Rush Hour: 24 Hours of Route Security along MSR Tampa

Iraq’s Highway 1, known as Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa, is a six-lane highway that runs north from Syria and south to Kuwait. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MSR Tampa has been the main logistics pipeline for the entire theater of operations. In April of 2004, Iraqi insurgents, collectively known as anti-Iraqi forces (AIF), conducted a series of coordinated attacks against coalition logistics convoys, resulting in a temporary suspension of all nonessential movement along the route. Since that time, a sizable number of U. S. forces have been dedicated to securing MSR Tampa. During the months from April 2005 to February 2006, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/3 ACR), was responsible for securing a portion of the route that ran from southeast to northwest along the outskirts of southern Baghdad. Staging out of Forward Operating Base Falcon in southern Baghdad, each of the three cavalry troops and one tank company was responsible for securing a 15- kilometer stretch of MSR Tampa in conjunction with conducting offensive and stability/reconstruction operations. Also assisting in route security were various military police (MP) and aviation assets which received their missions directly from division and corps level. By July 2005, each 3/3 ACR troop was required to continually have two tracked vehicles along its assigned portion of the route. On 17 July, 1st Platoon, I Troop, 3/3 ACR, was tasked with the route security mission. Within a 24-hour period, the platoon discovered one improvised explosive device (IED) prior to its detonation; helped secure an adjacent unit that had suffered a catastrophic IED attack, and coordinated close air support (CAS) to destroy insurgents conducting a complex attack against a contract logistics convoy. During this series of disjointed engagements, the AIF continuously had the advantage of choosing the time and place of the battle, and displayed — 47 a heightened level of military skill. However, these advantages were negated by superior U. S. firepower, situational awareness assets, and the ability to rapidly mass combat power, rendering the AIF incapable of accomplishing its mission. The Mission At approximately 1200 hours on 17 July 2005, 3 weeks after our unit arrived in Iraq, two of our M3A2 Bradley sections departed FOB Falcon to relieve one of our other sections, which was patrolling MSR Tampa (led by our senior scout, Red 2). These patrols were never routine; we would typically face a gamut of civilian traffic, and occasionally be engaged with small-arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the ubiquitous IED. Invariably, we would normally encounter at least one form of contact; however, on this particular day, we would encounter all three. By this stage of the war, the AIF clearly realized the value of MSR Tampa to U. S. forces. Improved to western standards during the 1980s, the portion of MSR Tampa on the outskirts of Baghdad had all the features of a California interstate, to include a divided highway, complex interchanges, and American-style signs posted in Arabic and English. Logistics convoys, mostly civilian contract tractor trailers, were slow and vulnerable targets. If this vital artery was severed, U. S. operations throughout Iraq would quickly be halted. Securing the entire MSR consumed vast amounts of combat power, but there was simply no alternative. For the duration, every kilometer of MSR Tampa would be contested. By July 2005, civilian traffic on MSR Tampa was limited to travel during daylight hours. Debris and brush were constantly being removed and the roads were cleared of vendors and bystanders. Conversely, military logistics convoys would travel almost exclusively at night. However, patrols were continuous throughout the day in an effort to prevent AIF from emplacing IEDs and preparing ambushes to attack convoys later in the day. These patrols routinely operated for 12 hours and patrolled to identify IEDs, conducted random vehicle searches, and established overt short-duration observation posts (OPs) to overwatch the route (often on overpasses). Earlier on the morning of 17 July, Red 2 identified an IED, which was successfully rendered safe by explosive ordnance personnel. At approximately 1200 hours, I (Red 1) relieved Red 2 and began patrolling the route with my wingman. At 1550 hours, approximately 4 kilometers to the south of our sector, an IED destroyed a HMMWV (M1114) that belonged to 1st Battalion, 108th (1-108) Armor, 48th Brigade Combat Team. Although the unit did not need direct assistance, we temporarily closed the MSR to prevent the enemy from driving by and video recording the attack site for use in propaganda videos (a common enemy tactic in our area of operations). After the medical evacuation was complete, we continued our patrols and established an OP as darkness fell. At 2200 hours, approximately 2 kilometers to the west of our position, the enemy launched a complex ambush against a 50-vehicle contract convoy with an IED attack on the lead vehicle. This effectively brought the convoy to a stop, at which time it was engaged with small-arms fire and what was later confirmed as RPG attacks. The escort vehicles began suppressing an enemy they could not effectively engage, as the enemy emplaced their positions behind a canal, which ran parallel to the MSR. Our section began to move toward the ambush site, along with an MP platoon located in the vicinity, which caused the enemy to slow its rate of fire. Due to the terrain, we could not maneuver toward the enemy, so I requested rotary wing close-air support (CAS), which continuously remained on alert over Baghdad. Within minutes, two Apaches (AH-64s) arrived overhead, which the enemy uncharacteristically began to engage. The contract convoy took this opportunity to rapidly move out of the engagement area. One aircraft sustained minor damage, but destroyed the pickup truck in which the AIF were attempting to escape. This attack marked the beginning of far more concerted efforts by the AIF to disrupt U. S. operations along MSR Tampa. The enemy displayed a surprising level of proficiency in terms of small-arms fire accuracy and selection of terrain, and displayed knowledge of military tactics far superior to that which we had previously encountered. Over the next 8 months, the amount of combat power we devoted to secure the route continually increased. Lessons Learned During our mission, we quickly realized that air assets (push CAS) were an invaluable asset. While the squadron had a standardized detailed air-ground integration (AGI) checklist, it proved to be difficult to execute while in contact. Instead, we used a simple task, purpose, and orientation to the battlefield that explained the composition and disposition of friendly and enemy forces, which proved sufficient. Much of this coordination was unofficially done in advance; the air assets habitually operating in our area of operations had our frequency and call-signs and vice versa, which often circumvented the lengthy and cumbersome process of passing requests through multiple echelons of command. Every vehicle in the platoon carried an AN/PEQ-2A in its turret, which was an “By July 2005, civilian traffic on MSR Tampa was limited to travel during daylight hours. Debris and brush were constantly being removed and the roads were cleared of vendors and bystanders. Conversely, military logistics convoys would travel almost exclusively at night. However, patrols were continuous throughout the day in an effort to prevent AIF from emplacing IEDs and preparing ambushes to attack convoys later in the day.” 48 — invaluable tool that served as an aiming light for air assets, as well as land forces. In addition, Blue Force Tracker (BFT) was used to help verify that friendly forces moving to the area were not within the aircraft’s engagement area. Although the convoy was transiting through our battlespace, we were unable to coordinate with it because we did not have their frequency and call signs. As a result, the only alternative was face-to-face communication, which was not practical. Later convoys with BFT capability were “free-texted” our contact information as they approached our area of operations. Frequency modulation (FM) coordination helps reduce fratricide by alerting transiting convoys where OPs are established and affords them the opportunity to receive details on recent significant enemy activities. Mission Analysis The complex attack along MSR Tampa was well planned and would have been more devastating if multi-national forces had not reacted so quickly with overwhelming combat power. The attack occurred in the same vicinity as the IED attack on 1-108 Armor, which indicated a large portion of the local populace supported the AIF. The source of the two initial explosions was unknown, and since there was no indication of an IED, it is possible the initial attacks were carried out with RPGs. The small-arms fire did not start until after the convoy had slowed down or stopped, so it is likely that the initial attack was intentionally directed at the front of the convoy to facilitate a linear ambush. Also, since the tracers were moving at different speeds, it is possible that at least two different weapons systems were used (AK-47s and light/medium machine guns). The AIF used the terrain to its advantage; the canal that runs parallel to MSR Tampa prevented ground forces from maneuvering onto the enemy. The terrain also provided ample vegetation to the south to conceal enemy forces. The AIF firing at the air element was highly unusual and indicates they were extremely audacious or were concerned their withdrawal was compromised. How ever, the AIF were astute enough to know not to shoot until the trail aircraft had passed; unfortunately, the night’s high level of illumination silhouetted the aircraft and facilitated the AIF attacks. Captain Amos Y. Oh is currently a student at the Advanced Regional Analysis Course, U. S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Maneuver Captains Career Course, Armor Officers Basic Course, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, scout platoon leader, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Baghdad; assistant observer controller, 4th Brigade, 78th Division (TS), Fort Bragg; and tank platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 252d Armor, North Carolina Army National Guard, Diyala Province, Iraq. “Our section began to move toward the ambush site, along with an MP platoon located in the vicinity, which caused the enemy to slow its rate of fire. Due to the terrain, we could not maneuver toward the enemy, so I requested rotary wing close-air support (CAS), which continuously remained on alert over Baghdad. Within minutes, two Apaches (AH-64s) arrived overhead, which the enemy uncharacteristically began to engage.”

Cultural Awareness from Page 35 for level 1 languages such as Spanish and French) when their skills are needed elsewhere. We may see this transformation when current mid-level officers begin reaching levels of brigade and division command within the next 10 to 15 years. Solving the void of cultural awareness and understanding in our formations is not simple. As mentioned before, it starts at the top; priorities must be placed on training our soldiers, at all levels, in understanding various cultures. A basic understanding of culture must begin with language and may lead to interaction during training with foreign nationals or, optimally, a cultural immersion in the target language country. Recently, commanders began sending junior-level soldiers to study language at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), Presidio of Monterey, California, in preparation for future deployments. These soldiers are primarily assigned to combat formations and are infantrymen, tankers, scouts, and artillerymen. This is quite a shift from sending only linguists or cryp-tographers for language study. Language study at DLI not only teaches languages, but immerses a student in the culture through various means. It is difficult to release a group of soldiers from your ranks during deployment training; however, these soldiers will be a tremendous asset to the unit and during deployment. We attempt, as much as possible, to not hinder other schooling opportunities, such as Sniper School, Air Assault School, Ranger School, Warrior Leaders Course, and noncommissioned officers courses. The same effort should be applied to cultural awareness/understanding schooling opportunities. As a caveat, DLI does a wonderful job of implementing cultural studies into language training. The school is well aware that language study alone does not constitute cultural awareness. The U. S. Army, as a whole, needs worldwide cultural awareness and understanding because it is not just in the business of killing a faceless enemy. Our ignorance of other cultures and the impact of misperceptions of what we perceive as “normal” actions will undermine our mission success and waste resources through failures. The tip of the spear is the soldier who interacts with local nationals while conducting daily operations. That soldier’s actions will likely have a tremendous impact on the unit’s overall success, just based on what he or she does or says. Based on recent DoD directives and studies (2005 to present), it takes time and resources to implement programs, which explains why cultural awareness/understanding and language proficiency is stressed at the Army level, but is not yet a priority at the junior level. More importantly, it takes effort to prioritize this type of training; there are those who think it is a waste of time and just one more thing added to an already-overfilled plate. This thinking will take time to transform. The reality is we can no longer afford to focus only on warfighting skills and killing the enemy; we are tasked to do more. We took on peacekeeping missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo and there were arguments about the military’s role during these operations. Judging by our current doctrine, we accepted that role and will continue to accept it into the foreseeable future. Consequently, we should accept our global role and teach our soldiers to be diplomatic, proficient in foreign language(s), and culturally aware. The battlefield is evolving and the armor branch has an obligation to prepare its warriors for that evolution — we will continue the spearhead tradition by leading the charge in this new task. Notes 1Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5160.41, Subject: Defense Language Program, U. S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 21 October 2005, paras 4.1 and 4.1.3, pp. 2-3. 2Ullrich Fichtner, “The U. S. Army Learns Mistakes in Iraq, Spiegel Online, 18 December 2006, URL: http:/www.spiegel. de/international/Spiegel/0,1518,455165,00.html. 3Tom Regan, “Pentagon Studies Examine ‘Mistakes’ in Iraq, Afghanistan, The Christian Science Monitor, 16 August 2006, URL: http://csmonitor.com/2006/0816/dailyUpdate.html. 4Department of Defense, Defense Language Roadmap, U. S. Department of Defense, January 2005, p. 3. 5“In Foreign Language Proficiency, Generals Should Lead by Example,” Digital Journal, Open Source Media, 11 May 2007, URL: www.digitaljournal.com/article/180520/In_Foreign_ Language_Proficiency_Generals_Should_Leade_By_Example. 6Ibid. 7Ibid. Major Klaudius K. Robinson is currently a student, 229th Military Intelligence Battalion, Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey. He received a B. A. from Florida Southern College, Lakeland. His military education includes Airborne School, Air Assault School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and Tank Commander’s Certification Course (M1A2SEP). He has held various command and staff positions, to include S3 (Air), Task Force 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Baqubah, Iraq; S1, 1st Battalion (ABN), 509th Infantry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA; and airborne armored scout platoon leader and XO, D Troop, 1st Battalion (ABN), 509th Infantry, Opposing Force, Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk. “Contrary to popular belief, and from an isolationist viewpoint, Americans are not held in high regard in some cultures — most of these cultures do not like us because we are Americans. This view of Americans by other cultures and our own prejudices can be mended and abridge of understanding built by interaction and cooperation. We, as an armor force, were truly unprepared for the culture shock faced in Iraq.” 50 —

Slaughter Over Sicily by Charles Whiting, Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., South Yorkshire, England, 2006, 179 pp., $14.74 (paperback) The well-entrenched mystique, in our current Army notwithstanding, concerning the efficacy of large-scale airborne operations is still a subject of debate in some circles. The largest and most well-known airborne operations in military history were executed more than 60 years ago with mixed, perhaps even disastrous, results. Assaults on Crete, Sicily, Normandy, and Arnhem were victories bought at high and questionable prices. British author Charles Whiting tells one of these stories in the 2006 reprint of his 1992 book, Slaughter over Sicily. No comparable airborne operations have been successfully executed since World War II. Dropping airborne divisions into the middle of hostile formations of significant size and ability will always be a controversial tactic. Yet, armies worldwide continue to devote assets and expend resources maintaining large airborne formations. The allied invasion of Sicily had a significant airborne component that was rife with problems from the beginning. Intelligence, training, equipment, planning, and coordination shortfalls and failures caused hundreds of deaths among the airborne troopers and flight crews from accidents and friendly fire before they reached the invasion beaches. The result was a fiasco that placed the entire operation at risk. Post-operation investigations and analysis resulted in finger pointing between the Army, Navy, and Air Services, and between the British and Americans. The exact cause of the debacle has yet to be agreed on to this day. In the aftermath, General Eisenhower cancelled all future British and American airborne operations and privately wrote, “I do not believe in the airborne division.” Although he would later lift this ban for the invasion of Normandy, the future of airborne operations was in doubt and has been under scrutiny ever since. Slaughter over Sicily is a well-written, but loosely constructed, narrative of these events. Rather than a solid history, the style applied reduces this book to an entertaining, but hardly elucidative, series of anecdotes, in many of which the author frequently strays from his topic causing the reader to wonder where he is going with a particular line of examination. For example, the chapter on military intelligence attempting to glean information about Sicily through contacts with New York mafia families is interesting, but seems out of place in a book on airborne operations. The occasional notes only serve to further the anecdotal information. The index is incomplete and the source list is nothing more than a small, but decent, reading list. Not one primary document, other than a few memoirs, is referenced. The bottom line is, Slaughter over Sicily is a good read for one with a casual interest in World War II, but is hardly the final word on the subject. It does not answer the question of what went wrong in Sicily or examine the larger questions of airborne operations. Serious students of World War II or airborne operations would probably be disappointed by this book and should seek more significant studies on the subject.

CSM, U. S. Army George C. Marshall: Rubrics of Leadership by Stewart W. Husted, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006, 300 pp., with B/W photos, notes, bibliography, and index, $23.95 (hardcover) George C. Marshall is perhaps the least known of America’s great military leaders of World War II. Wartime Army chief of staff, postwar secretary of state (where he advocated America’s rebuilding of war-torn Europe in what is known as the “Marshall Plan”), and later secretary of defense during the Korean War, General Marshall has been frequently and favorably compared to George Washington. Professor Stewart Husted’s George C. Marshall: Rubrics of Leadership, presents Marshall as a “case study in how leaders are developed (made) after years of experiences that shape their character, develop their values, and challenge their decisionmaking and problemsolving skills.” The Random House College Dictionary defines “rubric” as “any rule of conduct or procedure.” Washington’sown character, according to some biographers, was shaped during his formative years by the repetitive copying of such rules of conduct or “civility.” Husted has attempted to distill lessons from Marshall’s life into his own “rules” of character and leadership and, while he does not advocate that readers copy the rubrics he’s drawn from Marshall’s example (good thing because there are over 180 of them!), Husted does suggest that they are “tools…to build or ‘reconstruct’ a career based on a Marshall servant-leader model.” Husted has arranged his material in convenient and easily digested topical chapters, such as “Building and Maintaining Morale,” “Communications,” and “Conflict Resolution and Negotiation,” and he makes a good case for their applicability to military and civilian leaders alike; although, the utility of his last chapter on civil-military relations may be limited to those leaders who work in that environment. This book is not history; it is a leadership text and Husted does not claim it to be anything else. The examples drawn from Marshall’s life are used to illustrate the various rubrics outlined by the author, which does lead to some issues. For example, the reader might wonder about General Marshall’s example of selfless service as touted by the author in Chapter X: “A Life of Selfless Service,” when a few pages earlier, Marshall is portrayed using his connections with his mentor, General Pershing, to wrangle Pershing’s support in securing Marshall’s promotion to brigadier general. Husted also suggests that Marshall is an example of correct civil-military relations, yet cites an event during his tenure as Army chief of staff where, not having been consulted in a matter involving the Army Air Corps, he files a directive, signed by Secretary of War Stimson, in his desk drawer rather than publish it. In these, and some other cases, the author’s rubrics work at cross purposes and the supporting examples drawn from Marshall’s life seem contradictory because the vignettes are taken out of their historical context. The book is also marred slightly in places by spotty editing. Professor Husted could have used the help of an editor to double-check facts, spelling of names and other minor details. Examples include Marshall receiving two awards of the Distinguished Service Medal, not the Distinguished Service Cross, which is given for valor in combat, and John Foster Dulles never served as secretary of the Navy, although he was President Eisenhower’s secretary of state. For the general readership, these details are minor and will most likely go unnoticed, but those who are well-read in history may find such lapses annoying. For the Army officer wishing to examine the life of a great American soldier-leader, a more complete telling of General Marshall’s story, like that found in Mark Stoler’s fine one-volume biography, will perhaps be more satisfying. But for those who are looking for general leadership lessons, which are easily read and understood, Professor Husted has succeeded in drawing them from someone deserving of study and an exemplar of great leadership and character, and has made them accessible to everyone.

LTC, U. S. Army, Retired Colt Terry, Green Beret, Charles D. Patton, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX, 2005, 227 pp., $18.95 (hardcover) As members of the U. S. Army’s elite Special Forces continue to pursue jihadists in Iraq and the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda outlaws in Afghanistan, one is reminded of a not too distant war where Special Forces carried the war to another foe. This war, of course, was Vietnam, and it proved to be the incubator of today’s Special Forces operations. Leading this first transformation in land warfare was Lieutenant Colonel Curtis “Colt” Terry, one of the original U. S. Army Green Berets. Author Charles D. Patton’s book, Colt Terry, Green Beret, is a masterful account of this legendary soldier, who overcame personal adversity to rise to become one of the Army’s premier Special Forces’ soldiers during the Korean and Vietnam wars. Indeed, as the author concedes, this is a story “of an ordinary man who performed extraordinary deeds” in two wars and in many training exercises, and in time, became a pioneer in the techniques and practices of special operations used today by Special Operations Force soldiers on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the burn ing plains and deserts of Africa, and in the jungles of South America and Asia. Born and raised in Florida, Colt Terry entered the U. S. Army in 1946 after a troubled childhood and adolescence. After basic training at Fort Hood, Texas, Private Terry attended the Army Air Force Radar School, located in Boca Raton, Florida, and received training as both a — 51 radar operator and repair technician. Colt later volunteered for and completed airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, where after graduation the Army assigned him to the 82d Airborne Division as a signal technician. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950, Corporal Terry volunteered for duty with the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and reported to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where he prepared for combat duty in Korea. After training in California, Terry and the rest of his platoon left for Korea. Assigned to “George” Company with the MOS of radio repairman/rifle squad leader, Sergeant Terry entered combat near Taegu as leader of the 3d Squad. Here, Sergeant Terry had his first taste of combat during the bitter, hard-fought advance past the 38th Parallel. After surviving the harsh winter attacks of November-December 1950, Sergeant Terry and the remainder of the 187th Regiment conducted their first airborne operation near Munson-ni, North Korea, in March 1951, to drive both the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) and Chinese Communist forces (CCF) away from the South Korean capital of Seoul. Here, Colt and the members of George Company fought off a series of nighttime counterattacks of Chinese and North Korean soldiers, who attempted to drive the Americans off a hill near the drop zone. After a night of bitter fighting (24-25 March 1951), the paratroopers fell in behind an American tank unit sent to break the siege, and acting as assault troops, the paratroopers “double timed” alongside the tanks as they drove off the enemy. It was during these early engagements in Korea that Colt Terry began to earn the respect of his superiors and his subordinates as a competent noncommissioned officer. After the airdrop at Munson-ni, Sergeant Terry and the rest of George Company became involved in Operation Ripper (20 February–6 March 1951), General Matthew B. Ridgway’s counteroffensive that eventually drove the CCF and NKPA away from Seoul and back across the 38th Parallel. Colt volunteered for a special unit that was being formed by a then relatively unknown U. S. Army lieutenant colonel, William C. West moreland, to conduct special operations behind North Korean lines. After maneuvering his name to the list of qualified candidates, Terry, now a master sergeant, was shortly thereafter off to train with a unit known only by its numeric designation — Miscellaneous Group 8086th Army Unit. Thus began Colt Terry’s experience with the Army’s Special Forces — little did he realize then that the formation of Miscellaneous Group 8086 was the birth of today’s Special Forces. After being extensively trained by both U. S. Army and CIA instructors, Colt Terry and his fellow soldiers were soon sent into action behind North Korean and CCF lines, to gather intelligence and conduct sabotage operations against enemy facilities and their logistics infrastructure. Terry, placed on Nan-do Island, carried out clandestine operations, along with several other operatives until being slightly wounded. After a quick recuperation, Colt rejoined his special operations group on Nan-do Island until the Army evacuated him in July 1952. Commissioned a second lieutenant, Colt volunteered for anew group called “Special Forces” being formed. Assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) under Colonel Aaron Bank, Lieutenant Terry had just volunteered for what became one of the world’s “most elite military forces.” Here, the author, relying on interviews with Terry and other members of the original Special Forces group, provides excellent details on the diverse training Lieutenant Colt and his fellow “Green Berets” received as the new unit stood up. Indeed, as Patton writes, the Army underwent a significant “transformation” as it trained this new elite body inside the Army. Fortunately for the reader, Patton, unlike other authors whose books on the Special Forces deal primarily with the Vietnam War, instead concentrates on the men who made up the first Special Force units — hard men, tempered by war and in possession of a desire to make the Special Forces succeed. Indeed, Patton’s book concentrates on what this reviewer terms the ‘lost years’ of the Army’s Special Forces during the 1950s. Indeed, it is here that Colt Terry, Green Beret, surpasses other studies, in that the author demonstrates that contrary to the popular mythology of the 1950s, the Army, in fact, underwent a significant “transformation” not unlike the one presently occurring amidst the backdrop of the current Global War on Terror (GWOT). While Army forces in both the United States and Europe experimented with the so-called “Pentomic” army, built around the premise that the service would operate on a nuclear battlefield during the 1950s, thoughtful leaders in the U. S. Army saw the Special Forces as a more effective means of battling the Soviet Union and communist China in their own backyards. It is here that one notable omission by Patton appears — his failure to point out that the U. S. Army was well positioned to deal with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s call for “Wars of National Liberation” against the West in the Third World. Despite this omission, however, Patton proves a wealth of information on the different types of training Colt underwent as a member of the Army’s Special Forces during the 1950s and early 1960s prior to his deployment to Okinawa and Southeast Asia in 1961. One strong point of the book is the author’s attention to detail, particularly in his description of the organization and composition of the Special Forces and the different teams (A, B, and C) that comprised the 10th Special Forces Group. These teams, each charged with a specific mission, suited Colt’s talents naturally, for he had served in a variety of units and, as Patton writes, received countless hours of specialized training. This training, Patton writes, was what made Colt Terry different from any other soldier; as a Special Forces officer, the first and foremost requirement was that a leader “had to be a good soldier. Sent to Okinawa, Japan, and then on to Vietnam, where Colt and his C-Team worked among the Montagnards prior to the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in late October 1963, the Special Forces captain became acquainted early on with the complexities of waging war in South Vietnam. In nearly three tours of duty in Vietnam, Colt Terry fought not only the Viet Cong, but also the hard-core North Vietnamese Ar my (NVA), as well as in the conflicts that arose among the Montagnards and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). In fact, on several occasions, this in-fighting among the Montagnards and ARVN nearly cost Terry and his team their lives, as the South Vietnamese government resented the military assistance being funneled to the Montagnards by the Special Forces and CIA teams. As Patton points out, due to Sai-gon’s oftentimes heavy-handed approach toward the Montagnards, Terry, on more than one occasion, had to use his connections in Saigon and personal diplomacy to keep the Montagnards fighting against the NVA and VC. It is at this juncture that Patton’s book has much relevancy to our ongoing war against al Qaeda and jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Terry [and his superiors in Saigon] understood it, coun terinsurgencies are oftentimes won at the village level and not at the national level. Patton establishes that the U. S. Army did, in fact, have it right in Vietnam, as the war, demonstrated by the battle at Plei Me, was a mixture of counterinsurgency operations, special operations, and conventional battles. Yet the war was not totally asymmetrical, as Patton acknowledges, for it oftentimes required combined arms to defeat the enemy as Colt Terry himself experienced during the battle for Plei Me (19 October-4 November 1966). In fact, it was during the battle at Plei Me that the soldiers on Colt Terry’s C-Team and their Montagnard allies required assistance from ARVN units to break an enemy siege of their Special Forces camp. Here, an ARVN armored column spear headed by M113 carriers, M41 tanks, and Huey gunships “punched” through an encircled Special Forces camp located there and, as the U. S. Army’s official history of the battle at Plei Me states, “after two hours of battering… [by the ARVN relief column) … the attacking force [NVA] withdrew.” This is a timely book as the Army continues to transform the training of soldiers and officers, while simultaneously fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The one serious shortcoming (in an otherwise excellent book) is the lack of maps that would have made it easier for the reader to have an idea where Colt Terry and his Special Forces group operated in Korea and Vietnam. Nonetheless, this is a book that all soldiers, enlisted and officer alike, should read and have in their professional libraries, as it provides valuable insights into how to fight and win in the contemporary operating environment. With this in mind, company-grade officers and sergeants deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan should read Patton’s book, as it is a masterpiece on how to conduct small-unit operations. Indeed, as Patton indicates, Vietnam is a war from which the U. S. Army can learn much about transformation. The Vietnam War served as the incubator for today’s victories in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the GWOT. Indeed, in reading Colt Terry, Green Beret, one will come away with the impression that the war in Vietnam was, after all a “win,” and that by all accounts, was a war that changed the U. S. Army, the Nation, and a soldier — Colt Terry, for the better. LEO J. DAUGHTERY III, Ph. D. Command Historian U. S. Army Accessions Command 52 —