The Adaptability of the Modern-Day Cavalry Trooper

We must exercise critical thought and adaptive leadership. We must empower our junior leaders and foster environments for them to learn, grow and be successful leading our Soldiers in combat. We must visualize our current mission and the prospective battlefield, whether in garrison or forward-deployed, and develop adaptive, concurrent courses of action for maximizing our assets and combat power, meeting our commander’s intent and ensuring the safety, security and morale of our men. We are not merely tankers or scouts; we are leaders of combat Soldiers, period. We are still a nation and Army engaged on two fronts, known as 4th-Generation Warfare. The ability to maintain acceptable levels of success and relevance on a multi-dimensional, exceptionally irregular battlefield has proven to be complicated at times. Our success within the Armor force on the streets of Iraq and within the mountains of Afghanistan is largely due to our senior leaders’ employment of mission command and the empowerment of junior leaders on the battlefield. However, it is also due to the unique ability of our strategic leaders to adapt, innovate, overcome and execute within a multitude of diversely complex environments, operations, platforms and leadership positions. For some, the notion of transitioning from our conventional, traditional and even historic roles as Armor leaders to much more contemporary, non-Armor-centric roles during combat may seem a bit discouraging. On the other hand, there are likely several of our branch’s contemporary leaders who view leading Soldiers to be, in essence, branch-immaterial. Either you can lead Soldiers in combat, or you cannot, regardless of military occupational specialty. Either you understand both your commander’s intent and execute your full-spectrum mission successfully, or you do not. How we as leaders personally execute our duties associated with leading Soldiers in combat may vary – based on individual dynamics such as education, experience, task organization and the desired strategic endstate of our mission – but our metrics for success The Adaptability of the Modern-Day Cavalry Trooper by SFC David N. Harris SFC David Harris examines the Aminkhan and Kundalan areas of Northern Kandahar Province from his overlook. (Photo by SSG Karl Muller) must be the same. Our adaptability as leaders and readiness to place aside personal reservations and step outside our organizationally attained comfort zone is necessary to remain relevant and appropriately prepared for the modern-day battlefield. Background Early during February 2010, Comanche Company, 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, was approaching the end of its company-, platoon- and squad-level training densities. It was also preparing for a regimental mission-rehearsal exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Leadership decided that each company within 1st Squadron would form an additional rifle platoon during the MRE based on information from the unit that 2nd Cavalry would be replacing in Kandahar, Afghanistan: 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry, from Fort Lewis, WA, who had adopted the four-rifle-platoon concept during its deployment. The intent of the four-platoon concept is to provide commanders with another instrument to successfully accomplish their full-spectrum mission, especially within the austere, decentralized circumstances most units find themselves operating under. It’san extension and a means in maintaining more situational awareness, more interaction with locals, more security in your battlespace and more enablers for your host-nation security force counterparts. Doctrinally, Stryker infantry companies are comprised of three rifle platoons (infantry), one Mobile Gun System platoon (armor) and a headquarters platoon that includes a company fire-support officer, forward observers, snipers, mortars and support personnel. The MGS platoon’s principal function within the Stryker brigade combat team is to support the infantry platoons. In some Stryker infantry companies, the fourth “maneuver” platoon has been, and typically is, comprised of the MGS platoon and whatever vehicles and extraneous personnel they can acquire from the headquarters platoon. Task organization and integration By virtue of the decision to reorganize into four-maneuver-platoon companies, my platoon leader, CPT Walter Biner, and I went immediately from a 12-Soldier Stryker MGS platoon to leading two infantry rifle squads, a weapons squad, vehicle squad, two MGS crews, a radio-telephone operator, medics and an FO. The medics and FO stayed in close proximity to me, while the platoon RTO accompanied the platoon leader. My platoon leader, an Armor officer, and I (a 19K by trade) initially found leading a rifle platoon to be both foreign and frustrating at times, even though we had been training with our infantry equivalents quite frequently throughout the previous year. The principal source of our frustration was a lack of time to properly integrate our new platoon. While little can be done to accurately forecast and resource the requirements of an additional rifle platoon on short notice – particularly before deploying in support of the war on terrorism or other contingencies – the integration of new and existing Soldiers needs to begin as soon as possible. It’s not simply having enough time to become educated and train on specific doctrine, but also about having adequate time to properly assimilate your new platoon. Becoming familiar with each individual Soldier’s professional strengths, weaknesses and motivations, as well as each Soldier as an individual, should play heavily on how you as a leader staff and assign Soldiers and noncommissioned officers within your formation. Training and deployment preparation To be fully prepared for a deployment supporting the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom, CPT Biner and I felt that each Soldier in the platoon needed to be highly adept in all basic infantry battle drills and cross-trained in all relevant MOS-specific subject matter. We wanted the Soldiers of our platoon to be true cavalrymen: masters of all Rifle squad Platoon weapons squad Mobile Gun System crew Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle crew -Squad leader (staff sergeant) -2 fire teams: each consisting of team leader (sergeant), rifleman/squad designated marksman (private/ specialist), grenadier (private/specialist) and M249 Squad Automatic Weapon automatic rifleman (private/specialist) -Weapons-squad leader (senior staff sergeant) -2 M240B gunners (private first class/specialist) -2 assistant gunners (private first class) -2 ammunition bearers (by doctrine, weapons squad is authorized two anti-armor (Javelin) gunners, private first class/ specialist) -Vehicle commander (sergeant/staff sergeant) -Gunner (specialist/sergeant) -Driver (private/private first class) -Vehicle commander (specialist/sergeant) -Driver (private/private first class) -2 infantry dismounts serve as rear air-guards -Squad leader serves as vehicle NCO in charge Figure 1. Concept and task organization of four maneuver companies, illustrated. 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment 7 trades, practiced and proficient with anything they put their hands on. In preparation, I began leading NCO professional-development-style forums with the entire platoon, essentially forcing them to interact and learn about each other while learning other basic Soldier- and leader-related tasks. Everything we trained emphasized combat application. Our priorities were:

• Basic infantry battle drills. All Soldiers and NCOs of all MOSs received training on how to execute basic infantry battle drills in accordance with Field Manual 3-21.8. My 19K NCOs were expected to be able to not only perform their MOS-related duties but also lead a rifle squad or fire team up a mountain to conduct a squad attack or emplace a support-by-fire if need be.

• MOS cross-training. All Soldiers and NCOs within the platoon were cross-trained on relevant Armor- and infantry-related tasks, including our RTOs, FOs and medics.

¾ I learned the job of my weapons-squad leader, and he learned the duties and responsibilities associated with being a forward-deployed platoon sergeant.

¾ CPT Biner, along with the infantry NCOs who had Ranger experience, instructed the platoon on more advanced patrolling fundamentals.

¾ Each Soldier also learned reporting, the fundamentals of reconnaissance and their practical applications, with an emphasis on team leaders and squad leaders conducting multidimensional reconnaissance within the counterinsurgency environments of Afghanistan.

¾ Infantry squad leaders received in-depth instruction on the M1128 MGS and, once we deployed, had the opportunity to personally fire a 105mm high-explosive plastic round from the commander’s station.

¾ All Soldiers received instruction on the M1128 MGS and M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle’s gunner stations, also firing a 105mm HEP round from the MGS gunner’s station. This MOS cross-training allowed the Soldiers and leaders within the formation to fully recognize and appreciate their platoon’s capabilities as well as prepare them in the event they may need to serve as a MGS commander or gunner, or ICV commander. I also made it a point to keep dismounts on the ground during the 105mm shoots (with respect to the safety designated zone I had established) so they could experience first-hand what it’s like to be in close proximity to a large caliber, direct-fire platform while it’s supporting them in contact. All Soldiers within the platoon were trained on the duties and responsibilities associated with driving and maintaining both the ICV and MGS. Junior-enlisted Soldiers learned in detail the jobs of their contemporaries; MGS drivers served as M249 gunners and grenadiers in fire teams; riflemen obtained licensure on all Stryker variants within the platoon. Every Soldier became well-versed in vehicle maintenance and recovery. The platoon RTO trained everyone on our assigned communications equipment (with the exception of the PRC-117 Harris, which we would not receive until we arrived in theater), including Blue Force Tracker and the Simple Key Loader. The platoon medic certified every Soldier in the platoon on combat lifesaving, and the FSO and I gave detailed instruction on observed fire.

• Physical training. We did PT constantly. Both CPT Biner and I had the same philosophy: “When in doubt, do PT.” For the deployment to Kandahar, I developed an eight-week PT program designed to prepare Soldiers for the mountainous environments of Afghanistan. We did our normal PT in the morning IAW FM 21-20 and conducted the supplementary PT program in the afternoon. We ran farther, ruckmarched farther and generally beat our bodies up daily. For our platoon of 36 Soldiers, our Army Physical Fitness Test average was more than 280 points and the Soldiers’ level of fitness showed when it truly mattered in Afghanistan.

• Marksmanship. We conducted long-range, short-range and close-quarters marksmanship courses at the platoon level before deploying. All Soldiers fired the various weapons within the platoon in stress-shoot scenarios and continued to do so while in Afghanistan. When the operations tempo and Class V permitted, we fired our weapons as much as possible, and each Soldier became proficient with each of the platoon’s stabilized and non-stabilized weapon systems.

• Cultural training. The platoon had three Soldiers attend a six-week Pashtun-language training session held by a military training team from the Defense Language Institute. The information and training they imparted to the rest of the platoon was excellent, to say the least. Soldiers learned Pashtun phrases and cultural information specific to the region of Afghanistan we would be operating in, and CPT Biner, together with the platoon linguists, put together written tests for the Soldiers. When the squadron commander became aware of this, he applied our program as the cultural-training standard for the rest of the squadron.

• Counterinsurgency training. We tied this in with our cultural and language training classes. I led a weekly COIN seminar at the platoon level; often times, members of other platoons attended. We focused on relating COIN doctrine (FM 3-24) and the ISAF commander’s theater-specific COIN guidance to the junior Soldiers and leaders. The training was more interactive, as COIN for junior leaders should be, and it gave the young Soldiers and leaders the reasons why our processes, strategies and actions were important during COIN operations, as opposed to the specifics of executing them. Don’t assume that young Soldiers and leaders will understand COIN or, more importantly, that they will understand their company commander’s intent and operational design. It’s certainly not that they are unintelligent; it’s simply that COIN is fairly complex. Therefore, we needed to take better care to ensure our strategic leadership at squad level understood what exactly it was they were executing and, more importantly, why. I made them watch and take notes during movies such as “The Battle of Algiers,” “Red Dawn,” “The Beast” and “Breaker Morant.” Once complete, we held long discussions on the parallels between what they just watched, what we would potentially be doing in Afghanistan, and what they felt were acceptable and unacceptable strategies, etc. This was a great tool for grasping the attention of a younger generation of Soldiers.

• Leader development. As with COIN training, I also conducted a weekly leadership-development huddle with the NCOs of the platoon. It rarely involved any instruction, but it would get the leaders within the platoon thinking adaptively and critically, and developing themselves personally through the use of vignettes and scenario-driven discussions. In doing so, we sharpened our abilities as leaders in responsibility, accountability and interpretations of what leadership truly meant to us.

• Sustainment training. Between the end of the MRE and the day prior to our redeployment from Afghanistan, we 8 trained. We performed sustainment training on all subjects to a relentless level. We constantly conducted relevant MOS cross-training. This training associates with our evolving full-spectrum mission and battle drills. It also assures Soldiers get training on new equipment when we receive it, daily training vignettes in support of the COMISAF’s COIN guidance, PT (which usually consisted of whatever space and materials we could find out in-sector) and weekly NCOPDs with team leaders and above. Deployment in support of OEF X-XI As I stared at the mountains surrounding Kandahar and contemplated the dynamics of the Taliban insurgency, coupled with the intense tribal structure and historic partiality of the Pash-tuns in this province, I began to feel very anxious. I immediately began contradicting myself with internal questions such as “did we train enough?” or “are my Soldiers and I honestly prepared for this?” When we first began conducting patrols in the Shah Wali Kot District, we were operating within a company battlespace that was roughly 100 square kilometers. Through our relief in place/ transfer of authority with 1-17 Infantry and our initial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, it was evident that our focus early on would be to restore freedom of movement on Route Bear and within the adjacent villages. Over the course of the next 10 months, my platoon would consistently transition between mounted and dismounted operations in both urban and mountainous environments. The constant shift between mounted and dismounted operations necessitated a much more elaborate approach and execution of our troop-leading procedures. Although there was a considerable Taliban presence in the Shah Wali Kot District of Kandahar, the Taliban were not the foremost problem in our area of operations. As this isn’t intended to be a professional dissertation on Afghan-governance development and COIN strategies at the company level, I will merely remark that joint patrols with our Afghan National Security Forces counterparts required the Soldiers of my platoon to serve as instructors/trainers daily out in-sector. It was incredibly frustrating at times for CPT Biner and myself, so you can imagine how our younger Soldiers felt. Comanche Company relocated south of Kandahar March 29, 2011, to the town of Nakhonay in the Panjwai’i District, to relieve a company from 22nd Royal Canadian Battle Group. Although we had been conducting dismounted operations frequently in Shah Wali Kot, the immense size of our battlespace in that AOR typically required us to conduct amounted movement to our area of dismounted debarkation and establish a patrol base. In Nakhonay, it was exclusively alight-infantry fight. We rarely used our Strykers, largely due in part to the dense urban configuration and the vast grape orchards of Nakhonay. We relied heavily on the use of individual electronic-control measures, such as the Vallon mine detector, Targeted High-Output Responder and Guardian ECM systems. Each Soldier’s individual fighting load increased due to the nature of our operations. We were carrying more batteries, more water, more food, more lifesav-CPT Walter Biner gives 1st Squad his intent for their patrolat the platoon’s patrol base outside Baghtu Valley in Kandahar. (Photo by SSG David N. Harris) properly integrate and train prior to our deployment to Kandahar. In closing, I would like to point out that this article’s intended purpose is not to advocate that the SBCT company adopt the four-platoon combined-arms concept or to make unfair characterizations of the Armor Branch’s more conventional leaders. It is for the purpose of information-sharing and allocating my specific training methods, strategies and experiences of leading a rifle platoon in Afghanistan. What I have shared is what I feel complemented our success as a platoon and company in one of the most complex environments in the world. These are not “keys to success as an Armor NCO leading infantrymen” but rather what I believe were the keys to my success as a leader, period. I decline to consider that we (Comanche Company) have been the only company-sized formation to attempt this method of combined-arms integration and achieve success. It’s not outside the realm of possibility that our contemporary leaders will potentially find themselves in similar arrangements during the coming years. SFC David Harris serves as the regimental master gunner for 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany. He has served in various leadership and staff positions, including M1A2 gunner, Bandit Company, 1st Battalion, 8th U. S. Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; M1A2 tank commander and troop master gunner, Eagle Troop, 2nd Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; platoon sergeant and troop master gunner, Fox Troop, 2nd Squadron, 3rd ACR; squadron master gunner, 2nd Squadron, 3rd ACR, Fort Carson, CO; senior instructor and chief of training at 7th Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy, Grafenwoehr, Germany. He is a graduate of the Maneuver Senior Leader’s Course, the M1A1 and M1A2/System Enhancement Program Master Gunner Schools and the Army Reconnaissance Course. ing equipment and, more importantly, more bullets. In fact, the only Soldiers in the platoon who gained any semblance of comfort, as irony would have it, were the Soldiers in the weapons squad. We quickly discovered that our M240B machineguns were ineffective while patrolling in town due to the urban layout and proximity of the populace, so the weapons squad began exclusively using the platoon’s two M14 enhanced battle rifles, which worked exceptionally well within Nakhonay. The weapons-squad leader had been to Sniper School and was a former sniper section leader, while one of the machinegunners had served previously on a sniper team as well. The overall transition required us to approach our TLP differently than we had while in Shah Wali Kot, and stressing mounted actions on contact, recovery, support and evacuation became secondary to a heavier emphasis on dismounted infantry battle drills, deliberate dismounted route-clearance techniques, evacuation and other dismounted preparatory checks and rehearsals IAW FM 3-21.8. We still trained and rehearsed mounted skill sets, but not in the same manner we had before. Mastering basic Soldier skills and battle drills will save your life in Afghanistan. Aside from the abundance of pressure-plate improvised explosive devices and homemade explosives, the nature of the enemy contact we encountered in Nakhonay was exceedingly similar to that of what I had experienced in the likes of Fallujah, Ramadi and Tal’Afar: ample amounts of sporadic firefights, typically designed to entice our patrols into defensive IED belts or larger ambushes. However, the human and cultural terrain was no different, and just as diverse and complex as our previous location, and joint patrols with our ANSF partners were equally as, if not more so, frustrating as our previous experience in Shah Wali Kot. Conclusion We departed Kandahar May 13, 2011, and all my Soldiers were alive and boarding a C-17 alongside me. As each man boarded, I touched his shoulder for what I knew in my professional heart would be my last physical headcount of those men. Once the 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s reintegration was complete in August 2011, Comanche Company returned to its original authorized modified table of organization and equipment, and I too bid farewell to assume duties as the regimental master gunner. Over the course of the past 18 months, I have referred to previous deployments in which I served as tank commander, section sergeant or platoon sergeant. The men I served with, along with my experiences during those periods in my career, were exceptional; however, the 19 series and 11 series cavalry troopers who comprised 4th Rifle Platoon, Comanche Company, 1st Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, are without question the most professional, disciplined, intelligent, fundamentally competent and proficient Soldiers I have ever had the good fortune to serve with and, more importantly, to personally serve. Leading a rifle platoon was such a positive experience for me that even now, I feel slightly ashamed for having been initially reluctant about it. I believe we have a unique history within the Armor Branch for producing leaders who are adaptive, innovative, flexible and incredibly determined; more so than any other branch, in my experience. Unfortunately, I find too often that we allow ourselves to fall into particular stereotypes, which impart on our leaders a specific phobia of the unfamiliar and external. This is an Army that has evolved over the past 10 years out of necessity, and we as leaders must choose to evolve as well – not for our own personal benefit but for the benefit of those Soldiers and troopers we serve. I become extremely energized when I think about how much more technically and tactically proficient my platoon could have been with the appropriate amount of time to Acronym Quick-Scan ACR – armored cavalry regiment ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces AOR – area of responsibility COIN – counterinsurgency COMISAF – commander, International Security Assistance Force ECM – electronic-control measure FM – field manual FO – forward observer HEP – high-explosive plastic IAW – in accordance with ICV – infantry carrier vehicle IED – improvised explosive device ISAF – International Security Assistance Force MGS – Mobile Gun System MOS – military occupational specialty MRE – mission-rehearsal exercise NCO – noncommissioned officer NCOPD – noncommissioned officer professional development OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom PT – physical training RTO – radio-telephone operator SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team TLP – troop-leading procedures 10