Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Volume V, Part 2 of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Dr. Ali al-Wardi’s narrative of the 1920 revolt is particularly important given our involvement today in the Middle East. It provides an Iraqi, vice an American or British, perspective of this incident, which is pertinent to our current conflict. It also offers a point of view steeped in the peculiarities of a sociologist and historian, who spent the majority of his life in Iraq, becoming the father of Iraqi sociology. By exploring Arabic works, such as those of Wardi, we have a prepackaged history that offers valuable lessons on how the Ottomans, Persians, British, and Iraqi Monarchy under King Feisal I, addressed insurgencies, nationalist movements, tribal hostilities, and clerical hierarchies. By highlighting Wardi’s works, Commander Aboul-Enein, in collaboration with ARMOR, emphasizes the need to educate America’s military using Arabic sources. We owe our soldiers, who are going into harm’s way to protect the Iraqi population, an understanding of the area of operations that goes beyond a basic orientation or language pleasantries. It is hoped the Wardi series published by ARMOR will be used during pre-deployment training and be the subject of discussion and debate in professional military circles. I applaud ARMOR for providing Commander Aboul-Enein a forum for his important collection of review essays. Commander Aboul-Enein and I had the pleasure of serving together aboard the USS GUAM (LPH-9) when I commanded the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. During Exercise Bright Star, he not only provided me sound force-protection advice for my Marines and cultural orientation, but also arranged for hundreds of Marines to tour the El Alamein battlefield in Egypt’s Western Desert. His work is a valuable contribution in the continuing education of our forces on Iraq’s human terrain. Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command; Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans, Policies, and Operations (2006-2008) Part 6 of the ARMOR Series: Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Volume V, Part 2: Further Details of the 1920 Revolt (1918-1921) by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy Foreword The Mosque of the Prophet is Islam’s second most sacred site. The single dome in the center (background) stands above Muhammad’s tomb. Photo: Ali Mansuri http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Masjid_ Nabawi._Medina,_Saudi_Arabia.jpg

Further Details of the 1920 Revolt The 1920 revolt is a decisive event in modern Iraqi political history. Dr. Ali al-Wardi’s multivolume set devotes two full volumes just to this incident, revealing the most comprehensive examination of the revolt against British authority in Iraq from a religious, tribal, social, and military vantage. This topic is covered in two books, totaling more than 800 pages, because the revolt engulfed large swaths of Iraq. Wardi describes the unique nature of how the revolt started in Baghdad, Irbil, Baaquba, and Fallujah, just to name a few places touched with insurrection against the British mandate of Iraq. There are many lessons to be learned from reading Wardi’s seminal volumes. From a strategic perspective, it discusses the British realization that Iraq had to be placed on a tangible course toward independence. On the tactical front, the British attempted to subdue Iraq using the new technology of airpower when, in actuality, more troops were needed to finally pacify the revolt. Finally, there is much to be learned about committed nationalists versus those involved in the nationalist cause only to enrich themselves on the booty from raids conducted against urban areas, British treasury houses, or rail links. Wardi devotes more than 800 pages to dissecting the social, tribal, political, and military aspects of the 1920 revolt in his crucial volume six, “Lamahaat Ijitmayiah min Tareekh Iraq al-Hadeeth,” or “Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History,” which will be published in the May-June 2010 edition of ARMOR. In popular history, Iraq’s 1920 revolt began with the murder of British Colonel Leachman in central Iraq, which is now known as Al-Anbar Province. However, the Leachman murder was only one incident among dozens that British forces had to address throughout Iraq. It is vital for America’s military planners to dissect this event carefully by reading this important Arabic series. It is also important to explore British accounts in an attempt to understand the complexities of counterinsurgency that are unique to Iraq. Sheikh Taleb al-Naqib: Covering all Bases in the 1920 Revolt One of the most interesting characters in Iraq’s modern history is Sheikh Taleb al-Naqib, also referred to as Said (honorific title connoting descent from Prophet Muhammad) Taleb al-Naqib, the Sheikh of Muhammara, a region encompassing Basra and Umm Qasr. Sheikh Taleb was a master at playing many sides. During World War I, he escaped Ottoman authorities and sought temporary asylum in Central Arabia under Ibn Saud. Taleb was involved in a failed attempt to get Ibn Saud to plunder Southern Iraq, thereby challenging British authority and repairing his reputation with the Ottomans. In 1920, assessing that the British were facing mass insurrections, Taleb wrote the English asking for their pardon and offering his services. The British, facing tribal chaos and nationalist insurrections, invited him to Baghdad. Ever the cautious intriguer, Taleb arrived in Baghdad in July 1920 and visited with his supporters to assess British intentions toward him and evaluate whether or not he was falling into a trap. He discussed possible British objectives with Abdel-Kader Khudairy and learned the extent of the rebellion. Taleb also visited the British political agent in Iraq, Ms. Gertrude Bell, who was intrigued by his proposal of forming a moderate political party that would form a counter-weight to Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi “In popular history, Iraq’s 1920 revolt began with the murder of British Colonel Leachman in central Iraq, which is now known as Al-Anbar Province. However, the Leachman murder was only one incident among dozens that British forces had to address throughout Iraq.” At left, Colonel Gerard Leachman, intelligence officer in Arab disguise. January-February 2010 27 “Ever the cautious intriguer, Taleb arrived in Baghdad in July 1920 and visited with his supporters to assess British intentions toward him and evaluate whether or not he was falling into a trap. He discussed possible British objectives with Abdel-Kader Khudairy and learned the extent of the rebellion. Taleb also visited the British political agent in Iraq, Ms. Gertrude Bell, who was intrigued by his proposal of forming a moderate political party that would form a counter-weight to Iraq’s nationalist parties.”

Iraq’s nationalist parties. Taleb also asked for an appointment in British-mandated Iraq. Taleb then spent time with leaders of the nationalist movement in Baghdad, and acting as a double informant, he passed information between the British and the Iraqi nationalist leaders. As an example, Wardi captures a conversation between Taleb and Yousef al-Suwaidi (one of the leaders of the nationalist cause in Baghdad). Suwaidi proposes that Taleb become a nationalist leader who Iraqis can support, saying, “You were a native Iraqi and a force for rebellion.” Taleb affirms he is Arab and Iraqi and then asks Suwaidi to explain exactly why they are fighting. Suwaidi replies that they are fighting for “the principle of no foreigners, no mandate, and no external interference.” Taleb asks him to further explain his manhaj (program); Suwaidi replies that they have none. Taleb then declares, “You are no better than brigands; you cannot lead a revolution without a doctrine or program; you cannot defeat the British without a program for the future of Iraq.” Taleb explained that the British are planning to bring more forces from India to suppress any rebellion in Iraq and that the nationalists cannot hope to defeat the might of the British army. He explained that to join the nationalist cause, the nationalist leader must be an Iraqi from among the best lineage, and a provisional delegation must be formed to discuss gradual emancipation of Iraq from the British mandate. Taleb then went to see Gertrude Bell and informed her of the conversation and the fear expressed by Suwaidi at the prospect of British military reinforcements from India. During discussions with Iraqi nationalists, Taleb also learned that Shiites and Sunnis were unified in the cause of Iraqi independence; calling Abdullah ibn Hussein “king” was a ruse designed to drive a wedge between the Hashemite leaders, who supported the Arab Revolt, and the British, who incited this revolt against the Ottomans in World War I (it was also seen as a means to have international expression of their grievances through the Hashemites, who were attending international conferences to determine the fate of the Middle East); Iraqi nationalists had no intention of allowing Prince Abdullah to have any real authority in Iraq; and Iraqi nationalists were frustrated by Iraqis in Syria who were among the entourage of King Feisal ibn Hussein (brother of Abdullah) of Syria (they found the 16,000 pounds of financial support insufficient to incite rebellion and conduct attacks against British forces). Sir Percy Cox Returns On 6 June 1920, Sir Percy Cox, the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Persia, was informed of his reappointment as high commissioner in Baghdad. He was recalled to London for discussions on the state of Iraq and to outline a plan for setting up an autonomous Iraqi national government. He left Persia for London via Baghdad, stopping a few days to consult with the then current high commissioner, A.T. Wilson. During this visit, the two men (Cox was Wilson’s mentor) drafted a proposed official statement announcing plans to transition Iraq toward independence as early as autumn 1921. Wilson would discuss aspects of the statement with Iraq’s nationalist leaders, while Cox discussed it with officials in London. In August 1920, Wilson attempted to reason with reactionary revolutionary elements who wanted immediate and unconditional independence for Iraq. Wilson argued this would lead to a collapse of administration and services. Moreover, the country would digress into tribal, as well as sectarian, bloodshed. The reactionary Iraqi nationalists replied that this price needed to be paid for independence and that freedom is taken and not given! Wilson explained the mandate would gradually transition Iraq to independence; in addition, Britain would protect Iraq from Turkish interference. The answer of the revolutionaries was that the Turks were Muslims and the new regime offered unconditional independence for Iraq based on the 1919 National Compact. Wilson then stressed that the British guaranteed the rights of Iraq’s other groups such as the Kurds and Shiites. Iraqi leaders replied that these people were peasants and would obey their tribal and religious leaders. The Shiite religious hawza (clerical cluster) were unified with Iraqi nationalists for the independence of Iraq. Wilson was so frustrated with Iraqi nationalist leaders that he threatened the revolt and insurrection with military force. The Iraqis responded that British military leaders were vacationing in Persia (a reference to Lieutenant General Aylmer Haldane and his staff) and British troop concentrations were busy guarding oil interests in Abadan. Once the order for those troops to redeploy to Iraq occurred, a campaign of sabotage, disruption, and attacks on rail links, riverboats, oil terminals, and depots would begin, and the Iraqi police force set up by the British was unreliable. Wilson left the meeting, and the next morning, drew up arrest lists of nationalist leaders. The revolutionaries began to flee. Police altercations with pro-independence factions in Baghdad spread panic in Kazimiyah as Shiites came to defend Muhammad al-Sadr; ironically, the British had not included Sadr on its list of revolutionaries to detain. Nationalists fled Baghdad and hid in Yousoufiyah and Karbala. Martial law was imposed by British authorities in Baghdad, which led to the capture of seven revolutionaries, who were tried by military tribunal for firing at police forces, and six were given death sentences. “Wardi captures a conversation between Taleb and Yousef al-Suwaidi (one of the leaders of the nationalist cause in Baghdad). Suwaidi (shown at right) proposes that Taleb become a nationalist leader who Iraqis can support, saying, ‘You were a native Iraqi and a force for rebellion.’ Taleb affirms he is Arab and Iraqi and then asks Suwaidi to explain exactly why they are fighting. Suwaidi replies that they are fighting for ‘the principle of no foreigners, no mandate, and no external interference.’ ” “On 6 June 1920, Sir Percy Cox, the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Persia, was informed of his reappointment as high commissioner in Baghdad. He was recalled to London for discussions on the state of Iraq and to outline a plan for setting up an autonomous Iraqi national government.” 28 January-February 2010

The case of Abdel-Majid Kennah is an interesting one to examine; he was a smuggler involved in the nationalist cause for patriotic reasons, but also for a chance to make money. He would be among those given a death sentence by British military tribunal at the urging of Sheikh Taleb to make an example of those Iraqis undermining the gradualist approach of transitioning Iraq toward peaceful independence. The nationalists used funerals of those executed to organize mass public demonstrations of Shiite and Sunni solidarity. In September 1920, when Wilson departed Iraq, he delivered a speech in Arabic that expressed his sorrow for departing, as well as his delight of passing his commission to his professional father, Sir Percy Cox. He made mention of Iraqis, such as Sheikh Taleb, who wanted a peaceful transition to Iraqi independence. Wilson ended his speech with a quotation from the Quran appropriate for these difficult times, “With every difficulty, there will come times of ease.” His remarks at the train station showed Wilson publicly acknowledging two reasons for the ongoing revolt. First, British policies in World War I incited nationalist feelings against the Ottomans. British policymakers did not consider sending guidance on the channeling of this nationalist sentiment in creating a transition to an Iraqi nationalist government. Second, Iraq’s nationalist movement had been infected with reactionary, extreme, and anarchist elements that retarded progress toward an independent Iraq. However, the arrest of leaders in Baghdad, coupled with their fleeing the capital and the imposition of martial law, led to calm being restored to the city by late August 1920. Unfortunately, with this calm, Diyala Province exploded in rebellion. Diyala Province was important to the British, just as it had been to the Ottomans, because it contained access roads connecting Baghdad with the Persian border. Baaquba, the provincial capital, was the first major city for caravans, pilgrims, and travelers arriving from Persia. Events in the middle Euphrates region, Baghdad, and the Iraqi-Syrian border led tribes in Diyala to consider rebelling against British authority. The tribal chieftains in Diyala deluded themselves into believing that tribes in other parts of Iraq enjoyed fabulous plunder and that revolutionary activity paid those willing to take risks. Said Habeeb Edroosi, a Sufi leader, was a key contact between Iraq’s nationalists in Baghdad and Baaquba’s leaders. Mahmood Mutwali, a leader in Baaquba, had absolute hatred for the British due to the loss of his authority, privilege, and position, which Baghdad, the riverfront, looking north to the Old City from the right bank, near the British Embassy. “Iraq’s nationalist movement had been infected with reactionary, extreme, and anarchist elements that retarded progress toward an independent Iraq. However, the arrest of leaders in Baghdad, coupled with their fleeing the capital and the imposition of martial law, led to calm being restored to the city by late August 1920. Unfortunately, with this calm, Diyala Province exploded in rebellion.”

was bestowed on him and his clan by the Ottomans. He would be a key inciter in the urban areas of Diyala, chiefly Baaquba, as he represented many of the educated Effendiah (bureaucratic) class that brought and spread revolutionary ideas among the populace. Said Saaleh Hilli, a Shiite, was a famous orator of taziyah (religious passion plays commemorating the death of Hussein, Muhammad’s grandson) and ran a Husseiniyah (religious center) in Baaquba. He had many contacts within the clergy and mosques located in Diyala that could incite rebellion and support his cause. Saaleh Hilli would be a link between Baaquba’s leaders and anti-British Shiite clergy in the Najaf and Kufa Hawza (Shiite clerical hierarchy). The Sunnis of Baaquba were represented by Sheikh Habeeb al-Khalsi. Tribal leaders, who would play a major role in the Diyala insurrection, included Sheikh Habeeb al-Khuzairan of the Uzzah Tribe and Mohammad Ukh’shaim of the Khubaysat Tribal Confederation. The Diyala insurrection began with tribal greed in August 1920. The Kar’khiah Tribe attacked remote train stations and a treasury known to have a safe filled with government funds for payroll in the town of Mehrut. The British responded with two regiments to pacify the Kar’khiah, which brought order in Mehrut initially, but the British were lulled by their success at driving away the tribal fighters. The British did not understand that 300 mounted tribesmen were charged with harassing these regiments, looking for weaknesses. Once weakness and daily routines were discovered, the tribesmen would pounce on the regiments in a mass attack. This was the ancient tactics of al-farr wal-karr (retreat and attack) that wore down an adversary while probing them. These tribal attacks were beaten back only by a concentration of artillery fire. General Haldane felt this final push by the tribes signified the subjugation of the wayward tribes and the artillery attack blunted any further attacks by this rabble. Wilson, the high commissioner, disagreed with Haldane, withdrawing the two regiments from Mehrut and Baaquba. Even the British major in charge of Baaquba disagreed with General Haldane. However, the commander in chief of British forces in Iraq thought Baaquba was a side show, a tribal rebellion that would be quickly suppressed, and Baghdad was a more important objective that needed protection. In essence, General Haldane had scarce amount of troops to keep the peace in Baghdad while dealing with insurrections in other parts of Iraq. Not long after the two British regiments were removed from the area, tribal raids and lawlessness moved from Mehrut to Baaquba. The Kar’khiah raided the city, its markets, government houses, and more importantly, the treasury and arsenal. Residents of Baaquba formed a local government, raised an Arab flag, and convened a municipal independent government in the post office. This effort would be useless as tribes intimidated the government into submission. The Uzzah Tribe, which was away from Diyala supporting the nationalist cause in the Middle Euphrates, returned to fight the Abeed Tribe that was encroaching on its lands. Haldane had only dealt with Diyala as fresh regiments arrived from India. But soon, Haldane had to make a choice: either devote troops to deal with the Middle Euphrates and Syrian-Iraqi border region that were taken over by Iraqi nationalists or address the anarchy in Diyala. He decided to quickly address the chaos in Diyala, pacify Baaquba and Shaherban, as well as secure the access roads to Persia. Haldane used a combination of infantry, artillery, armored mobile infantry, and aerial bombardment to clear the road of tribal threats. Regular troops took over the city and drove out the tribes, imposing fines on rebellious tribal chiefs and demolishing homes of rebel leaders. Hiding in Diyala was Muhammad Sadr, who would flee and seek refuge in Karbala, successfully inciting rebellion in Samaraa. By September 1920, the Diyala insurrection was subdued. The British issued a proclamation, which stated that all tribes who raised a white flag and sent a delegation to negotiate terms with British commanders would not be molested or fired on by airplanes. Tribal chiefs clamored to see the general in charge of the Diyala operation. The chiefs signed loyalty oaths, agreed to repay or replace damaged and stolen goods, and pledged not to offer asylum to nationalist agitators. The British set up a committee made up of tribal elders, municipal leaders, and British officers to form a reconciliation and recompense committee. A side benefit to this committee was the intelligence provided on insurrectionists, as well as those involved in murder and sabotage of British forces and property. In 1919, the Kurds conducted a major revolt that was brutally suppressed by the British. It lasted from May to June 1919 and resulted in the exile of Kurdish leader Mahmoud al-Hafeed to India. In 1920, small pockets of Kurdish resistance broke out in areas bordering Diyala Province. The Khanqain revolt involved the Kurdish Dahlu Tribe. The Turks financed the rebellion of the Kurds with the additional help of an Ottoman officer, Khorshid Bey. The organized rebellion of the Jabbur, Rabiah, and Bani Wais tribes attacked British army camps containing 158 troops. The British used forces on hand with reinforcements from the town of Qazwain to bring order to the town of Khanqain and Kaf-ri. The city of Irbil would be pacified by rebelling tribes using British forces in Kirkuk and Mosul. These forces were marched as a show of force to entice the Kurdish tribes to negotiate. The tactic worked, as the 1920 Kurdish rebellion was not as potent as the region’s 1919 revolt; however, with some gold and a Turkish military officer, the Kurds succeeded in tying down a few British regiments to suppress the Kurdish outbreak of hostility. Fallujah and al-Anbar Popular history has the 1920 revolt starting in Fallujah, which is mythical. The revolt occurred in various regions of Iraq and was based on a range of motives from nationalism to outright greed. What makes this insurrection, known as the “Zaubah rebellion,” stand out was the murder of British colonel and intelligence officer, Gerard Leachman. The roots of the Zaubah rebellion began in 1917, when the British pursued the policy of selecting a tribal chieftain to be the one person responsible for a specific region. In the Zaubah area, the British selected Sheikh al-Dhari as the responsible leader. The British gave him an allowance of 750 silver rupees a month. However, in 1918, the British withdrew its support for al-Dhari, for reasons unknown. Following the 1920 revolt, the British resumed their payment to al-Dhari, but decreased the compensation to 500 silver rupees a month. This was viewed by the Sheikh as inadequate. Only to make matters worse, Colonel Leachman treated al-Dhari with great contempt, insulting him publicly numerous times. For example, Wardi reveals how Dhari attended a banquet and was not seated among tribal elders; instead, he was turned away by Leachman himself. This unnecessary treatment drove al-Dhari toward collaborating with the revolutionaries. Leachman, who was more 30 January-February 2010 attune to events in Arabia, was out of touch with Iraq. During a speech, he claimed that the British were the only ones keeping Shiites and Sunnis from killing each other. Leachman was unaware that awarding Iraq as a British mandate outraged Iraqis and the call for independence was shared by Shiite and Sunnis alike. Al-Dhari inspired tribes in and around Fallujah and Ramadi to raid roads and rail links to Baghdad. Leachman used motorized gendarme and police to pursue these tribal brigands. Wardi writes that in 1928, the court of inquiry best describes the events of Colonel Leachman’s murder, as follows. Leachman had insulted Dhari too many times. When Leachman and Dhari were negotiating a cessation of hostilities, Dhari insisted that he had nothing to do with the raids. Not believing this account, Leachman addressed him as ya Dhari (you Dhari) instead of Sheikh Dhari, called Dhari a liar, and spat on him. Dhari ordered his son to Khamis dook’uh (kill him). Obeying, the son fired his rifle into Leachman while Dhari took a sword to him. They also killed Leachman’s Indian driver. The revolt in Zaubah isolated British forces in Fallujah and Ramadi. The murder of this senior British officer emboldened tribes and made Dhari a hero. The British could not travel from Baghdad to Fallujah, except in an armored railcar with mounted machine guns. General Haldane used combined infantry, motorized infantry, and air forces to regain control, while the negotiations in the 1921 Cairo Conference led to pacification of this region of Iraq. Three leaders of the Zaubah rebellion fled to Arabia with one, Jameel Madfai, serving the future king of Jordan, Abdullah ibn Hussein. Sheikh Dhari had a 10,000 silver rupee bounty on his head. In 1927, he was betrayed by his Armenian driver and would die that year awaiting trial by a military tribunal. The British system of paying off tribal elders would continue until 1933. The 1921 Cairo Conference installed Prince Feisal ibn Hussein as king of Iraq, thus placing the nation on a course of independence by 1932. Dhari’s importance remains relevant today as his descendants, Muthana and Harith al-Dhari, are major representatives of the Sunni Iraqi Nationalist Insurgency. They headed up the Muslim Ulema Council (MUC), which is one of the brigades that turned against al-Qaeda, after cooperating with the group during the 2007-2008 movement, known as the “Anbar Awakening.” The militia who cooperated and then turned against al-Qaeda is called the “1920 brigades,” after the 1920 revolt. Wardi ends his volumes on the 1920 revolt by asking, and then attempting to answer, why the Iraqis did not revolt against the Ottomans, as they so zealously did against the British? He lists the following factors:  Religious influence was a factor as the Ottomans were Muslims and the British were not; this underlying tension was always present when the British attempted to govern Iraq.  The death of the quietist Grand Ayatollah Yazdi and his replacement, the anti-British Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, brought the Shiites to cooperate with the Sunnis over Iraqi independence.  Provocation by the Effendiah class. Iraq’s bureaucrats were unemployed and underemployed. They were the Iraqi masses’ first introduction to the ideas of the French revolution, European nationalism, and news of Arab revolts against the British in places such as Egypt and India.  British broken promises. Just as A.T. Wilson said in his farewell remarks, the British did not adequately or even attempt to address what a mandate over Iraq meant, nor did they provide any sort of timeline for Iraqi independence.  External influences. The 1920 revolt was sustained by outside interferences, including Syria, Persia, Turkey, and Arabia. Iraqis who fought against the Ottomans in the Arab Revolt coalesced in Syria with the Hashemites and formed a cadre of incitement and rebellion directed against the British in Iraq. In Volume VI, Wardi covers the process, personalities, and events that led to creating the nation-state of Iraq in late August 1921, which occurred following a plebiscite showing 96 percent in favor of this proposal. The clear majority of the vote has been questioned by historians and was most likely engineered by the British who wanted to put Feisal bin Al Hussein Bin Ali El-Hashemi, known in western references as “Feisal ibn Hussein” in power. Feisal, who was already king of Greater Syria, agreed to become king of Iraq. King Feisal I would face the typical challenges of a Sunni ruler attempting to rule a Shiite majority. He ruled until his death in 1933. The line between the noble values of Arab self-determination and outright brigandage was somewhat blurred in the 1920 revolt, just as it was blurred during the 1916 Arab Revolt in Arabia. Wardi humanizes the characters of the revolt with all their intrigues and double dealings. He brings to life the stories of terrain, cities, areas within those cities, and incidents that drive Iraq’s social, tribal, political, and military history. To Iraqis, these are not objectives or operating bases, but areas where a rebellion started or was suppressed. This land is where ancestors who opposed British rule are buried, and terrain where tribes made a stand against Royal Air Force warplanes and British infantry formations. As we focus on educating America’s servicemen and women on the human terrain, we would be remiss if the works of Dr. Ali al-Wardi were not highlighted, discussed, and taught to deploying units operating in Iraq. Familiarization with the history of this region will go a long way to understanding its people. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B.B.A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M.B.A. and M.A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M.S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U.S. Naval War College, the U.S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. This work would not have been possible without the help of Lieutenant Commander Margaret Read for her edits and valuable comments and the help of the John T. Hughes Library and Library of Congress Middle East Reading Room. Finally, a portion of this work was written at the Ike Skelton Library at the Joint Forces Staff College, while waiting to deliver a seminar on the nuances of Militant Islamist Ideology. January-February 2010 31 “The line between the noble values of Arab self-determination and outright brigandage was somewhat blurred in the 1920 revolt, just as it was blurred during the 1916 Arab Revolt in Arabia. Wardi humanizes the characters of the revolt with all their intrigues and double dealings. He brings to life the stories of terrain, cities, areas within those cities, and incidents that drive Iraq’s social, tribal, political, and military history.”