The Staff Ride

The Staff Ride by Colonel Thomas Williams The U.S. Army is at a potentially dangerous crossroad; it has been at war for nearly 8 years and will very soon promote a generation of field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers who have never known an Army at peace. While they have earned invaluable combat leadership experience, they are also at risk for developing operational myopia. This happens when (absent critical thinking) leaders fit events and evidence into preconceived patterns and make decisions using mental templates and checklists. Given our enemy’s ability to learn and adapt, this is a sobering thought. Therefore, the Army needs to give these leaders an opportunity to transcend the immediacy of Iraq and Afghanistan, to explore the theory and practice of battle command without debating the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) particular to any past commander, region, or unit. The staff ride is one of the best ways to provide this type of professional development; it allows the study of leadership, modern doctrine, and decisionmaking without the burden of a learning environment. The staff ride’s effectiveness is based on its low-stress environment where the objective is an exchange of ideas, not a quiz on methods. Participants have the freedom and time to think about all aspects of the operational problem and can debate ideas and unconventional solutions without the fear of being wrong. In the process, they have the added advantage of learning something about themselves and how they see the world, including the line between audacity and foolishness, between initiative and opportunism, between agility and aversion to risk. Although the basic format for the staff ride comes from William Robertson’s seminal work, The Staff Ride, there are ways to make it more effective as a teaching tool.1 For example, keep Robertson’s three phases — the preliminary study phase, the field study phase, and the integration phase, but emphasize or introduce something broader such as the elements of reasoning or the intellectual standards leaders might have used to reach a decision. To do this, the learning objective must clearly focus on modern doctrine. For example, on a recent staff ride to the battles of Trenton and Princeton, New Jersey, the learning objectives were actually four modern doctrinal constructs: constructing and leading effective after-action reviews (AAR); analytical decisionmaking using the military decisionmaking process (MDMP); intuitive decisionmaking using the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process (RDSP); and the role of the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Creed and Army Values in mission command — all chosen for their relevance to the unit’s mission. The battlefield’s anatomy (who did what, when, where, why, or even the end result) serves to amplify, illustrate, or provoke the discussion toward one of these objectives. The idea is to study why events happen and their root causes. The preliminary study phase included a briefing and discussion on the strategic situation, as well as a recommendation to read one or more books on the subject, such as The First American Army; The Day is Ours! An Inside View of the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, November 1776 – January 1777; Washington’s Crossing; The Winter Soldiers: The Battles for Trenton and Princeton; and 1776.2 Most will remember from American history that George Washington crossed the Delaware on Christmas day to defeat the Hessians, but the campaign between 25 December 1775 and 3 January 1776 actually consisted of three battles: two at Trenton and one at Princeton. Preceding these battles were a string of defeats that left the army, and the cause, in jeopardy. During these 10 crucial days, George Washington’s army defeated and outwitted more than just the Hessians; he defeated the better equipped and more disciplined forces of General Charles Cornwallis. This major victory saved the Continental Army and renewed the Nation’s will to continue its struggle for independence. To provide a structure for this discussion on the strategic context, the participating group used U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations.3 They considered the operational environment in 1775, including an analysis using the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure-physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT)), and how respective forces viewed and used the soldier’s rules (and to what effect.) They framed the campaigns using the continuum of operations and operational themes, going over each side’s plans in the context of full-spectrum operations and the elements of combat power. Lastly, these soldiers applied the concept of operational art to each commander’s plan and debated the effective use of information and knowledge management. Complex topics all, but history brought them to life. The next segment of Robertson’s program is called the field study phase, which consists of a series of stops along the battlefield, called “stands.” Typically, stands are the location of some significant event, but in this modified program, a stand can also serve as a means to describe how a modern process, such as the MDMP, might have served the battlefield commander and his staff. During the Trenton and Princeton ride, the group stopped at five stands: the crossing, the monument, the barracks, Assunpink Creek, and Prince ton. Here, in brief, is how the day unfolded. Stand one — the crossing With the Delaware River as a backdrop, facilitators briefly reviewed the tactical situation that brought Washington to this decision point. The facilitator’s knowledge and preparation allowed him to prepare and deliver a full operations order brief to the training audience, which told them what was meant to happen (delivered as Washington might have) without giving away any details on what actually happened. The facilitators did this because they had an unfair advantage knowing how the battle unfolded. The idea was to create the same conditions that contemporary leaders face — specifically, not knowing how their decisions will turn out. Stand two — the monument This is the stand where participants learned what did happen. The monument sits in the center of downtown Trenton right at the point where George Washington placed his artillery (and dominated the Hessians.) Here, the group discussed how the battle unfolded, using play-by-play sequences, punctuated by key decision points made by both forces. Participants considered more than unit dispositions; they struggled with the notion of friction, the fog of war, and how things are not always as simple as they seem. They began thinking about the battlefield cause-and-effect relationships that might drive the content of an AAR. Stand three — the barracks At the southern end of Trenton battlefield, there is an historic museum known as “The Barracks.” The group did not tour any museums on this trip as it was not an historic tour, but the barracks made a nice backdrop for the ensuing conversation. The facilitators led two discussions, beginning with the NCO Creed and Army Values, both of which are essential for the tenets of mission command. Our creeds and values serve as guides because they check opportunistic behavior when taking the initiative; allow leaders to build teams on trust, not rules; and ensure leaders know what it means to take care of soldiers in conjunction with the mission, not despite it. We can relate to these men and their actions because we are fortunate to have many diary entries from the battle’s participants, stories that brought the fight alive and made it personal to the 21st-century audience. The story used for this staff ride was that of Sergeant Joseph White. Colonel Henry Knox, the chief of artillery, told Sergeant White three times to abandon his damaged cannon. White ignored the colonel and brought his piece back across the Delaware River as the Army withdrew. The facilitators, carefully telling this story to avoid biases, forced the group into facing how they would handle this soldier. How would such actions be handled in today’s environment; is this how we want our subordinates to behave; and what are the boundaries? Incidentally, Colonel Knox not only praised White, but promoted him. Following the Sergeant White discussion, the facilitators returned to the subject of conducting an AAR. Using the Warfighter Functions, the group identified which battlefield observations were essential to Washington’s success or the Hessian commander’s failure. They discussed the causal linkages, being careful to help the group distinguish between the “so what” and the relevant. Lastly, having determined these AAR themes, they brainstormed open-ended questions that might have helped Washington and his team reach the same conclusions (guided discovery), and along the way, identify potential doctrinal or TTP solutions.4 Stand four — Assunpink Creek The Assunpink Creek was key terrain for both sides in this campaign and serves well as the backdrop to describe the events and decisions from 25 December 1776 “The preliminary study phase included a briefing and discussion on the strategic situation, as well as a recommendation to read one or more books on the subject, such as The First American Army; The Day is Ours! An Inside View of the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, November 1776 – January 1777; Washington’s Crossing; The Winter Soldiers: The Battles for Trenton and Princeton; and 1776. Most will remember from American history that George Washington crossed the Delaware on Christmas day to defeat the Hessians…” January-February 2010 23 to 29 December 1776. After providing context, the facilitators led a discussion — using the MDMP — regarding the choices for Washington and his commanders. They compared and contrasted this to Cornwallis and his decisionmaking, as well as how their respective cultures and climates (the elements of combat power) served as the framework for this particular discussion. Stand five — Princeton The next stand was an approximate 20- minute drive into the town of Princeton. On the way, the facilitator reminded the group of Washington’s plan for an attack on Princeton and how he slipped away from what Cornwallis thought was a sure trap. The attack turned into a meeting engagement between Washington’s army and a British brigade rushing south to reinforce Cornwallis, offering a rich illustration of the RDSP — learning and acting faster than your opponent might overcome the weight of numerical disadvantage. The British, heavily outnumbered, did heroically well in this fight. During the field study phase, it is important to avoid lecturing. The facilitators must develop a set of open-ended questions (not unlike the type used in AARs) that invite participation, as well as challenge assumptions and romantic myths. For example, the facilitators at Trenton asked several provocative questions, including, “What would your recommendations be to General Washington had you learned two of his three crossings had failed?” The last phase of a staff ride is the integration phase, and the unit accomplished this in two parts. The first part took place right on the battlefield with a discussion of the resulting strategic situation in the Jerseys, to include how decisions at all levels (then and now) have tremendous strategic consequences. The second part was at home station where the group conducted its own AAR, and surprisingly, soldiers continued discussions on the application of doctrine over dinner that evening. Despite the quality of the experiential learning detailed above, the staff ride remains a neglected teaching tool. There are many reasons for this, not the least of which include the frenetic pace of deployments and training plans, and the stream of administrative requirements that manage the Army, which is precisely the reason to make time. A key premise for this article is that modern Army doctrine is not about memorizing and adhering to rules; it is about harnessing imagination and creativity into a common structure that is replicable and works across different personality types and leadership styles. The staff ride is one of the best ways to nurture the adaptive and agile leadership style that Army doctrine requires. Think about it this way — to apply the tenets of FM 3.0, Operations, or FM (Interim) 5-0.1, The Operations Process, or execute mission command as defined by FM 6.0, Mission Command (using the tools of FM 5.0, Army Planning and Orders Production), the Army clearly needs to be an organization of critical thinkers, not process experts.5 The Army’s effort to develop adaptive and agile leaders is not a luxury — it is an essential task — because checklists and mental models provided in our doctrine too often substitute for critical thinking; they become a crutch. Decisions can easily become formulaic if time and again a particular cause yields a certain effect — A+B will always equal C because it always has. We must guard against the possibility — given the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity of the contemporary operating environment — that circumstances may look the same, but only on the surface. Tomorrow A+B may not equal C, because we cannot always control the rules. As critical thinkers, leaders must know the difference between accuracy and precision; they must understand logic, relevance, significance, and fairness. If not, they are likely to encounter unexpected implications or consequences from faulty inferences and conclusions. This is not heretical thinking; in fact, these ideas line up with the Army’s education program for field grade officers and what is currently occurring with the noncommissioned officer education system. For example, the intermediate learning environment (ILE) program does not teach what to think, it teaches how to think. Before students begin classes on operational art, joint doctrine, or Army doctrine, they develop the ability to think critically and creatively. Students learn self-expression in both written and spoken forms, which helps them apply skills, “The Assunpink Creek was key terrain for both sides in this campaign and serves well as the backdrop to describe the events and decisions from 25 December 1776 to 29 December 1776. After providing context, the facilitators led a discussion — using the MDMP — regarding the choices for Washington and his commanders.” 24 January-February 2010 analyze problems, and work out valid and cogent solutions in ways useful to the reader. Essentially, they learn (using a “backdoor” method) how to provide the commander with a real mission analysis, not a restatement of the facts. They learn how to follow the logic of their mission analysis argument through to their courses of action recommendations. In other words, they are not two products from two processes, but the latter stems from and clearly (cogently and validly) addresses the former. These skills are difficult to learn and are perishable. They take practice to maintain and mature, but in the “real world,” critical thinking often becomes a casualty of our missions, tight suspense dates, and demanding schedules. Senior leaders need to guard against rationalizing these short-term considerations at the expense of the greater good of the profession. As noted earlier, a carefully designed staff ride serves as the foundation for this kind of practical, applicable, and professional development. It pushes leaders out of their comfort zone and allows them to explore how commanders and staffs make decisions and how mental models, such as the MDMP, RDSP, and boundary systems, such as the Army Values and NCO Creed, work for or against them. Discussions of this quality rarely happen in the classroom, so the opportunity for leaders at all levels to step out of their traditional (read: chain of command) roles and interact — inviting debate between officers and NCOs, junior members and senior members — is invaluable. It promotes the tenets of mission command, as described in FM 6-0, and is vital to sustaining the profession of arms.6 The staff ride also offers the advantage of teaching students something about the Army’s legacy. Given the absence of professional military historians and a general lack of American history knowledge among soldiers (author’s observation), it is important for us to connect our aspiring senior leaders to their past. It is important that they not only learn what happened and why, but to realize they are in good company when it comes to serving their Nation in hard times and at great personal cost. As with any training event, running an effective staff ride takes more than an afternoon’s effort to organize. But there’s no need to reinvent the wheel; there are guidebooks and subject-matter experts who can assist you in preparing a staff ride. For example, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth has produced excellent works, which are available on its website. There were no guidebooks for Trenton and Princeton, so the facilitation team had to research multiple texts to learn battlefield events, anecdotes, background intrigues, and diary stories that brought the events to life. The facilitators also made a careful reconnaissance of the selected stands to ensure they would meet the unit’s needs (bus parking, a place to brief, and safety). Certainly, nothing will replace the experiences that next-generation field grade officers are getting in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, or hundreds of other locations around the world. People sometimes mockingly note that the Army prepares for the next war by training for the last, but unless leaders see some diversity, this is all they will know. Using a centuries-old event to talk contemporary doctrine is actually a practical way to mature the academic foundations proffered in ILE in ways that are rewarding in terms of team-building and doctrinal understanding, while simultaneously connecting us to our Nation’s past. Given our new field grade officers’ limiting experience, it may also be the foundation for our future. Notes 1William G. Robertson, The Staff Ride, U.S. Army, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 1987. 2Bruce Chadwick, The First American Army, Sourcebooks, Inc., Naperville, Illinois, 2005; William M. Dwyer, The Day is Ours! An Inside View of the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, November 1776 – January 1777, The Viking Press, New York, 1983; David Fischer, Washington’s Crossing, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004; Richard M. Ketchum, The Winter Soldiers: The Battles for Trenton and Princeton, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1973; and David McCullough, 1776, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2005. 3Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 27 February 2008. 4This after-action review format dates back to Carl von Clausewitz; see Clausewitz, On War, Ferdinand Dümmler, Berlin, 1832, book 2, chapter 5. English translations include J.J. Graham, translator, Republished 1908, Project Gutenberg eBook, a partial version, 1873; O. J. Matthijs Jolles, translator, 1943; 1968, Edited with introduction by Anatol Rapoport, Viking Penguin, 1968; Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret, editors and translators, Princeton University Press, 1984. 5HQDA, 3-0, Operations; HQDA, Field Manual (Interim) 5-0.1, The Operations Process, GPO, Washington, DC, March 2006; FM 6-0, Mission Command, GPO, Washington, DC, 11 August 2003; and FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, GPO, Washington, DC, 20 January 2005. 6FM 6-0, Mission Command. Colonel Thomas Williams is currently serving as chief, Exercise Branch, 3d Battle Command Training Group, 2d Brigade, 75th Battle Command Training Division, Fort Dix, NJ. He received a B.A. from Boston University and an M.S.S. from the U.S. Army War College. His military education includes U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include small group leader, 80th Regiment (OES), 10th Battalion, Detachment 1, 84th U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Command, Schenectady, NY; commander, 172d Military Police Battalion, Camp Buehring, Kuwait; commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 172d Armor, Westminster, VT; S3, 86th Brigade, Northfield, VT; and S3, 1st Battalion, 172d Armor, Saint Albans, VT. “The next stand was an approximate 20-minute drive into the town of Princeton. On the way, the facilitator reminded the group of Washington’s plan for an attack on Princeton and how he slipped away from what Cornwallis thought was a sure trap. The attack turned into a meeting engagement between Washington’s army and a British brigade rushing south to reinforce Cornwallis, offering a rich illustration of the RDSP — learning and acting faster than your opponent might overcome the weight of numerical disadvantage.” January-February 2010 25