Task Organizing a Heavy Brigade Combat Team to Achieve Full-Spectrum Dominance in Any Environment

The Army’s current task organization for the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) provides enough combat power to achieve success in offensive and defensive operations, but does not provide for unhindered success across the breadth of full-spectrum operations (FSO). For the HBCT to achieve full-spectrum dominance in an era of persistent conflict, its task organization must include three combined arms battalions (CABs) that include components of each warfighting function and additional supporting battalions that reinforce the CAB’s combat power. The HBCT’s current task organization (see Figure 1) permits brigade commanders to engage enemy forces during offensive and defensive operations with two CABs (one as the decisive operation), using the reconnaissance squadron, fires battalion, and brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) during shaping operations, and the brigade support battalion (BSB) as the sustaining operation. The lack of a third CAB to maneuver against an enemy force ultimately forces the brigade to conduct multiple passages of lines or use its reconnaissance squadron as a maneuver force against the enemy. Although this still allows limited success during offensive and defensive operations, it poses significant challenges in the arena of stability operations. While conducting stability operations in Iraq, most HBCTs assign an area of operations (AO) to the reconnaissance squadron and fires battalion to achieve success along their lines of effort. While simultaneously managing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is seeking to increase the number of brigades in its inventory; however, the Army does not need more brigades, but needs brigades with greater capabilities to achieve full-spectrum dominance. The HBCT requires a task organization that includes three combined arms battalions with infantry, armor, reconnaissance, engineer, and field artillery units (see Figure 2). It would also include a reconnaissance squadron that integrates cavalry and military intelligence assets for a unified collection effort, an engineer battalion to increase the brigade’s survivability through prolonged stability operations, a BSTB with enablers to enhance the brigade’s command and control and force protection, and a BSB capable of sustaining the enhanced brigade. The intent behind the proposed task organization is to create a HBCT that uses its three maneuver battalions as the primary effort throughout offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The proposed task organization also eliminates the need for the brigade commander to commit one of his supporting battalions, such as the reconnaissance squadron or fires battalion, to perform in the same capacity as a maneuver battalion in either offensive or defensive operations (reconnaissance squadron) or stability operations (reconnaissance squadron and fires battalion). The Combined Arms Battalion, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.5, states that, “The role of the combined arms battalion (CAB) is to fight and win engagements on any part of the battlefield.”1 The proposed task organization for the CAB (see Figure 3) builds on the modularity inherent in the current task organization and reinforces full-spectrum domination. The major changes to the CAB task organization include:  The headquarters company losing its mortar platoon, scout platoon, and sniper squad.  The mortar platoon breaking down into two sections and each of the two mechanized infantry companies receiving a heavy mortar section.  Offsetting the loss of the battalion scout platoon by adding the armored reconnaissance troop to the CAB.  Adding the sniper squad to the armored reconnaissance troop.  Increasing the armor company’s combat power to four tank platoons.  Replacing one of the armor companies with an armored reconnaissance troop.  Adding an engineer company (again) to the CAB.  Adding afield artillery battery to the CAB and replacing mortars as the battalion controlled fires element.  Formally adding the personal security detachment (PSD) platoon to the task organization. Adding the artillery battery to the CAB requires removing the fires battalion from the HBCT task organization, but it provides each combined arms battalion commander with dedicated artillery support throughout offensive and defensive operations, as well additional combat power for stability operations. This addition also increases the capabilities of the infantry companies because they each gain a heavy mortar section to provide additional indirect fire support to use during dismounted operations. Adding the reconnaissance troop assists the CAB commander by providing an additional reconnaissance platoon, heavy mortar section, and a company commander whose main purpose is to conduct reconnaissance for the battalion. Although the reconnaissance troop replaces one of the armor companies, the loss of heavy combat power in the form of M1-series tanks is offset by increasing the number of tank platoons in the company to four. This allows the CAB commander to either mass the effects of 18 tanks against one objective or internally task organize tank platoons within his battalion without significantly degrading the combat capabilities of his armor company. Adding the combat engineer company to the task organization provides enhanced mobility and countermobility for the CAB across full-spectrum operations. The engineer company enables the CAB commander to breach enemy obstacles during offensive operations, emplace obstacles and establish battle positions during defensive operations, and provides a force that can provide deliberate route clearance and limited infrastructure classification during stability operations. Adding the personal security platoon to the task organization prevents battalion-sized units from using soldiers from the companies to create these elements and allows the battalion to appropriately train platoons in PSD tactics, techniques, and procedures. The proposed combined arms battalion task organization would also change Current HBCT Task Organization X

Proposed HBCT Task Organization Figure 2 how the battalion headquarters is organized and staffed (see Figure 3). The major changes to the CAB command and staff include:  Adding a third major (field artillery) to the staff as the battalion effects coordinator.  Adding a captain (field artillery) to the staff as the battalion fire direction officer.  Adding a chief warrant officer 2 (field artillery) to the staff as the battalion targeting officer.  Adding a sergeant first class (field artillery) to serve as the battalion master gunner for the M109A6 Paladin.  Reclassifying the title of battalion liaison officer (LNO) to battle captain. Adding the field artillery major prevents the CAB from struggling with span of control. His tasks would include supervising the battalion fire support officer (CPT), the battalion fire direction officer (CPT), the targeting officer (CW2), and command and control of the battalion’s fire support elements. As the battalion effects coordinator, the major also controls coordination and integration of the enabler teams and packages that a CAB typically receives throughout full-spectrum operations, which includes, but is not limited to, tactical psychological operation detachments, civil affairs teams, provincial reconstruction teams, additional engineer support, and military police support. Adding the Paladin master gunner ensures that the battalion S3 has a subject-matter expert to advise him on the training and employment of the M109A6 Paladin. The final change, reclassifying the title of the battalion LNO to battalion battle captain, simply codifies what most units currently practice. The current communications capabilities within the HBCT essentially negate the need to have an officer serve in the capacity of liaison officer at the brigade level — the lieutenant serving in that capacity is far more valuable coordinating efforts in the battalion tactical operations center. Overall, the proposed task organization allows the CAB to achieve dominance in offensive and defensive operations and allows it to continue dominance during transition to stability operations where the CAB commander has the organic assets to secure and dominate his AO. Furthermore, the three-CAB proposed task organization allows the brigade commander to achieve unhindered success during offensive and defensive operations, as well as the ability to secure his AO without committing support battalions to fill the gap created by the lack of a third CAB that currently exists in the task organization. According to FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, the reconnaissance squad-ro n is, “designed to provide accurate and timely information across the AO.”2 The current task organization of the recon squadron, which includes three identical reconnaissance troops, is capable of accomplishing this task on its own, in a limited capacity, during offensive and defensive operations. However, the recon squadron is unable to accomplish this task and purpose during stability operations because the lack of a third maneuver battalion typically forces the HBCT commander to employ the recon squadron as he would a CAB. Furthermore, the operations and employment of the squadron are not necessarily synchronized with the efforts of the military intelligence company in the BSTB. The proposed task organization for the recon squadron (see 15 Combined Arms Battalion Proposed Task Organization & Command and Staff

Figure 4) would allow the HBCT commander to have all of his reconnaissance and collection efforts synchronized within one unified battalion-level command. The major changes to the recon squadron task organization include:  Removing all three armored reconnaissance troops (one sent to each of the three CABs).  Adding one light reconnaissance troop with three platoons and a sniper squad.  Adding one engineer reconnaissance company with two platoons.  Adding two military intelligence companies: one focused on intelligence processing and collecting human intelligence and the other focused on collecting intelligence with tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV) and unmanned ground sensors.  Formally adding the PSD platoon to the task organization. This task organization synchronizes the efforts of the HBCT’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance under one command, instead of separating the efforts into two different battalion-sized elements and comparing raw data at the brigade staff level. The recon squadron would have the capability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance on enemy forces, areas, structures, local capabilities, organizations, people, and key events with the reconnaissance troop and engineer reconnaissance company. Including military intelligence companies in the squadron’s task organization would allow additional collection using TUAVs and unmanned ground sensors in areas the reconnaissance troop and engineer reconnaissance company are unable to observe, using human intelligence personnel to gain additional information from the local populace, and integrating collected data into an accurate intelligence report by the analysis and integration platoon. Similar to the CAB, restructuring the recon squadron would also require changing the structure of the squadron headquarters and staff (see Figure 4). The major changes, which are not uniform to the CAB reorganization, include integrating a military intelligence major as the squadron S3 and adding an engineer captain to serve as the squadron engineer. While an armor lieutenant colonel still commands the squadron and an armor major serves as the executive officer, replacing an armor major with a military intelligence major is indicative of the adjusted nature and scope of the squadron’s duties, which would instead focus primarily on collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data through various reconnaissance capabilities. This requires understanding the collection capabilities of military intelligence units that are significantly enhanced when executed in direct coordination with reconnaissance soldiers, and a military intelligence field grade officer should, by all rights, be the subject-matter expert on the employment of these capabilities. The purpose for adding the squadron engineer is to assist the squadron S3 with employing engineer forces and interpreting data collected on structures, local capabilities, and terrain. A reconnaissance squadron established with the proposed task organization would be capable of continually providing the HBCT with timely and accurate information and would also have the capability to synchronize the reconnaissance and collection efforts for the HBCT under one unified command. The current task organization of the BSTB (see Figure 1) includes a combat engineer company, a military intelligence company, and a signal company. With the proposed changes to the task organization of the CAB and the recon squadron, the only element remaining is the signal company. The proposed task organization for the BSTB (see Figure 5) includes:  Adding one field artillery battery that includes two combat observa- 16

(EN) Recon Squadron Proposed Task Organization & Command and Staff Figure 4 tion lasing team (COLT) platoons and a radar platoon.  Adding one air defense artillery battery that includes two avenger platoons with respective radar sections.  Increasing the military police element from platoon-sized to a company-sized element.  Formally adding the PSD platoon to the task organization. The additional field artillery battery places the HBCT’s COLT platoons and the radar platoon under one unified field artillery battery command. In the current task organization, one COLT platoon and the radar platoon are task organized under the fires battalion’s headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB), which no longer exists in the proposed HBCT task organization. Adding the air defense artillery battery provides the HBCT commander with increased security assets throughout full-spectrum operations. It is also logical to assume that our military will not always be the only force to employ TUAVs for observation, therefore, adding air defense assets to the task organization provides commanders at all levels the ability to negate this potential threat. The current task organization provides one military police platoon that is capable of conducting maneuver and mobility support operations, area security operations, military law-and-order operations, or military police intelligence. The key point is that one platoon is only capable of accomplishing one of these tasks and the other battalions must sacrifice combat power from their own formations to accomplish remaining tasks. Increasing the military police to a company-sized element with four platoons will allow the military police to accomplish all of its doctrinal tasks, as well as nondoctrinal tasks, such as police training teams, during stability operations. The proposed task organization also requires changing the structure of the BSTB command and staff (see Figure 5). The major changes to the BSTB command and staff include:  Afield artillery lieutenant colonel commanding the BSTB, as opposed to an engineer lieutenant colonel.  Afield artillery major would serve as the BSTB executive officer.  Afield artillery, air defense artillery, or military police major would serve as the BSTB S3. In the current HBCT task organization, an engineer lieutenant colonel typically commands the BSTB. Adding a heavy engineer battalion and removing the fires battalion in the proposed HBCT task organization, along with the proposed task organization for the BSTB, will require afield artillery lieutenant colonel to command the organization. Allowing majors from field artillery, air defense artillery, or military police to serve as the BSTB S3 simply reflects the changed nature of the proposed organization. Overall, the proposed task organization for the BSTB significantly enhances the HBCT’s security and protection, and maintains its ability to enhance the HBCT’s command and control. Adding a heavy engineer battalion to the HBCT task organization (Figure 1) significantly enhances the HBCT’s survivability and increases its interdependence 17

Figure 5 Brigade Special Troops Battalion Proposed Task Organization & Command and Staff ity as its maneuver battalions. If the HBCT is to achieve full-spectrum dominance, the future task organization must build on existing modularity by increasing the CAB’s capabilities. Furthermore, increasing the number of combined arms battalions from two to three would prevent the HBCT commander from obligat-ing his support assets to maneuver units to address the gap in combat power. The proposed task organization would ultimately allow the HBCT to conduct combat operations in any spectrum. The HBCT could use its three combined arms battalions as its sole maneuver force and employ the recon squadron in its intended role, which is to obtain information on human and geographical terrain within the unit’s AO. The engineer battalion would also significantly enhance the HBCT’s survivability and provide increased interdependence throughout prolonged or enduring operations. The BSTB would continue to enhance the HBCT’s command and control and increase its level of protection, and the BSTB would continue to sustain the HBCT. Overall, the proposed task organization would establish a HBCT that is fully capable of overwhelming dominance across the span of full-spectrum operations. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., 7 April 2008, p. 1-1. 2HQDA, FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, GPO, Washington, D. C., 4 August 2006, p. A-2. Captain John M. Zdeb is currently serving as officer in charge, N Troop, 1st Squadron, 409th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, KY. He is a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy, the Armor Officer Basic Course, and the Maneuver Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (3-7 Infantry), 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 3d Infantry Division (ID), Fort Stewart, GA; commander, Company D, 3-7 Infantry, 4th Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 3ID, Fort Stewart; assistant S3, 3-7 Infantry, 4th HBCT, 3ID, Fort Stewart; executive officer, Company D, 3-7 Infantry, 4th HBCT, 3ID, Fort Stewart; and platoon leader, Company D, 3-7 Infantry, 4th HBCT, 3ID, Fort Stewart. and ability to conduct protracted operations without task organization packages from echelons above division level. The engineer battalion would be capable of building initial forward operating bases for the HBCT during offensive operations, significantly increase the HBCT’s survivability during defensive operations, and have the capability to support the HBCT during stability operations by constructing numerous combat outposts/patrol bases, which are critical to success. Furthermore, the engineer battalion would provide expertise in several fields, which would significantly increase the HBCT’s capabilities during civil support operations. Overall, adding the engineer battalion significantly enhances the HBCT’s capabilities and enables it to achieve dominance during full-spectrum operations without relying on support from higher or adjacent echelons. The only change to the BSB (Figure 1) in the proposed task organization is the addition of two additional forward support companies, which will support the engineer battalion and the BSTB. In the current task organization, the BSB does not provide a forward support company to the BSTB. However, given the increased size and logistics complexity, which is inherent in the proposed task organization for the BSTB, the need for a forward support company is readily apparent. The proposed task organization ensures that the BSB is still capable of achieving success in any type of supporting operation for the HBCT. The proposed task organization does create some limitations and constraints on the HBCT commander in preparing for and conducting full-spectrum operations. The greatest challenges arise with the dissolution of the fires battalion and the significantly changed organization of the reconnaissance squadron. Dissolving the fires battalion and placing the field artillery batteries under the CAB limit the HBCT commander’s ability to mass all of his indirect fires under one element of command and control. However, with the BSTB now led and staffed by field artillery officers, the HBCT could task organize the field artillery batteries under the BSTB if the situation required all, or a significant portion, of the HBCT’s indirect fire assets to mass its fires. The same dilemma arises with the changed nature of the recon squadron and placing the reconnaissance troops under the CAB, which results in the HBCT commander losing the ability to conduct ‘traditional’ squadron-level reconnaissance or security operations. However, the HBCT could task organize reconnaissance troops from the CAB to the recon squadron, if mission success required a ‘traditional’ approach to reconnaissance or security operations. There is a fundamental difference between the current and proposed approach: the proposed task organization requires the HBCT commander to remove assets from the maneuver battalions to enhance his shaping or sustaining efforts; and the current task organization requires the HBCT commander to decide what assets to allocate from shaping and sustaining efforts to enhance his maneuver units. Overall, the challenges that the proposed task organization creates are not significant enough to prevent solutions to the HBCT’s success in full-spectrum operations. The HBCT has proven its success in full-spectrum operations with its current task organization, yet its success is limited by sacrificing the capabilities of its supporting battalions (specifically the recon squadron and fires battalion) when committing them to serve in the same capac- 18 Figure 6

Infantry PLTs 12 18 +6 Armor PLTs 12 12 N/A Recon PLTs 8 11 +3 Engineer PLTs 2 12 +10 Artillery PLTs 6 8 +2 MP PLTs 1 4 +3 ADA PLTs 0 2 +A312 MI PLTs 2 4 +2 Signal PLTs 3 3 N/A FSCs 4 6 +2 Infantry CO CMDs 4 6 +2 Armor CO CMDs 7 7 N/A Engineer CO CMDs 1 7 +6 Artillery BTRY CMDs 2 4 +2 MP CO CMDs 0 1 +1 ADA CO CMDs 0 1 +1 MI CO CMDs 1 2 +1 LOG CO CMDs 6 8 +2 Infantry MAJs* 2 3 +1 Armor MAJs* 4 4 N/A Engineer MAJs* 2 2 N/A Artillery MAJs* 2 5 +3 LOG MAJs* 2 2 N/A Infanty BN CMDs** 1 1-2 +1 Armor BN CMDs** 2 2-3 +1 Engineer BN CMDs 0 1 +1 Artillery BN CMDs 1 1 N/A LOG BN CMDs 1 1 N/A *Does not include BCT staff, only MAJs required at BN/SQDN level **Number for proposed BN CMDs depends on whether IN or AR LTC commands 3d CAB