Applying Information Operations at the Company Level in a COIN Environment

In today’s media-rich environment, both positive and negative actions of a single company will be seen and heard by billions of people. A company commander’s ability to use provided tools or enablers can and will gain an advantage of the local networks and populace he is trying to influence or destroy. Information operations (IO) is one of the most important aspects of a mission for which company commanders must plan. Company commanders can enhance their operations with enablers, such as psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), human terrain teams (HTT), and other agencies such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). When one refers to IO, they think of a handbill as an integrated approach to enhancing the commander’s current operation. This is a common misconception of the full scope and capabilities IO provides. This article addresses several questions which will aid company commanders in applying tactical IO to shape the fight including, during a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, how does a company commander apply IO; what is tactical IO; and where can a company commander request assets to shape his fight and support both lethal and nonlethal operations? Information operations at all levels is a planned operation and best used proactively. Company commanders have the best advantage of IO and information engagement (IE) — they are at the ground level accessing word on the street. In most instances at the company level, IO is used reactively, instead of planned, to support either steady-state operations or time-sensitive missions. A before, during, and after approach that identifies local leader messages, shows current progress, and demonstrates the lasting positive results of any mission can increase the effectiveness of a $10,000 project tenfold. Conducting IE operations within the local populace, using several information mediums to inform and influence the populace, gains support for coalition force objectives and not enemy objectives. A company commander’s operations reach across all levels of war in counterinsurgency. Every deliberate attack, time-sensitive mission, or routine patrol is planned, prepared, and executed. IO is a shaping effort, or sometimes the main effort, to an operation. A commander must understand the environment in which he is operating. Identifying the enemy is important; a commander can use IO or IE to find and influence people who can assist in identifying and locating the enemy. IE is defined as “the integrated employment of public affairs to inform U. S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U. S. Government strategic communications, and defense support to public diplomacy and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and leader and soldier engagements to support both efforts.” Coordinating PSYOP, public affairs (PA) assets, and other enablers, such as CA, prior to the mission increases a commander’s success in current areas, and helps define the root problem and separate the populace from the enemy in areas where there is greater tension. The commander identifies, through reconnaissance, patrol debriefs, PSYOP, and CA situation reports (SITREPs), a method of engagement to begin separating the populace from the insurgency. Those members of the local populace who “stay on the fence” or passively support the insurgency simply because they do not feel secure have to be convinced that the forces patrolling their streets are better than the insurgency. IE and the unit’s actions must match the message being conveyed on the street. The effectiveness of the operation is clear when visible signs of change occur as soon as a plan is publicized. Information engagements that begin with local leaders, through PSYOP messages and CA government development efforts, inform and influence the populace, who “sanctions” the plan and permits it to unfold. During the development of the operation, or essential service revitalization, the commander focuses on the progress being made. In each engagement, commanders reinforce progress through quantifiable talking points and storyboards, which should be reviewed by the brigade combat team (BCT) S7 to ensure message synchronization, and provide bottom-up refinement to higher level leaders. The conclusion of the operation exploits the successes over the period of the project with either a media ribbon-cutting ceremony or a press conference, all led by the host nation. Coordination by the BCT public affairs office (PAO) provides an instant public message across all networks and newspapers. PSYOP uses factual information provided by the PAO and the aspects of the project to create a lasting effect with local citizens and leaders. (An example of the before, during, and after planning concept is shown in Figure 1.) There are three lines of effort (LOE) that a brigade uses to drive operations in the current counterinsurgency: the brigade plans governance, economics, and security operations while the company commander develops plans to support the LOE. Information operations enhance these plans by publicizing the positive progress made by the commander and local officials. IO and IE at the tactical level are about perceptions of the unit’s actions; for example, are the local people confident that the unit and host-nation forces have the ability to provide professional security? The unit’s actions must change the way the people see its local government; they must be convinced that the government is looking out for their best interests. These same actions must change the people’s perception to one of believing that better opportunities exist within the local economy — not in taking money from insurgents to plant bombs and kill U. S. soldiers. 43 Figure 1. Planning Concept Key z Accomplished „ Coordinated but not yet accomplished ‹ Issues to resolve Brigade Coordination z Coordination w/S7 and PAO for mass media support z Coordinated w/S7 to prepare them for potential good news storyboard z Coordination w/ PAO for PA guidance and media talking point approval z Coordinated w/ PAO to identify media embeds in AO z PAO is aware of CONOP details for media questions „ Coordination w/division S9 to identify possible post-event support

‡ ISF AND CF CLEARING AND CONTROL OPERATIONS.

‡ ENFORCEMENT OF RULE OF LAW.

‡ ISF INTERACTION WITH CIVILIAN POPULATION.

‡ JSS/COP ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATIONS.

‡ LARGE WEAPONS/IED CACHE FINDS.

IO Objectives:

1. Disrupt VBIED network C2 with synchronized precision kinetic strikes

2. Influence VBIED network support zones to stop providing passive support

3. Promote the progress of Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon to the International and U. S. audience

4. Selectively degrade threat communications networks with electronic attack

5. Protect the force from IED and VBIED threat with electronic warfare support Information Operations „ Leverage S7 IO Iraqi mass media „ IQATF atmospherics (M212) „ Battalions submit partnership stories to brigade „ SOI Engagements Public Affairs „ B-Roll and photos sent to Digital Video & Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) hub „ Battalions host embedded media Civil-Military Operations „ IP informed/integrated (MP LNO) „ Team repair During Information Operations z “IO for JOE” talking points for population engagement z PSYOP – handbills for mission „ Additional PSYOP products to troop „ Good news stories prepared „ Fardh Al Qanoon products Public Affairs ‹ 1 x BJ Public Affairs Team z Media talking points „ Draft press release prepared ‹ Media embeds Civil-Military Operations ‹ CA unit involved z Claims and condolence plan z Claims cards on hand and distributed Before Information Operations „ Partnership storyboards submitted to S7 „ PSYOP TPT report submitted „ Division G7 mass media leveraged „ FM106 radio announcement „ Baghdad Now news story submitted „ IQATF atmospherics Public Affairs „ Press release submitted to division PAO „ Commander’s DVIDS interview Civil-Military Operations „ CA engagement w/local government leader(s) (as required) „ Request CMP or BPT administer pack on hand (as required) „ Claims and condolence payments completed After Information Engagement – Concept of Operation (CONOP) Name AS OF: 02 Apr 2007

Creating certain perceptions is not as simple as throwing out a handbill or buying a generator for a community. IO planning and execution at the tactical level ensures consistent actions align with messages that commanders and soldiers on patrol share with local communities. A handbill, message, or press release reinforces soldiers’ actions, which influence the people who support the cause. For example, if the company is consistently putting out messages that soldiers are protecting the people, yet soldiers on patrol are rude and treat people badly, day-to-day operations become increasingly difficult. A commander does not have to create his own messages or objectives; he can use those of the brigade, which are typically generic in nature. He can request help from the brigade IO officer to quantify his messages, which will be more effective than the generic “the government is working for you” messages. Providing quantifiable messages that the local area is improving, combined with visible signs of change, will permit continued momentum and a belief that things will continue to get better. Integrating IO into a company operation enables efforts to improve people’s lives, which will lead to the development of a social network, build a trust between the unit and the local neighborhood, and facilitate an information exchange that will lead to defeating enemy networks. A commander does not have to plan IO on his own; key enablers, such as PSYOP, CA, and HTT, under tactical control of the task force are assigned to the company headquarters and can be used by the commander to develop an integrated IO plan. The primary mission of PSYOP is to persuade, change, and influence the behavior of the local nationals. If used to only make handbills or broadcast loudspeaker messages, the commander wastes a key asset in determining effectiveness within his plan. PSYOP teams are passive intelligence collectors; they can be used to confirm a unit’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR). PSYOP teams and the PSYOP detachment develop the plans to find key decisionmakers and influences within the town. The PSYOP detachment, based on assessments from company areas of operation, develops the plan to influence target audiences within each area of operation based on the objectives laid out in the overarching brigade information plan. Tactical PSYOP teams (TPT), if given Commanders at all levels can commit information fratricide if the message is not synchronized. Company commanders engaging local mayors have the ability to arm higher commanders with local issues that elected officials are not pushing higher. BCT commanders can influence their sphere of influence with those issues. Tactical PSYOP is not a handbill. PSYOP teams are adept at collecting information and identifying key people within the town to influence company objectives. They identify those who support our high priority targets (HPTs), as well as exploit successes degrading the enemy’s ability to control the population. In kinetic operations, the loudspeaker has an immediate ability to get the information on the street. Commanders can see immediate results by the number of people listening. 44 permission to run PSYOP-specific patrols, can assist a commander’s decisions on where to increase patrols, where security is perceived as good, and where using money as a weapons system will be more effective. One of their objectives is to locate enemy propaganda and develop a counter to that propaganda, if necessary. The tactical PSYOP detachment (TPD) tracks propaganda and assists the BCT S2 by developing a pattern analysis and determines the location of enemy encroachment. TPTs assist company intelligence support teams (CoIST) in determining patterns of threatening messages or propaganda at the company level. That determination identifies how much influence the enemy has on the population and how much support they provide. If there is heavy influence and company actions are inconsistent, the insurgents have a recruiting base to support their operations. These recruits are the target for TPTs, which will begin separating them from the populace. Civil affairs teams (CAT), another passive intelligence collector for the company, focus on civil reconnaissance, which educates the commander on the civilian and infrastructure aspect of area, structure, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE). For a commander to effectively operate in an area of operations, he must know who and what is operating on his battlefield. Units that conduct a mini-census can truly identify the root problem. CATs head up civil reconnaissance, in conjunction with HTTs, PSYOP teams, and unit biometric automated toolset (BAT) and handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDE) systems, to allow units to develop a clear hierarchy, find informal leaders and locations to spend money, and assist in identifying public enemy number one. The CA plan, focused on the government and economic lines of effort, complements the security LOE. The commander’s approach should be evenly distributed to allow the local government to take charge of its district. For example, a commander who fixes every problem and fails to incorporate the local community will continue to be called on to fix problems, which creates an impression to the local people that their government is not working. Civil affairs integrate local leaders into the company plan; local leaders, formal or informal, provide more credibility to the plan. These leaders, educated by CA and PRTs, develop priorities and publicize them first through the unit, then their own media outlets. People can perceive all day long that security is fine, but they will not trust their government if it is not out front fixing problems without our soldiers. The local police force will not fix the electricity or the sewer system. PRTs complement government efforts and can help company commanders with local issues and assist CA in developing a local strategy to improve the community. In many cases, PRTs are the initial link for company commanders as they have the local development plan laid out. PRTs bring money and influence to a commander’s area of operation, which encourages local leaders to develop priorities and stabilize the community. If a commander understands the neighborhood in which he is operating, he can assist the PRT in applying resources, and incorporate local security forces to keep the community safe. Understanding the capabilities of each enabler permits the company commander to use these assets to conduct operations effectively, massing his efforts on the root problem. Information operations are an aspect of every company’s operation, which is linked to the company’s actions on the ground. Kicking in doors at 0200 hours in the morning and dragging suspected criminals or terrorists into the street has a lasting effect on the entire community. This idea is not new and is discussed each time a unit goes into theater; however, we are still making the same mistakes. A company commander needs to identify the next order of effects when he kicks in a door at 0200 hours. The company commander may not understand that, in many cases, he has a strategic effect in his operation. Even if the detainee is guilty, a clear engagement plan to speak with informal and formal leaders is necessary. A storyboard of the incident, translated with the alleged crimes he has committed, stops many arguments in their tracks. PSYOP, the following morning, can assist patrols in the neighborhood to help explain the detention through public messages and face-to-face meetings with informal leaders. In just about every case, waiting for a handbill to be approved and printed causes delays — making the message too late. Face-to-face communications with the people is far more effective than a handbill. A handbill, if crafted with quantifiable messages, is a talking tool that soldiers can distribute. The handbill approach is more effective when specifically designed for each operation — print only a few hundred instead of several thousand; otherwise, the handbills are considered trash. If the detainee is truly guilty, then the amount of IO needed to mitigate risks will be very intense for the first couple of weeks. The patrols do not do this just as a crowd pleaser; force protection is necessary to prevent retaliatory attacks on our troops. Other than telling people why we detained a certain individual, talking points should deflect possible attacks against our troops. Planning to mitigate risks is essential and allows for more effective IO; future 45 Street-level engagements are a great opportunity to gather intelligence and confirm current priority information requirements.

events have greater impact when commanders identify and exploit successes in local plans. These events are not driven by division or brigade, but are identified at the company level — whether it is anew market to improve the economy or a local government event in which leaders have finalized and completed projects to improve essential services. When requesting IO products, commanders should seek assistance from their TPTs, just as they request public affairs officers to engage local media. IO is the plan; PAO, PSYOP, and soldiers on the ground are execution elements of that plan. Separating the enemy from the people influences the people to move toward coalition objectives. TPTs use brigade products that are intended to have a lasting effect and are appropriate for their areas of operation. In most cases, it requires simply modifying an existing product. These products should be planned in advance for future operations and be truthful and credible. To attain the full effect, a company commander should coordinate for PAO and PSYOP support to exploit his operation. PAO and PSYOP complement each other by hitting all information mediums with credible and factual information. PAO informs the people; PSYOP influences the people. The PSYOP call to action is the action we want the populace to take, such as reporting improvised explosive device (IED) makers and mortar teams, and supporting local school projects. Coordinated efforts with higher reach many audiences; the PAO, brigade S7, and PSYOP planner bring assets from the brigade and higher to support the commander during operations. The PAO can immediately affect the operation by reaching local papers and satellite television with factual events of the operation. Messages synchronized with PSYOP have a lasting effect through the use of media outlets such as newspapers, documentaries, and public service announcements. Exploiting the positive event or mitigating the negative event does not end with the event. For example, at a ribbon-cutting ceremony or community medical engagement many units miss opportunities to gather information from people waiting in line to partake in either of these events. Assets, such as CA, PSYOP, human intelligence collection teams (HCTs), and HTTs, all have a specific mission to gather information to support future operations. If there is no effort to identify the needs and issues of the people, the unit continues to walk the streets, without a clear end state for transition or passage to the next unit, and the problem remains. Commander’s control their operations through patrols and actions conducted within their areas of operation. Rumors and negative incidents that happen among our forces fuel the enemy’s information effort; many of the unit’s actions have a tactical, operational, and strategic effect. Escalation of force (EOF) incidents may be local, but the parties involved are typically at higher levels of government and coalition headquarters. These incidents, when severe, reach U. S. audiences and could cause U. S. Forces to lose the support of the American people, which would severely impact the mission. Embedded media is another key enabler a commander can use to influence audiences and achieve his end state. Media, in most cases, have an agenda — journalists are typically fair in reporting, listen to both viewpoints, and ultimately report accurate information. The issue is that most soldiers are not comfortable using open media sources to tell “our side” of the story. In such cases, commanders should use the brigade PAO, who will identify the information the reporter is seeking and provide an operational overview of the unit’s efforts. Commander’s who provide factual information will avert the risk of “journalistic misperception.” On today’s battlefield, company commanders are required to have varied assets, which serve as key enablers, at their disposal. Tactical IO enhances operations by separating the population from the enemy, thereby setting conditions for the local populace to support coalition efforts instead of enemy activities. A commander who integrates enablers, such as PSY OP and CA, will soon realize he has gained operational advantage in his area of operations. Incorporating these capabilities and focusing on face-to-face meetings, supported by targeted handbills, provide higher quality information and intelligence gathering to identify insurgents determined to thwart a unit’s plan. Company commanders need to remain aware of brigade-level assets, which have capabilities to support the unit’s requirements. The strategic effect a company commander brings to his operations supports the overarching campaign to claim victory in a counterinsurgency, neighborhood by neighborhood. Major James P. (J. P.) Smith is currently serving as senior nonlethal trainer, Bronco Team, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA. He received a B. S. from Georgia College and an M. S. from Troy State University. His military education includes Infantry Captain Career Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, and Information Operations Qualification Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include brigade combat team S7, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, Fort Hood, TX; small group instructor, Armor Captain Career Course, Fort Knox, KY; commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 54th Infantry, Fort Benning, GA; and deputy J3, Operation Uphold Democracy, Port Au Prince, Haiti. Even after 7 years of conflict, many companies and S2s still don’t understand what to do with propaganda. Insurgent propaganda is an indicator of possible upcoming actions. PSYOP teams analyze the message and make recommendations to commanders for future operations. 46