Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba — Master of the Light Horse

Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba (1453-

1515) is not exactly a household name among U. S. Army officers, which is unfortunate because he was the greatest commander of his age; an age much like our own, in which societal and technological advances inspired profound changes in warfare.2 Perhaps military history enthusiasts remember Gonzalo (or Gon-salvo, as he is referred to in Italian references) as the first commander who successfully employed infantry firearms to defeat heavy cavalry at Cerignola (1503).3 However, few recognize he was a master in employing light cavalry in both a tactical and an operational role. Examination of Gonzalo de Córdoba’s use of light cavalry forces as part of a combined arms team reveals that, when used properly, light cavalry forces are agile, versatile, and represent a tremendous force multiplier for any army — they are truly a commander’s “ace in the hole.” In an age when many are seduced by the dream of technological solutions to operational problems, it is well to remember that the fundamentals of warfare remain constant because, to paraphrase Clausewitz, war is a contest of wills.4 Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba’s Italian campaign of 1495-1498 offers military professionals the opportunity to get reacquainted with the basic realities of warfare, especially the uses of light cavalry, by examining the actions of a master practitioner of tactics and operational art. Combatant Commander In 1495, Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba y Aguilar was summoned to appear before the king and queen of Spain, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, to accept a highly prestigious, but difficult, commission.5 A hero of the war against the Moors of Granada (1481-1492), in which he distinguished himself in combat and served as special envoy of the monarchs to negotiate the surrender of Granada, Gonzalo was personally selected by the queen for his first independent command. He was to assume command of an expeditionary force and set sail for the Kingdom of Sicily, a Spanish possession, with the overt purpose of defending it against a possible attack by the Turks. In reality, he was to defend Spanish interests in Italy and the Western Mediterranean by limiting French adventurism in the region.6 In modern terms, Gonzalo Hernández would act as a “combatant commander,” and would be expected to “shape the security environment,” and execute national policy within his assigned area of responsibility. In the fall of 1494, the young French king, Charles VIII, decided to launch a military expedition to press his claim on the Kingdom of Naples.7 His idea was to claim the throne of Naples, based on a weak dynastic claim, and then embark on a crusade to recover Jerusalem for Christendom. To many of his contemporaries, this idea seemed far-fetched, but Charles was imbued with the ethos of chivalry and a desire for glory. He intended to revitalize the crusading tradition of his ancestors. It was not difficult for the king to convince the warlike French nobility, bored with the pursuits of peacetime, to accompany him in this adventure. But even though the king of France operated under the traditional medieval ethos of knightly combat, the army he recruited was thoroughly modern. His heavy cavalry, made up of superb knights and their mounted and heavily armored retainers, was the best in Europe. He enrolled numerous companies of Swiss pikemen who had clearly demonstrated their superiority on many battlefields.8 But the decisive force was the French train of artillery. Charles spared no expense to provide himself with the most modern and mobile artillery yet assembled. This would “The Spanish light horse came upon them, and routed them, so that in fleeing toward the city, a great number of them were slaughtered.” — Crónicas del Gran Capitán1 “In 1495, Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba y Aguilar was summoned to appear before the king and queen of Spain, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, to accept a highly prestigious, but difficult, commission. A hero of the war against the Moors of Granada (1481-1492), in which he distinguished himself in combat and served as special envoy of the monarchs to negotiate the surrender of Granada, Gonzalo was personally selected by the queen for his first independent command.” — 37 Below, King Ferdinand of Spain. Right, Queen Isabella of Spain.

ensure that no walled town or castle in Italy could stop or delay the French advance.9 The mercenary levies and city militias of the Italian principalities melted away before the French juggernaut. Milan, Florence, and Rome opened their doors in submission to Charles. The French king succeeded in rapidly overrunning any enemy defenses and entered the city of Naples in February 1495. But Charles soon tired of the pleasures of the city and returned to France with the bulk of his army, leaving the remainder of his forces to garrison his newly won realm under the command of experienced Scottish commander Bernard Stewart (French Bérault Stuart), the 3rd Lord of Aubigny. Lacking support from his subjects, Alfonso, the king of Naples, fled to Sicily and abdicated in favor of his son, Federico. The new king showed a stronger mettle than his father and began to assemble an army. King Federico sought the aid of the Spanish Gonzalo Hernández, who was in Sicily, because he was closely related to the Spanish king.10 Gonzalo agreed to help since this was in keeping with abroad interpretation of his mission, supporting the interests of Spain in Italy against French expansionism. The Italian Campaign of 1495-1497: Opening Moves Gonzalo acted quickly; he assembled his forces, crossed the Strait of Messina, and laid siege to the city of Reggio at the toe of the Italian boot, which was occupied by French forces. He took the city by assault, using a ruse he had learned in the wars against the Moors. He bombarded the city’s walls with artillery, leading the enemy to believe he was preparing an assault from that side, while a smaller group of escaladores (soldiers trained in scaling fortified walls) quickly infiltrated from the opposite side and overwhelmed the garrison. After taking Reggio, Gonzalo established a base of operations and took stock of his forces. He counted around 5,000 infantrymen and 600 cavalry. The infantry were a mix of men equipped with crossbows and arquebuses, a matchlock firearm that preceded the musket, and close combat specialists armed with sharp Toledo swords, helmet, plate armor, chain mail and a steel shield (buckler). The mounted men included a few heavily armored knights on large warhorses, but the majority were outfitted as jinetes — the traditional light cavalry of Spain. The Spanish jinetes evolved from the experience of centuries of warfare against the Moors.11 During the 8th century, the Moors had overrun most of Spain and had just recently been expelled from their last redoubt — the Kingdom of Granada.12 Warfare along the long frontier between Christian and Moorish Spain consisted mostly of guerrillas conducting raids and counter-raids to capture prisoners and booty, carry out quick incursions, and the occasional taking of castles and towns.13 In the broken country of the high Andalusian sierras, large set-piece battles were avoided by both sides. Ambushes, ruses, feints, and rapid maneuver were the preferred tactical methods. Light cavalry was used to reconnoiter the enemy, raid baggage trains, harass supply lines, take prisoners, and provide security for larger forces. The jinetes had in fact adopted the tactical methods and many of their armaments from the Moors. They were mounted on light, but hardy, horses — a mix of the spirited Arabian and the hardy North African breeds. They were armed with one or more javelins made from cane or light wood with sharp steel points used for skirmishing on horseback, and long and flexible swords suitable for mounted combat. They carried alight kidney-shaped shield — the Moorish adarga — and were protected by open steel helmets that did not impede their vision. Most wore steel breastplates or brigandines to protect their torsos and some also wore shirts of mail and a few pieces of plate armor. But in general, the jinetes traded the full-armored protection of the manat-arms, or knight, for agility and freedom of action. The Spanish also had men who fought in the tradition of European nobility — equipped in suits of plate armor and charging with the lance on large, equally well-armored warhorses. Although knightly combat was practiced in Spain, many Spanish nobles, even kings, would on occasion adopt the style and dress of the humble jinete when operating in difficult terrain or in the heat of the Mediterranean summer. Thus, the Spanish cavalryman could fight as a knight lanza en ristre (with the lance resting on a special hook on his breastplate), or a la jineta (in the style of the light cavalry jinete).14 These then, were the troops available to Gonzalo; they were few in number, but “In the fall of 1494, the young French king, Charles VIII, decided to launch a military expedition to press his claim on the Kingdom of Naples. His idea was to claim the throne of Naples, based on a weak dynastic claim, and then embark on a crusade to recover Jerusalem for Christendom. To many of his contemporaries, this idea seemed far-fetched, but Charles was imbued with the ethos of chivalry and a desire for glory.” “…Gonzalo established a base of operations and took stock of his forces… The mounted men included a few heavily armored knights on large warhorses, but the majority were outfitted as jinetes — the traditional light cavalry of Spain.” 38 — each of them was a proven soldier — a veteran of the war against the Moors of Granada accustomed to privations and tough field conditions. He also recruited volunteers from Sicily and Southern Italy. With this force, Gonzalo would face the combined armies of the French and the many Neapolitan nobles who supported their cause — a force three to four times his army’s number. The French also had many companies of Swiss infantry, which had not yet been defeated in open battle. With these forces, Gonzalo set out from Reggio, capturing other small towns, harassing small French detachments, and avoiding decisive engagement. King Federico of Naples joined forces with him as they began to drive north toward the city of Naples. But the French commander was not idle — Bérault Stuart, Lord Aubigny, was an old and experienced soldier. He began concentrating his troops, which were dispersed throughout Southern Italy so he could form afield army capable of defeating the combined Spanish-Neapolitan force. Gonzalo knew about the French move ments because his light cavalry jinetes were riding far and wide ahead and to the flanks of the main body, gathering intelligence, gaining the support of small towns and castles, and foraging for food. His jinetes rode into the town of Seminara and convinced the townspeople to return to their king’s alliance and expel the small French garrison. Shortly thereafter, Gonzalo entered the town in the company of King Federico. Soon, the scouts brought intelligence that the French main body was marching on Seminara. After a careful estimate of the situation, Gonzalo advised that it would be better to withstand a siege than risk open battle. King Federico thought it dishonorable to adopt a defensive posture, perhaps remembering his own father’s disgraceful flight before the enemy, and decided to seek out the enemy in battle.15 Many of the hot-headed Spanish captains agreed. Bowing to the inevitable, Gonzalo prepared for battle. The battle of Seminara ended quickly. The combined Spanish and Neapolitan forces were quickly overcome by the French heavy cavalry and the Swiss infantry. The Neapolitan infantry, in particular, became confused and fled when they saw what appeared to be the flight of the Spanish jinetes, unaware that it was standard practice for them to charge and break contact before reforming and charging again from a different direction. Even King Federico narrowly escaped death or capture when his horse buckled and fell. Complete disaster was avoided only by the heroic action of Gonzalo Hernán- dez and his jinetes who fought a tenacious delaying action, which allowed the bulk of the defeated army to escape. After this fiasco, the Spanish forces returned to their base near Reggio while the Neapolitan king went back to Sicily. There, he received news that the French were guarding Naples with only a very small garrison and that the population had turned against them. He decided on a bold course of action and sailed to Naples with his available forces. The Neapolitans received their king enthusiastically and the besieged French were forced to surrender. Gonzalo decided to continue operations to retake Southern Italy since the French field army had again dispersed to hold on to their territorial gains and take control of a restive population. Again, the Spanish jinetes rode far and wide, gathering intelligence and launching limited attacks wherever they found a weakness to exploit. The French could not match this level of operational mobility and were put in a defensive, reactive mode. By operating within a large screen of light cavalry, which served as his eyes and ears, Gonzalo seized and maintained the operational initiative and set the terms of conflict by operating inside his enemy’s decisionmaking cycle. The lack of an effective enemy light cavalry only worsened the French situation. For his part, King Federico marched east from Naples and entered the mountainous province of Basilicata where he found a strong French force near the town of Atella. The French were entrenched inside the strongly fortified town and prepared to stand a siege. The king did not have enough forces to completely cut off supply routes to and from the town nor did he have enough experienced soldiers to attempt an assault. He therefore called on Gonzalo for help. Fighting March and Checkmate When Gonzalo received the request for assistance from King Federico, he considered three options: continue his current successful strategy of methodically taking towns and castles; shadow the main French force under Lord Aubigny, whom he knew was to his north, to harass him and prevent him from relieving Atella; or honor the king’s summons and ride to his assistance. As was his practice, he carefully considered the potential costs and benefits of each option and decided to ride to the king’s assistance. This course of action seemed the most profitable since he would help capture an important French base in another province, defeat a major French force, and assist the allied king in his hour of need. In addi- “The jinetes had in fact adopted the tactical methods and many of their armaments from the Moors. They were mounted on light, but hardy, horses — a mix of the spirited Arabian and the hardy North African breeds. They were armed with one or more javelins made from cane or light wood with sharp steel points used for skirmishing on horseback, and long and flexible swords suitable for mounted combat… But in general, the jinetes traded the full-armored protection of the man-at-arms, or knight, for agility and freedom of action.” — 39 tion to these practical reasons, Gonzalo thought this would also be the most honorable course of action, and the one that would do the most to heighten the prestige of both the Neapolitan king and his own king and queen, as well as bring other recalcitrant cities into the fold. In modern terms, he had a sound appreciation for the second- and third-order effects of an operational decision and its likely political impact. Having made his decision, Gonzalo acted with his customary energy. He quickly marshaled his forces, sending out the jinetes as a covering force far ahead and to the flanks of the main body. He then conducted one of the most remarkable fighting marches ever. His small force crossed the mountain wilderness of the Aspromonte, beginning on the Tyrrhenian coast and ending at Atella in the rugged mountains of south-central Italy. This is, even today, almost impassable terrain crisscrossed by narrow steep paths that are often no more than goat trails among the rocks. Along the way, he fought off ambushes by French sympathizers, captured many important towns, including, once again, Seminara, and routed a large French camp, which included many Neapolitan nobles who had rebelled against their king. Chief among them was Agos-tino da San Severino and members of his family. This action was a night attack in which Gonzalo’s hard-marching force first identified the enemy position without being seen and then informed their commander who rapidly reconnoitered the terrain and launched a coordinated assault from all sides, completely surprising the enemy — a renaissance example of the principles of see first, decide first, and engage on your own terms, achieved without the benefit of modern technology. This was made possible by the intelligence furnished to the commander by his light cavalry scouts. Finally, Gonzalo’s reinforcing force reached the town of Atella. Upon arrival, he deployed his army in order of battle straight from march column. His intent was to impress friend and foe alike, and prepare for any opportunity that may arise. His jinetes continued their unceasing reconnaissance, riding around the perimeter of Atella and studying the lay of the land. The King rode out to greet Gonzalo, accompanied by Cesare Borgia — the Pope’s son and a distinguished captain — and the most senior captains of the Neapolitan army.16 After the usual pleasantries, Gonzalo, rather than allowing his soldiers some well-deserved rest, immediately launched an attack on an outlying French outpost. His jinetes had once again gathered critical intelligence, and noticed that the French position had not been fortified against the type of forces the Spanish had available. The French had occupied a series of watermills near a stream that provided them with water and ground flour. The garrison consisted of French crossbowmen and Swiss infantry. They were not vulnerable to King Federico’s Italian infantry and small force of knights; however, they were not prepared to confront the tactical combinations devised by Gonzalo Hernández. Gonzalo sent his close combat sword and buckler infantry against the mills, followed closely by pikemen. He sent amounted force of jinetes and a few heavy men-at-arms to interpose between the mills and the town to block any attempts by a relief force to relieve the defenders at the mills. The bulk of the jinetes were to ride along the other flank of the mills and cut off any retreating French. The Spanish infantrymen, protected by their shields and armor against French crossbow bolts, closed quickly on the crossbowmen before they could fire more than one or two arrows each. The Swiss did not have the time or space to properly form into their fighting phalanxes and were cut down individually by expert Spanish swordsmen. Those who fled were then run down by the jinetes and no relief could be found in the city. In short, the Spanish victory was complete — a fine example of a tactical opportunity exploited by Auftragstaktik, before the word was coined. The French were deprived of their supply source and demoralized by the tactical superiority of the Spanish. The Neapolitan army received a needed boost in morale and now had the manpower to completely seal off the town of Atella. Indeed, a few days later, Gonzalo led a force that captured the small town of Ri-vacandida, which dominated the only possible route from which the French expected reinforcements. Faced with an untenable situation, the French garrison of Atella surrendered. With the Spanish-Neapolitan victory at Atella, the campaign was essentially over. The French soldiers were allowed to return to their homeland; however, very few were able to do so. The defeated army was plagued by various outbreaks of malaria and other fevers, and was harassed by a vengeful population all the way back to France. Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba was recognized by both friend and foe as “the Great Captain,” a title by which he would always be known. Other honors followed: he was awarded the “Golden Rose” by the Pope; and King Federico rewarded him with various towns and castles, and the titles of Duke of Terranova and Duke of Sant’ Angelo. The “Great Captain” “Armor and cavalry officers will notice that Gonzalo’s use of light cavalry jinetes gave him a decisive advantage over the enemy at both the operational and tactical levels of war. His light cavalry allowed him to see the battlefield and extend, in modern terms, his “area of influence” and take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Many military historians fail to give proper weight to the value and versatility of light cavalry, basing their assessments only on the contributions of light cavalry to set-piece battles.” 40 — soon returned to Spain where he was received with great honors by the king and queen. He was destined to fight another war in Italy against another French king in just a few years — the one in which he would distinguish himself in the use of hand-held firearms (arquebuses) in battle, and in which he would make excellent use of his light cavalry. Assessment and Lessons Learned Modern officers can draw many lessons from this campaign, first of which is the importance of flexibility in selecting the appropriate course of action to accomplish mission-type orders. Gonzalo Her- nández assumed a role very much like that of a modern combatant commander. He received broad guidance on his mission from the heads of state and was allowed a great deal of latitude in its execution. However, he did not receive adequate resources to deal with the potential threat in a rapidly changing situation. Gonzalo Hernández succeeded only because of his superior ability to “do more with less” — a situation that is haunting-ly familiar to commanders at every level in today’s contemporary operational environment (COE). Once more, a strong commander’s character rises above all other considerations and becomes the crucial determinant of victory or defeat. Gonzalo’s ability to minimize the results of defeat in the Battle of Seminara, and his ability to sustain the morale of his troops and organize anew offensive are truly the marks of a “great captain.”17 Second, Gonzalo Hernández demonstrated a mastery of the operational level of war. He was very thorough in his intelligence gathering and used all the means at his disposal — light cavalry, informers, and political channels. When determining which course of action to select, he was cautious and carefully considered all options, but once he made a decision, he acted with great energy and speed. This allowed him to operate inside his enemy’s decisionmaking cycle, gain and maintain the initiative, and pose operational and tactical problems to the enemy, which were difficult for him to solve. Finally, the “Great Captain” understood the capabilities and limitations of his forces and those of his enemy, down to the smallest details. This allowed him to take advantage of fleeting tactical opportunities, which he was quick to exploit with innovative and effective combined arms combinations, such as those in the action before Atella. Armor and cavalry officers will notice that Gonzalo’s use of light cavalry jinetes gave him a decisive advantage over the enemy at both the operational and tactical levels of war. His light cavalry allowed him to see the battlefield and extend, in modern terms, his “area of influence” and take advantage of fleeting opportunities. Many military historians fail to give proper weight to the value and versatility of light cavalry, basing their assessments only on the contributions of light cavalry to set-piece battles. For modern students of the art of war, Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba serves as an ideal example of what a great commander can achieve when he understands the capabilities and limitations of light cavalry and uses it appropriately. Notes 1Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Crónicas del Gran Capitán, Bailly-Ballière, 1903, translated by author, p. 292. 2Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800, 2d ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; and David Eltis, The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1995. 3Hans Delbrück, Archer Jones, John Keegan, Charles Oman, F. L. Taylor, and Robert O’Connel are some of the best known among many military historians who mention Cerignola as a significant battle in the history of warfare. Typical of their judgment is the entry in R. Ernest DuPuy and Trevor N. DuPuy, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, s.v. Cerignola, Harper Resource, 4th Edition, April 1993: “This was probably the first battle in history won by gunpowder and small arms.” 4Carl von Clausewitz, On War, introduction by Anatol Rapoport, Penguin Classics, New York, 1982, p. 101, “War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. […] War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill [sic] our will.” 5The king and queen of the newly confederated Spanish Kingdoms were Fernando of Aragon and Isabel of Castile — the famous royal couple who were known as the Catholic Monarchs. Spain emerged as a major player in the European stage in 1492 with the final conquest of the Kingdom of Granada and the “discovery” of a “New World” by Columbus — a protégée of Queen Isabel. The best narrative history in English of the period of the Catholic Monarchs is William H. Prescott, The Art of War in Spain: the Conquest of Granada 1481-1492, ed. by Albert D. McJoynt, Stackpole Books, Philadelphia, 1995; a good one-volume history is Felipe Fernández Armesto, Ferdinand and Isabella, Taplinger, New York, 1975. 6Details of Gonzalo Hernández de Córdoba’s first Italian campaign are based on the three historical sources compiled and edited in Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Crónicas del Gran Capitán. 7Charles VIII was 22 years old at the time and not in very good health, but he was ambitious and was led to believe he was capable of heroic deeds in the tradition of his knightly ancestors. In addition, the French king was invited into Italy by Lodovico Sforza, ruler of Milan as an ally against his Italian rivals. This act was the beginning of many years of misfortune for all the Italian states. See Francesco Guicciardini, The History of Italy, translated and edited by Sydney Alexander, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969, pp. 21-24. 8After the Swiss established their independence from their Haspburg overlords and the Burgundian and Italian princes that surrounded their Alpine homeland, they offered their services as mercenaries and were employed as such by the French kings. See Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, 1937; reprint Greenhill Books, London, 1999, p. 69 ff. 9For an overview of the changing relationship between gunpowder weapons and fortifications in Italy, see Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1996, pp. 9-22. 10The line of Spanish Neapolitan kings of the House of Aragon began when Alfonso V of Aragon conquered the Kingdom of Naples after a power vacuum in 1443. He did not have legitimate children by his wife, María of Castile, but he named Fernando (Ferrante), his “natural son” by a Neapolitan mistress, as heir to the throne of Naples. Ferrante reigned from 1458 to

1494. His son, Alfonso II, reigned briefly, but was mentally unstable and abdicated in favor of his 22-year-old son, Fernando II (Ferrante II). King Fernando of Aragon was the son of Juan II of Aragon the younger brother of Alfonso V. Thus, he was the uncle of Alfonso II and great uncle of Ferrante II. But Fernando of Aragon considered his nephews illegitimate monarchs since they were descended from the “natural” or illegitimate branch of the Aragonese family. 11The best study in English of Spanish frontier warfare in the late 15th century is William H. Prescott, The Art of War in Spain: the Conquest of Granada 1481-1492, ed. by Albert D. McJoynt, Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania, 1995, see especially pp. 20-21 for a discussion of the role of Spanish light cavalry. 12The Spanish monarchs, Fernando and Isabel, entered the conquered city of Granada on 2 January 1492. Gonzalo Her- nández de Córdoba had been instrumental in negotiating the surrender conditions between them and the last Moorish King, Boabdil. Prescott, The Art of War in Spain, pp. 240-242. 13Most military historians associate the term guerrilla (literally “small war” in Spanish) with the fierce resistance put up by Spanish peasants and townsmen against the invading armies of Napoleon in the early 19th century. However, guerrilla tactics and wars have been common in Spain since time immemorial. Among the invading armies who have been harassed and, at times, defeated by guerrillas in Spain are the Greeks, the Carthaginians, the Romans, and later Christians and Muslims used guerrilla tactics extensively against each other in the rugged terrain of the Iberian Peninsula. See Prescott, The Art of War in Spain. 14The lance rest, a steel hook attached to the breastplate of a suit of armor, became important in the 15th century as the lance became heavier. For a survey of technical improvements in armor and the techniques of war of heavy cavalry, see Malcolm Vale, War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages, University of Georgia Press, Athens, Georgia, 1981, pp. 100-128. 15Ferrante of Naples, Federico’s father, fled from the French and sought refuge with Gonzalo in Sicily. He died shortly thereafter. It was said that he believed that the French invasion was God’s punishment for his many sins. He abdicated in favor of his son, Federico. 16Cesare was perhaps the most notorious scion of the notorious Borgia family. He was the son of Rodrigo Borgia, who took the name of Alexander VI when he was elected to the papacy. He was created a cardinal by his father, but preferred the life of a warrior. For a balanced treatment of the Borgia family and their times, see Michael Mallet, The Borgias, Academy Chicago Publishers, Chicago, 1987. 17It is interesting to note that, in both current and emerging U. S. Army doctrine, leadership is the most critical of the elements of combat power. It ensures the other elements, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and command and control are used in a coordinated way to accomplish the mission. See Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-0, Full Spectrum Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, July 2007, p. 4-1. FMI 3-0 will replace U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, June 2001, which defines combat power as maneuver, firepower, protection, and information brought together by leadership. Lieutenant Colonel Prisco R. Hernández is currently the director, Reserve Component Programs, Army National Guard, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. A. from the University of Puerto Rico, a M. M. from Indiana University, and a Ph. D. from University of Wisconsin. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Field Artillery Course, CGSC, Canadian Forces Joint Reserve Command and Staff College, and the Senior Field Artillery Officer Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include tactics instructor, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth; staff member, Center for Army Tactics, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth; S3, 1st Battalion, 120th Field Artillery Battalion, Wisconsin Army National Guard; and commander, C Company, 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, Wisconsin Army National Guard. — 41