Reforging the Saber

98 January-March 2015 Reforging the Saber by MAJ Brett Matzenbach er, CPT Robert W. Hum phrey and CPT Andrew Jenkins “Change typifies the modern world. You can either deal with change, or it will deal with you.” –GEN Gordon R. Sullivan The military as a whole currently finds itself in a period of change. The Army is transitioning from a wartime force focused on its assigned missions in Iraq and Afghanistan to an Army posturing to execute unplanned contingency op erations around the globe. Simultane ously, the Department of Defense is re ducing the size and budget of the force. With these changes, the Army is seizing this opportunity to address a number of structural, organizational and systemic problems that have de veloped over the last decade-and-a- half of conflict. An example is the addition of a third maneuver battalion to the armored and infantry brigade combat teams (BCTs). These changes are necessary and make the Army more capable of executing unified land operations. However, a number of issues remain unaddressed. Chief among these issues are the capability gaps that exist in Cavalry formations. At present, the problem statement fac ing our Cavalry formations is as fol lows: Cavalry squadrons are not led, equipped or properly employed to be able to execute reconnaissance and se curity operations against a hybrid threat in the current or anticipated op erating environment. Also, current Cav alry doctrine is fractured and lacks the detail required to offset the shortcom ings of leadership and employment. Recently, a great deal of time, discus sion and effort has focused on finding the right balance of manning and equipping for Cavalry organizations. This article acknowledges the progress underway and proposes ways to aug ment that progress by ensuring that squadrons are led by experts; guided by clear, consolidated and nested doctrine; and properly employed as the BCT’s proponent for information collection (IC).1 Expert leadership Cavalry squadrons often lack leaders trained or familiar with the unique mis sion set inherent in Cavalry operations. At present, there is no forcing function to ensure that leaders assigned to key command-and-staff positions within Cavalry squadrons have the training, expertise or experience necessary for the job. Leaders assigned to Cavalry formations do not regularly attend available functional courses specializ ing in Cavalry tasks, and few receive mentorship in planning, preparing, ex ecuting and assessing Cavalry opera tions. This lack of institutional training is exacerbated by the shortage of se nior leaders with experience gained from assignments in Cavalry forma tions. Within the current divisional and BCT construct, no senior leader exists to serve as the primary adviser to the di vision commander for Cavalry opera tions or provide mentorship to Cavalry squadrons. Who fulfills this need in the absence of this subject-matter expert (SME)? Who supervises the training and mentors the leaders of the various BCT’s Cavalry squadrons? Who coordi nates with higher echelons for more support to conduct reconnaissance and security operations? Similar shortcomings, with the result ing drop in proficiency among its bat talions, were identified within the Field Artillery Branch after the dissolution of divisional artillery (DIVARTY). As such, a U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) implementation order published April 9, 2014, re-established DIVARTY in each of the Active Compo nent divisions.2 According to the sup porting whitepaper published by the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, OK, DIVARTY’s role is to “coordinate, inte grate, synchronize and employ fires,” as well as to “provide training-certifi cation standardization of all field-artil lery units in the division.” Ideally, the DIVARTY is stationed within the divi sion headquarters to provide this su pervision.3 We should resurrect the division cav alry (DIVCAV) but model it off the DIVARTY blueprint to address similar issues within the Cavalry squadrons. Like DIVARTY, this organization would be responsible for training and certify ing the Cavalry squadrons within the division, while also providing SME on the employment of these organizations to division and BCT commanders. The Cavalry squadrons would still belong to the BCT commanders but would now receive the sorely missed mentorship from a seasoned Cavalry leader. Also, the DIVCAV would act as the divi sion’s IC-planning proponent if aug mented with additional collection as sets to answer division priority-intelli gence requirements (PIR). A command-select-list colonel would lead the DIV CAV, which would include a headquar ters and headquarters troop (HHT) to operate with the division staff. While acknowledging that the expan sion of BCT- or division-level staffs may be an unpopular proposal during an era of drawdown and fiscal uncertain ty, the resurrection of the DIVCAV as a component of the division staff would undoubtedly improve the training, management and employment of the Cavalry squadrons within the BCTs. Secondly, many leaders within Cavalry squadrons have not attended the func tional courses available to build the skills required to plan, prepare and ex ecute reconnaissance and security op erations. We need to align our various Cavalry functional courses with addi tional-skill identifiers (ASIs) and tie these to key leadership positions with in the squadron by the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). For example, a lieutenant as signed to a Cavalry squadron should first attend the Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC), which is tied to the R7

ASI.

Tying these functional courses to ASIs, and subsequently tying these ASIs to

99 January-March 2015 duty positions, is currently conducted in other specialized areas of the Army and has several benefits. It allows these skilled positions to be tracked; it drives funding for units to send leaders to their appropriate schools; and, last ly, it can assist Human Resource Com mand in the assignment process. Cap tains and majors assigned to Cavalry formations should attend the Cavalry Leader’s Course (CLC), and their posi tions on the MTOE should reflect an as sociated ASI. We cannot fail to address our enlisted leaders as well. Scout-platoon team-leader positions (sergeants) should be aligned with the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader Course (RSLC); sec tion leaders (staff sergeants) and pla toon sergeants (sergeants first class) should be aligned with ARC; and non commissioned officers assigned to squadron staff positions (sergeants first class and sergeants major) should be aligned with CLC. This progression captures the spirit of the lifelong-learning model and ensures that the key leaders within these formations ac quire, develop and master the skills re quired of them within Cavalry squad rons. In addition to maximizing functional schools, we need to ensure that officer assignments to Cavalry formations are repetitive. Formalizing a Cavalry Branch may not be the answer; how ever, an officer’s first assignment to a Cavalry squadron should not occur as a field-grade officer. Assigning field-grade officers without prior experience creates a lose-lose situation: the field-grade officers face a very steep learn ing curve, and we are denying junior leaders a vital mentor with experiential knowledge of how to execute recon naissance and security operations. Who serves as the senior mentor and trainer of a scout-platoon leader if his squadron commander has never served in a Cavalry unit? Who trains the squadron staff to conduct planning for reconnaissance and security opera tions if the squadron commander, ex ecutive officer and operations officer (S-3) have never been Cavalrymen or executed these types of operations be fore? They are the senior trainers of the unit, and only habitual, repetitive assignments to Cavalry formations will develop the experience with recon naissance and security tasks these leaders need to truly develop the next generation of Cavalry leaders. Nested doctrine Developing competent and experi enced leaders will systemically remedy many of the issues that exist within Cavalry organizations. To reinforce this position, the Army must also develop clear and concise Cavalry doctrine. Cavalry is an organization specifically designed to conduct reconnaissance and security, and while it possesses the capability to fight for information, it is not designed to close with and destroy the enemy. It bridges the gap between the maneuver and intelligence warfighting functions. Current doctrine does not clearly state, in one manual, how IC should be planned, integrated and executed by the Cavalry squadron. To illustrate this, imagine for a moment that you are a newly assigned intelligence officer (S-

2) or an Army source-selection-supple ment in a Cavalry squadron, and you receive notification that you will be ex ecuting the military decision-making process (MDMP) for an upcoming mis sion. You decide to get yourself men tally prepared to execute planning for the Cavalry squadron by brushing up on your doctrine, but where to begin? Field Manual (FM) 6-0 is the manual for staff operations,4 so that sounds like a logical place to start. Although it doesn’t directly address Cavalry opera tions, the FM says that the ninth step of mission analysis is to develop an ini tial IC plan. The manual explains that, together, the intelligence and opera tions staffs create the information-re quirement management tools and IC plan. From there, it says that more informa tion can be found in FM 3-55, Informa tion Collection (manual change #1).5 FM 3-55 states that the staff must de velop several key products to aid IC planning, including an enemy event template and matrix, and an updated intelligence estimate. It goes on to say that the event template helps develop the IC plan to answer the commander’s PIR. Where do you find how to build an event template and then further refine that into information that units identify and report? You suppose it would be explained in detail here in the IC manual, right? Wrong. Instead it says, “See FM 2-01.3 for additional in formation” (manual change #2).6 FM 2-01.3 addresses how to identify initial IC requirements. This manual ex plains how to use an event template to further develop an event matrix. With an event matrix, you should be able to go on to refine PIRs into easily digest ible information for units to answer. What page is that on? Well, it doesn’t explain that process, so at this point you have hit a dead end. Since the Cavalry squadron routinely executes this process, you assume that another place to look would be FM 3-20.96, The Reconnaissance and Cav alry Squadron (manual change #3).7 For the sake of brevity, the rest of the story is that you open FM 3-20.96, which only has one page dedicated to IC planning but references FM 2-0 (manual change #4).8 FM 2-0 provides you with no new information but ref erences Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) 2-01 (manual change #5).9 After opening ATTP 2-01, it is apparent that this manual explains the details of how to plan IC require ments and describes the process of re fining PIRs into manageable bits of in formation for collection assets to iden tify and report. Unfortunately this ATTP, while useful for planning the re quirements, does very little to explain how to plan for the execution of collec tion by the Cavalry squadron, and it is here that we run into another problem with Cavalry doctrine (manual change #6). Cavalry doctrine does a sufficient job of explaining what guidance every Cav alry commander needs to give to his units and considerations for planning; however, it does not provide the Cav alryman with a framework for recon naissance or security.10 In contrast, other maneuver manuals cover the se quence of events for different types of operations. For example, an urban at tack has six steps: 1) recon the objec tive; 2) move to the objective; 3) iso late the objective; 4) secure a foothold;

5) clear the objective; 6) consolidate and reorganize.11 Doctrine uses the same type of sequencing for offensive or defensive operations.12 While there

100 January-March 2015 will never be a one-size-fits-all solution, developing a basic framework would give Cavalry staffs a structured way to think through the execution of their plan. For reconnaissance operations, it could look something like this: 1) plan collection; 2) move/infiltrate; 3) defeat/bypass counter-reconnaissance; 4) collect; 5) conduct handover; 6) transition (Figure 1). Security sequencing could look something like this: 1) plan security; 2) move; 3) establish screen/guard/cover;

4) observe/defend; 5) conduct handover; 6) transition (Figure 2). The Army’s new method of developing doctrine, where SMEs from around the force come together in working groups to create draft manuals, shows a great deal of promise. With FM 3-98 currently undergoing vetting from the force, the Cavalry community is hopeful that it will remedy some of the ambiguity in current doctrine. The SMEs who develop the next generation of IC doctrine must ensure that IC planning is not unnecessarily complicated. Intel and Cavalry doctrine must be nested and clearly describe the IC process from start to finish and in enough de-Figure 2. Sequence of security tasks. Figure 1. Sequence of reconnaissance.

101 January-March 2015 tail without having to reference multi ple manuals. Cavalry squadron’s role After ensuring quality control for lead ers and adequate doctrine, the Cavalry force will be postured to lead and con trol the IC process within the BCTs. Doctrine dictates that reconnaissance and surveillance activities support the BCT through four tasks: IC synchroniza tion, IC integration, surveillance and reconnaissance. FM 3-90.6, The Bri gade Combat Team, attempts to clari fy these processes by identifying how the staff conducts planning to support reconnaissance operations, but unfor tunately, that system is complicated and lacks unity of effort.13 IC planning at the BCT-level is conduct ed by the IC working group. This work ing group is a temporary organization of designated staff representatives and subordinate units. Members include the BCT executive officer (who chairs the group); the BCT S-3 (or representa tive); the BCT S-2; the military-intelli gence company (MICO) commander; the Cavalry squadron S-3; the BCT chemical, biological, radiological, nu clear and explosives (CBRNE) officer; and representatives from the remain ing staff sections. This ad hoc team, while chaired by the BCT executive of ficer, relies on only two individuals who, by definition, are educated and trained at IC planning: the BCT S-2 and Cavalry squadron S-3.14 The remaining members split their efforts between IC planning and their normal responsibil ities during the BCT’s MDMP. In a time-constrained environment, the staff is accepting risk in either the IC plan or the rest of the BCT’s MDMP. According to FM 3-90.6, the BCT S-2 synchronizes the collection effort in coordination with the operations officer, MICO officers and other staff elements as required. This effort includes recommending tasks for assets that the commander controls and submitting requests for more support. The BCT S-3 integrates the sensors and other capabilities of the BCT to accomplish this, while the Cavalry squadron’s role is only to obtain information for the BCT commander.15 This ignores a wealth of capability that exists within the Cavalry squadron staff, who are educated and trained to synchronize and integrate IC assets. By keeping IC planning responsibility purely within the BCT staff, with only minimal augmentation from the Caval ry squadron, most of the BCT’s IC ex perts are not involved in the process until execution. Two changes to doc trine would fully exploit the capabili ties that exist within the squadron staff. First, replace the ad hoc BCT working group with a team from the squadron staff to directly collaborate with the BCT S-2 for IC synchronization. This team, or cell, would have a habit ual relationship with the BCT S-2 and scalable capability based on mission variables. This method was used effec tively by 2nd Armored BCT, 1st Infantry Division, during National Training Cen ter (NTC) Rotation 13-04.16 Alternately, doctrine could be changed to show a different division of labor where the BCT S-2 is only responsible for developing information require ments, while the Cavalry squadron is entirely responsible for developing the synchronization and integration of all IC assets. This creates unity of effort in the process and allows the BCT S-2 to focus on the analysis of products – us ing that to support the BCT command er’s decision-making. Either option puts IC and reconnais sance experts in charge of developing the BCT’s IC plan. The BCT’s organization further compli cates the current process by dividing the four tasks that support its IC activ ities across the formation. The Cavalry squadron is responsible for combined-arms reconnaissance through synchro nizing ground-reconnaissance ele ments. The MICO, part of the brigade engineer battalion (BEB), is responsible for synchronizing and analyzing un manned air system, human-intelli gence and multisensory information that its organic assets collect. All CBRNE reconnaissance is conducted by a CBRNE recce platoon that is organic to the BEB’s headquarters and head quarters company (HHC). This leaves the BCT S-2 responsible for developing the information requirements, the col lection synchronization and the collec tion integration across the BCT.17 If the current organization were changed to place the collection assets of the MICO under the Cavalry squad ron in the form of a “surveillance troop,” it would improve the BCT’s abil ity to conduct reconnaissance and sur veillance activities. This change would create a single proponent within the BCT responsible for the synchroniza tion and integration of IC assets, as well as for the training and develop ment of these formations. By filling this organization with leaders who are experts at reconnaissance and IC, they will be able to manage and accomplish these tasks with a greater focus and unity of effort than the current con struct. Conclusion Current ongoing efforts across the Army to improve the capabilities of the Cavalry squadron’s vehicles, equip ment and organization are necessary to prepare for the battlefields of the future. However, material solutions are only half the equation. New vehicles, optics and organizational structure will all be for naught if Cavalry squadrons are not led, trained and used properly. Cavalry leaders must be experts through senior mentorship from a DIVCAV commander, by requiring proper professional-military education for their roles and by habitual assignments to Cavalry organizations. IC doctrine must improve; it is imperative to have a nested concept to guide the planning and execution of information collec tion within an integrated framework for reconnaissance and security opera tions. Cavalry squadrons must be the BCT’s proponent for IC by making them responsible for IC synchronization and integration, and by consolidating all of the BCT’s IC assets inside the squadron to unify efforts for their training and employment. The Cavalry’s success on the battle fields of the future requires leaders who are true experts and empowered through doctrine as the BCT’s propo nents for IC. For Cavalry to remain rel evant in the next conflict, we must re forge the saber. MAJ Brett Matzenbacher is a student at the Naval War College, Newport

102 January-March 2015 Naval Station, RI. Previous assignments include small-group leader, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC), Fort Benning, GA; aide de camp for the commandant, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Benning; troop commander, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air As sault), Fort Campbell, KY; assistant S-3, HHT, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regi ment, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell; and pla toon leader, Troop B, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd BCT, 101st Air borne Division (Air Assault). His mili tary schooling includes CLC, MCCC, Scout Leader’s Course, Airborne School and Pathfinder School. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from the University of Central Arkan sas. CPT Robert Humphrey is a small-group leader at MCCC, Fort Benning. His pre vious assignments include Cavalry troop observer/coach/trainer and se nior Cavalry tactical analyst, NTC, Fort Irwin, CA; commander, Company D, 1-64 Armor, Fort Stewart, GA; assistant operations officer, HHC, 1-64 Armor, Fort Stewart; and platoon leader, Troop A, 1-4 Cavalry, Fort Riley, KS. His mili tary schooling includes the Armor Ba sic Officer Leadership Course, MCCC, CLC, Scout Leader’s Course, RSLC, Air Assault School and Airborne School. CPT Humphrey holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from James Mad ison University. CPT Andy Jenkins is a small-group lead er at MCCC, Fort Benning. His previous assignments include commander, Troop B, 1-33 Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell; commander, HHT, 1-33 Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); S-4, 1-33 Cavalry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); division maneuver plan ner, G-5, 101st Airborne Division (Air As sault); executive officer, HHT, 1-71 Cav alry, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY; and platoon leader, Troop C, 1-71 Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum. His military education includes CLC, MCCC, Scout Leader’s Course, Ar mor Officer’s Basic Course, Air Assault School and Airborne School. CPT Jen kins holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in history from Santa Clara University. Notes 1 “CSA Cavalry Review_JDS_12MAR14. PDF,” Maneuver Center of Excellence brief to the Army Chief of Staff. 2 FORSCOM DIVARTY implementation or der, Fort Bragg, NC, April 2014. 3 U.S. Army Field Artillery School whitepa per, “Field Artillery Brigade, Division Artil lery (DIVARTY),” Fort Sill, OK, May 2014. 4 FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organi zation and Operations, May 2014. 5 FM 3-55, Information Collection, May 2013. 6 FM 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, December 2010. 7 FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and Caval ry Squadron, March 2010. 8 FM 2-0, Intelligence Operations, April 2014. 9 ATTP 2-01, Planning Requirements and Assessing Collection, April 2012. 10 FM 3-20.96. 11 ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Opera tions in Urban Terrain, June 2011. 12 FM 3-21.10, The Infantry Rifle Compa ny, July 2006. 13 FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, September 2010. 14 FM 2-19.4, Brigade Combat Team Intel ligence Operations, November 2008. 15 FM 3-90.6. 16 “5-4 Cavalry End-of-Rotation After-Ac tion Review,” NTC, March 1, 2013. 17 FM 3-90.6. ARC – Army Reconnaissance Course ASI – additional-skill identifier ATTP – Army tactics, techniques and procedures (publication) BCT – brigade combat team BEB – brigade engineer battalion CBRNE – chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives CLC – Cavalry Leader’s Course DIVARTY – division artillery DIVCAV – divisional cavalry FM – field manual FORSCOM – (U.S. Army) Forces Command HHC – headquarters and headquarters company HHT – headquarters and headquarters troop IC – information collection MCCC – Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MDMP – military decisionmaking process MICO – military-intelligence company MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NTC – National Training Center PIR – priority-intelligence requirement RSLC – Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader Course SME – subject-matter expert Acronym Quick-Scan