Light Armour in Light Force Operations

Light Armour in Light Force Operations by Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Cullinan Introduction In the 40 years since the end of WW 11, the United Kingdom (UK) has deployed light forces on operations of various kinds on 74 occasions. These operations involved a variety of force levels, anything from three divisions to less than a battalion, and a wide range of environments from Western Europe to Asia, Central America and the Middle East. Experience has been gained of operating in deserts, mountains, jungles - including the concrete city jungles - and the particularly bleak terrain of Korea and the Falkland Islands. The availability of light armoured vehicles (LAW in 72 of these operations proved invaluable. These light armour forces employing their classic armoured tactical characteristics of firepower, mobility and protection, were the “Jack of All Trades” of the operations. Mobility and flexibility have been their most important characteristics, while firepower and protection, though useful, have generally been less in demand. In the same way that main-battle tanks exploit their characteristics to produce shock action, so LAVs have provided versatility, an asset demonstrated in the way light armour units performed their role and many varied tasks. Light Armour Characteristics The principal characteristics of an armoured vehicle are its mobility, protection and firepower. “he priority given to each determines the nature and the use of the vehicle. In the main battle tank, the emphasis is on firepower and protection, where as the LAYS design emphasizes mobility with limited firepower and relatively little protection. To the LAV’s advantages may be added flexibility which stems from the versatile nature of the vehicle and the excellent communications provided. Mobility. LAVs can travel quickly on roads and tracks and have good endurance. Their excellent agility and cross-country performance reduces their dependence on roads for tactical movement. They are also airportable, and in most cases, air-droppable. A light armour force can take on wideranging operations and achieve quick shifts in weight and direction of operations. It is important, however, to appreciate that mobility is not an end in itself but a means of achieving that end at minimum risk and maximum effectiveness. An LAV is relatively useless when on the move, as it cannot observe or fire effectively, and thus if there are enemy about it is likely to come off second best in the ensuing battle. Mobility enables a vehicle to move from one position of observation and fire to another by the shortest or safest route and at best speed, cutting unproductive time to a minimum. It also provides a degree of protection, as a vehicle moving fast across country is likely to be much harder to hit then one moving slowly on a road. Running Gear. The choice of wheels or tracks is determined by the LAV’s operational role. If crosscountry mobility, especially over soft or marshy ground, is of prime importance, then the lower ground pressure achieved by tracks offers a major advantage. However, in general, track-laying vehicles tend to be nois-ier, more complicated, and harder to maintain. They cannot travel as fast on roads and the tracks wear out sooner. Track life is a significant factor in the cost of ownership. Thus, when cross-country mobility is less important, a wheeled vehicle is preferred. It is interesting to note that various attempts have been made to combine the advantages of wheels and tracks, such as the highly successful U.S. half-track which was used extensively in the desert. AUK- 16

At left, cannon-armed Scorpion crew performs reconnalssance. At right, Britlsh Infantry In the Falklands actlon get a lift from a Scimitar crew across desolate landscape. Below, Sclmltars take gunnery practice after Falklands flghting died down. The light tracked vehicles served well in the boggy terrain. designed experimental wheeled v e hicle, which employed shear steering, showed considerable promise and a prototype was built but it never entered service. In reality, there is no unresolved wheels-versus-tracks debate as the choice is determined by the LAV's operational role. Firepower. The principal direct ground-fire capability of light armoured vehicles in service today lies with 76-mm/90-mm guns, 25-mm/ 30-mm cannons, and coaxial/commander's machineguns. The main guns can knock out a tank if it is hit in the side or rear at close range, and they can be used very effectively against enemy APCs and reconnaissance vehicles. If firepower is the primary consideration, which it seldom will be, then vehicles should be sited to engage an enemy with defilade fire. In its primary role of observation, the LAV will only use its main armament just prior to moving to a new position. To shoot and stay is to invite destruction. LAVs also have a semidirect and indirect fire capability. This capability may be used in operations world-wide to carry out the deliberate bombardment of an enemy strongpoint. Protection. LAVs have limited protection and thus are sometimes vulnerable to antitank fire, mines, and direct hits by artillery. They give crews some measure of protection from small arms fire, mortar bombs and shell fragments. All v e hicles must use the ground to best advantage to offset their lightweight armour. Some vehicles can be pressurized and these have an NBC filtration system. Flexibility. The mobility of LAVs combined with communications and the versatility of the crewmen gives light armour units operational flexibility. This allows for a change of task at short notice, quick redeployment and the simultaneous, rapid execution of several diverse activities. Tasks for Light Armour Advance to contact. The task of light armour in the advance or pursuit is to obtain and pass back accurate and timely information about the enemy and to find and exploit gaps in his defences so that they can be used by the follow-up main force. The Scorpions and Scimitars of 5 Brigade in the Falklands campaign provided such a screen and in the words of the brigade commander, “... it was good to know that we had something with tougher skins than the infantry which could go ahead.” Offensive Operations. Light armour units lack the equipment and manpower to mount deliberate attacks against enemy positions organized and deployed in strength. They may, however, carry out quick or diversionary attacks against ene my parachute/heliborne landings, airfields, bridgeheads and other such targets. Again, by way of example, in the Falklands campaign, the light armour provided firepower in a diversionary attack which was mounted to mask the first phase on Tumbledown Mountain. The direct-fire capability of Saladin armoured cars was also used most successfully in the 1964 Rad-fan (S. Arabia) operations against difficult land targets which could not be engaged effectively by artillery or mortars. On other occasions, light armour firepower was used when air strikes were prohibited because of the lie of the land or due to political repercussions. In addition, light forces in the Middle East theatre were called upon to carry out such tasks as: independent raids, deep penetration missions, and disruption of the enemy in the pursuit. The ligl ployed to the F ht armour force d e ‘alklands was also At right, S C O ~ I O C ~ a rmsiiy ma a I ~ - m i m m m m main gun firing HESH and HE rounds. A land mlne caused headaches, but little else, for the crew of this Scimitar employed in the Falklands fighting. * 18 july-august 1985 ?repared for their task Brunei ,,-: - +-,L :- ..-+.-.l.1: trained and 1 of NBC recollllruaamr;c, u MSE UA the final event they were not called upon to carry out. If there is a lack of organic heavy armour it is almost inevitable that the light armour contingent of a light force will be called upon to take a share of defeating enemy armour. However, other than in the Korean War and the Falklands, where the threat did not materialize, British light armour has seldom been r e quired for this task. OP line. A line of observation is manpower-intensive, particularly in close country and in jungle terrain. The heavy demand on infantry can be eased by light armour taking part in the line where suitable arcs can be found. Normally, in campaigns such as the Malayan Emergency and in i, where overt OPs had been Pat.uUlished and it was decided that these needed to go covert, then light armour was brought in to cover the same arc from a different location. This had the added advantage in that OPs could act as delaying positions if or when necessary. British light armour forces are also trained in the use and direction of artillery, this being the primary offensive area of armoured reconnaissance. As the crew are relatively well-protected in comparison to dismounted infantry, they can bring fire down almost on their own position. This cuts down the time spent in adjusting fire on those occasions when any adjustment is possible. Mobile patrols. Mobile patrols have been one of the major tasks for British light armour forces and their success has been out of all proportion to the numbers of men and vehicles involved. The most recent example was the British contingent of 100 men in the 4-nation peace-keeping force in Lebanon equipped with Ferret scout cars; probably the highest in profile of the contingents in the force, although by far the smallest, and all due to an intense programme of flag patrols. The patrolling principles employed in the rural areas of Northern Ireland have differed little from those in similar areas in counterinsurgency and conventional operations elsewhere. The only important differences have been in the emphasis placed on gathering information and the constraints on aggressive and retaliatory action. Many types of patrols have been employed by British light armour forces in operations worldwide: route reconnaissance/clearance patrols; antismuggling patrols; patrols to deny enemy freedom of action and to isolate him from the local population; intelligence-gathering patrols both to get to know terrain and information on the enemy identity, location, habits and methods; combined vehicle and foot patrols where the light armour has been a useful adjunct to foot patrols where rapid reinforcement or additional fire support has been necessary. Protective tasks. Light armour escorts for columns and VIPs, particularly when reinforced by infantry and helicopter support, has been a prime task in British counterinsurgency/counterrevolutionary and internal security (IS) operations. Vehicles used have been wheeled (Saladin/Ferret/Fox), or tracked, (Scorpion/Scimitar), and all have proved successful, although on balance, the tracked CVR with their high road speed and cross-country performance have proved more versatile. In the British experience, anti-mine patrols are best done by light armour forces supported, when available, by infantry and helicopters. Although antitank mines with the equivalent of 15 pounds of explosive will remove wheels, sprockets and tracks and displace the vehicles, bodily injury to the crew is rare. One such mine detonated under the right hand track of a Scorpion in the Falklands, removed both tracks, most of the road wheels, lifted it some 3-4 feet and bent the belly plates, but did not penetrate. The crew evacuated with nothing worse than headaches for the next few days. Communication tasks. Since LAVs are protected, armed, agile and equipped with radios, they have excellent communication potential with the ability to extend the range and reliability of a net with their rebroadcast facilities. The vehicle-charging system means that power to the radios can be supplied for extended periods without any logistic requirement for resupply of batteries. Light armour platoons in the Middle East operations also formed small command groups which could, for example, carry and escort a forward observing officer, a forward air control officer, a political officer and an Arab liaison officer into a prescribed area during active operations. The force headquarters then had the armour direct-fire guns, artillery, and aircraft support available as required and the presence of a political advisor and Arab interpreter. The availability of a large number of radios in light armour units also makes them particularly appropriate for deployment as a traffic control organization, for the crossing of a water obstacle, a minefield, or the negotiation of any major defile. Crowd dispersal. In IS situations, the dispersal of large crowds, particularly in enclosed areas, is a task for dismounted infantry and the use of armoured vehicles in close proximity to large crowds is inadvisable. They can only be effective as a threat, much like that of a policeman on a horse. However, light armour has been used on many occasions in urban areas such as Hong Kong, Palestine, Aden and Singapore as a follow-up to crowd dispersal by infantry, to provide road blocks and communications. Road blocks and cordons. The mobility and good communications of light armour suits it well to the task of setting up and operating deliberate and snap road blocks and has been fully exploited in most British Army operations and has proved particularly successful in the Northem Ireland situation. Conversely, light armour has been used to demolish road blocks and barricades e- rected by rioters, either by crashing through or towing them away using grappling hooks or tow ropes. Light armour has also been used to form outer cordons to warn off or prevent groups outside cordoned areas, villages, housing estates, etc., from breaking in and attempting to disrupt troops searching the area and carrying out interrogation. Conclusion In the light of British experience since WW 11, in many different levels of conflict, it can be judged that the LAV's characteristics of mobility, flexibility and protection have exerted a major impact. Highly versatile LAVs such as Saladin, Ferret, Fox, Scorpion and Scimitar, although lightly gunned, carried out all tasks required of them and proved invaluable.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MI-

CHAEL E. CULLINAN was commissioned into the 14th/ 20th King's Hussars from Mons Officer Cadet School in 1966 and served in Germany, North Africa, Hong Kong and Singapore in ar-mourand reconnaissanceun-til 1971. He has served in Northern Ireland several times in urban and border areas and for 14yearswith theBrit-ish ArmyoftheRhineinclud- i ng three years as an armou red squadron commander and staff appointments with G3 Headquarters, 1 st British Corps and G1. Headquarters 1stArmouredDivision. In 1983 he became the British Liai-sonOfficertotheUSAARMC, Fort Knox. In April, this year, hereturnedtotheUnitedKing-dom at the completion of his Fort Knox tour.

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