Design for Operational and Tactical Leaders

If you command or plan operations for Army units, “design” is in your future. The 2010 rewrite of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 5-0), The Operations Process, devotes one entire chapter to design.1 While the word “design” is relatively new to Army doctrine, design concepts and principles are longstanding tools for successful leaders. Design neither replaces nor duplicates the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). More importantly, design is not a topic reserved to “smart folks” and you need no special course to apply design principles in tactical units. Design is all about the commander’s estimate, problemsolving, and battle command. This article describes design concepts in a battle command framework for current operational and tactical commanders and planners. Army Planning Background After World War II, FM 101-5, Staff Officer Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure (1950) discussed planning in terms of two complementary components: conceptual and detailed planning.2 The commander’s estimate was a conceptual activity that set conditions in terms of a well-defined framework of how to deal with a particular situation. In the detailed component, the staff translated the estimate into specific tasks for subordinate units to arrange activities in time and battlespace. In 1968, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, continued emphasis on the commander’s estimate and established problemsolving as the bedrock of Army doctrine.3 In 1986, FM 100-5, Operations, introduced operational art and the initial concepts of design.4 In 1997, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, highlighted staff estimates and procedures while emphasizing “battlefield visualization” over the commander’s estimate.5 By 2005, the commander’s estimate had become almost invisible in the planning process. In 2005, FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, described visualizing as a “mental process of achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that move the force from its current state to the end state.”6 Doctrine has a consistent emphasis on the commander’s role to lead planning through understanding the situation, visualizing how to achieve a desired end state, and describing that visualization to planners. The first point to remember — conceptual planning and design are enduring concepts of Army planning doctrine. Planning Basics In placing design in operational and tactical operations, there are three important definitions or reference points: ill-structured problems, complex problems, and the relation of design to the MDMP. I am defining a problem as a discrepancy between how a current condition is developing and the state of affairs as it should be, which requires military action to close the gap.7 A problem is ill-structured when no clear formulation seems possible, not all required information is available, the number of variables makes analysis difficult, and there is no verifiable answer.8 A problem is ill-structured when “both the nature of the problem and the appropriate response are unique and fluid.”9 Similarly, the characteristics of complex problems include “a large number of variables (complexity) that interact in a nonlinear fashion (connectivity), changing over time (dynamic and time dependent), and to achieve multiple goals.”10 Teaching your teenager how to drive may be an ill-structured problem; on the other hand, preparing an Afghan army battalion to maneuver vehicles in combat through an interpreter is a complex problem. The second point to remember — context distinguishes the nature of problems. 6 January-February 2010

In contrast to the MDMP focus on analysis to develop a course of action, the design focus is to understand the nature of an ill-structured or complex problem. MDMP is a tool to help solve ‘a problem’ while design is a tool to help ensure you are solving the ‘right problem’ without creating collateral problems. While the initial approach in detailed planning is specialized staff analysis to identify facts, the initial approach in the conceptual component is to reach shared understanding of context as the basis to place value on facts. A shared understanding of context enables commanders to see relative importance of various facts and set priorities for tasks. Similarly, the MDMP is a staff-centric activity with well-defined inputs and outputs, while design hinges on discourse among commanders, between the commander and staff, as well as between a commander and others having knowledge about a given situation. Finally, while the MDMP is linear with a focus on producing an order, design follows the battle command logic as an ongoing activity just as the original commander’s estimate was a continuous process. As a detailed planning effort unfolds or an operation moves forward, the commander should continue to think in terms of reframing — the environment, the problem, and the operational approach — because adaptive opponents cause situations to change in unpredictable ways. Reframing makes design a continuous effort to exploit new opportunities and mitigate new threats. The difference between “design” and “detailed planning” is the difference between world geography and a roadmap to your next duty station. The third point to remember — design is commanders leading learning through an honest, forthright exchange of ideas aimed at collective understanding.11 Design Basics: Three Frames A commander’s most important role is to make high-quality decisions in a timely manner. All decisions are subject to three fatal errors: type one error is to decide a problem solved when the problem remains; type two error is to decide a problem is not solved when it is; and type three error is to devote effort in solving the wrong problem.12 Type three errors tend to occur when leaders consider only “what needs to happen” in dealing with ill-structured, complex problems. The fourth point to remember — design is a best-practice approach to counter the three fatal problemsolving errors and, thus, to improve decisionmaking. The Understand Component of Design: Frame the Environment The understand component of battle command provides a solid foundation of relevant knowledge. To achieve understanding, the commander makes a decision to “step back to clarify the nature of the problem itself.”13 The decision to understand the problem is “essential to the commander’s ability to establish the situation’s context.”14 Figure 1 shows January-February 2010 7 that design begins with open-ended questions such as what is going on now, what expectations we must meet, what are trends in the current situation, where are sources of momentum, what needs to happen (given existing trends), and what realistically can be accomplished? Operational variables represent a tool to help frame the geographical area where you can directly influence operations through your maneuver and fire support assets.15 Framing context sets conditions to make sense of a complex situation and helps establish sign posts for knowing, analyzing, and acting.16 In other words, effective decisionmaking requires situational understanding to recognize the difference between existing and desired conditions, while concurrently visualizing end states. The Visualize Component of Design: Frame the Problem Visualization is the mechanism to translate understanding into purposeful activity. The commander’s visualization is a constantly changing, ready image of what’s going on and what needs to be done. Doctrine defines visualization as “the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve that end state.”17 The aim of the visualize component of design is to frame the problem. A problem frame sets boundaries for factors to address in order to move from the current condition to the desired end state (see Figure 2). Mission variables are valuable tools to aid in establishing critical relationships and relative capabilities between friendly forces and enemy forces.18 The decisive operation in conceptual planning is to distill the problem frame into a problem statement because without clearly defining the problem, efforts to develop courses of action are “misguided and vague.”19 I define a problem statement as one or two sentences that set the direction of effort for the force. A problem statement begins with “how to” and identifies the decisive point (DP) friendly forces must achieve before an enemy can set conditions to achieve a desired end state (see Figure 2). Next, the commander’s operational approach serves to bridge conceptual planning and detailed planning. The Describe Component of Design: Frame the Concept The aim of the describe component of design is to combine the environmental frame (understand) with the problem frame (visualize) into expressions that drive staff planning and shape expectations for external audiences (see Figure 3). In the describe component, commanders communicate what military forces should accomplish in terms of an operational approach, or “the manner in which a commander contends with a center of gravity” and by extension to the tactical level, a decisive point.20 At a basic level, commanders communicate an operational approach through a statement of intent that outlines the purpose of the operation and conditions the force must establish to achieve the end state. Commanders also describe acceptable risk and issue planning guidance that establishes specific activities in developing “As a detailed planning effort unfolds or an operation moves forward, the commander should continue to think in terms of reframing — the environment, the problem, and the operational approach — because adaptive opponents cause situations to change in unpredictable ways. Reframing makes design a continuous effort to exploit new opportunities and mitigate new threats. The difference between ‘de-sign’ and ‘detailed planning’ is the difference between world geography and a roadmap to your next duty station.” Figure 1. Understand Component Framework Current Conditions Trends / Propensity What needs to happen? Opportunities & Strengths Threats & Weaknesses What can realistically be accomplished? Context Regional / Local Expectations, Intents, and Actions The gap between these vectors is “the problem” concepts on ‘how to deal with the problem’ for subordinates and staff planners. The revised FM 5-0 (2010) describes the need for a “mission narrative” that expresses the conditions, actions, and payoffs that external audiences will observe as the operation unfolds.21 While the commander’s intent is three to five sentences, the mission narrative is about 150 words. The lower part of Figure 3 indicates that an opponent also has intentions and forces to shift the trend line to an undesirable outcome for friendly forces. Conceptual planning enables a commander to make an explicit, well-informed framework, which takes the form of an environmental frame, problem frame, and a frame of the operational approach. When all is said and done, what might the conceptual planning component look like for incorporating “design” into Army planning practice? Design: A Way (Not the Way) to Understand, Visualize, and Describe Professional planners and doctrine writers outline activities and outcomes that capture the goodness of conceptual planning. A review of the effort to introduce design to the Army should help illuminate the principles of conceptual planning. These facts are based on my perspective and do not reflect any official position. It is my intention to first frame the environment based on past doctrine, background research in planning, and discussions with doctrine writers; secondly, frame the problem based on learning in the environmental frame; and finally, describe my frame of the operational approach for embedding design in Army planning. Environmental frame. The operational environment brings a pressing requirement for a new approach to planning and problemsolving.22 The notion of persistent conflict, security operations conducted among the people, asymmetric threats, and information operations represent dominant factors that frame the operational environment. Equally important, commanders must have a deep understanding of “the physical environment, the state of governance, technology, local resources, and the culture of the local population.”23 Senior leaders recognize “there were conceptual problems early on in the conduct of the current wars, which were attributable to flaws in imagination and understanding.”24 There are several schools of thought on updating planning doctrine. Some argue that any attempt to put structure into conceptual planning, or design, is misguided because conceptual planning is, at heart, an unstructured exercise. Alternatively, others argue that detailed planning, or the MDMP, has served well and is sufficient. Design proponents emphasize the need to understand the complexity that is inherent to the operational environment as a necessary precondition to solving the right problem through detailed analysis. Alternatively, MDMP proponents contend that design tends to devolve into “paralysis by analysis.” The history of planning doctrine highlights a well-established planning culture that once embraced conceptual planning, but currently follows doctrine that emphasizes detailed planning. Today, Army leaders and planners have experienced a decade of transformation, which means the real story involves a well-established planning culture and leaders with inclinations to be dubious of change to a well-known and successful planning method. Problem frame. The decisive operation in problemsolving is to state the problem. While the problem set and gaps in knowledge are critical to a tactical problem frame, this example addresses only the problem narrative and problem statement. Based Figure 2. Problem Frame and Problem Statement Ways: Friendly Strengths Friendly Weaknesses Friendly Means Opposition / Enemy DP & End State We must do this They do this Before Context of Expectations & Opportunities for Friendly Forces Context of Expectations & Threats to Friendly Forces Ways: Opposition / Enemy Strengths Opposition / Enemy Weaknesses Opposition / Enemy Means Friendly DP & End State Trends / Propensity Current Conditions Military: What to Do Observers: What to Expect Opposing Forces Friendly Visualization: What needs to happen Opponent’s Visualization: What needs to happen Observers: What to Expect Figure 3. Describe Component Framework January-February 2010 9 on the environmental frame, the current state of Army planning is a well-established, staff-centric, linear process, which emphasizes detailed planning. The desired condition is a commander-centric method that incorporates conceptual planning while maintaining competencies for detailed planning. As the pattern of factors in the security environment expanded, Army planning evolved in the opposite direction to a linear problemsolving process. After World War II, the relatively stable nature of likely opponents and a forward-stationing strategy enabled commanders to become intimately familiar with all mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) factors in an area of operations.25 In places such as Germany and Korea, leaders often knew more about their assigned area than their hometowns. Media accounts, after-action reviews, and reports now paint a different situation. Commanders and planners now deal with problems that involve multiple players in varied roles, seeking different outcomes. There is a growing requirement to step back and develop a conceptual view of what needs to be accomplished. Today, a linear, stand-alone planning model, such as the MDMP, is no longer sufficient. Commanders and planners need additional tools to aid in framing the operational environment, the problem, and the concept of what needs to be done. The greatest threat to reframing Army planning is a planning culture embedded through professional military education, training centers, operational practice, and nondoctrine-based training programs. The significant weakness is that Army leaders have little to no experience in other planning methods. The greatest opportunity in reframing Army planning is to provide field units with commanders and professional military education graduates who have the expertise to participate in and lead design activities. The greatest strength is that design provides a clear logic that experienced commanders find valuable. However, the problem is how to employ resources at professional military education institutions and training centers to influence Army leaders to perceive design as conceptual planning and decisionmaking in a battle command framework before any counter-doctrine approach gains credibility. Framing the concept: forging an operational approach. The commander’s visualization sets the direction of effort to make a situation as it ought to be. Although commanders often consider elements of operational design in describing their visualization, this example blends describe elements to address risk, intent, and mission narrative.26 Risk. Adopting conceptual planning in tactical units requires identifying any risks and framing the implied consequences. First, there are risks associated with time. Commanders must recognize the opportunity of quick action against the risk of allocating resources to resolve the wrong problem. Second, there are risks associated with ignoring design. Commanders must weigh the opportunity of a shortened planning process against the risk of committing one or more of the three problemsolving errors. Third, there are risks associated with assessing operations. Commanders must balance ease of developing measures of performance against the effort required to develop measures of effectiveness against the risk of inaccurate conclusions on whether a problem has been resolved or continues. Finally, there are risks associated with planning competence and competencies. Leaders must appreciate the strength of high proficiency in conceptual and detailed planning against the risk of threats to unit success in dealing with complex problems. Intent. The commander’s intent “succinctly describes what constitutes success in an operation. It includes the operation’s purpose and the conditions that define the end state.”27 The purpose of incorporating design into Army planning is to provide Army leaders with a method to make a logical and orderly examination of all factors affecting the accomplishment of any mission to determine the most suitable course of action. Conditions that constitute success include all professional military education institutions and training centers presenting design as an organizing conceptual work to frame the environment, frame problems, and describe approaches that resolve complex problems. Army commanders model design as their preferred approach to critical reasoning and creative thinking. Army leaders collaborate in conceptual planning to create understanding regarding unique situations and visualize and describe how to generate change. Mission narrative. While the commander’s intent speaks to the internal or military audience, the commander’s mission narrative speaks to external audiences “whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are relevant to the unit’s mission.”28 A mission narrative is part of a strategic communications process and aims to let people know what to expect.29 The mission narrative of what commanders, leaders, and planners should expect from the new FM 5-0 begins with a condition that doctrine aims to assist commanders in efforts to prepare their organizations to dominate all situations.30 The overarching opportunity is in professional military education and training to equip leaders with tools, methods, and doctrine that provide the greatest support for success across the range of full-spectrum operations. A critical action is to provide situations for leaders to practice “best practice” plan- “Operational variables represent a tool to help frame the geographical area where you can directly influence operations through your maneuver and fire support assets. Framing context sets conditions to make sense of a complex situation and helps establish sign posts for knowing, analyzing, and acting. In other words, effective decisionmaking requires situational understanding to recognize the difference between existing and desired conditions, while concurrently visualizing end states.” 10 January-February 2010 ning methods to achieve success through superior decisionmaking. The payoff is to enable Army leaders to develop a comprehensive understanding of their environment, visualize how to achieve desired end states, and describe that visualization to their units, which help commanders achieve their vision of success in all missions. Transition: Conceptual to Detailed Planning The next step is to shift the main effort to detailed planning (MDMP). The sum of knowledge in how to make the transition from conceptual to detailed planning resides in three words — it all depends. One option is to orient the staff on filling known gaps in knowledge from conceptual planning. Another option is to revisit problem framing with more in-depth analysis on critical planning factors and the problem set or sequence of actions to achieve the end state. A third option is to begin developing courses of action. The underlying principle is to focus on activities that point to developing a response to the “right problem” and maintain momentum directed toward the desired end state. This article provides a historical background of Army planning, describes design from a doctrine perspective, and offers an example of how design works in regard to a complex problem of revising Army planning doctrine. Given the nature of operations conducted “among the people” to be ill-structured and complex, design is a tool to aid critical reasoning in developing creative approaches to problems that defy intuitive responses. Design is a complementary process to enhance detailed planning under the MDMP, which is a planning method that helps the commander develop a complete response to ‘a problem.’ Through framing the environment, the problem, and operational approach, design is a tool that helps ensure commanders have the right resources to address ‘the right problem.’ Through reframing, design is a tool that helps commanders avoid declaring a problem solved when it still exists or continue working against a problem that has been resolved. The final point to remember is that developing the competencies to apply design principles is a matter of practice, practice, and more practice. There is no time like the present — design starts now. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, TBR March 2010. 2HQDA, FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure, GPO, Washington, DC, July 1950, pp. 59, 67. 3HQDA, FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure, GPO, Washington, DC, June 1968, p. 6-1. 4HQDA, FM 100-5, Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, May 1986, pp. 179-182. 5HQDA, FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, May 1997, pp. 1-3, 5-1, and 5-5, representative not exhaustive. While there is a short discussion of the commander’s estimate in Appendix C, the emphasis in planning was more in the commander’s visualization. 6HQDA, FM 5-0 (2005), Army Planning and Orders Production, GPO, Washington, DC, January 2005, p. 1-9. 7FM 5-0 (2005), p. 2-7; and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, version 1.0, Fort Monroe, VA, January 2008, p. 8. 8FM 5-0 (2005), p. 2-5. 9Richard M. Swain, “Commander’s Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 2d Quarter, 2009, p. 62. 10Jennifer Xu, G. Alan Wong, Jiexun Li, and Michael Chau, “Complex Problem Solving: Identity Matching Based on Social Contextual Information,” Journal of the Association for Information Systems, Volume 8, Issue 10, 2007, p. 525. 11Swain, p. 67. 12Roger J. Volkema, “Problem Formulation in Planning and Design,” Management Science, Volume 29, Number 6, June 1983, p. 640. 13Ronald Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization and the World, Harvard Business Press, Boston, MA, pp. 47, 49. 14HQDA, FM 3-0, Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, February 2008, p. 5-4. 15Ibid., p. 5-5. 16Definition based on a Joint Forces Command (JFC) Component Commander’s Meeting Presentation, 28 July 2009. 17FM 3-0 (2008), p. 5-5. 18Ibid. 19Julia Storberg-Walker and Thomas Chermack, “Four Methods for Completing the Conceptual Development Phase of Theory Building Research in HRD,” Human Resource Development Quarterly, Volume 18, Winter 2007, p. 507. Cited in the same article, Karl Weick in, “Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination,” Academy of Management Review, Volume 14, Number 4, 1989, believed that the measure of effectiveness for problem statements is in how well the theorist or planner understands the environment, p. 520. 20FM 3-0, (2008), p. 6-9. 21FM 5-0, (TBR March 2010). 22TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, (2008), p. i. 23FM 3-0, (2008), p. 1-5. 24Swain, p. 62. 25FM 3-0, (2008), defines mission variables as mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), p. 1-9. Mission variables are linked to the visualize battle command component, p. 5-3. 26FM 3-0, (2008), pp. 5-5, 5-8, and 6-7. 27Ibid., p. 5-10. 28Dr. Jack Kem, Design: Tools of the Trade, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2009, p. 50. 29Admiral Michael Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 4th Quarter, 2009, pp. 2-3. 30FM 5-0 (TBR March 2010). Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Thomas Clark is an associate professor and deputy director, LandPower Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a Ph.D. from Texas A&M University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. During his military career, he served in various command and staff positions in the Continental United States and overseas. “The commander’s intent ‘succinctly describes what constitutes success in an operation. It includes the operation’s purpose and the conditions that define the end state.’ The purpose of incorporating design into Army planning is to provide Army leaders with a method to make a logical and orderly examination of all factors affecting the accomplishment of any mission to determine the most suitable course of action.” January-February 2010 11