The 1984 Armor Conference The Manpower Situation

Vice Chief of Staff of the Army I’ve got a few items of information that I think are useful to you as you continue your debates on the Armor Force... There’s some things going on in your Army that need some explaining. We need to make sure you understand what’s cooking out there... You know an organization is built around its people, not systems, and I want to delve into that for just a moment because I think it’s germane to some of the work you will be doing tomorrow... It was only five years ago when we were in deep stress in the personnel business and it required attention. You must dot be frivolous about the people working for you. They’re very high quality youngsters and we should expect to see the attrition rates go down instead of up... You know, about one-third of the people in the manpower pool do not even qualify for service in the armed forces. This leaves about 900,000 in the male bracket every year that are qualified. We’ve had a dramatic turnabout now in the quality of people saying, “Yes, we’d like to serve in your Army...” you have an enormous contribution to make in the way you treat people in our Army, because 160,000 youngsters that are here leave our service and go back to mainstream USA and tell the kids back there what’s going on. If you treat them right, they carry the right story. If you treat them ill, they’ll say we’re a bunch of rag bags in the Army! So you have a vested interest in that. The Air Force is still the number one preference in the hearts and minds of the 18 to 23 year-olds, but the Army, since 1981, has moved into the number two position in a dramatic shift over the Navy, which has been historically number two. Today, the Navy is number three, and the Marine Corps is number four. In 1976, we brought in about 105,000 high school graduates, about 58 percent of our total intake... In 1979, we brought in about 84,000, about 64 percent high school graduates. Last year, we were at 115,000 high school graduates, or 87 percent. This year, we’re running close to 90 percent... So, by that standard, we’re doing very well in terms of the raw material presenting itself for service. If you look at the national sample, 53 percent of the kids in 1980 scored 50 or better on our qualifications test. That’s the upper half cut line. And 24 percent are in category

4. Seventy-five percent of the kids in America are high school grads. This year, the Army is up there, with only 10 percent category four, so you have a dramatic change in the youth of America coming to work in your unit. The question is: Are you treating them any differently than four years ago? Because if you’re not, they’ll walk off the job on you. This is true across all the services. There is a very extraordinary quality of kids coming in. One of the questions you might ask yourself is why the stress on the subject of quality? Isn’t everybody as good as everybody else? The answer, of course, is no... The high quality youngster, the upper middle category 1 kid scoring his SQT, does dramatically better than the lesser noble in the crowd. It’s just a simple fact. So let’s translate that into an experiment we had at Fort Ord. We took a bunch of infantrymen out and wired them up with MILES. We found out that if we use mental category 1 to 3, upper half kids, you get a higher kill ratio as opposed to lesser nobles getting a lesser kill ratio, and getting shot faster. So the point 1 want to make to you is, you must go after qualiy. You must assert that you need it, because if you don’t assert that you need it, then I’ll be unable to persuade the Congress to give us the resources to get it. There’s another good deal going on in your Army, and that is the work that is going on in COHORT. We expected stability and we’re getting it. The one thing you can understand, given the fact that we just started this program, is that the horizontal blending is very strong between the group, they’re wiping out the peers that don’t qualify; but the vertical blending between entry-level soldiers and the NCOs needs more work. And we look forward to it. Now we’ve been talking a little about the functional area analysis, the FAA, we just completed; I’ll give just a few insights about it that says great work has been done at the Armor Center. Let’s look at a few of these things you will be interested in. One of the things you have to understand is the amount of change. There is a dramatic shift in the emphasis on support. In fielding equipment, that support is of tremendous importance. On our training devices, we fielded the MI in 1982 but all the training devices came along later. And notice the Unit Conduct Of Fire Trainer is still not up and operating. It should have been up when we fielded the MI, and I just tell you that we’re trying to get our arms around it. We’re trying to recapture the things we can, to try to field, or field the systems better, than we have in the past. That’s the nature of the game. O. K., what’s the status of the MI tank? Well, the status of the MI tank is that it’s operating at a 94 percent OR rate in Germany. That means it’s doing damn good. DAMN GOOD! It’s doing better than the M60A3, as a matter of fact. So the status is very good, but we’ve got some problems with it and we’re trying to work it, and Ijust ask your forbearance. We know the process now of getting it all together in order to grind it out and that’s the purpose of what the FAA is all about. That’s also what I call a mark of excellence when we’re able to sit down in a conference run by a four-star general in order to get at some of those answers. There is also some good stuff going on out in industry as well. When General Dynamics took over the tank plant they brought in an engineer whose name is Ewing. Ewing is an F- 16 fighter engineer who doesn’t know anything about manufacturing a tank, but he’s had a 47 percent downslope on manufacturing defects in the plant in a period of less than a year. So you’re getting a very high quality product coming out as he is getting better in his stewardship. At the same time, he’s reduced the direct labor man-hours by 40 percent. So what I’m telling you is that in industry there is the same striving for excellence. Okay, what I’m trying to suggest to you is that on all the good work all of you are doing, one of the things you should 26

“Taking Stock and Directions for Excellence” remember is that the American people, in 1982, thought you were in about 6th place in their hearts and minds. And this is the National Research center Gallup Poll, that the University of Chicago runs in October of each year. In 1983 this inquiry of the American public was taken at the height of most of Beirut and the Grenada operations and now you’re number three in the hearts and minds of the people! You have everything to do with staying there and I just say to you that when you walk through the downtown Atlanta Airport and you see a soldier who doesn’t represent being number three in America it’sup to you-part of your duty-to fix it up because all of us, both the Guard, the Reserve, the Active, as well as our civilian colleagues that help work in this industry, contribute to that notion. Let me give you a couple of other notions here, that track what I have begun to talk to you about. The first thing I leave you as a notion, is that of setting standards. For example it is clearly up to the officer corps in our great Army to set the standard. And so one of the questions you have to ask yourself is: What set of standards have we imposed upon ourselves? One of the questions you have to ask yourself is: Shouldn’t an officer who is going to be in command of tankers qualify himself? So, maybe as a precondition to a commander taking command of his unit, he should be qualified here at the Home of the Armor before he goes out and inflicts his standards on his unit. On the master gunner question. “Can you be a master gunner without being a distinguished gunner?” Have we got a contradiction in terms? Does the master gunner have to take a requalification test every year if he’s going to retain the title? I think you ought to take a hard look at that. Regarding the Reserve Component, I’ve issued an order and I intend for you to carry it out, that all Reserve lieutenants will come to the resident school in order to go through the resident course. I don’t believe that you can learn how to fire a Table VI11 on paper with a correspondence course. So we have to send all Reserve officers through the school just as we do the active officers. Meanwhile, I ask you where you’ve been, because many of you have influence over the training that we provide for the Reserve components. So, I ask you to do that. A refresher course then would seem to be in order for those who haven’t been through the correspondence course or the resident course here who are now commanding armor companies of armor battalions to make sure the reserves are trained right. Further, I ask you to just give a little thought to how you are imposing your standards on your subordinates. One of the things we want you to do as the commander, for example, is to take an affirmative action on promoting a guy, for example, from 2d lieutenant to 1st lieutenant. No Armor lieutenant who can’t qualify by taking his tank downrange on Table VI11 should be promoted to 1st lieutenant until he can do so. So start writing it up that way. You’ll find a hell of a lot of people will start studying their manuals if you do that. I would assert to you that if you do not speak about excellence, and if you do not demand excellence, that you will not get it. So you must state it. I’ll just give you my own illustration about it. I don’t know how many of you saw the Seattle Seahawks and Raiders game on the AFC conference final. But at the end of the game when the Raiders left the field, they ran back down into the tunnel and in the tunnel going back into their dressing room, on a wall placard as high as this ceiling right here, is a big sign with silver letters on black that says “Dedicated to Excellence.” They’re paying those guys 200, 300 or 500 thousand dollars a year to go out and play football but they also talk, speak and act excellence to their people and the Redskins got the message two weeks later in the Super Bowl in big detail, because they were too busy worrying about whether they were going to sign next year’s contract. So I suggest to you in ways in which you know best, that you must work on those things that we talked about here tonight, in excellence of people, standard setting, and the like. Now, just to give you insight into the caliber of young men and women that are presenting themselves for service in our Army today, I had the pleasure of going over to Walter Reed Army Medical Center after the Grenada deal to pin Purple Hearts on the group that came into that hospital. The first lad that I came across was a Blackhawk crew chief who had been shot in the leg with an AK47 round. He was lying on the bed, about ten o’clock at night after an arduous trip. This big 24-year old kid grabs me and pulls me right down on his chest... and I have not been hugged by a 24- year old Blackhawk crew chief in some time... so I paid attention... and he said, “General, I want to tell you that my buddy saved my life.” And I said, “Tell me about it,” and he said, “Well, you see, sir, my buddy and I went to Blackhawk Crew Chief School together at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and then we were assigned to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He was killed a month ago and when I got into trouble in Grenada, he interceded with God and saved my life.” Here is a kid, 24 years old, who’s telling us what cohesion is all about. The next fella was a Ranger from 2/75 Infantry, who had been wounded in the leg and he said, “Well, General, 1 came around this corner and there were three Cubans there and they had AK47s and I had my M16. I shot three of them and they shot me, and 3 to 1 ain’t bad.” I said, “Right on, troop. That’s exactly what you’re supposed to be doing! Now listen, you’re a Ranger there, right? Now is it really true that you went in there at 500 feet without a reserve chute? How many jumps have you got?” He said, “Forty-five,” and I said, “Well, tell me about that one at 500 feet without a reserve chute.” He said, “Exciting, General!” And I said, “Well look here soldier, you get the Purple Heart and you get one other thing which is the hallmark of every infantryman, and that is the famous Combat Infantryman Badge and I held up the blue badge and said, “You are an 1 lB, right?” and he said, “Yes, sir,” and I said, “You did --o in there and you did fight in a battle?” and he said, “Yes, sir,” and I said, “You get one of these, soldier!” and with that he ripped off his pajama top and said, “Punch it right in there, General, just punch it right in there!” So I did! The only thing was, I couldn’t get the grippers through the back of his chest! What I want to try to explain to you is that in those two incidents if you get a chance to see the insight of the great young Americans who have joined your United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and the Coast Guard, they’re looking for one thing. They’re looking for dynamite leadership and you know that the group in this room can provide it.

The 1984 Armor Conference Reducing Training Costs An Armor Conference White Paper (The following two Armor Conference white papers were selected from the many discussed). Introduction The purpose here is to describe a combined arms unit training program that provides equal or better training than is currently available and at lower operating and support costs. The key is to understand the objective before choosing a specific training event and manpower/vehicle density. After designing a leader-intensive, resource-relaxed training program, USAARMC determined the cost of this program in terms of hours, miles, and dollars for tank operation. Finally, USAARMC estimated what cost savings and cost avoidance could occur were a battalion to be equipped with near-and intermediate-term training devices. Use of training devices reduces Class 111, V, and IX expenditures, while increasing training. All the training events described in the Combined Arms White Paper can be accomplished as overall Armor Force readiness is improved. Objectives The objectives are fourfold: One, to outline a plan for the Armor Force to enable each battalion to increase the quantity and the quality of every training event while operating in a resource-constrained environment; Two, to outline present testing and validation efforts while projecting future application of resource-saving devices and cost-conscious scheduling; Three, to assist in accelerating procurement of essential training devices and simulators to improve the quality and quantity of training the active and Reserve components; Four, to assist in accelerating the necessary materiel acquisition to reduce O&S costs. First, we must identify those cost areas we can change by modifying training needs. Vehicle-use curtailment reduces organizational and depot maintenance costs and fuel consumption, but the personnel and other support costs required for tank ownership do not change. The differences in the type of tank or in how much it is operated are not remarkable. What is expensive is the support structure needed for the tank, such as personnel and indirect support. Tank ownership simply incurs an overhead which no amount of reduction in training funds can vary significantly. Training costs are almost marginal compared to the cost of maintaining the large tank combat fleet which is the centerpiece of the European battlefield. Nevertheless, we need to reduce current training costs so we can transfer savings to improved training, leading to higher levels of training readiness on our AirLand Battle doctrine and new capabilities. Present Requirements Training regulations prescribe mandatory training events but each unit must be able to modify training programs according to the factors of METT-T, as interpreted by the unit chain of command. Current training programs are not correlated to miles or hours of operation, but rather to various training and administrative events. Hours and miles can be reduced by doing what is required more efficiently. Armor battalion unit training begins with the individual Soldier’s Manual crewmember tasks. The next step is tank-pure training using the tank combat manual with its tank gunnery and tank tactical proficiency tables. Unit training culminates in combined arms training using the ARTEP and ARTEP Mission Training Plans (AMTP) with associated situational training exercises (STX) and Combined Arms Live-Fire Exercises (CALFEX). The goal of these training documents is to provide guidance and standards for effective and efficient training. With the proper use of time and resources, we can train at a greater frequency for a reduced cost. In approaching possible reductions in training-related O&S costs, we first determined what unit training events should occur and at what frequency, using AR 350-1, including USAREUR and FORSCOM supplements. Additionally, with the MI/2/3 vehicles, there is a need for more training, not less. These new training requirements are generated by the need for the Armor Force to use to the fullest the mobility, agility, and survivability of these vehicles and to train a force in these new capabilities. Model Training Program A sample annual training program was designed as described in the battalion AMTP (TC 17-17-1). All required events for each company were accounted for. Recommended frequencies to accomplish the training which the new systems demand were determined for each training event. This model training program allows considerably more training than required by AR 350-1. For example, there are three repeats of tank combat tables combining gunnery and tactical proficiency as described in the new FM 17-12 series, Tank Combat Training. This is a notional program for a fiscal year. USAARMC is in the process of validating all the program elements at Fort Knox: STXs, tactical tables, and field circulars (FCs). We are confident that we have developed an appropriate training program, which will be demonstrated as more units credit the effectiveness of the program in pre-NTC training. In the next phase, representative figures for hours of engine operation and vehicle mileage per tank were assigned plus the number of tanks required for each event. The results were then multiplied by the annual frequency of the event. Only training event miles were computed. Vehicle miles to and from training sites are an administrative cost, and generally do not relate to training. These costs may be assigned to cost-efficient vehicles, such as heavy equipment 28

“Taking Stock and Directions for Excellence” transporters (HET) or railroad flat cars. Training event miles also represent the lowest common denominator for all armor battalions in the force, regardless of location. The TACOM MI dollar cost of $121 per mile was assigned. The only cost considered for each event results from multiplying tank mileage by $121 per mile. We considered engine operating hours for those events in which a tank would not move. We considered unit maneuver areas assigned by the ARTEP and AMTP for the appropriate unit level and computed mileage requirements to do each mission in the postage-stamp maneuver area one time in an FTX period (allowing sufficient time for after-action reviews and special training). Our estimate developed a total annual requirement of 762 hours and 695 miles per tank for a per-tank cost of $84,000. Any program must not, however, overly restrict the ability of the commander to be innovative. Each commander should be allowed to increase his hours of usage or miles required to meet a particular need, such as a change of mission or additional training to compensate for maneuver restrictions. Mileage and engine hours are associated with normal maintenance procedures as well as various community good will and administrative requests. To account for these contingencies, battalion commanders should be allowed a 15 percent, or 100-mile, flexible reserve to be used at their discretion. After calculating these costs, we identified those areas where substitution of current or near-term devices could be applied to reduce either miles or hours of engine operation, or both. The videodisc gunnery simulator (VIGS) substitutes for basic gunnery Tables I and 11. It saves engine hours but not mileage because it is used for stationary tables only. The unit conduct-of-fire trainer (UCOFT) substitutes for basic gunnery Tables I11 and IV as well as for intermediate Tables VI and VII. The platoon combat mission trainer (PCMT) is a computer-assisted decision support system that duplicates the combined arms environment. It will enable the platoon to carry out field maneuver-like missions while actually located in a simulator room. It portrays the exterior environment using digital image generation and allows free play and specific problem-solving. We think it will be a substitute for low-level platoon combined arms training at a minimum cost. We also determined its cost, and estimated the impact a tank driver trainer would have on the program. Device-Enhanced Program Incorporating these new devices in the training program, we calculated the mileage, hours, and dollar figures for the device-enhanced program and determined the actual savings per tank as well as the percent savings of the training device-enhanced program over the present method. We realized a savings of 4.1 percent in engine hours and 6.4 percent in mileage driven. Though the percent savings may seem petty when compared to the total O&S cost figures, the dollar savings for the Armor Force in one year are significant. What has to be acknowledged is that cost savings cannot be realized until these devices are in place in each unit. This means that the cost of device acquisition cannot come from cost savings that are realized after the device is issued. None of the devices mentioned are yet fielded. Development processes have begun but device development, test, and evaluation is a laborious, time-consuming process. Only after the force is trained to use the new devices can a payback in terms of genuine cost savings or force proficiency be expected. Additional Factors One factor not yet considered is cost avoidance. If we introduce a training device and hold proficiency constant, fewer resources are required for training. This represents an actual cost savings. If we introduce a training device and hold resources constant, the effect is to achieve an increase in proficiency. If we had tried to achieve the same proficiency gain without the training device, more resources would have been required. Cost avoidance represents the “might-have-been” costs if we try to achieve proficiency gains without using the devices already considered. Cost avoidance is vital as we field revolutionary new equipment with remarkable capabilities that must be trained to take full advantage of the equipment. The synergistic interaction of the MI, M2, A A His an example. Training resources must be shifted to combined arms exercises. Training at individual weapon and small pure-unit proficiency must be more effective and more efficient to generate resources to buy the devices which will facilitate enhanced combined arms training proficiency. There are many benefits in a device-enhanced program that cannot be documented. Because an event appears on a training program does not necessarily mean it was done; conversely, because an event does not appear on a training schedule does not mean that it was not done. When a device is on hand, it can be used formally during scheduled time periods and informally during spare time. It is the latter use that cannot be estimated in a costlbenefit analysis. We know units can do additional, unprogrammed, unscheduled training by one or two crews, using a device like VIGS or UCOFT whenever they have time and the device is not in use. There is no way to accurately capture this increased cost savings and proficiency. What should be appreciated, however, is that the cost of a device is minimal compared to what a unit gains in increased proficiency. The increased capability of our combat systems dictates that units train and rehearse how to maximize system performance under realistic conditions. They must not spare themselves from the necessity of doing, now, what they will be required to do in combat. More effective and efficient training programs and increased simulator usage are practical means to this end. Device Savings And Cost Avoidance The hour, mileage, and cost savings that will occur when the UCOFT is fielded were estimated. Units could amortize the UCOFT on mileage savings alone in 7.6 years - and this again does not account for any cost avoidance or ammunition savings. When the UCOFT is fielded, the present allocation of 134 main gun rounds may be reduced to realize additional savings. For example, if a crew fires calibration three times per year, (3 rounds each), three Table VI11 qualifications (25 rounds each), and fifteen rounds during a company live-fire exercise, it requires 99 rounds per year. A per-tank savings of 35 rounds (or approximately $8,000 for a 105-mm ammunition and approximately $22,000 for 120-mm 29

The 1984 Armor Conference ammunition) is realized. Per battalion, the savings is $473,000, or $1,295,000 respectively. As ammunition costs increase over FY84 actual costs, then the savings increase accordingly. Mission funds cannot be reduced before the devices have been introduced without having a serious adverse impact on force readiness. The money for device procurement must come from elsewhere-possibly after a review of our national combat vehicle acquisition strategy. For the cost of several new MI tanks, the necessary training devices could be purchased to equip the entire fielded force. By consolidating UCOFT mileage and ammunition savings the MI UCOFT can be amortized in three years. Unit Drivers Training Program We estimated the dollar savings impact of driver trainer simulation. Using the current training device requirement, we identified 27 tasks for training, 25 of these must be done on a moving tank. Several of these tasks cannot be reproduced on an actual tank due to safety or cost; others, such as snow, ice, or sand, cannot be reproduced in the unit on order. A 50 percent personnel turbulence rate is assumed. In a given year, six men will operate a given tank (1.5 drivers and 4.5;ewmen). Each driver will receive an initial training program when he arrives at his unit and the other crewmen will receive an annual driver’s skills sustainment program. A battalion will require 3,480 hours of trainer availability per year. Our model program requires 342 mi/tank/yr. The tank battalion requires 19,836 miles/yr. By using the driver trainer, the battalion could avoid $2,400,156 per year. A driver trainer costing $1,800,000 would amortize itself in nine months. - _ _ Future Applications While this example has focused on an Active Component tank battalion, equally impressive results could be realized from Army Reserve and National Guard applications. In fact, by using mobile training device equipped vans, the armor force has a feasible solution to the sustainment training requirements of the National Guard. Stationing training device platoons, with appropriate training support material, throughout the United States would provide a workable solution to the requirement for regional training centers to support the Reserve Component and would enable us to provide a trained armor manpower pool to support immediate personnel needs during mobilization. These applications seem workable and may, indeed, be the only solution if we are to have a trained, combat-ready Reserve Component force in a resource-constrained world. They do, however, call for a substantial new look at our Reserve Component training procedures, our mobilization plans, and our training device budgets. Conclusions The Armor Center, in its efforts to identify areas for O&S cost reduction, while increasing the amount of training, concluded: First, tank mileage could be held to below 700 miles per year. We could, perhaps, require considerably less with an auxiliary power unit (APU). Second, APUs must be acquired for the MI. This equipment is needed now. The product improvement process must be streamlined to get our MI fleet equipped as soon as possible. Third, DARCOM and CAC should aggressively pursue the acquisition of sufficient HET assets to move the armor force in a peacetime environment to save operational costs. There is an obvious application of HETs to tank force mobility at the operational level, but we are emphasizing the peacetime necessity of holding down needless tank mileage with use of HET assets. These assets could be used more efficiently by pooling at a central point. Fourth, DA should fund essential training device acquisition now, so that PM TRADE could begin development. The need is pressing to expedite this long, rigorous device acquisition cycle with the wise, timely, selection of off-the-shelf technology where possible. The tank driver trainer is a good example. Once the pump is “primed”, savings accrued will fund the purchase of additional training support material. Fifth, USAARMC is now moving to validate specific pieces of a model annual training program, but we need to accelerate and expand this process. We especially need assistance, both in USAREUR and FORSCOM, to validate our complete training program. Action Plan The Abrams and Bradley are already being issued to the close combat (heavy) force. The Armor center has been moving to support that force and a number of actions are underway: First, we have briefed this training program and our conclusions to DARCOM, the DA Staff, FORSCOM, USAREUR, and the Undersecretary of the Army. We have put together a mileage-constrained sample unit mission training program for evaluation in FY84-85. The training is now being evaluated by a battalion of the 3rd ID and one from the 8th ID(M), both in USAREUR. I11 Corps at Fort Hood has also begun initial coordination in preparation to validate the program beginning on 1 Oct 84. This mileage-constrained program could be available for general use by FY86. Second, we have provided input to PM MI for acquisition of an MI APU. Afield verification will be done at Fort Knox this year. Additionally, we are doing an MI fuel-usage test at the Armor and Engineer Board during FY84 to determine the impact of various driving techniques on fuel consumption. Third, we support accelerated HET acquisition. If a data collection effort is necessary to determine how many HETs we need and where best to station them, DARCOM should collect that data now. USAARMC is presently coordinating the requirement of such an effort with TACOM, but no data-collection contract has been funded. Fourth, the coordinating draft of FM 17-12-1, MI Tank Combat Training, is now available. The ARTEP mission training plans are distributed in draft. The institutional courses have been modified to include use of these training documents in the training of all armor NCOs and officers. Fifth, we are fielding the UCOFT as rapidly as possible. There is a USAARMC representative as a subject matter expert with the PM TRADE in Orlando to assist in the GE UCOFT development. We are continually sending experienced vehicle commanders and gunners to participate in the training matrix validation and first article testing. UCOFT fielding begins in March 1985. 30

“Taking Stock and Directions for Excellence” Sixth, we have written a training device requirement for both M60 and MI tank driver trainers. It includes trainers for both institutional and unit use. We have already formulated an initial and sustainment driver training program. We need support to get the device requirements funded, so we can begin to realize savings while increasing the amount of driver training necessary to take full advantage of the mobility and agility of the Abrums. We have asked the Director of Training at DA to help us acquire one THOMSON/BUR-TEK or SINGER/LINK M60 tank driver trainer in FY84 for a concept evaluation program (CEP). We are also asking that the current TDR be placed higher on the training device priority list so it can be funded as an MI tank driver trainer in FY84-85. Seventh, we are working with DARPA on a large-scale simulation device. The platoon combat mission trainer is part of this technology search to determine how much technology is available to produce such a training device. We are ready to review a platoon combat mission trainer as soon as one becomes available, hopefully by the end of 1984. Finally, we have introduced problems in conserving mileage and operating hours, as well as our proposed solutions, into courses at the Armor School. School training is absolutely essential if we are to avoid past inefficiencies associated with implementing new devices and training concepts into units before leaders understand them. We are working to instill in all our students a consciousness of efficiency, that there are ways to train that are just as effective as those they have used in the past, but cost far less. In summary, we need your assistance to get additional armor training devices funded to begin acquisition cycle. The Army must also start to decrease needless administrative tank mileage with lower cost combat service support assets. Finally, the Armor Force must be educated in using more cost-effective training methods. All these training assets can become the basis for improved training and readiness in the close combat (heavy) force. We must begin now to work together to improve the quality of our total close combat (heavy) force. Combat Service Support - At War An Armor Conference White Paper Introduction This white paper is structured in three parts: The first part will focus on the capabilities of combat service support (CSS) in support of the AirLand Battle, examining the challenges and proposed solutions to CSS doctrine, materiel, training and organization. The second part will develop a picture of CSS requirements to support Army 21, including a technology base proposal. The last part is a summary of Armor Center Combat Service Support (CSS) directions produced at the 1983 Armor Conference and an overview of the 1984 CSS Conference plans. The Battlefield The battlefield of central Europe and those of other potential theaters of operation pose great challenges to the CSS elements of maneuver battalions. U. S. forces must make the most of what they have. They must take advantage of every conceivable support asset. CSS planners and operators must possess the same resources and perspectives as combat leaders in order to support adequately the tactical plan. The CSS force must incorporate the principles of responsiveness, flexibility, and initiative. The fluid situations that will be encountered in the AirLand Battle require that the supporter anticipate needs, not wait to react to demands. They must not only be imbued with the spirit of aggressive support, they must also have organizational flexibility and authority to seek and implement innovative support concepts. CSS operators will have to be prepared to accept as routine deviations from plans. They must use initiative to carry out their responsibilities. They must devise innovative ways to support the plan and lessen the risks. Support of the combat mission of the maneuver battalion must remain the foremost consideration in the function of CSS units. Resources and priorities must be tailored to changing combat situations. Appropriate CSS should provide survivable logistical resupply methods as well as the means to sustain maneuver battalions, maximizing the combat potential of our weapons by arming, fueling, fixing, and manning systems as far forward as possible to minimize the time it takes to return them to combat. Capability Today The examination of CSS capability within a tank battalion today requires laying out a Division 86 organization which is in a transition period of doctrine, organization, and equipment. Therefore, each element of the CSS function within an MI battalion will be presented separately to isolate problems, and to propose corrective actions and developmental requirements. Interwoven into proposed corrective actions will be reference to a CSS Concept Evaluation Program/ Force Development Test & Experimectation (CEP/FDTE). The scope of this test is to conduct an evaluation to address specific deficiencies in CSS support to the MI tank company team by conducting isolated trials, small-scale trials and isolated actions at Fort Knox during the 2nd and 3rd quarters of FY 84 to determine proposed corrective actions and define new procedures. The proposed solutions will then be validated on a noninterference basis in brigade-sized CSS evaluations under the aegis of 111 Corps at Fort Hood, the National Training Center, and during the Reforger exercise in Europe in the fall of 84. The CSS test initiative is the Armor Center’s means of ensuring a CSS force which will optimize the combat potential of the fighting element weapons system. Rearming Class V hauling capability in the transitional MI battalion is a mix of 5-ton trucks and 8-ton GOERs. There appear to 31

! 1984 Armor Conference be J G V G l a l JGIIuuJ r l l a l l G l l G J pluvruing the rearming function now, with incomplete fixes in the future. The mix of 5-ton trucks and GOERs at battalion cannot lift the entire basic load when ammunition is in a palleted configuration. The 5-ton “weights” out and the GOER “cubes” out, requiring pallets to be broken with existing basic load. Wheeled vehicles lack sufficient mobility and survivability to closely accompany the fighting systems, particularly in offensive deep attack operations. Thus, there is a continuing requirement for rearm operations to be conducted generally at night, using the “service station” method, requiring fighting vehicles to withdraw from position and travel to a terrain feature behind the FLOT to rearm. Current ammunition packaging in wooden boxes (excepting APFSDS M833 in the metal canister) continues to cause rearming to be excessively manpower-intensive and time-consuming. In an NBC environment, wooden boxes pose a potential contamination problem when soaked with a persistent agent. Further, the increased packaging volume of the 120-mm round in its current wooden box increases the battalion requirement for HEMTT trucks to lift the current basic load above the 15 trucks currently authorized by

TO&E.

Class V truck driver shortage. The transportation section of the battalion support platoon is authorized 1.3 drivers per assigned vehicle. Draft AR 570-2, Manpower and Equipment Control Organization and Equipment Requirements Tables Personnel, recommends 1.5 drivers per vehicle for single shift operations and 2 drivers and 2 assistant drivers per vehicle for two shift (round-the-clock) operations. Still further, the (Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness) (AMORE) conducted as part of the Close Combat (Heavy) Mission Area Analysis (CC(H)MAA) indicated that, “Driver structure for all wheeled vehicles is insufficiently robust.” The analysis, which examined the TOE J- 120 tank company’s unit resiliency and recoverability, did not specify the number of drivers required to sustain the force over time, but it did indicate that the addition of assistant drivers appeared to be justified. Interim Solutions The HEMTT cargo truck, M977, with materiel handling equipment (crane) will be fielded beginning in the fourth quarter of FY 85. Ten HEMTTs in an MI battalion will adequately lift the current basic load and moreover, provide individual pallet lift which will speed operations at the ammunition transfer point (ATP). Further, this will enhance the ability to drop a pallet behind a fighting vehicle forward at all times. The HEMTT is, however, a vulnerable, wheeled vehicle with limitations in off-road mobility and survivability. 0 Reduced packaging volume (cube), for 120-mm ammunition will resolve two problems: First, metal canister packaging will permit less manpower-intensive rearming operations while providing a “clean” round which is protected from chemical contamination. Secondly, the reduced volume which allows 25-30 round pallet configurations, maintains the Class V truck requirement for the MIEI battalion within current TO&E authorizations. The packaging resolution will lag behind MlEl fielding by approximately two years, causing an interim two-truck shortfall of basic load lift. Expediting the packaging resolution will alleviate the truck shortfall. There are no plans to increase the HEMTT truck authorization to fill the shortfall in the meantime. Movement of Class V within the brigade boundary will be a primary issue in the CSS CEP. Specifically, we’ll examine the relationship of the HEMTT cargo trucks with the surrogate palletized loading system (PLS) and armored forward area rearm vehicle (AFARV) to determine the best means to maximize the fighting vehicles’ capability, using one, two, or all three systems. PLS appears to have great promise. It would appear, however, that some armored tracked resupply will be essential to support off-route deep-attack offensive operations. Additional test issues will be the transloading of ammunition from the ammunition transfer point to the fighting systems under all conditions, day and night and under NBC conditions. Refueling Class I11 systems currently in the field are the S t o n truck with tank and pump unit and the GOER truck. These systems will be replaced by the HEMTT M978. a 2,500-gallon tanker, in unit sets, beginning in the fourth quarter of FY 84. Problems similar to those of the Class V vehicles also exist in this system - specifically, a shortage of drivers to sustain the force, and potentially inadequate mobility and survivability in forward areas. These questions and potential problems will be closely examined in the CSS test at Fort Knox and Fort Hood. 0 The HEMTT refueler provides a significant step forward with its capability to refuel at a rate up to 150 GPM. When fielded, the MlEl will be the first ground armor combat system capable of fast refuel operations. This capability is a step toward force optimization and sustainment. Medical Evacuation And Treatment The MI13 is the primary medevac and treatment system available to front line units. This vehicle is sufficient in mobility and protection afforded, but there may be an insufficient number in each company to evacuate expected WIAs to the battalion aid station. National - Training Center (NTC) feedback indicates a shortfall of medical evacuation vehicles and a lack of emphasis in training to sustain the force in this critical CSS function. This issue will be thoroughly examined during the CSS test and any additional requirements will be identified. There is, however, a more serious issue concerning the medical treatment of injuries that can be expected from fighting in armor systems. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 fully validated the value of crew protective clothing and equipment, consisting of NOMEX coveralls (to include a NOMEX face mask) to reduce burn injuries and ballistic chest protectors to reduce spall injuries. Using the NOMEX ensemble with chest protection reduced armor injuries by 50 percent in the latest Israeli-Arab conflict. As of now, ballistic eye protection is an unfulfilled requirement. Seven percent of all Israeli combat related injuries in Lebanon were to the eye, of which 100 percent would have been preventable by eye armor protection. Prototype ballistic eye protectors are currently being tested. Proper crew protective clothing and equipment is an essential ingredient to overall force sustainment and weapon systems replacement operations. The combat vehicle crew clothing system, type classified in 1980, will begin fielding in 1985. 32

“Taking Stock and Directions for Excellence’’ The current surgical pack on the MI13 is not oriented to armor combat injuries, but more to a peacetime training exercise. For example, Israeli experience in 1973 indicated that normal delays in evacuation demanded that resuscitation treatment be started by the front-line medic using Rin-ger’s-lactate through a large-bore intracath. This need has not yet been introduced in medic training or in the composition of the medical aid vehicle basic load. This deficiency, combined with the potential necessity to treat in a contaminated environment, presents a serious potential deficiency of medical support to our mounted soldiers. Clearly, NOMEX suits, gloves, face masks, chest protectors, ballistic goggles, proper overgarments and decontamination facilities for medical units, and initiation of Ringer’s-lactate resuscitation at the point of first contact with the seriously wounded, are minimum requirements to sustain the force. These issues, plus others, such as handling of battle stress, will be closely examined during the CSS test, starting with the basic load for the medical aid vehicle. Maintenance Combat maintenance is dramatically different from peacetime maintenance. Repair versus recovery decisions will be largely contingent upon the initial battle damage assessment report. Night operations will be more frequent. Application of field expedients will take on increased emphasis. Repair part needs will be based on combat damage rather than normal wear. And the performance of maintenance will shift from preventive to mission-essential criteria. Forward support and Division 86 doctrine require crew members and maintenance personnel to be proficient in combat maintenance skills that have not been fully defined, taught, or practiced to date. Currently, resident training and practice in the field focuses on those skills directly related to the peacetime environment. A major portion of the CSS test will examine the tasks of the maintenance team, and make recommendations for materiel and organizational improvements to enhance sustainment of maneuver elements by the rapid return to combat of fighting vehicles. Emphasis will be on fundamental tasks: Ability to load required equipment, PLL, crew members and personal gear on authorized vehicles. 0 Ability to conduct recovery operations back to the brigade support area, with M88AI battalion assets. 0 Assess the requirement for the first sergeant to coordinate and execute CSS operations at the company/team in a dedicated armored vehicle (separate MZl3 ) instead of using the maintenance team’s tracked vehicle or attempting to use a vulnerable wheeled vehicle with marginal mobility. 0 Assess the impact of the Army of Excellence-design cuts on CSS operations, particularly in regard to PLL clerks and mechanics. 0 Battlefield damage assessment and repair. Maintenance in continuous operations (dayhight). Use of labor- and time-saving equipment. Utility, convenience and location of TMDE. In sum, the ability to quickly repair and return combat fighting systems to the battlefield may be a critical combat multiplier to sustain the robustness of the fighting force. CSS-Communications 0 The ability of the S1/4 to conduct effective CSS operations is keyed to their ability to anticipate needs, not to wait to react to demands. A critical force sustainment issue is effective communications to tight the logistics battle. Currently, scrubs of data distribution, present and future needs, are being conducted to determine requirements. Additionally, NTC lessons learned are providing the doctrine and organization proponents the necessary justification and validation to effect appropriate changes. NBC Environment The CSS test will focus on the requirement to conduct continuous combat operations in an NBC environment. This is the key to continued flexibility in future battles. Serious attention is given to providing the fighting vehicle with a microclimate cooling system, overpressure, and a means to live and fight for extended periods inside the fighting compartment. If CSS elements cannot operate in that same environment, the fighting elements may not be sustained under NBC situations. Procedures to conduct necessary maintenance, rearm, refuel, and provide medical treatment and evacuation in a contaminated environment are CSS test issues to be included. New procedures and doctrine should result as these critical issues are reviewed to ensure a resiliency and depth of CSS provided to the maneuver forces. Combat Logistics Training A combat logistics course is taught to each officer and noncommissioned officer who attends the Armor School, to include the pre-command course for armor/cavalry battalion and brigade commands. The CSS portion of each course describes what logistical assets are available, how they will be organized for combat and how support is provided to the maneuver force. Each block of instruction is geared to the appropriate level of student expertise and need. Additionally, each student participates in a situational training exercise (STX) Log, which trains them in specific resupply methods at the small unit level. The Armor School will continue to expand and enlarge combat logistical training as a critical force multiplier in sustaining the Armor Force. Summary of CSS Today As the fighting force transitions with the introduction of powerful new weapons systems, CSS improvements have not kept pace. Introduction of the HEMTT fleet of trucks and new ammunition packaging are notable exceptions to an otherwise inadequate effort to field CSS systems compatible with the supported fighting systems. The CSS test initiative is the first step in a collective effort to identify solutions in the near, mid, and far range which will ensure appropriate CSS to enhance tank company team and cavalry combat power. Future Development CSS systems required to resupply weapons must be designed to ensure that those systems are provided sufficient fuel and that the weapons are resupplied as close to the point of employment as possible. Vehicles capable of quickly fixing, rearming, and refueling the fighting systems are necessary to keep maintenance and resupply times to a minimum. Such vehicles must venture close to the battle, necessitating armor protection to withstand the indirect fire threat. This need is fully supported by the Close Combat (Heavy) 33

The 1984 Armor Conference Mission Area Analysis which identified CSS deficiencies as: fighting systems. 0 Inadequate ability to rearm, refuel, repair and resupply 0 Vulnerability of rearm, refuel, and repair vehicles. 0 Inadequate ability to receive accurate and timely status reporting. 0 Deep attack operations cannot be sustained by current CSS assets. Further, in order to conduct the AirLand Battle deep attack, some armored CSS vehicles capable of moving as part of the fighting force are required. Our current family of CSS vehicles (supply trucks, ammunition carriers and petroleum tankers) are essentially thin-skinned vehicles vulnerable to almost every weapon from a.22-caliber up. Since the deep attack combat environment can best be described as “fierce”, they would not survive long enough to perform the resupply tasks essential to the success of the deep strike. Thus, without such vehicles, optimum potential operational effectiveness of new close combat fighting vehicles cannot be achieved. Attrition of the current fleet of wheeled resupply vehicles would begin with the first requirement to support in combat. The Requirements The heavy combat force needs logistical vehicles that approximate the mobility and survivability of the weapon systems they support. Absolute parity in mobility and survivability is unnecessary because logistical operations are most effectively carried out during pauses or lulls in the battle, not during direct fire or indirect fire situations. Nor should all CSS support provided to the battalion/squadron be armored and tracked. In some cases, wheeled transport may be preferable, particularly in conjunction with aerial resupply. Furthermore, logistics vehicles should have V(INT)*, a command and control aid which is integrated into close combat vehicles to receive, assimilate, and process information, and to assist the S4 in fighting the logistics/maintenance battle within the battalion. V(INT)2 is essentially an electronic information gathering, processing, and distribution system. With it, the S4 could identify the requirements for logistical support and balance on-hand material against proposed courses of action. Using on-board sensors, the S4’s V(INT)* could accumulate on-hand supplies of ammunition and POL. It could determine consumption rates and measure these rates against projected operations. When an immediate need arose, the S4 could divert material already enroute by changing route data to the transportation platoon. Maintenance planning could be conducted in a similar manner through the battalion maintenance officer and the battalion maintenance platoon. For example, selected vehicles in the support platoon might be equipped with limited V(INTl2 to provide the platoon leader/S4 with an accurate status of battalion logistical support. The display could be primarily a map system with capabilities to display routes from brigade trains to company resupply points. The S4 or support platoon leader could select the appropriate route for each class of supply base on V(INT)* information and analysis. Proposed unit supply points could be designated by the S4 as part of his overall support planning. These points could be displayed as on-call information to the unit for each support vehicle. Displaying additional information concerning obstacles or congestion on routes could allow vehicles to avoid major delays in changing routes. The S4 could divert supplies enroute simply by identifying the appropriate vehicles and changing their route to the new location. On the small-scale map the vehicle could receive information concerning the route and local friendly and enemy forces. Air attack warnings and protective measures could be displayed on the V (INTp to reduce vulnerability. Friendly forces could be displayed on a small-scaled map to facilitate linkup. Using the V(INTI2 system, the S4 has the potential to integrate all classes of supply and maintenance, push his supplies forward to units without requiring detailed reports with precise accuracy, timeliness, and consistency which in sum should sustain and maximize the operational effectiveness of the fighting force. The concept needs to be scrubbed across the force. Initially it will be expensive; the focus will be on combat and combat support. How much of what should we develop for CSS in what priority of effort? Priority Development Medical, vehicle recovery, and a portion of the maintenance team are currently mounted in track-mobile, survivable armored vehicles. Rearm and refuel vehicles remain wheeled. We are the Armor Center believe that the first priority in CSS vehicle development is for an armored tracked refueler (ATR ) capable of carrying 1,800-2,000 gallons of fuel, and an armored forward area rearm vehicle (AFAR V ) capable of carrying 200 rounds of 105-mm tank ammunition, 105 rounds of 120-mm tank ammunition, or 75 TOW missiles. The AFAR V/ATR systems should be developed in concert with the wheeled palletized load system (PLS), as complementary systems designed to pick up the full pallet of unit-configured ammunition or fuel for final delivery to the combat vehicle near the fighting position. If possible, the ATR and AFARV should be interchangeable versions of the same vehicle, offering further application to artillery, ADA and engineer units supporting the Close Combat (Heavy) Battalion Task Force. Specifically, these capabilities should be flexible, compatible with PLS, and amenable to conversion from Class 111 to Class V, and vice versa. Recently, M88AI recovery vehicle problems surfaced because the vehicles are experiencing difficulty recovering the heavier MI and MIEI. The M88AIsare lighter vehicles, causing track slippage in recovery operations. Anew vehicle, referred to as recovery vehicle-90 (RV-901, or an improved M88A1, are proposed as alternatives. Fielding Options Because the ATR and AFARV are far more sophisticated and survivable than unprotected wheeled vehicles, the costs are considerably higher. Thus, fielding options must be developed. For example, ATRs and AFARVs could be distributed (two per MI, MlEl and M2 per company) only in Europe and to units with a NATO deployment mission. This would keep the total vehicles needed under 1,000 including those required in the training base. A second option would be a battalion of ATR/AFARVs at each corps, specially equipped to conduct, support, and survive deep attack and other special missions. This option could keep the total procurement well below the 500 mark, including training base requirements. Fielding options regarding M88A1 improvement or new 34

“Taking Stock and Directions for Excellence” development of the R V-90are currently being studied by the Combat Support Vehicle Systems Ordnance Center with Armor Center participation and input. Plans should be developed for the fielding of a family of A determination will be made to establish vehicle and equip- css vehicles which Will enhance the Potential of the fighting ment requirements which could be a mix of improved vehicles they support. As Previously stated, the ATR/ M88Alsand R V-90sor all of one kind. AFAR Vand R V-90 area are priority developments requiring immediate action. The remainder of the family includes (not Logistics Research and Development 0 Armored Maintenance Vehicle (AMV 1: Provides the support to address generic logistical problems, to improve maintenance teams lack the compatible mobility, ballistic lytical management techniques for assuring logistical sup- and NBC protection of the systems they support when re-portability of newly developed Army materiel. Service Support quired to operate in the forward battle area. The vehicle ciencies. The overall conclusion was: “Battle cannot be sup- nostics, and we*ding and cutting equipment* Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV ): This vehicle will ported.” Logistical systems are at least one generation be-percent of RDT&E is currently devoted to logistical system combat company/team locations to the battalion aid station while providing the capability to immediately apply life-sav-improvement. This is clearly inadequate. ing techniques to patients and provide armor and NBC pro-The Armor Center recommends that DARCOM establish Palletized Loading System ( P L ): This vehicle will a Single point Of Contact for the Logistics Research and De- interface with the AFAR V/A TR and HEMTT vehicles. A velopment Technology Base Program, as a means to asshi- hydraulic arm which drops or picks up racks loaded with late and establish a comprehensive Logistical R&D Program, Class 111 or V, quickly and efficiently, reducing manpower to define the key thrusts to be pursued in logistics, combat requirements. gram would be chaired and executed by DARCoM with the 9th ID. Prototypes of each vehicle should be developed presented as co-equal members. Currently, the Armored when funding becomes available. Combat Vehicle Science and Technology program directs the technology base through a number of action teams. For Future Developments Summary example, the support action team is primarily responsible for Currently there is an incomplete data base on ongoing most, but not all, CSS activities. Regrettably, neither the DARCOM and industry IR&D programs for logistics. Based support action team nor the other teams provide a forum to on the numerous MAA deficiencies, logistics R&D requires execute a coordinated Army-wide CSS tech base plan driven more emphasis and associated funding since the current CSS by the concept-based requirements of the user. To address systems are a generation behind the systems they support. these CSS inadequacies of the Close Combat (Heavy) Force, To fully maximize the potential of our powerful fighting a single point of contact is essential to close the generation machines, CSS systems must be funded, developed, and gap between combat and support systems. fielded as part of the combat systems. The Close Combat (Heavy) force needs logistics-related prioritized): the wholesale/retail logistical systems, and to provide ana-of forward area repair Of Current The Close (Heavy) and MAAs identified 87 logistics research and development defi-provide maintenance with power diag-hind the equipment they support. Regrettably, less than 2 provide a rapid for ground evacuation from Tech Base Proposal tection. support, and technical data requirements* Ideally? this pro-Prototypes of the PLS system are currently being tested by Infantry, Logistics and combined Arms Center re- now to isolate problems and be prepared for full production General Officers Attending the 1 984 Armor Conference GEN Maxwell R. Thurman LTG Donald E. Rosenblum LTG Walter F. Ulmer, Jr. LTG Carl E. Vuono LTG Robert J; Baer LTG Julius W. Becton, Jr. LTG Donald H. Cowles MG John L. Ballantyne, Ill MG Frederic J. Brown MG Wilber Bunting MG Melvin J. Crain MG Neal Creighton MG Oscar C. Decker, Jr. MG Robert M. Erffmeyer MG Vincent E. Falter MG John W. Foss MG Roy C. Gray, Jr. MG Johnny J. Johnston MG Thomas W. Kelly MG Thomas P. Lynch MG Robert F. Molinelli MG Delmer H. Nichols MG George S. Patton MG Crosbie E. Saint MG James C. Smith MG Robert B. Solomon MG Elmer L. Stephens MG Robert J. Sunell MG Dale A. Vesser MG Ronald L. Watts BG Philip L. Bolte BG James T. Bramlett BG Lawrence Campbell BG Michael J. Conrad BG J. T. Dennis BG Claude B. Donovon, Ill BG Samuel E. Fleming, Jr. BG Frederick M. Franks, Jr. BG Charles E. Honore BG Merwyn Jackson BG Thomas J. P. Jones BG Charles Kone BG Edwin S. Leland, Jr. BG Glynn C. Mallory, Jr. BG Antone F. Remich BG Kenneth Rieth 35