Operation Cooperation and the Need for Tanks

corporate tanks into our battle plan against insurgents will make victory in Kandahar more difficult to achieve. This article advocates the need for Canadian tank involvement in Kandahar City and defines the Taliban’s most dangerous course of action in its defense of the city. This article also addresses minimal disadvantages tanks bring to the urban fight. A thorough synthesis and analysis prove the need to use Canada’s Leopard 2A6Ms in Kandahar City in support of upcoming offensive operations. Strategic Importance of Kandahar Kandahar City is both strategically and historically vital to the Taliban’s campaign in southern Afghanistan. “The strategically important road linking Kandahar with Tarin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan Province, runs through this district.”2 Historically, the city has always played a vital role in past conflicts and formation of the Afghan state. “It [Kandahar City] is a symbol of the Afghan’s nationhood. It is their collective manhood.”3 Kandahar is also the place where Ahmed Shah Durra-ni — considered the George Washington of his country — held a council meeting among the elders of all the Afghan tribes to determine who would govern the country of Afghanistan in 1747.4 Kandahar City remained Afghanistan’s capital for the next 200 years, until the last shah of Afghanistan was deposed in 1973.5 The city, in addition to being the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban, is also home to many of its senior hierarchy. “The Taliban leadership was dominated by Kandaharis, and this did not change even after most of the country fell to the movement. Six of the ten men on the Taliban’s supreme shura were Durrani Pash-tuns, and several others, including Mullah Omar himself, were Ghilzais from Kandahar.”6 The aforementioned makes Kandahar City the strategic center of gravity in southern Afghanistan and something that the Taliban will not yield without a fight. Due to Kandahar’s role as home to many of the Taliban’s leaders, it is possible that they will plan some form of defense against the upcoming International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) offensive, directed against their homes in an effort to bloody the ISAF and ANSF and convince civilian leaders and populace of ISAF’s members that the war in Afghanistan is no longer worth fighting. The Taliban’s multiple offensives and attempts to take the city only serve to strengthen this belief. The Taliban’s Recent Activity in and around Kandahar City Since 2004, the Taliban has waged a series of offensive schemes in an attempt to reestablish control of Kandahar City. The first two offensives, in 2004 and 2005, both failed to capture, or significantly influence, Kandahar City, but the Taliban remained resolved to reclaim the city. In 2006, the Taliban attempted to enter the city through a northern approach by occupying the Zhari and Panjwai districts. In response to this occupation and various harassing attacks against Kandahar City, the Canadians launched Operation Medusa in an effort to run the Taliban out of the city of Pashmul. “After preparatory artillery and aerial bombardments, two Canadian companies attacked Pashmul from the south, crossing the Arghandab River and clashing with entrenched Taliban defenders. Taliban fighters replied to this initial assault with counterattacks from layered defensive positions.”7 The Canadians responded by using armored bulldozers to destroy bunkers, fire trenches, and other fortifications, eventually gaining control of the city.8 The Taliban’s defense-in-depth against the Canadians was a complete disaster for the Taliban. The severe losses the Taliban sustained during the operation caused them to change their tactics. When the Canadians attempted to force battle with the Taliban in a follow-up operation, the Taliban refused to stand and fight, and instead fought in small groups and blended in with the local population. They relied on a series of caches dispersed throughout the countryside, which enabled them to pass by the ISAF unarmed to their cache points, launch an attack against the ISAF, drop their weapons, and intermingle with the local population.9 These tactics proved effective against the ISAF and allowed the Taliban to retain its hold on the Zhari and Panjwai districts. While the aforementioned tactics proved more successful against the ISAF, they are not always the Taliban’s course of action. In response to the ISAF’s operations against the Taliban in Shan Wali Kot and Khakrez in 2007, the Taliban launched attacks on the Chora District in Uruzgan, and the Ghorak and Mianishin district centers in an effort to spread Canadian forces thin and sidetrack them from their operations in Khakrez and Shah Wali Kot.10 Instead of mixing with the populace, the Taliban decided to stand and fight. “The Taliban’s decision to stand and fight a sustained and costly engagement to defend Padah in Khakre against a coalition attack was unusual. Padah was reportedly the central strongpoint for the Taliban’s occupation of Khakrez. And the Taliban’s refusal to evacuate the position confirms its importance.”11 The contrast between the Taliban’s tactics during Operation Baaz Tzuka and its tactics in the defense of Padah demonstrate the Taliban’s flexibility in operational planning, as well as unpredictability in its courses of action against the ISAF and ANSF. The defense of Padah also demonstrates the Taliban’s willingness to stand and fight, even against Canadian Leopard 2A6Ms, which were deployed in support of clearing operations, when they determined an area to be of importance. Given Kandahar City’s above-mentioned importance, it is probable that the Taliban will mount a strong defense to inflict high casualties against the ISAF and ANSF in an effort to verify that the war in Afghanistan appears unwinnable, which will meet the Taliban’s strategic goal of ridding Afghanistan of foreign forces. Current Situation in Kandahar City Currently within Kandahar City, there are several subareas that the Taliban dominates. District Nine, where the Taliban is very active, contains Taliban safe houses in which weapons, fighters, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and IED components are moved in from Taliban bases in Arghandab and Senjaray.12 “General Sher Muhammad Zazai, commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 205th Corps, called it ‘a precarious area which was used by Taliban fighters for attacking foreign and ANA soldiers,’ and in 2008, ninety percent of the IEDs found or detonated in Kandahar City were in District Nine.”13 Another Taliban hotspot within Kandahar City is the Mirwais Mena area. The Taliban uses this area as a final assembly area for vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) used in attacks within the center of the city.14 In addition to District Nine Mirwais Mena, the Taliban greatly influences the southwestern suburbs near the villages of Nakhoney and Belanday. These areas contain “IED factories, safe houses, weapons caches, and field hospitals” to attack the ISAF in Zhari and Panjwai.15 As of the summer of 2009, there has been only a limited ISAF presence in Nakhoney and Belanday, which has undoubtedly allowed the Taliban to operate within those areas with more freedom. Despite numerous successful raids in the previously mentioned areas, conducted by Afghan Security Forces, which netted dozens of captured insurgents and numerous weapons, IED, and VBIED caches, our recent experiences demonstrated that a determined and ingenuous enemy can overcome well-laid response plans and resupply an area with men and materiel it deems important. One only has to look at Jaysh Al Mahdi’s continued ability to resupply and wage attacks in Sadr City, de- “Kandahar City is both strategically and historically vital to the Taliban’s campaign in southern Afghanistan. ‘The strategically important road linking Kandahar with Tarin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan Province, runs through this district.’ Historically, the city has always played a vital role in past conflicts and formation of the Afghan state. ‘It [Kandahar City] is a symbol of the Afghan’s nationhood. It is their collective manhood.’ ” 23 “Kandahar City is both strategically and historically vital to the Taliban’s campaign in southern Afghanistan. ‘The strategically important road linking Kandahar with Tarin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan Province, runs through this district.’ Historically, the city has always played a vital role in past conflicts and formation of the Afghan state. ‘It [Kandahar City] is a symbol of the Afghan’s nationhood. It is their collective manhood.’ ” spite numerous offensives and cordon and search operations conducted by coalition forces and the Iraqi army. The Taliban’s dogged determination to take Kandahar City, through a series of offensives spanning 5 years, signifies it will undoubtedly continue to smuggle arms and bomb-making materials into Kandahar City; if not necessarily in the areas mentioned above, then in other areas of its choosing throughout the city. The Taliban will use these supplies and men against the ISAF and ANSF as they continue to assert themselves around Kandahar’s surrounding areas in preparation for the eventual push into the city proper. Given the Taliban’s operational unpredictability — as shown in the operational differences between the Zhari and Panjwai districts and Padah — one cannot say for certain how it will fight against the ISAF and ANSF in the coming offensive. Advantages of the Leopard 2A6M According to Stephen Biddle, a civilian advisor to General McChrystal, the outcome of the entire U. S.-Afghan war is riding on our success in Kandahar City.16 Thus, it is imperative that we incorporate the Leopard 2A6M into our planning process to dramatically increase the likelihood of our success during this operation. The Leopard 2A6M, currently used by the Canadians in Kandahar, includes a third-generation armor package similar to the modular expandable armor system (MEXAS) add-on armor kit, which protects the tank from armor-piercing rounds, shell fragments, armor-piercing, fin-stabilized discarded sabot (APFSDS) rounds, and high-explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds.17 The tank also has added plates to protect against IEDs and other mines, blast-resistant crew seats, and revised ammunition storage.18 The Canadian 2A6M also incorporates armor to protect the vehicle against rocket-propelled grenades. All these features increase the tank’s survivability against insurgent weapons and have proven effective in operations around Kandahar City. In 2008, the commander of Lord Strathcona’s Horse Regiment (LSR) spoke highly of the vehicle’s survivability when he commented on a soldier lucky enough to survive two IED strikes: “six weeks later, he hit a second IED, which was much bigger in the new tank [Leopard 2A6M]. Had it been a LAV [light armored vehicle] III there would have been many injuries.”19 In addition to the Leopard 2A6M’s armor, its 120mm smooth bore Rheinmetall main gun has also proven effective in operations around Kandahar City. “It has killed numerous insurgents at ranges of 150-3800m while mitigating the exposure of dismounted infantry soldiers to enemy direct fire.”20 In addition to the Rheinmetall’s vast range, it also has tremendous penetrating power. In the past, insurgents have fought behind hardened structures, such as grape-drying huts and concrete walls sometimes measuring a meter in thickness, some of which are in Kandahar City.21 The Canadians state that “prior to the deployment of the Leopard tank, massive volumes of 25mm fire from LAV IIIs achieved limited results against these structures,” while one main gun round “can punch a hole in excess of five-by-five meters through a grape-drying hut or compound wall, penetrating structures with reduced collateral damage to sur- “General Sher Muhammad Zazai, commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 205th Corps, called it ‘a precarious area which was used by Taliban fighters for attacking foreign and ANA soldiers,’ and in 2008, ninety percent of the IEDs found or detonated in Kandahar City were in District Nine.” “The Canadians state that ‘prior to the deployment of the Leopard tank, massive volumes of 25mm fire from LAV IIIs achieved limited results against these structures,’ while one main gun round ‘can punch a hole in excess of five-by-five meters through a grape-drying hut or compound wall, penetrating structures with reduced collateral damage to surrounding infrastructure and less risk to our [Canadian] dismounted soldiers.’ ” Canadian soldiers drive alight armored vehicle through Kandahar City during Operation Tazi, January 2010. 24 rounding infrastructure and less risk to our [Canadian] dismounted soldiers.”22 Finally, the advanced fire-control system of the Leopard 2A6M gives it a distinct advantage over other direct fire weapons systems in theater. For example, a favorite tactic of the Taliban is deception, even at the tactical level: “In order to create a diversion, they engage from a concealed area and wait for the tanks to point their main armament in the direction of fire. At that point, concealed insurgents in a different area will engage with smallarms fire. The independent crew commander’s sight [a component of the tank’s fire control system] is therefore crucial in identifying [and engaging] threats coming from different locations.”23 The LAV III lacks an independent crew commander’s sight, and the air gunners on the Strykers, while able to engage targets from multiple directions, must do so from exposed positions. Additionally, the tank’s fire control system “allows our [Canadian] soldiers to acquire and engage targets with precision and discrimination, by day and by night, thus reducing the requirement for aerial bombardment and indirect fire, which has proven to be blunt instruments.”24 While the LAV III and the Strkyer can engage targets with the same precision and discrimination, the smaller calibers of their main weapons systems limit each vehicle’s effectiveness against hardened targets. Disadvantages of Using Tanks in Kandahar City Although offering many advantages, there are some disadvantages of using tanks to clear Kandahar City. First and foremost, the tank’s main gun may cause increased collateral damage when fired. Due to their size and weight, tanks also tear up roads, stress bridges, and draw a lot of enemy fire. During a counterinsurgency fight, it is imperative to minimize collateral damage by enforcing strict fire-control measures and escalation of force (EOF) criteria already in existence. While limiting the tank’s role in the urban fight, it still provides the ground commander the advantage of having an immediate direct fire support platform should he run into a situation that requires its use. It is certainly better to have a powerful weapons system accessible and not use it, than need it and not have it. As mentioned above, experience shows that the deployment of the Leopard 2A6M has actually reduced collateral damage and civilian casualties during engagements. As of late 2008, “there has been no suggestion of civilian deaths attributed to tank fire during a nine month period of combat operations.”25 Moreover, evidence has shown that the Leopard 2A6Ms have decreased collateral damage by deterring enemy activity. According to a RAND Corporation study, the Taliban have a deep respect for the Leopard 2A6M’s firepower, therefore Taliban activity “drops considerably when tanks are operating in an area.”26 In addition to government studies, “numerous signal and HUMINT [human intelligence] reports confirm that low-level Taliban fighters are terrified of the tanks and their ability to maneuver, and are often reluctant to attack coalition forces equipped with integral armored assets.”27 Albeit not an absolute, the deployment of the Leopard 2A6Ms in or around Kandahar City could cause the members of the Taliban to drop their weapons or surrender. The populace’s perception of tanks is another concern over the deployment of armor in Kandahar City. According to “…evidence has shown that the Leopard 2A6Ms have decreased collateral damage by deterring enemy activity. According to a RAND Corporation study, the Taliban have a deep respect for the Leopard 2A6M’s firepower, therefore Taliban activity ‘drops considerably when tanks are operating in an area.’ ” Continued on Page 51 25 ulace more than other weapons systems has proven completely unfounded,” but he also points out that “the deployment of armor to Afghanistan has reinforced with the local populace the resolve of Canada and NATO to bring stability to the region.”28 Also, the presence of tanks is not anew tactic or something new to the people of Kandahar Province. During a news interview, a trooper from the LSR stated that “every time one of the three [Canadian] infantry companies goes out, the tanks are right with them.”29 An effective way to overcome these differences of opinion and ease the population’s concerns is through effective information operations (IO) campaigns, using psychological operations (PSYOPs) teams and ANSF commanders to explain to the people that the deployment of tanks was to deter violence and protect members of the ANSF, who will undoubtedly play a substantial role in clearing Kandahar City. These messages could be conveyed through special key-leader engagements, scheduled as close to the offensive as possible, or over loudspeaker during the actual operation, which would deny the Taliban sufficient time to plan for and implement antitank countermeasures. Unfortunately, there is little solution to collateral damage caused from firing a tank’s main gun or from damages caused by enemy efforts to destroy the Leopard 2A6M. However, by not employing tanks, we run the risk of making the Kandahar City battle an unnecessary fair fight between light infantries, which could lead to increased friendly casualties and cause many on the home front to question the need for continuing the war. Also, one should consider the effect the deployment of the Leopard 2A6Ms will have on the ANSF. According to the company commander of India Company, 2d Royal Canadian Regiment, the presence of the tanks “increased the soldiers’ [Canadians] confidence as well as the ANA. They [the ANA] love the ‘tanka’ and they love that tank being next to them on the objective.”30 Since the ANSF will undoubtedly play a substantial role in clearing Kandahar City, it is only logical to give them a weapons platform they admire, sanction, and comprehend. The Role of the Tank To plan against uncertainly, ISAF planners should incorporate Canadian tanks in the upcoming offensive into Kandahar City. Instead of leading the clearing operation with the Leopard 2A6Ms, the tanks could form an outer cordon around the city and use optics and weapons systems to acquire and engage targets ahead of, or identified by, the infantry in a hunter-killer capacity. Or, in the event the infantry should face a determined resistance or encounter strongpoints, the tanks could serve as an armored quick reaction force (QRF) and neutralize the threat by engaging multiple targets simultaneously, through the use of an independent crew commander sight, to provide the infantry alternate forms of entry into compounds and adobe walls, just as effectively done in the Zhari-Panjawi region.31 Due to narrow roads in parts of Kandahar City, the Leopard 2A6M will be unable to enter the fight to move with and support the infantry. Thus, the hunter-killer tactic from an outer-cordon position is more favorable. Given the immense cultural and political importance of Kandahar City, it is unlikely that the enemy will offer a token defense, and tactics in areas, such as Padah, show that the Taliban will stand and fight when in its operational or strategic interest to do so. The deployment of Canadian Leopard 2A6Ms will enable us to respond to, or potentially deter, the enemy’s most dangerous courses of action. Although tanks may increase collateral damage, we can minimize the effects with proven tactics, established techniques, and proper procedures, and achieve a decisive victory against the enemy. The advantages of using tanks in support of operations in Kandahar City far outweigh the disadvantages. Captain John Rugarber is currently serving as assistant S7, 170th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Baumholder, Germany. He received a B. A. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Maneuver Captain Career Course, Air Assault School, and Advanced Military Transition Team Training. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include S3 advisor, 43d Battalion, 11th Iraqi Army Brigade, Military Transition Team, Iraq; XO, E Troop, 2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (2/11 ACR), Fort Irwin, CA; tank platoon leader, H Company, 2/11 ACR, Fort Irwin; and infantry platoon leader, K Troop, 2/11 ACR, Fort Irwin. Author’s note: A special thanks to Major Tim Doran, USMC, for helping formulate this article; and Major Dean Tremblay, Major Stephane Bi-lodeau, Captain John Hooyer, and Lieutenant Marta Rzechowka of the Canadian army for helping me with sources from the Canadian army’s experiences with armor in Afghanistan. 1Matthew Fisher, “Canadian tanks in Afghanistan inspire U. S. Deployment,” National Post, 18 November 2010. 2Carl Forsberg, “Afghanistan Report 3: The Taliban’s Campaign for Kandahar,” Institute for the Study of War, December 1, 2009, available online at http://www.understandingwar.org/ report/talibans-campaign-kandahar. 3Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban, Penguin Press, 2006, p. 86. 4Ibid., p. 98. 5Forsberg, p. 11. 6Ibid., p. 16. 7Ibid., p. 26. 8Ibid., p. 27. 9Ibid. 10Ibid., p. 37. 11Ibid. 12Ibid., p. 42. 13Ibid., p. 43. 14Ibid. 15Ibid., p. 44. 16“Outcome of US-led ‘War on Terror’ Hinges on ‘Battle of Kandahar’s Success,” Oneindia News, 12 May 2010, available online at http://news.oneindia.in/2010/05/12/outcomeof-us-led-war-on-terror-hinges-on-battle-ofkanda.html. 17“MEXAS, Ballistic Protection,” Army Guide, 2008, available online at http://www.army-guide.com/eng/product3847. html. 18“Background — Leopard 2A6M/2 A4 Tanks for the Canadian Forces?” Canadian American Strategic Review, 12 April 2007, available online at http://www.casr.ca/bg-leopard-2a6m- afghan.htm. 19Bob Bergen, “Canadian Tank Squadron’s Success in Afghanistan Goes Untold,” Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute, 9 August 2010, available online at http://www.cdfai.org/ bergenarticles/Canadian tank squadrons success in Afghanistan goes untold.pdf. 20Major Trevor Cadieu, “Canadian Armor in Afghanistan,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 10.4, Winter 2008, available online at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_10/iss_4/ CAJ_vol10.4_03_e.pdf, p. 20. 21Ibid., p. 19. 22Ibid., p. 20. 23Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Matheson, “Lesson Synopsis Report 08-002: Employment of the Leopard 2A6M-TF 3-07,” Canada, 13 February 2008, p. 2. 24Cadieu, p. 10. 25Ibid. 26John Gordon IV and David E. Johnston, Occasional Paper, “Observations on Recent Trends in Armored Forces,” RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 5. 27Cadieu, p. 21. 28 Ibid., p. 10. 29Trooper Jared Suggitt, Interview with Canadian Forces Combat Camera, Canadian Forces Combat Camera Productions, available online at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i= 3c4_1218966868, 2006. 30Major Dave Quick, Interview with Canadian Forces Combat Camera, Canadian Forces Combat Camera Productions, available online at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=3c4_ 1218966868, 2006. 31Captain Pascal Croteau, “Lessons Learned from the Use of Tanks in ROTO 4,” Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 11.2, Summer 2008, pp. 16-27, 25. 51