Combat Intelligence at Iron Star

Corn bat Intelligence at Ironstar by Captain Michael T. Pierson I Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (lPB), along with an aggressive counter-reconnaissance plan, is essential for a task force to defeat the mass, speed, and firepower of a Soviet-style regiment. An in-depth defense, in which the enemy is observed and attrited throughout the sector, is critical. This was demonstrated during the 1st Armored Division's (MD) recent Iron Star Exercise, conducted at Hohenfels, Germany, against an Opposing Force (OPFOR) similar to that of the National Training Center (NTC). In Iron Star, battlefield intelligence proved a ma.jor contributing factor in the success or failure of a task force. The critical first step in battlefield intelligence is the S2's Intclligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). The information provided in this study, including threat evaluation, battlefield area evaluation, terrain analysis, weather analysis, and threat integration, is an important factor used by the commander and S3 in planning the task force mission. This intelligence assists the commander in preparing his intent and the S3 in developing the concept of operation to fight the battle. The IPB is a continuous process of studying and analyzing the battlefield hefore and during a battle. It provides for maximum integration of combat intelligence - the enemy, the terrain, and the weather. Threat evaluation, using a doctrinal template, shows the enemy organization, equipment, and other important order-of-battle material (see Figure 1). This assists the commander in "seeing" the battlefield, and determining the enemy's caapahilities and probable courses of action. A detailed analysis of the terrain within the area of interest identifies avenues of approach and mobility corridors which support the enemy's doctrine and employment into the sector. It provides the commander with information concerning areas of good observation and fields of fire, locations affording good cover and concealment (not only for the task force, but also for the enemy), any natural obstacles or key terrain which, if controlled, can have an impact on the battle. Further study of the terrain allows the commander to answer other questions, such as: Does the area allow for appropriate maneuver space for the enemy to deploy his forces according to his doctrine? Does the road and trail network and cross-country trafficability favor the enemy or friendly forces if rapid reinforcement is needed at any given location? A detailed terrain analysis identifies friendly and enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and courses of action. It shows the commander where combat forces can and cannot move, shoot, and communicate After analyzing the enemy and his doctrine and performing a detailed terrain analysis, the next step in the IPB process is to study the weather. Temperature, precipitation, wind direction and speed, ceiling heights, and visibility all have to be taken into account when preparing for an operation. The commander must consider if the forecasted weather or outlook favors the attackers or defenders. He must consider how snow or rain will influence terrain conditions. In developing the concept of maneuver, the S3 must develop two plans, one for g o d weather and another for a battle in reduced visibility. In Iron Star visibility was a critical factor, with fog and/or snow at times reducing visibility to less than 50 meters. The final step in the IPB process is threat integration. Basically, this consists of determining how the enemy would "like" to fight - the IDEAL - and determining, because of actual battle conditions, how the enemy will have to fight in this battle - the REALITY. This produces a situational template. The situational template is basically a doctrinal template with terrain, weather restraints, and confirmed intelligence (such as combat losses) applied. It shows how the enemy has to deviate from his doctrine to account for these factors. A situational template is the basis for event templating. Event templating is the study and analysis of battlefield events and enemy activities which provide indicators of the enemy's course of action. By knowing the enemy's doctrine of rapid movement along high speed avenues of approach and also knowing the terrain within sector that supports this type of movement, an enemy's courses of action can be predicted. An enemy force moving into the area will become visible to friendly reconnaissance elements when it enters certain areas along a mobility corridor. These areas are called named areas of interest (NAI) - locations (such as a choke point or crossroads) where enemy activity or lack of activity can be used to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action. Once an NAI is designated and established as such, some type of reconnaissance element - scouts, recon patrol, observation point (OP), or ground surveillance radar (GSR) - must be assigned to cover it and collect the intelligence it provides. NAIs can be established along every mobility corridor or avenue of approach into the sector. An enemy force can be tracked and followed, identifying its location, direction of 16

Figure 1 Doctrinal template shows enemy organization, equipment, and other important order-of-battle material which can help the commander "see" the battlefield , determine enemy capabilities, and predict his actions. movement, and intent, giving the commander the timely intelligence he needs to fight the battle or to reposition forces. NAIs along each mobility corridor and avenue of approach can turn into target areas of interest (TAI). Each TAI is an area wherc the commander can delay, disrupt, or dcstroy the enemy, eithcr with direct or indirect fire, or where he can confront the enemy with obstacles, causing him to abandon or change a course of action and forcing him into the strengths of the task force. Once

TATS

are established, decision points (DP) can be identified. DPs are areas which may require a tactical decision by the commander as a result of battlefield events. Identifying a DP can assist the commander in examining and making a decision before it is thrust upon him in a critical situation. Likewise, enemy decision points can be predicted, at which his probable courses of action can be identified. The completed IPB gives the commander and S3 a good estimate of enemy strengths, composition, and possible courses of action, to allow them to develop the concept of operations. After the initial plan is developed, intelligence continues to play an essential role in developing the situation. Reconnaissance or counter-reconnaissance plans to determine the enemy's intention, along with continuous updating of the IPB, are essential in answering the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) - ~

EXAMPLE OF A DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE

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those questions or items of intelligence that the commander needs answered to light the battle. When a task force is defending, a counter-reconnaissance plan is essential to deny the enemy the intelligence he needs and will attempt to gather from his reconnaissance efforts. The counter-reconnaissance plan must provide security for the task force by killing the enemy's reconnaissance elements well forward in the sector. Long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs) or OPs from a reinforced scout platoon must find enemy reconnaissance elements and maintain contact with them, without being detected themselves, until the enemy unit can be destroyed. A tank platoon, with its mobility and firepower, must be identified as a reaction force and on call to move forward or to intercept an enemy reconnaissance unit and kill it. Within tank platoons, some crews should be designated to be on alert in their tanks, with their night-vision equipment, to search for enemy recon units. Other crews must get out of their tanks and provide dismounted security for the platoon. This allows the infantry to move forward in sector to cover dead space and any dismounted infantry avenues of approach between battle positions. GSR teams must be placed forward in sector, either under direct control of the scout platoon leader or company commanders to ensure timely intelligence. Different overlapping intelligence security systems are essential to provide mutual support and depth of effort. The areas which allow for easy infiltration into the sector by mounted or dismounted reconnaissance elements must be identified in the IPB. The S2 must stress to the S3 and commander the importance of covering these areas with surveil-July-August 1987 lance assets. The counter-reconnaissance battle must be fought awes-sively hy the task force, taking the battle to the enemy and forcing him to adjust his plans or mission because of his lack of intelligence. Counter-reconnaissance is a very difficult task, especially as proven in the German terrain in which 1AD conducted Iron Star. Dismounted infantry teams moving through the rolling forests during periods of reduced visibility were almost impossible to detect and stop. In one mission conducted during Iron Star, a battalion task force, consisting of three armor companies and one mechanized company, was assigned the mission to defend in sector. The intelligence indicators showed that the task force was facing a tank regiment with over 100 armored vehicles (tanks and BMPs) and heavy artillery support. Terrain analysis identified three major mounted avenues of approach into the task force sector (see Figure 2). All three avenues of approach originated at the same point before branching out through the task force sector. At this point, DP-1, the enemy commander was faced with the decision of which avenue to use in his attack. The S2 broke down the counterreconnaissance battle into three belts. The scouts, consisting of the organic scout platoon, with its three APCs and three ITVs, were reinforced with a FIST-V, an additional four APCs, a squad of infantry, and a GSR team, and were given responsibility for the first belt. The critical task for the scouts was to identify which avenue the regiment would take (the dcfending commander’s first PIR). They were assigned coverage of DP-1, TAI-1, TAL5 and TAI-3, and were instructed to attrit the enemy, once spotted, with indirect fire. The scouts had three major threats to avoid: the enemy’s reconnaissance elements searching to destroy them, the enemy dismounted infantry that would sweep through the area, and the rolling artillery barrage as the regiment advanced. In the second recon belt, the mechanized team forward in battle position 2 (BP-2), in the central sector, was assigned coverage of DP-2, TAI-5, and TAI-6. The tank team in BP-1, with an attached GSR team, was responsible for the northern approach route and TAI-4, just at the edge of its engagement area. Finally, in the third belt, which contained the task force main defense area, the tank team at BP-1 was assigned coverage of TAL8 in the north, while another tank company at BP- 3 was assigned coverage of DP-3 and TAL7 in the south. OPs were established by the companies and local patrols were run throughout the night to cover the dead space between battle positions. 18

Figure 2 In this Iron Star mission, a bat-probable avenues of approach ment. "...Infiltration by the enemy infantry teams that identified BPs and obstacles was decisive and had a major impact on the battle ...I' talion task force covered three as it faced an enemy tank regi-The task force commander and S3 were concerned with the enemy's massive amount of artillery, capable of firing 10,OOO-14,OOO rounds. Five enemy POWs captured that morning gave evidence that enemy LRRP teams had infiltrated the sector the previous night. Locations of CO/TMs and obstacles were probably known by the enemy, and made the task force extremely susceptible to an artillery attack. The commander decided to move the CO/TMs into hide positions in an attempt to avoid any "pinpointed" artillery. OPs were left behind on all BPs, and once the enemy was identified, the CO/TMs were to move forward and reoccupy their BPs. At 040, the scouts observed BMPs moving forward and infantry dismounting. Enemy troops started moving toward the reinforced scout platoon. Indirect fire was called immediately, and killed several enemy soldiers. In the battle that followed, two scout vehicles were destroyed by the enemy infantry. Three OPs and a GSR team were forced to reposition. However, the scout platoon was still combat effective and capable of carrying out its mission. The remaining dismounted enemy infantry headed toward BP-2, while another dismounted company headed toward BP-1 in the north. A critical factor in the north was the destruction of the attached GSR team by friendly tank fire (It was mistaken for an enemy vehicle). Enemy infantry teams began breaching the obstacles and attacking the infantry covering BP-2. Within minutes, there were over 60 enemy casualties; however, the mechanized team was now almost combat ineffective. At approximately 0750, the enemy artillery barrage began rolling over the scouts and through the sector. One scout vehicle was destroyed by indirect fire. The scouts repositioned EAST (toward the enemy), and established two OPs (one dismounted) close to DP-1. At 0830, the scouts reported a p proximately 45 tanks and 15 BMPs approaching DP-1 and turning southwest toward TAI-2. Shortly afterward, a smaller unit passed DP- 1 and turned north toward TALI. Because the infantry company had heen decimated in the earlier engagements (unknown to the task force), it was not able to displace to its alternate position (vicinity TAI-

21) or to report the movement of the regiment as it turned at DP-2 and headed towards TAI-6. In its hide position, the tank company in the south avoided the artillery, but its OPs were destroyed by OPFOR dismounted infantry and indirect fire, and could not report that at DP-3 the regiment had sent a small fixing force to the south, while the main body had turned north. The regiment rolled through TAI-21. Contact with the enemy was lost in the rolling forest terrain and further reduced visibility caused by scattered snow. The tank company in reserve did not see the regiment until it was too late. The tank company fought valiantly, destroying over 30 enemy vehicles in just a few minutes before bcing overwhelmed and destroyed by the regiment's mass and firepower. The IPB drove the concept of operation - enemy avenues of approach, TAls, and DPs were identified, and were for the most part accurate. A good counter-recon plan was established and a good counterrecon battle was fought. The scouts accomplished their assigned mission, surprisingly losing fewer vehicles and personnel than expected. But infiltration by the enemy infantry teams that identified BPs and obstacles was decisive and had a major impact on the battle. Forced to hide its companies to avoid artillery, the task force left critical TAIs and DPs covered by limited assets and not by the overlapping systems needed to ensure coverage. If the enemfs dismounted infantry intent had been detected, and if the tank company assigned BP-3 had been able to reoccupy its position to attrit and give early warning, the reserve company could have been committed to TAI-2, plugging the hole in the task force defense and possibly changing the outcome of the battle.

CAPTAIN

MICHAEL

T. PIERSON was commissioned in Military Intelligence from Carson-Newman College as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1979. Pierson holds a Master of Arts degree in geography from East Tennessee State University, and attended the MI Officer Advanced Course and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He served at the National Training Genter as a scout platoon leader, OPFOR regimental S2, and commander EWIREC for the OPFOR. He also served as 5 2 of the 1st Battalion, 35th Armor and is currently S 2 of 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Germany. 19 July-August 1987