Targeting: A Process for Wizards or Methodology for Patriarchs?

Utter the word “targeting” in military circles, then ask someone to define it. You will get as many definitions as you have people in the target audience, no pun intended. While some may get close to the mark with their proffered definitions, most will be wrong; their particular function and the perspective it offers them will influence all. Unfortunately, an inability to define targeting affects its usefulness and acceptance by the same audience. To compound the problem, shifting from a military that historically focuses primarily on high-intensity conflicts to a more adaptable force that must achieve multiple operational endstates continues to overcomplicate the meaning of targeting. Our operations today certainly exacerbate this confusion. New generations of military officers and noncommissioned officers, as valuable and experienced as they are, have developed a vision of targeting and planning that is entirely counterinsurgency-focused. This proves to be problematic at every staff level with the inevitable shift of our focus back to major combat operations. Furthermore, the current planning skillset is inadequate at best. For field artillerymen in particular, 10-year groups of officers have never planned, rehearsed or executed “echelonment of fires,” which leads to my next point that some believe targeting is “old school,” the stuff patriarchs like to talk about in revered tones, and therefore of little application in today’s environment and contemporary planning methodology. Targeting: A Process for Wizards or Methodology for Patriarchs? by CW3 Thomas S. Green

Some believe targeting is a process unto itself, one that is best divided between meat-eaters (lethal) and leaf-eaters (nonlethal) practitioners. Again, everyone is partially correct; all are equally wrong, but the sum of all the parts is rarely balanced. Targeting remains central to our planning, coordination and synchronization of military operations, regardless of type. The Joint Readiness Training Center’s Operations Group, Fire Support Division, maintains that basic targeting skills remain valid and relevant in current and future operations. Moreover, targeting is neither a realm solely for wizards peering into crystal balls nor for patriarchs longing for the comfort of a linear battlefield. Targeting is for you, the military officer and NCO, who must identify a problem, make a decision and then apply a solution; in essence, targeting is a doctrinal “problem-solving process,” one that is complicated and three-dimensional. Targeting and MDMP Are the terms targeting and military decision-making process synonymous or different? In the easiest of explanations, targeting is an extension of MDMP, not a separate or diametrically opposing process. If I throw a ball in the air, an opposing force – gravity – works to pull it back to earth. This is not the case with MDMP and targeting, which work in unison (re-ciprocating the efforts of each) to achieve effects on the battlefield, much like the camshaft and crankshaft work together in sequence to produce power in an engine (synchronous). Senior-leader confusion about that fact at battalion and brigade has muddied the waters when it comes to the targeting process. Some see targeting as a purely kinetic means of attacking enemy high-value targets. Others, given their recent experiences, are in the manhunt mode: targeting to capture or kill high-value individuals. To look at it from a nonlethal perspective, an example may be identifying key leaders who must be engaged to collectively or individually influence or compel them to support the central or provincial government. Yet others, especially artillerymen, offer a more doctrinal answer like “the targeting methodology is time-tested and is based on the decide, detect, deliver and assess function performed by the commander and staff in planning and executing targeting.” As I said in my opening, all are partially correct and, in sum, very wrong unless viewed as a systematic approach to problem-solving by combining lethal and nonlethal efforts against each target. It is important to understand that there are only targets, all of which have lethal and nonlethal concerns; they must be at the forefront of our critical-thinking process to ensure we are achieving the desired effects. No wizards, no patriarch Targeting applies the decisions arrived at during continuous MDMP. Offering definitions like those above implies that targeting is a separate, distinct and a quasi-mystical experience attended by a limited number of magically talented wizards with the necessary “vision” to see the future. Hardly. If MDMP is continuous, so is targeting in one form or another. Targeting and the targeting process help:

• Support the commander’s decisions;

• Determine which targets to acquire and attack;

• Determine lethal or nonlethal options;

• Determine what assets to use and when;

• Identify information requirements; and

• Determine results in combat assessment requirements. These points apply in COIN as well as major combat operations, especially the former, which requires immense assessments and the application of cerebral energy to determine success or failure. They are not, therefore, the sole purview of patriarchs or wizards. Targeting had the same role before 9/11 as it does today and, in all likelihood, it will have the same role in 2020. Regardless of the acronym of choice (D3A; find, fix, exploit, analyze, disseminate, or F3EAD; find, fix, track, target, engage, assess, or F2T2EA), the variables (inputs/outputs) are different, but the process remains the same; the paradigm rests in the execution, not the process – the result being a network-based approach using center-of-gravity analysis to determine how, when and where to apply the appropriate level of combat power and influence. Modularity made changes So, if targeting hasn’t changed in its function, what has changed to increase the challenges of targeting effectively? Look no further than modularity, as in the days of the “patriarchs,” the brigade combat team attached to its parent division by a logistical, intelligence and operational umbilical cord. Even in linear conventional or force-on-force operations, the pre-modular BCT needed significant enhancements from the divisional pool of assets to make it combat ready. When it actually received those assets, using and integrating them effectively was challenging for the pre-modular BCT staff. Modularity answered some of the problems even as it created anew set. The umbilical cord has in some cases been shortened or eliminated, but the planning challenges remain. A modular BCT has within its permanent structure an amazing array of enablers, allowing it to function as a pocket division. Theoretically, the modular BCT can use those fully integrated capabilities to synchronize joint operations across the operational environment. The addition of these enablers within the brigade means the staff must determine how to best use their capabilities to achieve their operational endstate. Doing so meant increasing the size and complexity of the BCT staff and adding more command-and-control capabilities inherent in an organic fires battalion, an organic brigade-support battalion and a brigade special-troops battalion. 4 ‘mores’ of modularity More assets, more staff and more command-and-control do not necessarily mean better; most of the friction lies within synchronizing all these enablers. Targeting and planning allows the staff to visualize, allocate and synchronize these assets to affect operations and provide the assessments and feedback needed for future target development. The need for more communications to tie it all together is implied in those newfound capabilities. More, better, encore! JRTC recently conducted the first full-spectrum operations rotation in eight years. It was, therefore, the very first FSO rotation for a modular BCT. This was the first time a modular BCT staff had to control, coordinate and synchronize a moving fight against a hybrid enemy capable of challenging the BCT in a stand-up fight, as well as having influence on the government, local population, etc. It was also the first time the modular BCT used the integrated Army Battle Command System. These systems were just emerging at the time of 9/11 and then adapted to the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan in a more mobile role. The commander and the staff plan for the fight, and if they plan well, they will use that plan to frame the fight against the en- 37 emy. Modularity and its four “mores” (more assets, more staff, more C2 and more communications) made the BCT’s ability to conduct sustained operations problematic. In particular, the last “more” was too much. The integrated ABCS architecture, so successful for low-intensity operations, proved less advantageous in an FSO fight. More communications became its own control issue for commanders and staffs already challenged to control more assets, more staff and more C2. In the end, more does not automatically translate to enhanced unity of command or unity of effort. Determining which ABCS to integrate in the early stages of the operation required intense planning to ensure units could collaborate effectively and continue the fight. This was especially true in transitions between high-intensity operations to stability operations. We found lack of planning in this critical realm disrupted the BCT’s operations, particularly its ability to sustain the targeting effort from brigade to battalions within the ABCS structure. In other words, vertical collaboration became the “Achilles heel” in efforts to synchronize operations and forced the staffs to become crafty to create a common operating picture across all echelons. More to do, less time to do it If the BCT had more to do, it had less time to do it in. Even as units struggled to bridge ABCS gaps with other units, the BCT as a whole never managed to get a suitable 24-hour targeting cycle in play to facilitate planning and operations. Units were accustomed to operating in a one-or two-week targeting cycle in use in both current theaters of operations. Frankly, as trainer/mentors, we struggled with the same issue as we tried to assist the units in cementing an effective 24-hour cycle. There were many lessons in this rotation, and targeting was at the forefront. It was not a clearcut case of shifting from COIN and steady-state operations in a mature theater to full combat operations against a peer enemy; FSO meant operations against a hybrid threat. In essence, targeting an enemy that was disrupting operations, while maintaining COIN overtones to gain populace support and to help build a legitimate government within a shorter timeframe, was a daunting task that will take time to evaluate and comprise intelligible solutions to navigate this myriad of obstacles. What we found was this is not an easy task for anyone, especially since most of the recent operations are planned in cycles extending as far as two weeks. This type of concept, not yet executed in today’s Army, was a learning point for everyone. The lessons-learned will be invaluable stepping stones for future FSO rotations and will provide valuable training mechanisms for operations of the future. Filling the gaps Our take-away as trainers/mentors in all of this was that the targeting methodology remains valid. The FSO rotation identified multiple gaps; the methodology will need modification – just like any process or plan – as necessary to meet such challenges. We continue to coach a standard model for staffs to use that will help facilitate their planning, and we rely primarily on a four-meeting model to establish the necessary vehicles for target development, refinement and execution. Within this concept we focus on the assessment working group as part of mission analysis, pretargeting meeting in course-of-action development, targeting meeting as part of wargaming and the commander’s decision brief. Our concept is just away to get, identify and resource problem sets. Most units develop their 38 own model and that’s OK — as long as they are prepared to modify it in meeting operational needs. We are omnivores Some tactics, techniques and procedures are less satisfactory. Remember my reference to meat-eaters and leaf-eaters? Most units separate lethal and nonlethal targeting, and the division is both artificial and self-limiting. Lethal targeting is not just for carnivores, and nonlethal is not just for herbivores. The successful commander is an “omnivore” who takes advantage of all opportunities, lethal or nonlethal, to achieve his desired endstate. Separation of a staff into lethal and nonlethal working groups creates gaps within their operational framework and degrades their ability to synchronize their efforts. It essentially kills the staff’s ability to fuse efforts across all warfighting functions and wastes their time by duplicating processes. As targets migrate through the process through the various meetings and working groups, if we separate our staff too much, they lose visibility of how they are providing mutual support for each target. “It only takes one bullet for a nonlethal event to become lethal,” said MAJ Jason

C. Foote of JRTC’s Operations Group, Fire Support Division. “So what have we done to prepare for this situation?” This concept is difficult for inexperienced staff members; separation is seductively attractive yet unfulfilling. Ultimately it’s dangerous, as it de-synchs the unit’s operations. If the BCT identifies a high-value individual who must be targeted to enforce security or eliminate a threat, the typical staff response is “this is a lethal target; give it to the carnivores.” Such a response completely ignores the nonlethal aspects of the same target and does nothing to foster the network approach to targeting. How do you shape the target via nonlethal means, or how do you exploit the success after the mission? Fusion of lethal and nonlethal applies in FSO as well. Whether the mission calls for an attack or a defense, how do you address nonlethal concerns before, during and after the mission is complete? The unit that does not fuse lethal and nonlethal planning in FSO is doomed to spend much time reacting to consequences rather than capitalizing on them. Ask not who targets but whom is targeted and why The answer to the question “is the targeting process for wizards or a methodology for patriarchs?” is a simple “yes.” As stated in the introduction, targeting is for everyone; it is as natural as problem-solving. The real questions that need to be asked flow from mission analysis: “What is the mission? What are we targeting, and why?” Transformation aside, targeting remains nested within the framework of the command decision and planning cycle. Field Manual 5-0 outlines planning as “the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results (FM 3-0). Put another way, planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future and laying out an operational approach to achieve that future. Based on this understanding and operational approach, planning continues with the development of a fully synchronized operation plan or order that arranges potential actions in time, space and purpose to guide the force during execution. Planning is both a continuous and a cyclical activity of the operations process. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with production of an order. During preparation and execution, the plan is continuously refined as situational understanding improves. Subordinates and others provide feedback as to what is working, what is not working and how the force can do things better. Planning may be highly structured involving commanders, staff, subordinate commanders and others to develop a fully synchronized plan.” Regardless of whether our Army finds itself storming the shores of Normandy, seizing an airfield in Panama, pushing an invading Iraq out of Kuwait or taking on the challenge of rebuilding a government from ruins, the problem-solving process we have used for each of these dynamically different scenarios is aversion of the decision-making and targeting process. The results are functions that are not mutually exclusive, but are complementary and support the ability of the commander to make determinations throughout his decision cycle. The JRTC Fire Support Division approach to targeting is as a process that “is nothing more than away to focus limited resources at the right time and place.” This statement simplifies the definition of targeting and embraces the idea that decision cycles must embed to act on issues within a continuous planning cycle while identifying key steps within any given network in which the application of force or influence is necessary. The problem-solving process is straightforward and requires identifying how, when and where we want to affect change within our operational environment, and how to achieve effects that cause change across the full spectrum of operations. The difficulties lay in determining if the effects of our decision-making have helped or hurt us in achieving our endstate. Doctrine, per Joint Publication 3-0, states, “Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.” That definition essentially stops at the point of execution, offering nothing about assessing the effects of the action taken, whether lethal, nonlethal or a combination thereof. Assessments, not assumptions. Although the current model of D3A incorporates assessments, Joint Publication 3-0’s definition doesn’t necessarily lead us to the same result. That shortfall is critical; the old saying, “The job’s not complete until the paperwork is done,” applies. Targeting has many challenges, including locating, identifying and engaging the selected target. No commander, however, has unlimited assets, not even in our modular BCTs. Post-strike/engagement assessments are critical in two aspects: the first is assessing effects to determine if the desired results were achieved; the second is to husband or mass resources as necessary based on the assessment. Detailed guidance and planning, to include violent, surgical execution, helps prevent many of these complications and make the most of our combat power. To further define the current targeting model, the JRTC Fire Support Division uses the assessment working group to identify our problem sets and conduct a formal, mission analysis for a specified time. Once we have identified our problem sets and where critical vulnerabilities lay within a given network, the next steps are to develop CoAs to allocate resources and wargame them in time and space against other competing targets, as well as enduring operations, which affect the same execution cycle. According to the patriarchs, this was conducted over a 24-hour period in a conventional fight. COIN allows a longer cycle of one to two weeks, depending on unit, mission and theater. FSO against a hybrid enemy may allow us to lengthen our planning timeline to 72 hours to two weeks, depending again on the mission, the enemy and other factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available – time available, civilians, or METT-TC. Longer cycles allow for a more robust analysis and allocation cycle 39 to ensure we are meeting the desired endstate(s). Figure 1 shows the logical cycle of the MDMP and how the commander’s critical information requirements and lines of effort tie it all together. We use these as our road map throughout MDMP to guide us along our targeting objectives to ensure that when assessments are conducted, they are used to determine change along the campaign plan. The process may seem simple enough; however, vertical collaboration with our higher headquarters and subordinate units is critical. This collaboration enhances our ability to assess change and improve the targeting effort. More often than not, our collaboration piece of the fight is broken, preventing us from measuring success or failure. In the case of the FSO rotation, the disruption within the ABCS disrupted targeting. Assessments and analysis are continuous. Assessments close the gaps between targeting cycles. They essentially help drive future target development and determine whether the actions we are taking as a force are appropriate for the desired endstate. Close collaboration, use of running estimates and careful analysis of the enemy situation synchronize our efforts in CoA development and wargaming. They determine our ability to assess our operating environment. We use assessments to predict change to our campaign plan and to determine the appropriate matrix that support our targeting objectives. The forms most common are measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. Each of these have quantifiable/quantitative indicators that, when used correctly, allow us to judge how we, as a force, are doing. Most BCTs struggle with this concept; they have difficulty articulating the outcome of previously executed targets and determining whether the outcome was successful or had a negative impact on the desired endstate. That, in turn, limits their ability to make informed refinements to their targeting effort, particularly about the CCIR, targeting priorities, high-payoff targets, campaign plan and other aspects of the campaign plan. Analysis to support assessments is an art. It provides the level of fidelity necessary to drive the targeting process. As depicted in Figure 1, assessments feed the decision-making cycle and keep us on course. The bottom line is that assessments provide the catalyst for the decision-making process at every step in the cycle. We have to ask ourselves whether we are aligned correctly with labor and time in our battle rhythm. Key issues in question include:

• Does the battle rhythm support our ability to conduct solid assessments?

• Do we understand our duties and responsibilities?

• Who conducts assessments?

• Do we have a forum where we can share information with our subordinates? (net calls, commander’s Brigade Battalion Company Platoon Unit Assessments

Step 1: Initiation Step 2: Mission analysis Step 3: CoA development Step 4: CoA analysis and wargaming Step 5: CoA comparison Step 6: CoA approval Step 7: Plan or order development

Military Decision Making Process Figure 1. The logical cycle of the MDMP. 40 update brief, battle update assessments, rehearsals, etc.)

• Do our collaborative tools/platforms facilitate cross-talk and knowledge management? These questions may seem simple; they are easy to wave off. However, if a unit really wants to “see itself,” the answers are much less facile, as all these areas play a critical role in determining success in achieving our desired effects. They become even more challenging to answer positively when the time to synchronize the four “mores” is compressed by a shift from COIN to FSO. The commander and staff: no wizard, no crystal ball The staff’s abilities to take a holistic view of the past and the current situation, and to predict the future enhance the commander’s abilities to make sound decisions, give cogent guidance and establish realistic priorities. Staffs must paint a clear picture for the commander. The first step is to understand the commander’s priorities (lethal/nonlethal); that understanding should frame how the staff articulates what they want to target, in consonance with the campaign plan, the CCIR and established targeting objectives. This is how a staff achieves a common visualization of the overall fight. Establish a common vision. Most BCT staffs struggle getting to this point. They never really understand how they are supporting maneuver commanders. Measuring success or failure, assessments allow the staff to provide the predictive analysis necessary to drive future targeting, determine critical gaps in planning and avoid friction points that will stifle operations. It starts with a common visualization of the operating environment, determined by the ability to achieve situational awareness and situational understanding. The staff must share and understand that visualization before planning can begin. They must determine the following, prior to moving forward in the planning process:

• Target nominations;

• Campaign plan shifts; and

• Assessments. Adjust that vision constantly. At this stage, the commander should be able to provide clear, concise guidance to the staff. His guidance steers the staff’s targeting against the campaign plan. In mission-analysis phase, the staff defines the problem and seeks appropriate inputs from battalions that will ultimately feed the working groups. Once the staff has finished wargaming and has synchronized enablers against all the competing targets, it looks ahead and proposes certain questions pending target execution:

• What was our desired endstate?

• What was the outcome?

• Was the target fully exploited? If so, what does it mean?

• Did the action succeed or fail? Why?

• What measures are we using to assess? (MOE/MOP)

• How does the success or failure drive decision points? Front-loading these questions before execution helps focus the staff on what they should gather to assess targeting along all lines of effort. The warfighting-function masters The deputy commanding officer and/or executive officer, along with the fire-support officer, intelligence officer and targeting officer, play key roles in the targeting and planning process. They guide successful execution of targets and ensure subordinate units are primed for success prior to conducting operations. This is not to say other staff officers are not important; they are. These particular staff officers, however, provide a warfighting-function foundation for the planning staff. Any holes within these WFFs will reflect as gaps in the process. Below are excerpts of the vast span of duties and responsibilities of each. The deputy to the commanding officer or the executive officer provides the C2 to organize the staff and make decisions on behalf of the commander. He enforces the commander’s guidance and targeting priorities and manages the campaign plan to ensure the BCT is targeting in accordance with the commander’s operational endstate. Without this seat filled, the staff would lack the necessary direction and would be unable to make sensible recommendations for future targeting. The FSO is an equally important member of the planning staff. He is, essentially, the conduit between lethal and nonlethal fires planning. His responsibilities go beyond that of just fire support; he ensures the staff, as a whole, understands all aspects of fires planning, preparation and execution for BCT operations. The FSO is the engagement-and-attack guidance manager for the commander and guides the staff in targeting according to priorities set in the commander’s fire-support tasks. The FSTs establish the way ahead for task accomplishment for the various problem sets. The S-2 manages the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance plan as the cornerstone for most operations. Without S-2 involvement in the targeting and planning process, the “decide and detect” portions of the targeting model suffers. Most information funnels through the intelligence section; their ability to look through the enemies’ eyes helps the commander determine DPs in target execution. Lastly, the targeting officer is the binder for the planning staff. His span of involvement reaches across the entire staff as well as to subordinate units. In simpler terms, he is the bridge between intelligence and operations. Doctrinally, the targeting officer works closely with the S-2 to facilitate the exchange of information, but his duties and responsibilities have grown significantly. He may be involved in portions of information operations and civil-military operations. The ability to multitask and speak the language of all the WFFs make this position on the staff crucial in helping solidify the staff’s efforts and ensuring they are targeting along the campaign plan by adhering to the established targeting objectives. These duties are only a sample of the vast responsibilities these key positions entail, but this snapshot shows the importance of these key individuals. The remaining staff members are equally important but many times not filled, causing one of the mentioned WFFs to fill this role. It’s problem-solving To take a final look at what targeting really is, it is tactical problem-solving. Quite simply, it is the marriage of MDMP and targeting. This concept remains unchanged with the move from high-intensity conflict to today’s COIN fight and will remain just as relevant in future FSOs. Targeting and MDMP together prevent staffs from falling into a “fire and forget” mentality that plagues so many units by not assessing the outcome of all operations and target execution. All this is called targeting, planning and cyclical MDMP. It integrates a holistic view of the targeting construct, integrated with intelligence preparation of the 41 battlefield along all lines of effort. The solutions emerge in the various targeting meetings to align targeting and MDMP on the course the commander has set, to reach his desired operational endstate. More often than not, the problem lay not in the process itself, but the institutional understanding of doctrine. (Editor’s note: CW4 Scott McKnight, program manager, Warrant Officer Education System, and CW4 Jimmy A. Gomez, 131A senior instructor/course manager, both from Fort Sill, OK, contributed to this article.) CW3 Tommy Green is the senior targeting observer/controller at JRTC, Fort Polk, LA. Previously he served as the targeting officer for 2nd BCT, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, KS, and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He also served as the targeting officer for 3rd BCT, 1st Ar-Acronym Quick-Scan ABCS – Army Battle Command System BCT – brigade combat team C2 – command and control CCIR – commander’s critical information requirements CoA – course of action COIN – counterinsurgency D3A – decide, detect, deliver and assess DP – decision point FM – field manual FSO – full-spectrum operations FSO – fire-support officer FST – fire-support tasks JRTC – Joint Readiness Training Center MDMP – military decisionmaking process METT-TC – mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available, civilians MOE – measures of effectiveness MOP – measures of performance NCO – noncommissioned officer OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom WFF – warfighting functions mored Division, Fort Riley. Prior to his time in 3-1 Armor, he was assigned as the Golf Battery executive officer and the brigade targeting officer for 1st BCT, 1st Infantry Division, as part of the military-transition-team training mission. He deployed and was assigned as a target-acquisition detachment commander as part of 18th Field Artillery Brigade in support of OIF. He also served as the radar-section leader and then brigade targeting officer for 1st BCT, 1st Infantry Division, deployed also in support of OIF. Reprinted from Fires Bulletin, September-October 2011 edition.