CRUSADER: Slow Step to Victory

Prologue War is filled with lessons in victory and defeat, and it is not always the former that are the best classroom instructors. Valuable lessons can be learned from the study of selected battles and operations; for in all instances, victor and vanquished will have displayed many command attributes that must be shunned by today’s leaders. A case in point is the 55-day series of battles in the Western Desert of North Africa from 8 November 1941 to 12 January 1942 - the battles known as Operation Crusader to the British 8 Army that fought them against the Axis forces that were laying siege to Tobruk in Cyrenaica. Preliminary Operations General Leutnant Erwin Rommel had arrived in North Africa in February 1941, and within a few months had recaptured almost all of Cyrenaica, which the British had taken earlier from Marshal Graziani’s Italian armies. But Tobruk, a port city on the Mediterranean coast, remained in British hands. Tobruk was the objective in two British relief offensives, Battleaxe and Crusader. The first failed. The second succeeded, in spite of itself. The 3-day shambles of Battleaxe should have proven to the British leaders-in the field and in London - the folly of mounting a campaign for wholly political motives, but the British were desperate for a victory. General Sir Archibald Wavell, British commander-in-chief, Western Desert Force (WDF), had mounted Battleaxe after being incessantly badgered by Prime Minister Churchill to “do something” in the desert. He was later sacked for following orders. During Battleaxe, Rommel’s innovative and decisive use of his 88-mm AA guns in their first major desert role as antiank weapons severely wracked the British armor at Halfaya Pass (Hellfire Pass), destroying 11 of 12 Matilda tanks. Another factor was that the German panzer units were trained as combined arms formations, with tanks, artillery, AT weapons and infantry fighting as teams. After Battleaxe, reinforcements of men and materiel flowed into the WDF. Meanwhile, Rommel, who was not as concerned with the logistical side of military operations as he should have been, began to plan for a decisive attack that was to be launched against the Tobruk perimeter on 20 November by the combined German-Italian armies. General Sir Claude Auchinleck (The “Auk”) was named C-in-C, WDF on 22 June 1941, replacing General Wavell. He had been General Officer Commanding, British Expeditionary Force, France, in 1940, and the German High Command regarded him as a “joke.”’ He proved them wrong. In addition to the WDF, Auchinleck also had command responsibilities over operations in Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Suez. Moreover, a major drain of his fighting forces in the Western Desert was underway to support the abortive campaign in Greece. Finally, he faced a continuation of the telegraphic bombardment from Churchill that had driven the distraught Wavell into launching the untimely Battleaxe. Rommel, too, was plagued by higher commanders (he had both German and Italian governments with which to contend), but he developed the practice of simply not saying much to his superiors and not infrequently presented them with a fait acompli. Also, Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia on 2 June, was to play havoc with Rommel’s victories and, in combination with Allied air and sea attacks on the Axis supply convoys from Italy to North Africa, was to eventually doom Axis endeavors in the Western Desert. The North African campaign was seen in Berlin as a sideshow to the Russian campaign; a pulling of Italian chestnuts out of the fire, but had Rom-me1 been adequately supplied, he 36 might well have taken Egypt and surged through the Near East with cataclysmic results for the Allies. It is not inconceivable that he would have linked up with German forces in southern Russia. However, while Berlin saw North Africa as a minor front, it was the pit and pith of the British Empire’s war. The Far East had been lost and Dunkirk had seen the withdrawal of British forces from the Continent. Their only fighting contact with the Axis on land was now centered in the Western Desert. Hence, Churchill’s incessant demands for action. General Auchinleck appointed Lieutenant General Sir Alan Cunningham as Commander, WDF, on 9 September

1941. Cunningham had just concluded a stunningly successful campaign in Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia against the Italians and had restored Emperor Haile Selassie to his throne from which Mussolini had deposed him in 1936. Cunningham had fought his infantry brigades with eclat, but he was to learn that commanding four brigades of infantry was a much different task than that of commanding a full-fledged army. Also, the Western Desert was a totally alien environment to Cunningham and to the majority of his newly-arrived battalion-level officers and men. On 26 September 1941, the WDF was renamed 8 Army with Cunningham as commander, but changing the army’s title did not ease its commander’s problems for he not only had to assimilate new men and equipment into his battered regiments, he also had to train his troops in desert tactics-and that training was incomplete when Crusader was opened. He had two months in which to do all that. Also, Cunningham was under fire, via Auchinleck, from London, to mount an offensive-even though Battleaxe had been a disaster. Such was the general climate for both armies before the British attack on 18 November. A short comparison of available forces and a recap of the German and British battle plans will clear the ground for the actual operation. Crusder Background The British were supplied via sea convoys from England that circum-navigated the African continent and entered Alexandria, Egypt via the Suez Canal. German and Italian air and sea-power precluded the use of the shorter Mediterranean sea route except for a few desperate convoys that were forced through to besieged Malta. Despite the 6-week (minimum) con- - 7 British equipment during Crusader included the slow but heavily armored Matilda, above, the ubiquitous Bren Carriers, right, and the very reliable American M-3 light tank, opposite page. Reliability problems plagued some models, like the Mk IV Cruiser, below, and the Crusader lls, bottom of page. I I--- I - -_.-..

voy runs, General Auchinleck was receiving ample supplies of men and materiel. However, his new tanks were the product of hurried production lines and his men were wholly unacclimated to the desert. The Crusader tanks arrived with nuts and bolts only hand-tight and even when they were properly assembled they were “extremely unsound mechanically.”2 All of the thousands of new vehicles had to be fitted with sand screens on their engine air intakes and otherwise prepared for desert use. In addition to the Crusader tanks, Auchinleck also received quantities of the MkZZa Matilda tank, the Valentine tank, M3 Stuart tanks and A-I3 cruiser tanks? When Crusader was launched, Cunningham and Auchinleck had available 213 Matilda and Valentine infantry tanks, 220 Crusader cruiser tanks, 150 A-I3 tanks, 156 Stuart light tanks, 600 field guns and no less than 34,000 soft-skinned vehicles. The British also had available 700 aircraft, plus a sizeable reserve. The terrible lesson of Buttleare that had yet to be learned by the British was that lesson taught at Halfaya Pass when Rommel’s 88-mm AA/AT guns ruined the British armor. The British had available in North Africa an excellent 3.7-inch AA gun that could penetrate heavier armor than the 88. There were more 3.7s in North Africa than there were 88s, but the tunnel-visioned British staff would not permit the 3.7-inch guns to be used in the AT role. They were to shoot at airplanes, and the 2- pounder (40-mm) was to shoot at tanks. And that was that. In an attempt to copy the German practice of moving AT weapons in concert with their panzer units, the British mounted a number of 2-pounder AT guns on the beds of 3-ton trucks. These were called “portees” and a degree of “up front” availability was served, but the 2-pounder could not penetrate the Mk IIZand MK ZVparuerarmor at long range without capped shot-and that type of ammunition was not available at that time in North Africa. Rommel had both German and Italian armor and troops facing 8 Army. He had been husbanding his resources for the attack on Tobruk and when Crusader opened, the Axis forces had 248 Mk ZZ, ZZI and ZV panzers, 3 captured Matildas and 145 Italian MI3/40 tanks? In addition to the now-famous 88, Rommel had also received a number of 50-mm AT guns that could kill any British tank in the Western Desert. Rommel’s greatest problem was his logistics. Convoys from Italy were regularly intercepted and decimated by Allied sea and air attacks out of the island fortress of Malta and Rommel had only the port of Tripoli whose facilities could handle only five cargo or four troop ships at one time. So intense were the convoy attacks that one group of four cargo ships was escorted by no less than four battleships, three light cruisers and twenty destroyers of the Italian Navy? Rommel also had only 570 aircraft on hand. As previously noted, Tobruk was Rommel’s primary objectiye. He needed the port facilities and he wanted to eliminate the British force in his rear before he began his offensive into Egypt. But he faced high level opposition. German and Italian commanders in Berlin and Rome wanted him simply to hold on to what he had gained, but Rommel was a fighting general and holding a static line was not his cup of tea. His plan was simple: Attack the Tobruk perimeter with overwhelming armor, artillery and infantry; break through the lines and capture the port. He flew to Rome to argue his point and then phoned Berlin for final approval. He was in Italy when Crusader opened and immediately flew back to Africa. The stage was set. Rommel planned to attack Tobruk on 20 November. Cunningham planned to unleash Crusader on 18 November with the express purpose of defeating the Axis armor and then of relieving Tobruk. Operation Crusader “At 0600, 18 November 1941, the Eighth Army with about 75,000 men excellently armed and equipped... started a general offensive in the Western Desert with the aim of destroying the German-Italian forces in Africa.” Such was the British Broadcasting Corporation’s announcement on 19 November to Britain and the world. Operation Crusader brought into the open the long-range results of two decades of Parliamentary parsimony. 8 Army faced the enemy with tanks that had been designed 10 or more years previously and that had never been improved upon. They were thrown against battle-proven tanks, some models of which had only recently been uparmored and upgunned. Crusader was planned and fought by British generals who knew little or nothing about desert fighting. Auchinleck had been brought from India and Cunningham was fresh from Central Africa. He had never commanded an army, nor had he ever commanded armor. Auchinleck, as well, had never commanded armor in a pitched battle. Cunningham’s principal subordinates were desert veterans and he tended to listen too closely to their opinions when drawing up his battle plan. However, he set about his job with commendable. alacrity and organized 8 Army into two corps: 13 Infantry and 30 Armored. 13 Corps, commanded by Major General A. R. Godwin-Austen, was composed of 1 New Zealand Infantry Division under Major General Bernard Freyburg, 4 Indian Infantry Division under Major General Frank Mes-servy and 1 Army Tank Brigade with 225 “infantry” tanks under Brigadier H. R. B. Watkins. (Note: A British brigadier does not equate to an American brigadier general. He commands a brigade, hence the title.) 30 Corps, commanded by Major General Willoughby Norrie, was composed of 7 Armored Division (the ‘Desert Rats’) under Major General W. H. E. “Strafer” Gott and contained three armored brigades: 4 Armored Brigade under Brigadier A. H. Gatehouse, 22 Armored Brigade under Brigadier J. Scott-Cockburn, and 7 Armored Brigade under Brigadier G. Davy. 30 Corps also contained 1 South African Infantry Division under Major General G. E. Brink, and 201 Guards (Motor) Brigade under Brigadier J. C. O. Marriott, 2 South African Infantry Division under Major General I. P. DeVilliers, and 29 Indian Infantry Brigade under Brigadier D. W. Reid, were in reserve. At this period of the war, it was British doctrine for the various arms (armor, infantry, artillery, etc.) to fight 38

PzKpfw 111, above, carried a 50-mm cannon. The PzKpfw IV, at right, was a 27-ton machine armed with a low-velocity 75-mm gun. separately, and such thinking was reflected in Cunningham’s pre-battle declaration, “the alternative would have been mixed groups.”6 Such mixed groups, however, were precisely the types of combined arms units that all but defeated him. General Auchinleck sent Cunningham two plans for Crusader. The first called for a wide-flanking movement to the south around the Axis forces, and the second called for a “direct thrust along the coast, with feints in the centre and left.”’ (map 1). Both plans had the primary aim of the relief of Tobruk. Cunningham rejected both and on 28 September submitted his own version-to Auchinleck. It was a combination of both of Auchinleck’s plans, but saw the relief of Tobruk as a secondary aim; Cunningham’s primary target was the destruction of Rommel’s armor in an all-out tank battle. I n order t o accomplish this, Cunningham proposed sending 30 Corps on a left flank swing to the south around the Axis flank to Gabr Saleh where he assumed Rommel would mass his armor for the climactic battle. At the same time 30 Corps was making its move, 13 Corps would assault the Axis line in the north to prevent any shifting of forces to the south. Following the looked-for victory at Gabr Saleh, 30 Corps would turn north, link up with 13 Corps, attend to the relief of Tobruk and both corps would then clear Cyrenaica of all Axis forces. Cunningham had excellent intelligence on the whereabouts of his enemy because the British had broken the German Enigma codes and fed him upto-date information on Axis plans. According to this information, 21 Panzer Division, commanded by General Major Walter Neumann-Silkow, lay northwest of Bardia, an Italian armored corps lay between Tobruk and Derna, Italian 21 Infantry Corps faced the Tobruk perimeter, and 15 Panzer Division, under General Major Richard Beith, lay south of Tobruk. During the period from Rommel’s arrival in Africa and the onset of Crusader, the separate German Afrka Korps and the Italian XXI Corps had been consolidated into Panzergruppe Ajirika with headquarters at Gambut. Rommel was in command. General Leutnant Carl Cruwell was named commander of Afrka Korps headquartered at Bardia, and General Novarinna was in commander of Italian XXI Corps Headquarters at El Adem. Each Ajirika Korpsdivision was made up of 1 panzer regiment of 2 battalions, 1 motorized infantry regiment, 1 artillery regiment, 1 AT battalion, 1 armored reconnaissance unit and 1 machinegun battalion. The division composition amply demonstrated the German combined arms doctrine that was to prove so effective against the British. Cunningham’s two-pronged plan left a 70-mile wide gap between his two corps and he placed 3 Armored Brigade (from 7 Armored Division) on the southern flank of 13 Corps. 4 Armored Brigade had just been equipped with A43 Stuart light tanks that were faster than any tank in the desert (40 mph), but were armed only with a 37-mm gun 39

British troops in the Western Desert received many American M-3 light tanks prior to Operation Crusader. Here, a Royal lank Corps officer looks one over, accompanied by Walter Kirk, U. S. minister to Egypt. and three.30-caliber machineguns. Cunningham laid down that if no threat developed on 13 Corps’ flank, 4 Armored Brigade would join 30 Corps’ assault on Rommel’s armor. Auchinleck accepted Cunningham’s plan, but General Norris (30 Corps) loudly doubted whether Rommel would so conveniently oblige them by coming to Gabr Saleh. The place was more than 20 miles behind Rommel’s southernmost defense position at Sidi Omar. (Note: the frontier wire fence shown on map 1 represented only a barbed wire fence on the Libyan-Egyptian border and posed no problems to passage in either direction.) The Axis forces were dug in from Sollum on the Mediterranean coast south to Sidi Omar in the desert. Norrie felt it would be disastrous to go “swanning off into the desert” behind enemy lines and then sit and wait for the enemy to show up. Norrie, who had desert fighting experience, also argued against his commander’s plan to move 4 Armored Brigade from his (Norrie’s) 7 Armored Division to the flank of 13 Corps. “It would be a very dangerous dispersal of armor,”* he contended, especially so when Cunningham was hoping to bring on an all-out armor battle. Norrie proposed thrusting 30 Corps straight for Sidi Rezegh, which lay on the decisive ground south of Tobruk, and assaulting the Axis besiegers from that point. Major General Godwin-Austen (13 Corps) also disliked Cunningham’s plan, and it was his insistence upon flank protection that led Cunningham to move 4 Armored Brigade to his southern flank. By now Cunningham had begun to have his own doubts about his plan. His corps and brigade commanders had desert fighting experience and he had none. Perhaps Norrie was right? What if Rommel did not attack them at Gabr Saleh? That was the key to his whole operation. But it was too late to change. He would launch Crusader’s two-pronged assault and then wait and see what Rommel would do. Only then would he decide upon when and where 4 Armored Brigade would move. Such indecision is fatal when facing an enemy of Rommel’s caliber and Cunningham should have been aware of this because Rommel had already established himself as a premiere armor tactician. The mere rumor of his presence on a battlefield was enough to cause considerable anxiety in the minds of his opponents. In fact, so omnipotent had Rommel’s presence become to the British in the Western Desert that Auchinleck felt it necessary to publish the following order to his commanders: “There exists a danger that our friend Rommel is becoming a kind of magician or bogeyman to our troops, who are talking far too much about him. He is by no means a superman, although he is undoubtedly very energetic and able. Even if he were a superman, it would still be highly undesirable that our men should credit him with supernatural powers. “I wish you to dispel, by all possible means, the idea that Rommel represents something more than an ordinary German General. The important thing now is to see to it that we do not always talk of Rommel when we mean the enemy in Libya. We must refer to the ‘Germans’ or the ‘Axis powers’ or the ‘enemy’ and not always keep harping on Rommel. “Please ensure that this order is put into immediate effect, and impress upon all Commanders that, from a psychological point of view, it is a matter of the highest imprtance.” Not even Churchill was immune to Rommel’s presence and he said in the House of Commons: “We have a very daring and skillful opponent against us and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general.” All of which was a backhanded slap at his own generals. The only sure thing that Auchinleck had going for him when Crusader was launched was the high morale of his inexperienced troops. Overawed by the masses of new armor, they fully believed that they were going to get the “Desert Fox” once and for all. Auchinleck was already in serious trouble with Churchill because he had delayed the start of Crusader from 1 November to 18 November, and Churchill was of two minds about firing him. However, Auchinleck had good reasons for postponing the operation: His armor was not all that mechanically reliable and his new troops were not fully trained. His army commander had doubts about his own plan, and nobody knew what Rommel might do. The latter situation is more or less normal in war, but when a theater commander has doubts about his army commander’s battle plan and the overall eficien-cy of his army, some action should be taken. Instead, Auchinleck permitted Crusader to begin. He had no option, for Churchill was constantly agitating at him to “do something.” Perhaps the biggest threat to Crusader 51 success was Cunningham’slack of understanding, through no fault of his own, of desert fighting. His corps and brigade commanders knew, but were unable to impress upon him those four very special rules that applied to desert fighting. Those rules had always 40

0 10 20 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ General Auchlnleck’s original two plans for Crusader are principal parts Into his own o p e r a t h i plan with the major shown above. Both plans were aimed at the relief of Tobruk. thesis of forcing Rommel to fight an all-out armor battle at or Both were cancelled by Cunningham who combined their near Gabr Saleh. controlled all previous desert combats, and were regarded as immutable as Holy Writ. They were: Desert armies brought everything with them on a campaign. Especially water. Total mobility ruled the battlefield-infantry was always trucked and tanks were the queen of battle. The need for speed in thinking and moving-a fast-moving army possessed the tactical edge and a quick-thinking general could dominate an opponent who gathered up all his loose ends before making a move. The open battlefield-there were no cities or towns, no civilian population to be concerned with, nor political considerations to clutter up the tactics. The desert offered limitless tactical mobility.l0 Von Ravenstein, one of Rommel’s staff oficers, is credited with the pithy remark that the desert was the tactician’s paradise and the quartermaster’s nightmare. And so, Crusader was launched with artillery and mortar fire falling heavily on the Axis line from Sollum south to Sidi Omar and 30 Corps began its flanking swing through the desert wastes to Gabr Saleh (map 2) while 13 Corps fought along the northern front. The tanks and soft-skinned vehicles of 30 Corps, accompanied by the trucked 1 South African Infantry division, raced all but unopposed to their goal in across-desert lunge of some 50 miles. A torrential downpour of rain and sleet the night before had grounded the Luffwane (and the RAF, too) and the Axis forces were denied the vital air reconnaissance that would have laid bare the British flanking move. Five hours after the flank movement had begin, a screen of light tanks and armored cars of 21 Panzer Division skirmished with the armored cars of 11 Hussars at Gabr Saleh and General Cruwell was informed of a “reconnaissance in force.”ll Rommel was on his way back to Africa and Cunningham had established his battle headquarters at Fort Mad-dalena at the southern flank of 30 Corps’ sweep toward Gabr Saleh. The German garrison at Halfaya Pass again shot up the British armor. 7 Armored Division that had been so severely handled in Battleaxe, reached Gabr Saleh, halfway to Tobruk. Rommel arrived in Africa and cancelled Cruwell’s order to move 2 1 Panzer Division to Gabr Saleh. He also ordered 15 Panzer Division to hold fast east of Tobruk. Rommel was still enamoured of taking Tobruk and felt that the British move to Gabr Saleh was, in truth, a reconnaissance in force. The next day, under Cruwell’surg-ings, Rommel dispatched a force of about 120 panzers to Gabr Saleh where they stopped 4 Armored Brigade. Rom-me1 hadcome to Gabr Saleh, as Cunningham had hoped, but not with all his armor. The Germans quickly saw 4 Armored Brigade’s thrust for what it was-one part of the British forces that were running north, aimed for Tobruk. The desert terrain south of Tobruk-at Sidi Rezegh, would become the focal point of battle. Abroad plateau runs roughly from southwest of Tobruk eastward to Bardia on the coast. The escarpments (sides) on the southern flank were steep and could only be scaled by armor at a few isolated positions: Halfaya Pass was one, and Sidi Rezegh was another. Sidi Rezegh lay below the southern flank of the escarpment just southeast of Tobruk and if British armor could scale the escarpment and establish itself on the plateau, the Tobruk garrison could sortie from its lines, link up, and break the siege. 41

M.p 2. 22 Armored Brigade had swung on a wider southern arc than had 4 and 7 Armored Brigades and went for Bir el Gubi, roughly 25-30 miles west of Gabr Saleh, where it was stopped cold. (Map 2). Up to this point, and especially after the overwhelming British victories prior to the appearance of Rommel and his Afrika Korps, the Italians were held in low esteem. But at Bir el Gubi, the Ariete Armored Division, dug in behind a screen of AT guns, effectively shot up 22 Brigade and its accompanying 1 South African Infantry Division. It was the first of several such Italian holdouts and shocked the British. Meanwhile, British armor (7 Armored Division plus attached infantry) had swept into Sidi Rezegh where they captured the airfield that was quickly to become a murderous battlefield. On 20 November, 4 and 7 Armored Brigades converged on Sidi Rezegh airfield and Rommel swung 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions into the attack, but not without some confusion as 15 Panzer Division had emptied its gas tanks while searching for 4 Armored Brigade. After a quick refueling, 15 Panzer made contact and destroyed 26 Smarts Then 22 Armored Brigade disengaged from the Ariete Division at Bir El Gubi and raced to 4 Brigade’s help, but nightfall put an end to the fighting. The British withdrew from the battlefield to refuel, rearm, and recuperate during the night, but the Germans, as was their practice, leaguered on the spot and were able to recover many of their knocked-out panzers and to destroy the abandoned British armor. Expediency and German e a - ciency in recovering battle-damaged vehicles was further spurred by the Axis’ precarious supply situation. At Gambut, Panzergruppe Afiika’s headquarters, complete machine shops were set up, able to affect major tank repairs, and the efforts of the mechanics and technicians were responsible for a large number of damaged vehicles being quickly returned to combat. Such work was indispensible to Rommel, for in November, convoy losses ran to 63 percent.’* The next day, 15 and 21 Panzer Divisions withdrew toward Sidi Rezegh airfield and Cunningham believed he had beaten the Germans and sent 4 and 22 Armored Brigades in pursuit. Auchinleck’s Cairo headquarters radioed to the world that Rommel was in full retreat. Far from retreating, Rommel was massing his panzers at Sidi Rezegh and holding back 4 and 22 Armored Brigades with skillfully deployed AT screens that leap-frogged back, keeping the British at arm’s length. Then, 15 and 21 Punier Divisions hit 7 Armored Brigade with AT guns and tanks and began its decimation on the airfield. 7 Armored Brigade held grimly with its remaining 26 tanks and for two days the battle raged. Although the panzers finally took the airfield, both sides were exhausted.13 The severe British losses were tied to two vital factors: 0 They did not realize that the only viable counter to the tank was the AT gun, not another tank. Rommel used his AT guns both in offensive and defensive operations and they maneuvered with the panzer divisions, whereas British AT guns were apart of the At Bir el Gubi, the Italian stand disrupted British plans for the assault on Sidi Rezegh airfield, enabling German armored units to join the fight. artillery arm and were maneuvered separately from the armor formations. Many British tank commanders, still imbued with the traditions of their cavalry regiments, attempted time and again to form battle lines and charge the German AT guns and were shot to pieces. Cunningham had fed his three armored brigades piecemeal into the Sidi Rezegh cauldron and the massed panzers of 15 and 21 Divisions destroyed them. The British lost over 300 “cruiser” tanks. Rommel, correctly gauging his opponent’s frame of mind, took his remaining 90 panzers and went all out for the Egyptian border in his famous “dash to the wire” (map 3). He was counting on devastating the British rear areas, cutting off their supplies and communications and overrunning their infantry. It was an audacious tactic and failed only because of Rommel’s disregard of his logistics. Typical of Rommel’s attitude toward logistics was his remark in the early days of the African campaign to Colonel General Franz Halder, chief of the general staff, at a Berlin conference. Rommel had visions of taking the Suez Canal in one grand thrust and when Halder asked him what he would need in addition to the forces he already had in Africa, the impetuous general replied he need two more panzer corps. Halder then asked him how he would supply and feed them and Rommel replied, “That’s quite immaterial to me. That’s your pigeon.”14 Even so, the “dash to the wire” came within an ace of success. Rommel’s racing panzers came within 15 miles of a pair of gigantic British supply dumps in the desert below. Gabr Saleh. Had they found those treasure houses of food, ammunition and fuel they undoubtedly would have struck deeper into Egypt, perhaps even as far as Cairo. The panzers, running amok in the British rear areas, did considerable damage and unnerved Cunningham who ordered his forward fighting units back to protect his rear. but Auchinleck, who had flown up to Fort Mad-dalena, took matters into his own hands. He saw Rommel’s spectacular move for what it was; a raid, pure and simple, and disregarded the damage the Germans had done to his rear echelons and refused to panic. He replaced 42

Ronwnel’s “dash to the wire”, a deep strike attack, aborted due to fuel and parts problems. Rommei rejoined the action at Sidi Rezegh airfield but succumbed to superior British forces. Cunningham with General Neil Ritchie, countermanded Cunningham’s withdrawal orders and ordered the forward units to stay at Sidi Rezegh and fight it out.” Meantime, Rommel and his nearly fuel-starved panzers returned to Sidi Rezegh where they became embroiled in the battle that raged for 10 more days. Conclusion The panzers were finally overwhelmed because of the unfailing supplies of new British tanks and men. The Axis forces began along, well-fought, retreat westward to El Agheila where Rommel had taken command of the Ajirika Korps nine months before. The Tobruk seige was lifted and the German garrison at Halfaya Pass surrendered. A third of Rommel’s command had been lost, 36,000 prisoners were taken and his panzer strength was reduced to 30 running tanks. The British lost 18,000 men and their tank losses have never been accurately determined. Operation Crusader proved to be a British victory, but the battles were won only because of their superior supply system. There was never any doubt about the courage and tenacity of the British soldier, but his upper echelon leadership left much to be desired. Rommel, ever the impetuous commander, spent many vital hours in the front lines with his fighting toops and was often unavailable to his staff when they needed him. His men adored him, but a commanding general’s place is not necessarily in the front line when the battle is raging. Also, Rommel disregard of his logistics did him severe damage when he made his “dash to the wire.” He simply did not have the fuel or spare parts to maintain his impetus and was forced to backtrack to Sidi Rezegh where his depleted panzers had to fight it out with the never-ending British forces. But Crusader did not mark the end of Rommel in North Africa by any means and when the British entered Benghazi in their pursuit of the Axis forces to El Agheila they found a hand-lettered and prophetic sign in one of the cafes that read: “Back Soon.” The operation was filled with “ifs”, many of which apply to present day armor operations. The lessons to be learned from the mistakes of both army commanders are there: Train your troops. 0 Fight as a combined arms unit. 0 A general’s place is not necessarily in the frontline but where he can best affect the outcome. 0 Select skilled subordinates who are as knowledgeable of local conditions as you. 0 Finally, never underestimate your enemy, always give him credit for as many brains as you believe you have-and perhaps a few more. Footnotes “Checkmate at Ruweisat,” p. 29. Hereafter “The Desert Generals.” p. 70. British tanks were designed as ‘cruiser’ or ‘infantry’ types. Cruisers were to exploit a breakthrough that had been made by the heavier infantry tanks working with the infantry. “Rommel,” p. 70. Ibid. p. 70. “The Desert Generals,” p. 84. ’ “Checkmate,” p. 42. * Ibid. p. 43. “Rommel as Military Commander,” pp. 245- 2% “Desert War in North Africa,” p. 21. “AfrikaKorps,” p. 51. I’ “Desert War in North Africa,” p. 27. l3 “Tank Warfare,” p. 164. l4 “Triumphant Fox,” pp. 68-69. Is “The Desert Generals,” p. 121. “Checkmate.” Bibliography AFRKA KORPS, Lt. Col. AJ. Barker. Bi- son Books, Ltd., London, 1978. Walter J. Spielberger & Uwe Feist Aero Publishers Inc., Fallbrook, CA. 1968. ’

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