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ARMOR · July-August 1986

"Beans and Bullets": Logistics Training in 2/3d ACR

Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich
pp. 22–25Features1986

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“Beans and Bullets “ 8 8 Logistics Training in 2/3d ACR by Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich and Major N. Winn Noyes Cavalry regiments have led the way in appreciating that sergeants must conduct unit-level combat service support operations in the field. The ACRs have recognized that in combat, planning and conducting tactical operations will fully absorb the attention of commanders and platoon leaders. However much they would wish otherwise, officers at the unit level will have precious little energy or time to devote to the routine, but critical, tasks of unit sustainment. If they are to be done at all, these tasks will be done by sergeants. To describe these tasks as routine is not to imply that they are simple. On the contrary: few thing are more complex - and more susceptible to going off the rails - than the business of supporting an equipment-intensive combat unit operating on a fluid and highly lethal battlefield. If our sergeants are going to be up to the challenges of combat service support in wartime, we have a clear obligation right now to train them to master the skills needed to sustain a unit’s ability to fight. Some of you might argue that one function of FTXs is to develop proficiency in logistics operations. We disagree for several reasons. Our experience in “full-up” exercises has been that it’s maneuver that gets all the attention, with service support training hardly more than an afterthought. In the context of the “crawl-walk-run” approach to training, moreover, most FTXs take place at a sprint. During an FTX, the emphasis is on making it happen now. This accelerated tempo no doubt accounts for the madcap, helter-skelter aspect of the limited logistics play that accompanies an FTX. Such a pace is not conducive to teaching, and seldom permits the reflection needed to learn from mistakes. Any logistics play that does occur during an FTX falls into the narrow spectrum of Class I and Class I11 resupply, plus the evacuation of broken-down vehicles. Other support requirements are all but ignored: resupply of Classes 11, IV, V, and VIII; PLL replenishment; Class VI1 replacement; medical evacuation; graves registration; and personnel replacements. We believe that to become proficient in conducting unit sustainment operations, NCOs need training dedicated to that purpose. With this in mind, our squadron has instituted a series of recurring exercises designed specifically to train our sergeants in logistics operations. We call this Beans & Bullets. The term recurring deserves emphasis. Given the personnel turbulence with which all units live, one-shot training in the intricacies of service support simply will not work. We’ve structured the squadron training calendar to incorporate a Beans & Bullets exercise each quarter, a frequency intended to introduce newly arrived sergeants to their logistical responsibilities while ensuring that old hands remain current. Of the two exercises in the series, Armor School graduates will find Beans & Bullets 11 (BBII) the more familiar. It is the Logistics Coordination Exercise (LCX) devised at Fort Knox and described in Field circular 71-7. The LCX provides invaluable training. It gives sergeants a realistic appreciation of just how tough sustainment operations can be and illustrates the crucial role that NCOs must play. It provides a valuable, “hands-on” opportunity to grapple with combat-related challenges. Most importantly, it provides the arena in which sergeants can develop the drills and SOPS so essential to the effective accomplishment of these activities. A word of caution for those who have never been in an LCX. A good LCX requires plenty of preparation. Overhead is substantial. An LCX’s effectiveness varies inversely with the amount of simulation permitted. The unit that wants rearming to be something more than simply the transfer of a piece of paper, for example, must plan imaginatively, and well in advance of the event. BBIIprovides first sergeants and platoon sergeants with realistic training in executing sustainment operations, but contributes little toward educating sergeants on the overall functioning of the combat service support system available to the squadron. To address this need, we devised Beans &Bullets I (BBI) - a logistics war game. BBI does three things: First, it lays out key elements of the squadron logistics apparatus on a scale where they become comprehensible (Figure 1). Platoon sergeants and first sergeants see normally-obscure elements like the combat trains and maintenance collection point and learn where they are established, and what they do. Secondly, BBI exercises the flow of logistical information: units submit status reports, request routine and emergency resupply using the prescribed formats, and keep abreast of information such as which Logistic Control Point (LCP) is “active” and when the next “Logpad’ is due. Third, since BBI incorporates a tactical war game that produces a wide variety of logistical requirements, the exercise forces the sergeants to walk through the full range of sustainment problems that they will encounter in combat. The emphasis must be on “walking through.” The game allows plenty of opportunity for instruction and critique. If the attempt to evacuate a “casualty’’ misfires, for instance, those involved - platoon sergeant, first sergeant, unit medic, and the medical platoon sergeant, discuss how it ought to have been done. BBI also pays off in a fourth way. All squadron radionets down to the platoon level are operational. The war game that produces logistical need also generates maneuver play, 22 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare July-August 1986

”. ..The game allows plenty of opportunity for instruction and critique.. . 8 8 intelligence, and fire support requirements. Troop leading procedures are exercised. Orders are drafted and issued. In effect, BBIis a scaled-down CPX that benefits the entire C3I system. Let’s look in greater detail at Figure 1, from the rear up toward the FLOT. What is actually on the ground in the area marked off as the “Regimental Service Support Area’’ (RSSA)? The squadron field trains contain the M577 that is the admidlog rear CP, manned by the personnel who actually operate it in the field. Nearby are representatives of logistical elements located in the field trains - most notably, unit supply sergeants and the squadron support platoon leader. The field trains also contains an imaginary bank of materiel - realistic quantities of Class I11 and Class V, for example, that units must draw on as they deplete on-board stocks. Since that bank contains limited quantities, those in charge of the field trains must coordinate with the RSSA to refill. the bank as the units draw it down. For BBI, the RSSA itself is primarily a communications node, manned by the Regimental Materiel Management Center. Set up of the combat trains and maintenance collection point is similar. Communications equipment is actually on hand and placed into operation. Key personnel such as the S4, squadron maintenance technician and the physician’s assistant are present. Here the “bank” has a different character, cbnsist-ing of recovery, PLL, medical evacuation, an aid station, and limited quantities of uploaded ammunition and fuel for emergency resupply.

MANUAL WAR GAME,

k - 2 0 0 ’

300 ’ I Figure 1

LCPA01 Y

LCPBll I a

REGIMENTAL SERVICE

SUPPLY AREA

FIGURE 1 : BEANS & BULLETS

LAY -OUT

The schematic reDresents a sauadron defending with three cavalrv trooDs abreast, a tank company in reserve, and the howitzer bakery in support, but game layout can vary. Forward of these elements is the squadron TOC - fully deployed and operational. As the tactical situation unfolds, the TOC receives reports from units and issues the orders that cause “Blue Forces” to maneuver on the game board. Beyond the TOC are the units themselves. The schematic shows a squadron defending with three cavalry troops abreast, tank company in reserve, and the howitzer battery in support. In practice, units could be laid out in any number of ways. In terms of equipment, each unit’s position consists of a command post (BOC for howitzer battery) with a combat vehicle for each platoon sergeant. “Players” in each unit are more numerous: XO, first sergeant, platoon leaders (maneuvering their platoons at the game board but not participating in the logistics play), platoon sergeants, motor sergeant, VTR operator, and medic. The unit commander’s exclu-Jdy-August 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 23 h T sion from the list of players is intentional. The XO and platoon leaders fight the tactical battle depicted on the game board. The sergeants attend to logistics. This division of labor frees the commander from immediate involvement and allows him to concentrate on helping his NCOs learn the techniques needed to sustain their unit in combat. Here’s how the game works. Play normally begins with units assuming their actual equipment and personnel status. Platoon leaders array their forces on the game board. “Red Forces” - placed on the board and commanded by the S2 - initiate combat and the fight is on. Contact between Red and Blue produces combat information, passed by platoon leader’s radios to their CPs and up to the squadron TOC. This information in turn stimulates orders that cause troops and platoons to maneuver on the game board. More importantly, contact with the enemy generates logistics requirements for Blue - equipment destroyed or damaged, soldiers wounded or killed, prisoners needing evacuation, supplies needing replenishment. Platoon leaders note these requirements on 3x5 cards and notify their platoon sergeants by radio of what has occurred. Now, it’s up to the NCOs to coordinate the support needed to fill these requirements. Here are three examples of how that coordination works in BBI: Example 1 The platoon leader of 1st platoon, E Troop annotates a card as follows: E4 19D WIA; compound fracture to right femur. In response to this situation, these actions occur: (a) Having been notified that the platoon has suffered a casualty, platoon sergeant calls his CP on troop command to request medical evacuation. (b) The first sergeant escorts the troop medic from the troop trains to the vicinity of 1st platoon. (c) The platoon sergeant guides the medic to the game board and passes the casualty (i-e., the 3x5 card) to the medic. (d) The medic evacuates the casualty to the nearest active LCP, in this case A07. (e) The E Troop XO in his CP calls on squadron admidlog to have an ambulance sent to LCP A07; he also updates his casualty feeder report. (f) The squadron aid station dispatches a medic from the combat trains to LCP A07, picks up the casualty, and receives a report on what Class VI11 items the E Troop medic has expended. (g) The squadron medic completes the evacuation of the casualty to the aid station. (h) The adminllog CP incorporates the E Troop casualty into its loss figures subsequently reported to regiment. (i) The RSSA provides a replacement - a new 3x5 card reading E4 190 - to the squadron field trains. (j) As part of the next routine resupply, the E Troop supply sergeant carries the replacement forward to the unit, ensuring eventual delivery to the platoon sergeant of 1st platoon and subsequently to the game board itself. Only at that point has the platoon’s fighting strength been restored. Example 2 The platoon leader of 3d platoon, F Troop informs his platoon sergeant of the following: M60 tank deadlined; Number 1 right side road wheel arm unserviceable. Given this situation, these actions occur: (a) The platoon sergeant reports his problem on troop command to the troop CP. (b) The first sergeant dispatches his motor sergeant to assess the situation. (c) The first sergeant goes to the 3d platoon’s location, consults with the platoon sergeant, and decides whether to fix the vehicle on site, tow it to the troop trains, or evacuate it further to the rear. He bases his decision on the tactical situation depicted by the war game and on the actual availability of parts in the unit’s PLL or the Support Squadron ASL. (d) Assuming the part is unavailable, the first sergeant calls forward his VTR operator. The platoon sergeant guides the VTR to the site of the downed vehicle, (i.e., to his platoon’s location on the game board.) The VTR now evacuates the vehicle, (the 3x5 card) to the nearest LCP, in this case, A14. (e) The troop XO calls on the squadron admidlog net to request that a squadron M88 be sent to A14; he also updates his equipment availability report. (f) At the maintenance collection point, the squadron motor officer dispatches a mechanic representing a VTR to A14; the mechanic assumes control of the downed M60 and evacuates it to the maintenance collection point. (g) Squadron maintenance requisitions an arm from the RMMC. (h) July-August 1986 24 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

RMMC produces the arm, (a new the first sergeant determines if the 3x5 card) and provides it to the LOGPAC contains all the unit’s squadron a t the field trains; the needs and decides how to distribute next available transportation de-any shortfall that exists. (h) The livers the part to the collection first sergeant guides the LOGPAC point. (i) Once part and vehicle are to the battery, coordinates resupply married up, the vehicle comes off with the section sergeants, and re-deadline and moves forward to returns the emptied LOGPAC to A01. join the unit. The first sergeant From A01, the unit supply sergeant ensures its return to 3d platoon. guides it back to the field trains. Only when the repair part card has (i) As the unit rearms and refuels, actually reached the game board its combat capability is momentari-does the platoon leader consider his ly degraded. As the first sergeant tank strength to have been re-resupplies each section in turn, stored. that section of the game board Example 3 moves off of its position and is Routine resupply of Howitzer unavailable for delivering fires. Battery. To accomplish this, the Having well-coordinated drills for following actions occur: (a) At this procedure enables the battery times designated by the unit TAC- to expedite resupply and to return SOP, all section sergeants provide the unit quickly to a fully ready the battery first sergeant with their posture. (j) Based on supplies con-requirements for fuel, ammunition, sumed by all of the unit LOGPACs, or other classes of supply. (b) The the S4 requests resupply through BOC passes a consolidated list of theRMMC. requirements to the squadron S4 on The play in BBI continues as the admidlog net. Again, theTAC- long as the commander wants the SOP prescribes time and format. (c) war to last. Our experience has Drawing on his bank, the S4 in the been that six hours permits a bat-field trains provides the howitzer talion or squadron to run through battery supply sergeant with those most situations and still leaves requested requirements that he is time for the after-action review able to fill. This constitutes the which is so crucial in reinforcing battery’s LOGPAC for that day. (d) teaching points. On adrnin/log, the S4 tells the battery when and where they can ex-Logistics training is not especial-pect their LOGPAC. In this case, ly glamorous. As far as we’re con-delivery will be to A01. (e) The first cerned, it’s not nearly as much fun sergeant moves to A01 to linkup as racing across the desert or shoot-with the LOGPAC. (f) The supply ing at Dona Ana. We’re convinced, sergeant assumes control of the however, that Beans & Bullets is LOGPAC, &e., a set of 3x5 cards) making a significant contribution and guides it from the field trains to to our overall readiness through A01. (g) Once linkup is complete, detailed training.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL A.

J. BACEVICH commands the 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, TX. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he was a cavalry platoon leader in Vietnam and commanded a troop in the 3d ACR. More recently, he has served as S3 of the 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment and S3 of the 1 1 th Armored Cavalry Regiment. MAJOR N. WlNN NOYES is the regimental S3 for the 3d ACR at Fort Bliss, TX. Commissioned in OCS in 1973, he has served as a divisional cavalry platoon leader, executive officer of the l/lOth Cavalry, air cavalry platoon commander and regimental cavalry troop commander with the 2d ACR. Other assignments include aviation advisor to the reserve components, instructor at Fort Knox, and squadron S3 for the 2/3 ACR. July- August ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 25

End of indexed article

Citation

Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich. “"Beans and Bullets": Logistics Training in 2/3d ACR.” ARMOR, July-August 1986, pp. 22-25.
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