Fighting an Uphill Battle – India Overcomes High-Intensity Skill Atrophy at Kargil

The Pakistani surprise incursion into the Kashmir region at Kargil in 1999 forced the Indian army to rapidly transition from a counterinsurgency posture to a more conventional approach. The Indian army eventually adapted under fire and exploited weaknesses in the Pakistani plan by applying massive firepower and isolating the enemy. The Indian army’s initial setbacks, only two years before 9/11, provided an excellent example of where years of focusing on COIN operations caused degradation of conventional warfighting skills. This is a lesson the United States should take to heart. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U. S. military has mostly focused on securing populations rather than on large, synchronized operational maneuvers. When GEN Martin Dempsey was sworn in as the Army’s 37th chief of staff in 2011, he expressed the desire to “rekindle our expertise in combined-arms maneuver” after having emphasized wide-area security operations over the last 10 years.1 This shows that the U. S. military’s focus has allowed many conventional skills sets to perish. Let’s look at lessons-learned as India stalemated in COIN operations for an extended period and was forced to rapidly transition to more high-intensity operations when the Pakistanis surprised them at Kargil. Road to Kargil Although an eventual strategic victory for India, its armed forces initially experienced setbacks due to ill-synched combined-arms maneuver, inadequate intelligence-collection capabilities, poor air and artillery coordination, deficiencies in training and poor acclimation to harsh terrain and climate. The Indian army’s initial setback at Kargil stemmed from an almost-exclusive focus on COIN operations rather than a more holistic and full-spectrum approach throughout the 1990s. The Indian army consumed the 10 years prior to Pakistan’s incursion with COIN operations and was caught off-guard due to a degradation of conventional skills and capabilities.2 Insurgencies have plagued this culturally diverse nation since its inde-Counterinsurgency professional development: Fighting an Uphill Battle – India Overcomes High-Intensity Skill Atrophy at Kargil by MAJ E. Scott Walton pendence in 1947 and have distracted its military’s focus and resources. For example, the Maoist-inspired Naxalite insurgents have sought agrarian reform in nine Indian states since the 1950s.3 The Sikhs’ bids for partition also led to a violent insurgency that resulted in the deaths of more than 21,000 people in the Punjab region in the 1980s.4 In addition, the Indian army committed considerable attention and resources to neighboring Sri Lanka, and its government has extended the fight against the Tamil Tigers.5 Finally, the mujahedeen (freedom fighters) in Kashmir were emboldened by the Taliban victory in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and since have spread their insurgency east into the contested region.6 While these insurgent groups had a plethora of motives, the Indian government only used military force rather than working long-term political solutions to rebel groups’ dissent. Several of these political groups have stymied the Indian army into area-security missions and have distracted focus from defending against conventional threats.7 Pakistan recognized India’s atrophy in high-intensity warfighting skills and sought to quickly seize the initiative and exploit those weaknesses. Therefore India’s previous focus on COIN operations was both an underlying justification for Pakistan’s attack and a reason for its initial tactical success. After the battle, India’s Kargil Committee Report concluded, “The heavy involvement of the army in counterinsurgency cannot but affect its preparedness for its primary role, which is to defend the country against external aggression.” Pakistan contributed to the dilemma by supporting proxy insurgencies in Kashmir and further weakened India’s ability to fight conventionally. For several reasons, the Indian government did not provide necessary oversight and long-term defense strategies to neutralize insurgencies and became too confident and complacent in its conventional capabilities.8 The strategic objective of Pakistan’s limited invasion of Kargil in 1999 was to escalate the Kashmir regional dispute globally and drive political concession.9 By seizing the initiative and quickly securing terrain across the line of control, 10 Pakistan believed it could compel the United States to negotiate a ceasefire agreement advantageous to Pakistan.11 In addition, Pakistan’s self-image of martial superiority and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s desire to consolidate domestic popularity fueled the country to attack its main adversary.12 Pakistan believed that nuclear parity restrained India’s political leaders, making them weak and indecisive, which then created an opportune time to exploit the political climate. India’s perceived nuclear restraint and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities prevented a major conventional response by India. Nuclear parity thereby negated India’s superior conventional force and leveled the playing field. Therefore, Pakistan had nothing to lose from a surprise attack. In addition, Pakistan was willing to accept risks in its tactical plan since it believed that the United States would immediately intervene and negotiate a ceasefire due to the potential implications of a nuclear exchange. Pakistani incursion Operationally, Pakistan’s objective was to deny India use of the 134-kilometer-long Srinagar-Leh National Highway. Cutting this line of communication would isolate Kargil from the Indian mainland and reduce resupplies and reinforcements. Subsequently, Pakistan sought to secure a foothold in Kargil to provide further infiltration routes into the Kashmir.13 Publicly GEN Pervez Musharraf claimed the operation was defensive in nature and continued to protect the border from Indian attack.14 However, Pakistan’s plan was logistically not feasible and destined to fail over time due to its heavy reliance on an expeditious foreign intervention to broker a ceasefire. In late Winter 1999, 1,700 Pakistani soldiers and local guerrillas infiltrated an 80-kilometer unobserved gap in the LOC by foot and helicopter. The Pakistanis seized the high ground, built supply caches in the area and acclimated to the environment before initiating a fight with the Indian army at the end of May.15 Most of the fighters were the paramilitary Northern Light Infantry, accustomed to the area and the local conditions. They deployed in small groups but with substantial firepower in the form of light cannons, mortars and surface-to-air missiles.16 The NLI carried artillery pieces up hilltops with mules and assembled them in position. They expertly used dispersion and concealment of their SAMs’ positions. By the end of the winter, the NLI and Pakistani soldiers occupied 130 guardposts in the LOC, with a frontage of 150 kilometers and a depth of only four to eight kilometers.17 Although there were fierce artillery exchanges prior to the conflict, the infiltration was a surprise to the Indians since they underestimated Pakistan’s ability to attack in the restrictive and harsh terrain.18 Shepherds, hired by the Indian army as scouts, did not detect the invaders until May 3. By May 11, India’s 15th Corps reported 160 to 240 intruders in eight locations.19 Initial counterattack Despite being unready, the Indian army sought a rapid and decisive response to the infiltration. By the end of May, India had amassed 19 infantry battalions and several artillery regiments prepared to attack. Labeled Operation Vijay (Victory), India’s goals were to isolate intruders to prevent reinforcements; force a withdrawal of all intruders back across the LOC; and occupy key terrain along the LOC to prevent further infiltration. Although a counterattack into Pakistan was successful during the 1971 war, India decided not to continue across the LOC to avoid further escalation and nuclear retaliation.20 Despite overwhelming combat power in the region, India’s initial counterattack failed due to weak intelligence, insufficient synchronization, lack of training of forces in harsh climate and terrain, and inadequate air and fire support. Weak intelligence. Mediocre Indian intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination led to ineffective initial ground operations during the Indian counterattack. Almost all Indian intelligence assets were in one organization, the Research and Analysis Wing. The RAW, lacking staff and technology, failed to identify the warnings of increased shelling in certain areas and NLI emplacement of caches since the previous autumn. In addition, Winter Air Survival Operations personnel only conducted surveillance of the valleys, therefore strictly focusing on large mechanized avenues of approach and neglecting other, smaller mobility corridors.21 Likewise, ground scout patrols only followed open paths along dried riverbeds.22 By neglecting the ridges, Indian collection assets missed the proper location for NLI infiltration and provided inaccurate and irrelevant intelligence. Lack of acclimation training. When the initial Indian troops deployed, they lacked enough equipment and training and were not acclimated to wage combat operations at high altitude. Poor training in mountain operations forced the Indian infantry to move along open terrain, thus becoming easy targets to indirect fire.23 In fact, more than half the Indian casualties were from artillery.24 The Pakistani ability to control the LOC and interdict Indian resupply along the Srinagar-Leh Highway made it difficult to move artillery within range to cover Indian maneuver. Infantry battalions, with no indirect-fires support, attacked uphill against a fortified enemy with superior firepower.25 Initially this daunting task proved futile. Inadequate air and fire support. Insufficient air support compounded issues on the ground. The Indian air chief was reluctant to use air power to avoid the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear response. Therefore, there was no air support until May 26, almost 23 days after first reports of the intrusion. Once committed to the conflict, Indian air power had limited impact on the outcome of initial battles.26 Pakistani SAMs and the mountainous terrain negated the superior Indian air force. After NLI forces downed several Indian planes, the air force instituted ceiling restrictions and prevented low flights from supporting ground commanders’ assaults.27 Transitioning to high-intensity ops Despite initially having an advantage, Pakistan’s flawed and inflexible tactical plan was doomed from the start. Pakistan’s plan eventually faulted since its forces lacked resupply capabilities and didn’t plan for enough manpower to sustain its defensive positions over an extended period. But primarily, the Pakistani tactical plan eventually failed because the United States did not intervene immediately to broker a ceasefire – the United States refused to alienate a democratic and economically important India and did not want to set precedence by allowing aggression to change the global status quo.28 Pakistan wasn’t prepared to sustain the fight over the long haul after no immediate U. S. intervention.29 As time went on and the United States had not negotiated a ceasefire, the Indian army was able to adapt and ultimately seize the initiative. In addition to subscribing to false strategic assumptions, Pakistan’s army and the NLI didn’t have a concerted defensive scheme. Instead, they had isolated outposts of about 30 men fighting independently. The effects of terrain, climate and the inability to reinforce battle losses ceded the initiative to the Indians.30 Because of the steep cliffs, the Indian army required a 9-to-1 force ratio for a frontal attack uphill, as opposed to the normal 3-to-1 ratio re- 24 quired. Therefore, Indian units eventually determined the best way to defeat Pakistani positions was to surround them, overwhelm them with massive artillery prepping and attrite them over time.31 This tactic was far more successful than an all-out frontal assault. The perfect example of this change in tactics and turning point of this war was the Battle for Tololing (Point 5140) May 22. With little flexibility and no resupply, several 30-man Pakistani outposts fought to the death in place. While they had been hard to detect, these small outposts were not large enough for a sustained defense. At Tololing, the Indians exposed Pakistan’s logistical failures, labor shortcomings and a lack of depth in their defensive perimeter.32 Ceasefire, casualties U. S. President Bill Clinton negotiated a ceasefire July 4, 1999, restoring the pre-conflict conditions and LOC. Indian forces, both air force and army, had 474 killed and 1,109 wounded, whereas Pakistan suffered about 700 deaths in 74 days of fighting.33 In addition, the fighting displaced about 20,000 civilians from local villages in the Kargil region.34 Internationally, the world was less stable since the Kargil conflict directly contradicted two of the most widely acknowledged political-science theories: the democratic peace theory and nuclear peace theory. Both theories attempted to provide hope for long-term security and stability.35 Although Sharif claimed victory for Pakistan, the Kashmir conflict was an international issue and his nation’s aggression further isolated Pakistan globally. Even China was afraid to support Pakistan since its support could bring scrutiny to its oppression of Tibet.36 However, the defeat’s most important ramification was how it led to Musharraf’s replacement of Sharif via coup the following October. A decisive reason for the leadership split was the prime minister’s blame on the military for the attack and its ultimate failure.37 On the other hand, although Sharif denied specific knowledge of the plan’s details, the Kargil Committee Report claimed that he was completely aware.38 Many of mujahedeen and NLI continued fighting because they did not perceive the ceasefire as legitimate. Aftermath Musharraf argued that the Indians made a strategic mistake by committing almost all military resources to Kashmir, thereby allowing Pakistan to attack with little resistance in other parts of the country. Despite Musharraf’s claim, the conflict worked to India’s favor because Pakistan lost credibility with the United States. India became closer to the United States after the Kargil incursion despite performing nuclear testing the previous year that the United States opposed.39 India, with combat deaths dispersed across most of the country, also experienced a surge in patriotism and solidarity.40 However, this patriotism often led to revenge and excessive use of force on other groups with political dissent.41 On defense issues, India has firmly resisted change over the past 52 years.42 Few changes have taken place in India’s defense apparatus despite the 1962 defeat to the Chinese, the 1965 stalemate with Pakistan, the 1971 victory over Pakistan and inability to make progress in several insurgencies and political unrests. Although militaries tend to stagnate after their last victory, defeat usually breeds innovation. However, the Indians failed to adapt after their 1962 loss to the Chinese, and they made many of the same mistakes again at Kargil in 1999 in similar terrain and conditions. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s desire to develop an apolitical officer corps at India’s independence had long-term implications for the country’s defense-policy formulation. For example, at Kargil, the Indian service chiefs were both the operational commanders in the field and strategic staff proponents. Since they tended to focus on their first duty or on the war at hand, they often neglected important long-term issues and reform in their other duty as service chief.43 Despite becoming a nuclear power, the Indian army remained vulnerable in the 1990s to conventional military threats due to its failure to develop a comprehensive defense strategy and its inability to alleviate the impact of multiple insurgencies. Lessons-learned Today the American armed forces have likewise fought 10 years of mostly COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In looking at future wars, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in 2010 that “[t]here was a concern that our force is too focused on [COIN] and has lost its edge for complex, conventional operations involving multiple brigades or divisions.”44 In obtaining balance, the United States might learn from the Indian army’s initial setbacks at Kargil only two years before 9/11. Indian initial weakness in high-intensity skills at Kargil in 1999 led to poor battlefield coordination and initially negated India’s conventional superiority. Soldiers were unprepared for the harsh Himalaya conditions. Had it not been for Pakistani false strategic assumptions and lack of resourcing, the Kargil conflict could have been more detrimental to India. The Indian army eventually adapted under fire and exploited weaknesses in the Pakistani plan by isolating the enemy through massive firepower. India’slack of focus on high-intensity skills was mostly due to significant COIN operations throughout the country, partly fueled by Pakistan in the Kashmir. The Indian army found itself “fighting an uphill battle” at the beginning of the Kargil conflict since area-security missions had distracted its focus from conventional capabilities. Adaption solely based on COIN led to defeat for the Indian army, and re-adaption to high-intensity conflict led to victory. Therefore, the key to military preparedness is balance. MAJ Scott Walton is an Armor Branch officer serving as executive officer for 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, and deployed in support of Operation New Dawn. Previous assignments include service as an aide-de-camp in U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; assistant professor of military science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; and various command and staff positions in 1st Cavalry Division and 3rd Infantry Division. A graduate of Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, he also holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in government and history from the College of William and Mary and a master’s of arts degree in security studies from Kansas State University. 25 Notes on page 49 COIN – counterinsurgency LOC – line of control NLI – Northern Light Infantry RAW – Research and Analysis Wing SAMS – surface-to-air missiles Acronym Quick-Scan