Armor in South Vietnam (the final years)

This article discusses the use of armor by the United States, Army of the Republic of Vietnam and North Vietnamese Army during the final years of South Vietnam’s existence (1972- 1975). When I say armor, I include cavalry as well (tanks and armored-personnel carriers conducting armor/cavalry operations). The United States used tanks in South Vietnam designed for high-intensity conflict in Europe. After a study by U. S. armor officers found that more than 46 percent of the terrain in South Vietnam was traversable year-round by armored vehicles, armored units conducted operations in every geographic area in Vietnam. However, the vehicles experienced some severe restrictions traversing the Mekong Delta and the Central Highlands, according to GEN Donn Starry, and the use of medium and light tanks in South Vietnam had mixed results.1 “Medium tanks were severely restricted in Vietnam,” according to LTC Ray Battreall Jr. “They were able to negotiate coastal sand, piedmont hills, the central plains and – surprising to some – rice paddies without difficulty. Light tanks suffered the same limitations as medium tanks. Being lighter and narrower, they were able to make better use of existing bridges. In turn, this allowed them access to larger and more widespread operational areas and increased their opportunity to engage the Viet Cong.”2 Departure of U. S. forces GEN Starry, commander of 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in South Vietnam (1969-1970), wrote the following: “With the [Jan. 28, 1973] ceasefire, the last U. S. advisers left the country, and for the first time, South Vietnamese divisions and corps were truly on their own.”3 There were no advisers to summon and coordinate the once-vast U. S. tactical and strategic air power, naval gunfire and on-call resupply, nor did these resources exist any longer. This forced some South Vietnamese commanders to readjust their battlefield techniques, but most armored commanders were not overly dependent on air support. The organic firepower available to armored-unit commanders generally made them more self-sufficient and self-confident than commanders of other ground units. Consequently, the departure of advisers from tank and cavalry units, which in most cases had already occurred by mid-1971, did not have much impact. With the ceasefire came an overdue change in the role of armored forces in Vietnam. Armored units employed in a purely tactical role as front-line troops for maneuver and fire support. In practically every operation of size or note, cavalry was there, slugging it out alongside infantry or spearheading an offensive against an enemy sanctuary. However, the conventional warfare and large-scale operations initiated by the North Vietnamese during their spring offensive of April 1972 had dictated a substantial change in this employment. Continuous front-line exposure of armored units in static defensive positions soon resulted in unacceptably high losses of men and vehicles. Fortunately, there appeared to be growing awareness among high-level commanders and staff officers of the need to use armored and cavalry forces as mobile reserves. The experiences of April 1972 made it immediately apparent that using armored units in a static role, where inherent advantages of firepower, mobility and shock-effect, avoiding exploitation, invited piecemeal destruction. The tactical situation that existed immediately before and for some time after the ceasefire was ideal for the employment of armored forces as mobile reserves.4 With this change, South Vietnamese armor leaders had to adapt to their new surroundings and procedures for fighting and re-supplying. Beginning of the end The NVA started moving its units forward into South Vietnam after the 1972 offensive in conjunction with a massive buildup of its main and local forces. The NVA occupied the western half of the northern part of South Vietnam, or Military Region I; the northwestern part of Military Region II; and the western part of Military Region III. After the Paris Agreement in 1973, Hanoi started moving units into these occupied areas with sophisticated artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and radars. “Hanoi also moved a great number of armored vehicles to South Vietnam; many were introduced for the first time on the battlefield such as tank-launched Scissors Bridge, BTR armored-personnel carriers, North Vietnamese T59 tank captured by South Vietnam’s 20th Tank Regiment, south of Dong Ha, Quang Tri province, Vietnam, during the 1972 Easter Offensive. (U. S. Army photo) Armor in South Vietnam (the final years) by LTC Scott K. Fowler 43

ASU-75 airborne assault guns and the T-60 medium tank,” GEN Cao Van Vien recalled.5 By 1974, the NVA conducted a substantial overhaul to the Ho Chi Minh trail, making it an all-weather road. The NVA could now “sustain a general offensive like the one in 1972 for an estimated 18 months,” said GEN Van Vien. “Also, the time required to send personnel from the North into the South was reduced from four months to approximately three weeks.”6 Fatal reductions The ARVN’s soldiers faced many grave challenges after the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. With the threat of dramatic reduction and eventual discontinuance of American congressional aid to South Vietnam, the ARVN leadership had to make some tough choices; it had to defend a nation that was narrow and long on a reduced budget. “According to Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, the South Vietnamese armed forces could replace arms, munitions and war material damaged, worn out or used up after the ceasefire,” said GEN Van Vien. “However, limited funds permitted replacement of only a few trucks, tanks and artillery pieces during the fiscal years 1973-74. M-48 tanks for the ARVN were replaced at 75 percent of requirement, and more than 4,000 vehicles transferred by U. S. and allied troops remained unserviceable for lack of spare parts.”7 Not only was material replacement a problem for the ARVN leadership, but personnel was as well. The ARVN leadership could not maintain its quotas of labor needed to sustain it. A 2 percent desertion rate and potential draftees dodging the draft were two reasons for the ARVN’slow numbers. Surprisingly, the draft dodgers (for the most part) did not join the communists. They either vanished into the cities or avoided the authorities in their villages with the help of friends and family, according to GEN Van Vien. The difficult decisions for ARVN armor units were just as painful as the other branches of the ARVN. “Two armor task forces were activated with assets of the Armor School, to include M-48 and M-41 tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers,” said GEN Van Vien. “The two task forces were to stand ready for deployment within two and six hours respectively. In Summer 1974, the ARVN forces made every effort to retake important areas and population centers the enemy had occupied. But their losses were high, and their forces became overextended.” 1975 In 1975, North Vietnam’s leaders began planning for anew offensive. They were uncertain whether the United States would resume bombing or once again intervene in the South. When their forces overran Phuoc Long Province, north of Saigon, without any American military reaction, they decided to proceed with a major offensive in the Central Highlands.8 In late December 1974, North Vietnamese forces attacked Phuoc Long, which is 75 miles northeast of the former Saigon. A town with a population of about 30,000 and close to the capital of South Vietnam, it worried ARVN leaders when Phuoc Long came under attack. The battle for Phuoc Long ended Jan. 15, 1975. During the battle, the enemy used tanks with sappers hanging on them to attack the city center. American-made M-72 Light AntiTank Weapons inflicted little damage on enemy tanks; in this battle, 90mm recoilless rifles proved more effective, GEN Van Vien recalled. From March to April 1975, Military Region II was under attack by NVA forces heading due east from the Central Highlands. They attacked along three routes: QL-19 to Qui Nhon, LTL 78 to Tuy Hoa and QL-21 to Nha Trang. Roadblocks of ARVN Rangers and M-48 tanks from 21st Tank Squadron along each route stopped NVA movements. However, by March 27 the final blockade position was destroyed, and the NVA column moved on to the coastal city of Tuy Hoa.9 By April 15, the situation in Military Region I was lost and Military Region II was bleak, at best, for ARVN forces. In Military Region II, NVA units reached the city of Ca Na, their final port in the Ninh Thuan province. In Ca Na, a column of enemy troops and tanks exchanged gunfire with South Vietnamese naval ships, where the NVA lost several of their tanks from naval gunfire.10 The final prize for the NVA and North Vietnam was the city of Saigon, and it was in Military Region III, the southern portion of South Vietnam. During the final days of South Vietnam’s existence, ARVN soldiers and leaders pressed on. “The enemy offensive [in the south] was conducted on four different fronts,” said GEN Van Vien. “To combat this, the remaining ARVN forces (III Corps) had three divisions: 3rd Armor Brigade (two M-41/M113 squadrons and one M-48 squadron), which was positioned northeast of Saigon (east of Bien Hoa –between Main Routes 1 and 15) from [April 25-29, 1975].”11 By the afternoon of April 28, 1975, the enemy had surrounded everyone within 130mm artillery range. By April 29, 1975, 3rd Armor Brigade, part of the 18th Division, moved southwest to anew position south of Long Binh Base, due east of Saigon. The Dong Nai River separated the two positions. This is the last GEN Van Vien speaks of ARVN armor in the fight to preserve South Vietnam. At 10 a.m. April 30, 1975, “President Minh ordered the armed forces to stop fighting. South Vietnam fell to communist control and no longer existed as a free nation.”12 Current doctrine Starting in 1972, the NVA primarily used its armor in an offensive role. U. S. and ARVN forces used armor in both offensive and defensive roles. In 1970, invasions of enemy safe havens just across the Cambodian border also employed armor and cavalry units. ARVN forces also heavily used armor from the 1972 Spring Offensive all the way to the defense of Saigon April 30, 1975. Against these facts, keep in mind that today, when Soldiers read U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, they read in Chapter 3 (“How the Army Fights”) that combatant NVA armor captures Saigon, ending South Vietnam’s existence as a free nation. (U. S. Army photo) 44 commanders should fight as combined arms: “Army formations integrate fire and maneuver, employing appropriate combinations of infantry, mobile protected firepower, offensive and defensive fires, engineers and Army aviation and joint capabilities to achieve desired outcomes.”13 The pamphlet further states that when employing forces for combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security, Army forces defeat or “fix” the enemy before he can attack. This allows the joint-force commander to retain the initiative; it further states that future brigade combat teams will require reconnaissance formations with additional combat power to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, fight for information and conduct WAS. Army leaders found out in South Vietnam, that armor and cavalry, fighting as combined arms, can fight for information and can wreak havoc on the enemy with its heavy forces, regardless of the terrain and environment. LTC Scott Fowler serves as the branch chief-armor for the U. S. Army Armor School at Fort Benning, GA. He served in Iraq in 2007 in the Theater Observation Detachment, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Multinational Division-Center (3rd Infantry Division), observing information operations. Other assignments have included various command and staff positions, encompassing executive officer, 4th Cavalry Brigade, Fort Knox, KY; plans officer, 4/85 Training Support Brigade, Fort Knox; S-3, 103rd Chemical Battalion, Kentucky Army National Guard; commander, Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY; company commander, 3rd Battalion, 123rd Armor, KYARNG; platoon leader, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division (Forward), Boeblingen, Germany; and tank-platoon leader and company executive officer, C Company, 4th Battalion, 37th Armor, 2nd Brigade, Fort Riley, KS. His military educa-Acronym Quick-Scan ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam KYARNG – Kentucky Army National Guard NVA - North Vietnamese Army WAS – wide-area security tion includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. He holds a bachelor’s of arts degree from Northern Kentucky University and a master’s of business administration degree from Trident University. Notes 1 Starry, Donn, GEN, Mounted Combat in Vietnam, Washington, DC: Library of Congress cataloging in publication data, 1978. 2 Battreall, Ray Jr., LTC, “Armor in Vietnam,” ARMOR magazine, Vol. LXXV, No. 3, May-June 1966. 3 Starry. 4 Ibid. 5 Van Vien, Cao, GEN, The Final Collapse, Washington, DC: U. S. Army Center for Military History, 1983. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Demma, Vincent H., American Military History, Washington, DC; U. S. Army Center for Military History, 1989. 9 Van Vien. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Van Vien. 13 The United States Army Operating Concept, TRADOC Pam 525-3- 1, Fort Monroe, VA, Aug. 19, 2010.