A Professional Warfighter for Any Platform

73 January-March 2015 A Professional Warfighter for Any Platform by CPT Luke C. Bowers Commanders and units are often asked to accomplish more with less. It’s a timeless request, but as leaders, we must be creative to overcome our fi nite resources and accomplish the mis sion in spite of the immediate difficul ties. The purpose for this article is to discuss an approach to training an ar mor company for both traditional com bat on tanks and as a motorized, or truck, configuration to create more versatility with the same personnel and different equipment. Armor companies adapted wheeled c o n f i g u ra t i o n s t o exe c u t e counterinsurgency-focused operations for most of the war on terrorism; however, the transformation often didn’t address supplemental tasks of wide-area security (WAS), stability and contingency missions. There are a number of challenges inherent in reconfiguring and reinventing an armor company, but the lessons are even more important now in an environment of fiscal and personnel constraints and challenges. The following emphases address themes of how to accomplish more with less, efficiency in training and generating versatility for an organization’s capabilities in tactical and operational employment. Efficiency for armor-company training There is little doubt that armored forc es, with their speed and shock effect, will become antiquated and unwanted in future conflicts. In the meantime, however, armored formations must certainly continue to train core mis sion-essential task list (CMETL) tasks to develop and sustain proficiency; this must occur with the best management of time and resources. To this purpose, the combined-arms breach task remains the standard for armored-warfare maneuverists to train. This task is an excellent training objective; it incorporates many sup porting and collective tasks for the ma neuvering platoons, attachments and enablers. Commanders can develop platoon collective-training strategies that emphasize the supporting collec tive tasks of the breach and see great payoff and efficiency of time and re sources that indirectly support other company and platoon mission-essen tial tasks (MET).

74 January-March 2015 An efficient scenario of a company could look like:

• Company team conducts a move ment-to-contact through an ene my disruption zone;

• Team destroys security forces to accomplish a react-to-contact;

• Team identifies a planned or sus pected obstacle in the battle zone;

• Team initiates and controls fires in preparation of the breach;

• Team conducts the obstacle breach (augmented with engineer assets or not);

• Team conducts the attack through the remaining battle zone; and

• Team culminates with a defense es tablished in the enemy support zone to defeat the counterattack. This approach is linear on a training battlefield, progressive in difficulty and encompasses mostly all the standard armor-company METs, creating effi ciency at the company level. Also, the training concept can be exer cised in digital environments and sim ulators during various phases of a training cycle. Commanders can prime platoons and sections with tactical sce narios from history and tactical-deci sion exercises to validate future com pany collective-training standards and forecast deficiencies in understanding early, possibly identifying necessary leader-development program topics. Revisiting the virtual environments (combat training centers or installation training areas) enables the certifying leadership to assess tactical under standing and mission-command profi ciency while saving on unnecessary op erational tempo (OPTEMPO), mileage and Class III, V and IX costs. Understanding and using this approach allows development of a similarly effi cient model for platoon training. Pla toon training on offense tasks enables the best use of land and fuel resourc es. Collective tasks such as “conduct an attack” and movement-to-contact will test and develop the maneuver princi ples, such as tempo, that will pay off during company maneuver training or operational deployments. Platoons achieve high payoff with situational-training exercises (STX) that train land navigation, change-of-formations drills and transitions-of-movement tech niques. These greatly support profi ciency and can be increasingly effec tive with the integration of blank am munition and the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System with a pla toon force-on-force STX scenario. Digital trainers like Virtual Battlespace 3 and Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT), or integrating a terrain walk, are best for developing a platoon- and company-defense training strategy. The fundaments of engagement-area development, trigger-based decisions and engagement criteria/techniques are maximized with these tools. The capability to create multiple environ ments can be used to confirm strengths and test weaknesses of defense plans, and they have a number of instant and complementary after-action-review ca pabilities for assessment and teaching. Integrating a sister company or platoon into the virtual fight can provide objec tive feedback for the training as well. TEWTs are another method that sup port training important defense con cepts without incurring the consump tion of resources and vehicle OPTEM PO. Commanders and training planners can also achieve efficiency and resource conservation by training movement and maneuver techniques in humvees. This is an excellent training option to execute concurrently with a tank focus but also as a transitioning and familiar ization event if the unit must operate in a motorized configuration for future missions. Develop assigned

METL

Armor companies may conduct an op erational deployment with a require ment to operate on wheeled platforms (humvees or mine-resistant, am bushed-protected vehicles) exclusively or in addition to other vehicles. This scenario is very common and increas ingly necessary, as commanders de mand more options and capabilities from a slimming force – especially in stability environments where the psy chological or environmental impact of armor is not conducive to operations. Armor leaders and their formations are well equipped to provide more capa bilities. The unit’s initial challenge is to identi fy the METL and collective tasks need ed for its assigned mission or contin gency requirements. A number of com panies are motorized by an modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), such as the infantry brigade combat team’s (BCT) Cavalry squadron; however, these troops are equipped with more personnel, anti-armor and surveillance equipment that will likely be unavailable for an armor company and therefore are not suitable for com parison. Also, these units have METLs for reconnaissance, offense and de fense missions that may not necessar ily be required of an ad hoc motorized armor company. The company commander will need to establish an assigned METL (AMETL) based on the higher headquarters’ guidance. The AMETL crosswalks should build on the tasks that support WAS and stability operations. Assuming proficiency is already achieved, or planned, through CMETL tasks, an example of WAS/stability METL and METs follows:

• Conduct an attack;

• Conduct area security;

• Conduct stability tasks;

• Perform basic tactical tasks;

• Conduct a movement-to-contact;

• Conduct a mounted roadmarch;

• Secure civilians during operations;

• Conduct a raid;

• Conduct a cordon and search;

• Secure a base camp;

• Defend in an urban area; and

• Secure routes. Training and sustaining proficiency in the METs for platoons will likely re quire the same efficiency of time and conservation of resources as heavy-ar mor STXs. Initially, investing in high-quality training for individuals, small teams and sections will provide the greater return for platoons and com panies’ collective-task training and will prepare platoons for decentralized op erations. Many of the tasks and mis sions of WAS/stability require greater decentralization of control and more independent action at the section and crew levels. This is best to develop

75 January-March 2015 early for establishing confidence in ju nior leaders. Close-quarters marksmanship and close-quarters battle are excellent primers that develop practical skills, lower-level teamwork and espirit de corps; instill confidence; and highlight talented junior leaders. The next focus for progression and team/crew development is unstabi lized gunnery. Unstabilized gunnery will enable more crew cohesion and confidence. If the material resources exist to field more than four guntrucks, a five-truck platoon configuration pro vides an opportunity to challenge up coming leaders who have shown po tential as vehicle commanders. Com panies attempt to balance crew-served weapons, if resources permit, to achieve an even distribution of M2, MK-19 and M240B systems. This will provide greater options for escalating force and balancing ammunition’s pen etrating effects and surface danger zones in urban population centers. Offensive collective tasks such as “con duct a raid” are excellent for building a training scenario with complexity and integrating other individual, support ing and collective tasks. An ideal sce nario can build from a short-notice alert of a quick-reaction force, requir ing hasty troop-leading procedures (TLP) and the fragmentary-order pro cess; this can progress into tactical movement, integrating ambushes with improvised explosive devices enroute, and culminate in a cordon and search/ raid. This efficient scenario challenges platoons and easily accepts supple mental tasks like “treat a casualty” and “process detainees” for efficiency and complexity. Tank-unit task organization Potentially, the greatest challenge to reorganizing the tank platoon and company is task organization and personnel management. Of immediate concern is adapting the 16-Soldier MTOE manning force of a tank platoon into a unit that can operate mounted and dismounted, and have enough combat power to accomplish tasks without sacrificing force protection and sustainment. Commanders and platoon leaders will need to continuously assess mission requirements and conduct task organization as appropriate. During operations for Spartan Shield (Kuwait), two distinct platoon configu rations were organized and tested us ing five humvees per platoon. The first model emphasizes the maximum num ber of personnel for vehicle-dismount ed operations when the commander has a greater need for personnel to in teract with civilians, search buildings or operate in vehicle-restricted terrain. The commander achieves this capabil ity by organizing two platoons with a five-truck configuration and cross-lev eling the third platoon as an infantry platoon, with a section to each of the motorized platoons. The commander can attached these third-platoon sec tions as combat-power multipliers to the platoon, or he can use the platoons to move the sections onto an objective or dismount point, and enable the sec tions to consolidate for their mission tasks as a maneuvering element. Clear establishment of authority and responsibility for mission accomplish ment ought to be developed during this model, especially when two pla toon leaders are organized in the same formation. The second model is a platoon “pure” organization consisting of platoons or ganized with four or five humvees. Equipping the platoons with five hum vees is ideal; this provides better adaptability for accepting attachments and enablers, and for retrograding de tainees/enemy prisoners of war. The platoon-pure model mirrors tank-pla toon manning but provides another crew from a mature noncommissioned officer (NCO) – possibly the platoon leader/platoon sergeant gunner and loaders. This configuration can also condense to four vehicles to create more capacity for dismounting Soldiers for special teams and tasks. This model better supports decentral ized platoon missions such as patrol ling, key-leader engagements, route re connaissance and security. The need and assignment of special teams, in either configuration, will quickly commit the combat power at the platoon level. This element of troops-to-tasks must be carefully con sidered for platoons conducting decen tralized missions. Many Soldiers or sec tions will have to own multiple respon sibilities – for example, “aid and litter” and site exploitation – therefore, pri oritizing efforts during TLPs will be es sential. Since executing special-team efforts simultaneously will not be like ly, platoons will have to conduct these sequentially. Training proficiency on searching tech niques, detainee processes and casu alty-evacuation tasks, for example, will become high payoff training and re hearsal foci for platoons. Soldiers will require the capacity to perform and rapidly transition among the tasks dur ing missions to mitigate the limited combat power available. Manning and value of CoIST In addition to the special teams that enable mission execution and force protection of platoons, the company must organize and appropriate person nel to a company intelligence-support team (CoIST) to support intelligence processing, planning and targeting dur ing WAS/stability operations. The ar mor company can build this team using the best common practices and tactics, techniques and procedures of the Op eration Enduring Freedom/Operating Iraqi Freedom periods. The company fire-support officer (FSO) is best suited to serve as company lead for the CoIST. The company’s targeting efforts and intelligence requirements will often be complementary or have commonality, and thus are well nested with the FSO. The company’s fire-support team is likewise naturally well nested with the FSO; however, the team should also be fielded from analytic talent within the company. A composite of members from the platoons, at least one per pla toon, with demonstrated cognitive and problem-solving skills (it is also benefi cial if they have strong social skills for dialogue and street side engagements) should be identified and selected for the CoIST as habitual members. The se lection and assignment of these per sonnel should be treated like an addi tional duty or crew stabilization. The Soldiers should not transition often so

76 January-March 2015 they can build familiarity with process es and analytical tools. While wholly organic to the platoon, they become the primary candidates and recipients of specialized intelli gence and language training. This ap proach allows the company to focus its efforts, resources and schooling alloca tions for building skills and proficiency at the level where the intelligence-col lection effort will truly occur. The platoon-developed approach also preserves the headquarters section’s manning and capabilities instead of at taching these Soldiers for each mis sion. Once trained on the CoIST’s prin ciples and functions, these members become valuable assets to platoon leaders for analyzing missions, debrief ing company and battalion intelligence estimates, and building platoon opera tions orders. Also, when selecting a NCO, this method develops a Soldier who can communicate priority intelli gence requirements and interpret ob servations in an informal manner (common vernacular). This enhances “every Soldier a sensor” value and ef fectiveness. Today’s armored warriors and organi zations must continue to evolve be yond dependency on a single vehicle platform – for instance, tanks – and practice prudence with resource us age. Currently, the nation and Army can’t afford the luxury of a single-pur pose tool; the need for multi-faceted and versatile units is great. Training and reconfiguration occur regularly across BCT formations; it is time to codify this in doctrine for application and common understanding for cur rent and future leaders who will inher it our armored formations. The future U.S. Armor Corps should build doctrine and ethos for employing armored warfighters instead of tankers. Cavalry scouts (19D military-occupa tion specialty (MOS)) who train using humvees, Strykers and Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (multiple platforms) serve as a model for versatility and capabilities. Broadening MOS 19K’s skills will in crease utility to the force and preserve the meaningful presence of armored warfighters in MTOE organizations. CPT Luke Bowers serves as battalion lo gistics officer (S-4), 1st Battalion, 509th (Airborne) Infantry, Operations Group, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. Previous assignments include commander, Delta Company, 1st Com bined Arms Battalion, 67th Armor Regi ment, 2nd Armor BCT, 4th Infantry Divi sion, Fort Carson, CO, where he also served as brigade chief of operations; assistant operations officer, 3rd Squad ron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Air borne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; execu tive officer, Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 73rd Acronym Quick-Scan Cavalry Regiment; and platoon leader, 3rd Squadron, 73rd Cavalry Regiment. His military schooling includes Maneu ver Captain’s Career Course, Cavalry Leader’s Course, Infantry Mortar Lead er’s Course, Armor Basic Officer Lead ership Course and Ranger, Airborne and officer-candidate schools. The Bronze Star recipient holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in political science from St. Cloud State University. AMETL – assigned mission-essential task list BCT – brigade combat team CMETL – core mission-essential task list CoIST – company intelligence-support team FSO – fire-support officer MET – mission-essential task METL – mission-essential task list MOS – military-occupation specialty MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NCO – noncommissioned officer OPTEMPO – operational tempo STX – situational-training exercise TEWT – Tactical Exercise Without Troops (digital trainer) TLP – troop-leading procedures WAS – wide-area security In recognition of the U.S. Army’s 240th anniversary June 14, 2015, the Government Publishing Office (GPO) Bookstore assembled a collection of new and popular publications focusing on military history. Browse GPO’s U.S. Army Center of Military History collection at http:// b o o k s t o r e . g p o . g o v / agency/1061?field_format_value_ m a n y _ t o _ o n e = A l l & s o r t _ b y = c r e a t e d & s o r t _ order=DESC&items_per_page=20.