley, but 1 did not see how he could get it without giving up a horse unit. The Office of the Chief of Cavalry had little direct contact with Fort Leavenworth, but Lieutenant Colonel R. E. McQuillin, an old Fort Riley friend, had written me several times to help him on organization questions for instruction at the Command and General Staff School. I told him to stop teaching "those funny mechanized divisions" until the War Department put out an official TO&E for one. In the meantime, he could use the hrigade that was actually in existence. A week later, 1 received a letter which stated in part that McOuillin requested that the organimtion of the mechanized cavalry division developed by the C&GSS be discarded in favor of the one proposed by our office. On 6 June 1938, the War Department relieved the Commanding General, V Corps Area, of responsibility for the developmcnt of mechanized cavalry and restored it to the Chief of Cavalry. This revoked part of the directive of 5 April 1935. The V Corps Area continued to have administrative and operational control of the brigade. This was splendid news to us as it put the development of mechanization strictly under the Chief of Cavalry. General Herr's attitude in July 1938 is illustrated by two entries from my diary: 77te Chief wants to reopeit the question of the saber, wliicli was abolislted in 1934. .. ' Will line rip the necessary directive to the Cavalry Board to reopeit the reqiireitteitt arid sir biiiit ittilitan, cliaracrenstics. Coitfctereitce with Hm, Crittenhepyr arid Bradford on the mecltanized cavalnr division ... Herr wants a rttccliaitized division, biit Ite doesn 't want to p q for it by cortvemhg any horse tuiits. He will ltave to ... He warits ortlv oitc scltool - Iierice lie wants ritecliaitized cavalry at Riley ... It's all still in tltc air. General Herr's speech to the War College on 19 September 1938, however, was more accommodating. He emphasized: (1) that cavalry mut be used in mass; (2) that reconnaissance is a secondary mission, but that it was necessary to have reconnaissance squadrons at division and corps level; (3) that horse units and mechanized units are complementary and should be used together; and (4) that in strategic reconnaissance, mechanized cavalry should be in the cavalry reserve, except for its own reconnaissance elements. The speech went over well. Summarizing our projects in the fall of 1938, there were a list of horse needs, then a progressive program for the Cavalry Branch to include the organization of a cavalry corps of three horse and one mechanized divisions, replacement personnel carriers for the 1st Cavalry (Mechanized), and improvements or redesign of the combat car for

1940. Van Voorhis was promoted to major general and given command of the V Corps area on 1 October

1938. Adna Chaffee was promoted to brigadier general and given command of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) at Fort Knox. Van Voorhis and Chaffee steadfastly opposed the transfer of mechanized units to Fort Riley. General Herr, after observing the maneuvers of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mech- . anized) that fall at Fort Riley, told me that he definitely wanted a combat car squadron at Fort Riley. On 7 October General Herr and I had a long conference with the G3 Department (Generals Beck, Gruber, Grimes, and Ingcls) on the proposed mechanized cavalry division, the proposed mechanized squadron at Fort Riley and related problems. All the cards were put on the table as both parties talked freely about their concerns. The G3 agreed to take prompt action on the mechanized cavalry division. This conference was followed by a trip with Herr, Bradford, and Cheves to Aberdeen for more vehicle and weapons demonstrations. I recommended that we get a troop of convertible combat cars in 1940 to keep the idea alive and to develop it. General Chaffee came to Washington in late November with a complete TO&E for a mechanized cavalry division. It was similar to the TO&E proposed by Van Voorhis, but perhaps a little better. Chaffce proposed three combat car squadrons of two troops each in the mechanized regiments. I did not think the TO&E was as sound tactically as the one we made up the previous winter, but I raised no objections since it was better than the ~~ July-August 1987

MG George S. Patton, at left, commanding the 2d AD, confers with then-LTC Grow during maneuvers at Manchester, Tennessee, in 1941. TO&E that we had at the moment. As 1939 opened, it was apparent that the Army was due for augmentation. On 5 January, Harmon of G4 told me: 77te Chief sltoiild pit in a letter asking for expansion of tlie 7th Carpaby Brigade to a division at once, riot await appvaI of Toms ... tlie whole thing is in a middle now dire to personal requests bv Van Voorliis arid CliajJee to the Chief of St@. Following this conversation I drafted a short letter to TAG asking for approval of expansion of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) to a division. Crittenberger told Herr that this was not necessary, that "the Staff has all it needs and will give us what we want." Maybe so, but at this time, there was not one cent for mechanized cavalry in any program. Cheves had worked up comparative initial equipment costs as of 1938, which showed a mechanized cavalry regiment to cost $2,122,000 and a horse regiment $394,000. Unless the mechanized cavalry division project was approved on paper, we would never get the money we needed to complete it. A month later, Harmon called me to tell me that we could put in our request for equipment for the mechanized cavalry division for FY

1941. I replied: ' wltere are the nreri coming fmnt? Herr won't a p e to coiivetiiitg and there is no cliartce to get thent froit oiitside the Cavalw. .. He cart get eqtiipritertt for a niecltanized division arid a regintent at Riley ... but he can't get niow nieii... We must go ahead with nreclianization or we stand still, wliiclt is a step backwards ... The decision nttist be made sooii. Time was running out. If we did not make a decision to support a , mechanized cavalry division from our existing assets soon, the decision would he made by someone else. On 25 February 3939, the Chief of Cavalry approved the plan to include the mechanized division in estimates for FY 1941. One of the questions that kept coming up was whether the mechanized cavalry school should be kept separate at Fort Knox or whether it should be kept as a part of the Cavalry School at Fort Riley. I held the view that we should support only one Cavalry School, which should not be a horse school but a cavalry school. To this end, there must be mechanized school troops at Fort Riley as well as a mechanized cavalry division at Fort Knox. Both Van Voorhis and Chaffee, however, opposed mechanized schooling at Fort Riley. Since both were my very close friends from the earliest days of the Mechanized Force at Fort Eustis, it was apparent to me from many private discussions (although never positively stated in so many words) that they were convinced that the Cavalry Arm (more specifically the Chief of Cavalry) could not, or would not, support the massive expansion of mechanization that events in Europe indicated we would need. The situation continued to become more critical until the final break in June 1940. In the spring of 1939, however, there was still time for Cavalry to save itself. The time was ripe for the Chief of Cavalry to take action to form a mechanized division. 1 met Bennie Grimes on the bridle path at the end of April and he told me that "the G3 is raring to go on the mechanized division if Herr will only get in his recommendations." The tentative directive for FY 1941 came out on 2 May. It included the expansion of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), but the Chief of Staff disapproved this action on 14 May. Any expansion was to take the form of another brigade. The Rearmament and Reequipment Program for FY 1941 came through officially on 5 July 1939. We got everything we asked for, an almost unprecedented action. 1 took a trip to Fort Knox in July. Chaffee told me that if the Chief of Cavalry could not get personnel for mechanized expansion, he would take steps to force some conversions. He took me on a tour of the

July-August 1987 40

post, and it was amazing to see the transformation that had taken place since I first saw the place in 1930. During the visit I also had a long talk with Mr. Jones, engineer of the White Company, on our need for a half-track with certain characteristics. He promised to go to work on the project at once. The eventual result of this conversation was the half-track used by the Armored Force in WWII. In a final talk with General Chaffee before I left Fort Knox, he frankly stated that he was going to have a division and was going to get the necessary men, even if they had to come from horse units. He was going to have General Marshall (Chief of Staff designate) visit Fort Knox after the Plattsburg maneuvers and "go to the mat with him." A few days after my return from Fort Knox, General Herr told me that he was willing to take sufficient personnel from the 2d Cavalry to create a mechanized cavalry squadron at Fort Riley. Heretofore, he had stood firm on his vow not to give up a single horse soldier. "I bcliew this d q cart be marked as the begiiiriitig of the riiecliariizatiori of Joliiiiiy Herr," I wrote in my diary that evening. The effect of the German invasion of Poland was showing up by mid-September. I recorded in my diary: I tliirik the Chief sliocild jiinip on the iiiecliariized barid wagon with both feet ... the Chief will riot reverse his stand on horse iiriits arid offer to conrwri aiiv unless he can get more horses, cottseqietitlv we get notiring. .. I will riot be siiprised to see a move-riieiif to take riiecliaiiizafiort away front Cavalty. The Chief's lecture to the War College on 19 September 1939, however, indicated his readiness to expand mechanization. The class was with him and asked more questions than I had ever heard at the College. General Herr indicated that there was no conflict between horse and mechanized cavalry. He emphasized that the German mechanization in Poland was purely cavalry and could be carried out by our mechanized cavalry. Confirming his War College lecture, General Herr told me on 21 September that he is going all the way in mechanization as being the best thing for Cavalry. He wants one and, if possible, two "Panzer" divisions organized "vertically" instead of our current organization. He feels the time is ripe now to definitely nail down mechaniiation for Cavalry ... The Chief has finally gone all the way over to mechanization. When he went, he went fast. He is afraid of Chaffee, afraid Chaffee will take advantage of the looked-for expansion of mechanization to go for a separate corps. He has asked for Chaffee to come here next week for a conference - to get together and keep all mechanization in Cavalry. It was much too late! General Chaffee gave his War College lecture on 29 September 1Y39. I recorded in my diary: He gave the best etpositioii on tiiecliariizcd cavaliy I have heard. He said it was Cavalnl atid riot Itifantiy, altlioiigii he did not go so far as to sav that it slioiild not be a separate anti. He said it slioiild be expanded to four riiecliariized cavalry dirisioiis; that regular a n y cavalry oflcers slioiild lead it with National Guard arid ORC taking over the horse caval- n i (or what is lefl of it). He didri't riiince any words as to what lie tlioiigiit of mecliatiized versus horse. He did not rireritioti any conversion in exact words, but he left no doubt that he meant we slioiild corivert oiir regular casalni and depend on the National Guard for horse iiiiits. Chaffee followed up with a letter to TAG, through the V Corps Area, and referred to our office for comment. The letter recommended the mechanization of all regular cavalry, except a small nucleus, and relying on the National Guard and Re-seves for horse units. Van Voorhis endorsed the letter. General Herr asked me to draft our endorsement. I fully agreed to the plan to expand mechanization, but not to take it away from the Chief of Cavalry, which could only result in a separate Arm. This was the most open and bitter difference that had come up between the Chief of Cavalry and Fort b o x . There was no doubt in my mind at this time that a separation of mechanization from Cavalry was in the cards. General Herr put in a memo to the Chief of Staff asking for four "Panzer" divisions. I agreed, except for Chaffee's plan to train all cadres at Fort box. In that case, we would have two cavalry schools, and one of them would not be under the Chief of Cavalry. I considered that point vital. It was a strong entering wedge for a separate arm. The Chief overruled me. General Herr met with General Lynch, the Chief of Infantry, on 17 October 1939. General Lynch stated that he did not want any "Panzer" divisions, although he was having trouble with his tank people on that point. Herr suggested that Cavalry take everything under ten tons and Infantry everything over ten tons. I agreed, except as to furing an inelastic weight limit. This conversation left the way open, however, for Cavalry to become the driving force behind mechanization. On 10 November Fort Knox reported unfavorably on the convertible combat car T7 and I recommended that Ordnance drop the project for a convertible. The most important radio conference we ever held began at Fort Knox on 13 November with representatives of Cavalry, Infantry, Field Artillery, Signal Corps, the G4, and others in attendance. For the first time we had a demonstration of frequency modulation (FM) radio. Demonstrations, a field exercise, and conferences lasted live days and resulted in agreement on basic principles, requirements, and characteristics. Our findings were reflected in the radios used by the Army during WWII. 41 July-August 1987

Secretyy of War Henry L Stimson reviews the 2d Bn, 1st Armored Regiment at Fort Knox, September, 1941. My first talk with the Chief of Cavalry on mechanization in 1940 was a disappointment. General Herr did not want another horseman to be dismounted. He was to he disappointed, however, for in late March plans were announced for the 14th Cavalry at Des Moines to be broken up and converted to mechanized cavalry at Fort b o x and Fort Riley. This was a blow to the Chief who had been ignored by General Marshall when the decision was made. Germany's invasion of Holland, Belgium, and France on 10 May 1940 had immediate repercussions. I noted in my diary: Btisiness is picking tip. Looks like Corigress is ping to set up ntore ritonq for eqriipnterrt so the p a t geiteral staff is all in a dither. Our recoritmertdations ltave long since been in, but of coiine we have to tepeat tltent. Apparently tlrey cart never find artytlting in the fire. (14 May) 7lte President snbntitted an eritergertcy defense bill to Con- p s s today ... I took tlte bid1 by tlte horns 011 decisiorts (tlte Chief was away) and a p e d to the ntodent-ization progmrii ... Invitations are to go out right awq. Enotigli for the wltole Pmtective Mobiliiatiort Plan. All we needed now were personnel to man the new mechanized formations. I said goodbye to General Herr on 25 May 1940 and had a long talk with him. He told me that he had put in a memo to the Chief of Staff asking for the 1st Cavalry Division at full strength, two corps cavalry regiments, and two mechanized cavalry brigades. For the latter he agreed to sacrifice the rest of the horse units, retaining only enough to fill up the 1st Cavalry Division. In this way, the 11th and 14th Cavalry Regiments would be mechanized. I felt this was the best move he had made since he had been in office, hut unfortunately it was much too late. In late May, 1 left Washington on a thirty-day leave and traveled to San Francisco by way of western Canada. I was completely out of touch with events. As I was about to drive my car on board a transport ship at Fort Mason on 26 June 1940, however, a radio message arrived cancelling my orders. I wired Cheves for information. His reply stated that 1 would probably go to Mechanization Headquarters at Fort Knox or Fort Benning. "Zt looks like the separate ntecltanized force boys have won the day," 1 noted in my diary. The "Ten Lean Years" had come to an end. The Armored Force had been created, not because a new arm was necessary, but because Cavalry did not grasp the opportunities that were available. The Chief of Cavalry did not submit the memo he had shown to me on 25 May, in which he agreed to convert horse units to mechanized cavalry. Instead, he staunchly refused to give up a horse unit. So he lost it all. The new force was still mechanized cavalry, so our ten years of work had not been wasted. But it had a new name - Armored Force - and a new Chief: Adna Chaffee.

MAJOR

GENERAL

ROBERT W. GROW, whose career began as a horse cavalryman, became one of the pioneers in the mechanization of the U.S. Army. He was the first S3 of the Mechanized Force under Chaffee and Van Voorhis in the early 1930s and later commanded the 6th Armored Division in the European Theater during WWII. He retired as a major general in 1953 after serving as military attache in Moscow during the postwar years. General Grow died in November, 1985. Captain Peter R. Mansoor and Kathy Cast Garth helped to prepare "The Ten Lean Years" manuscript for publication. July-August 1987 42