Consequence Management during Counterinsurgency Operations

While counterinsurgency (COIN) operations may differ regionally due to distinct environments, insurgent ideologies and objectives, and cultural variations, maintaining governance, legitimacy, and popular support remain a resounding coalition force (CF) objective during these operations. Regardless of COIN conditions, unintended consequences as a result of CF-led actions will undoubtedly occur on the battlefield. Unfortunately, these actions have the potential to influence a negative perception of CF by the populous, or even worse, exploitation of the unintended consequence via an insurgent-led information operations (IO) effort. Hence, the need for consequence management in such situations is certainly a relevant requirement to maintain legitimacy and stability within the host nation. Actions, Insight, and Tactics at Battalion and Below Task Force (TF) 4th Squadron, 73d Cavalry (4-73 CAV), 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division, experienced such unintended consequences during their current deployment to Afghanistan. Subsequently, the organization developed consequence management tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to maintain local stability, legitimize local governance, and isolate insurgents from their cause and support. Events, such as the accidental wounding of an Afghan civilian by a ricochet warning shot, or the death of local Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) soldiers who unsuccessfully tried to disarm unexploded ordnance (UXO), highlight the need for consequence management and preventive actions within the COIN fight. As a result of the two aforementioned events on the battlefield, the squadron methodically developed “consequence management” battle drills, plans of action, and formal TTPs to mitigate such situations. It must be noted, however, that consequence management is more than a positive IO message to the populous. Conversely, it must be “operationalized” holistically within the organization and requires “full-spectrum” engagement, to include:

• Internal actions — synchronization and efforts of all staff sections within the battalion or squadron.

• External actions — continuous crosstalk and integration with the higher headquarters, relevant staff sections, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRT), as appropriate.

• Local security actions — incorporation of the Provincial Coordination Center (PCC) and local ANSF leaders into the process.

• Local governance actions — coordination for shuras/meetings with the governor, local governance, and tribal elders. As this article demonstrates, holistic, continuous engagement with respect to the aforementioned actions is not an op-Consequence Management during Counterinsurgency Operations by Major Ernest Litynski — 13 tional requirement, but an essential task in the consequence-management process. Therefore, an “isolationist” or “economy of effort” approach, as well as a lack of proper planning, coordination, communication, and execution of these actions, can potentially result in more harm than good (result in further consequences, de-legitimization of CF/governance, and exploitation of negative IO by the insurgency). The lessons learned outlined in this article provide any organization a good starting point or template for consequence management. It must be noted, however, that they are not the approved solution for every situation, as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilians (METT-TC) conditions differ within every organization’s battlespace. However, these lessons learned and TTP should be adapted by organizations using leadership judgment based on current conditions (melding of battle command “art and science”). The following lessons learned were developed by 4-73 CAV and deemed so significant that they were disseminated throughout Combined Joint Task Force- 82 as a tool for consequence management. They were developed as a result of a gap discovered in the unit’s standard operating procedures (SOP) following the aforementioned accidental wounding of an Afghan civilian. All actions during the actual incident were conducted properly and in accordance with theater escalation of force (EOF) and rules of engagement (ROE) criteria. Lessons Learned The following lessons learned were developed from after action reviews (AARs) and subsequently led to creating the demonstrated TTP and battle drills that assist in mitigation and/or elimination of negative consequences, such as a noncombatant casualty or collateral damage, created in a COIN environment: Consequence management battle drills. Currently, there is no systemic process established to ensure the tactical operations center (TOC) can rapidly inform all necessary personnel and begin necessary procedures. As a result, the course of action process becomes disjointed and proper staffing functions are lengthy. Hence, the need to develop comprehensive battle drills to ensure all appropriate actions are taken, personnel are notified, and coordination is executed. Recommendation: Develop battle drills for solatia (condolence) payments, noncombatant casualties, and consequence management for these actions. An example battle drill is demonstrated in Figure 1. Lack of coordination with higher headquarters. Higher headquarters can become proactive and better prepared to send talking points or approve radio messages if coordination occurs earlier in the process (hence, the need for battle drills). Updates must be sent, as available, to maintain a common operating picture (COP) with the higher headquarters, enabling them to provide the necessary resources and enabling effects warrant-

Submits reports and routinely updates BDE until completion Tracks status of all requirements until complete BTL CPT initiates notification and requests name of the of 15-6 Investigation Officer from the SQDN CDR Appointed 15-6 Officer Conducts investigation Prepares report with finding Submits to XO for approval BTL CPT notifies:

SALTR: w/in 5 min. FUSION NET (I): w/in 15 min. STORY BOARD (I): w/in 2 hrs. - Finalize FUSION NET report - Finalize STORY BOARD

Coordinates for and maintains

Continuously updates SQDN on status of wounded LN S5 Coordinate meeting between SQDN CDR and civilian’s family Provide humanitarian aid to family

Prepares and submits solatia payment paperwork Obtains specified payment for the SQDN CDR

Informs governor and ANSF leadership Coordinates for shura with governor and local leaders.

Develop speaking points and a letter of apology to LN’s family Constructs positive IO campaign

Coordinates A/C for all consequence management meetings/engagements Figure 1 “Units must have the ability to collect information at collateral damage sites, which enables them to take proper consequence-management steps and mitigate second/third-order effects. Furthermore, the incorporation of humanitarian aid (HA) and appropriate solatia payments must be a reinforcing and continuous process within the affected area. Similarly, conducting shuras at the appropriate levels, such as local, district, and/or provincial, should occur as soon as possible during the consequence-management process.” 14 — ed to mitigate risk in the consequence-management process. Recommendation: In accordance with the commander’s established guidance, communicate with higher headquarters IO section at least every 48 hours. For consequence-management incidents, communicate with higher headquarters at a minimum of every 2 to 3 hours (or as updates become available). Immediate distribution of solatia funds. Multiple instances have existed in which reparations and positive IO could have mitigated risk and reduced consequences had solatia funds been on-hand and immediately available. Hence, the timeliness of solatia payments becomes a requirement to link the negative action with a suitable and well-timed reaction. The timely linking of solatia payments with the negative action can significantly reduce risk in the consequence-management process. Therefore, a full understanding of the solatia payment system, as well as development of related SOPs, becomes a requirement within the organization. Recommendation: Receive guidance and legal review from the appropriate staff judge advocate’s (SJA) office prior to relief in place/transfer of authority. Such a review allows the unit to maintain solatia funds locally, rather than waiting for higher headquarters to distribute these monies. The brigade SJA section can provide guidance on how to maintain and distribute local solatia funds in accordance with legal guidelines. Timely and appropriate key-leader engagement (KLE) and humanitarian assistance. Units must have the ability to collect information at collateral damage sites, which enables them to take proper consequence-management steps and mitigate second/third-order effects. Furthermore, the incorporation of humanitarian aid (HA) and appropriate solatia payments must be a reinforcing and continuous process within the affected area. Similarly, conducting shuras at the appropriate levels, such as local, district, and/or provincial, should occur as soon as possible during the consequence-management process. During these shuras and meetings, local officials (district/provincial levels) must be incorporated in the process to maintain government and security legitimacy. Recommendation: The unit must establish an SOP for information collection and an action plan following an incident. Each troop- or company-level unit must have the SOP and action plan on-hand during missions. Below is an example of a squadron-level plan of action (wounded noncombatant): ❑ Medical personnel obtain noncombatant’s name, height, weight, and other relevant information. Update medical-condition report to fire effects coordination cell (FECC), as necessary. ❑ Administrative and logistics operations center (ALOC) maintains soldier at hospital with victim’s family and attends to their needs. ❑ FECC submits plan of action to brigade FECC and continues to update status of items completed. ❑ S5 schedules meeting between provincial chief of ANSF and squadron commander on date-time group (DTG). ❑ Squadron commander briefs provincial chief of ANSF on plan of action. ❑ S4 coordinates solatia payments for victim’s family. ❑ S4 coordinates for HA drop at victim’s village. ❑ Squadron commander meets with provincial chief of ANSF to discuss plan of action. ❑ FECC develops IO campaign to counter negative IO fallout. ❑ Troop commander coordinates with local (district) police chief to conduct combined investigation of the incident site. Squadron commander and provincial chief of ANSF transported by air to accident site. ❑ Troop commander and local police chief conduct a combined investigation of the site and individuals involved. ❑ Troop commander and S5 conduct HA drop at the victim’s village (50 bags rice, beans, flour, children’s clothing, shoes, tea, cooking oil, etc). ❑ Local police chief and company commander host a shura on DTG. The district commissioner, provincial chief of ANSF, and squadron commander also attend shura. ❑ Troop commander receives the victim and family on arrival from coalition medical facility and escorts to village. ❑ Troop commander delivers solatia payment, once approved. ❑ FECC and S3 create executive summary of events and findings. Repeated HA should be used as pre-solatia payments to victims of consequence-management events; this serves as an initial compensation and alleviates some of the family’s burden. Furthermore, it also serves to establish an immediate foundation of trust between the victim and the family (IO focus on the human terrain). Once an incident occurs, a local shura should be convened as soon as possible, preferably within 48 hours, to address the concerns of the local community. This shows respect for the victim and the community’s cultural sensitivities; it also negates insurgent IO opportunities. A district-level tribal shura should be conducted after the local shura to negate insurgent IO opportunities; this also emphasizes the CF’s understanding and respect for the Pashtunwali (an unwritten, democratic, socio-political culture, law and ideology of the Pashtun society inherited from their forefathers and carried on to the present generation). This same message must be continuously emphasized to establish legitimacy and true caring for the affected individual, family, and community. Notional themes (talking points) should continuously reiterate the same positive message at all levels during the consequence-management process. Be- “Once an incident occurs, a local shura should be convened as soon as possible, preferably within 48 hours, to address the concerns of the local community. This shows respect for the victim and the community’s cultural sensitivities; it also negates insurgent IO opportunities.” — 15 low is an example of notional themes used for shuras and meetings for civilian casualty incidents:

• Our hearts and prayers go out to the injured person, his family, and his friends. (International security forces will never intentionally injure or bring suffering to the citizens of ‘Province A.’ We work to improve the standard of living for those who have requested our support).

• International security forces are here at the request of the people and the leadership of ‘Province A.’ (We work alongside national security forces to promote security and stability of the people of this region. We will continue to conduct combined operations to pursue the enemy and address the population).

• We must work together with national security forces and the population to prevent similar incidents in the future. (We will conduct a thorough, combined investigation to determine how we can best rectify any damages we have caused. We have established measures to prevent this type of incident from occurring).

• The population must work and obey the directives of local security forces. (The local leaders must explain to the population the necessity of cooperating with security forces. The enemy hides among the population, so we must interact with the populous to find them. The information you provide and your assistance make us successful). Finally, district and provincial-level officials should be incorporated into the entire process. Provincial-level representatives should be at all local and tribal shura meetings. When possible, the national security forces should be encouraged to conduct their own investigation of the incident to maintain governance and legitimacy. Weapons system employment during escalation of force. Although soldiers fully comply and understand escalation of force measures, a well-placed warning shot injured an Afghan civilian during such an incident. The resultant ricochet, at no true fault of the soldier, resulted in a consequence-management process to mitigate the risks associated with the injury. Recommendation: Units should develop weapons system effects and surface danger zone (SDZ) SOPs and periodically retrain escalation of force monthly to reaffirm TTPs and shoot/no shoot criteria; ensure units understand hostile intent; and ensure there is no ambiguity with engagement criteria and warning shots. This understanding and associated SOP/TTP is clearly important, as it mitigates risk and will actually prevent a number of consequence-management situations from occurring in the first place. Units should develop formal tools, such as TTPs, SOPs, and battle drills for the consequence-management process. Within all kinetic and nonkinetic operations, these tools will provide the commander with potential options and unity of effort when developing the appropriate courses of action for a consequence-management incident. Furthermore, organizations should ensure full engagement by all staff sections, as well as request support from higher headquarters, to mitigate the risks associated with an incident. As previously mentioned, this will facilitate timely and continuous engagement with the human terrain — the local populous (to include elders and tribal leadership), local/provincial political leaders, and local/provincial security leaders. This timely and continuous engagement must come in all appropriate forms available — shuras, humanitarian aid, solatia payments, informal/formal investigations, print/radio/televised IO messages, and potentially public works projects. Once again, conditions-based actions and METT-TC play a critical role in determining the appropriate engagement strategy. Although every situation on the COIN battlefield will be different, the aforementioned lessons learned (the hard way) will undoubtedly assist in risk mitigation and positive outcomes during the consequence-management process. Most important, however, is that we treat the affected local populous with the same dignity, compassion, and respect we would show our own families and citizens. Consequence Management Prevention: Understanding Weapon System Effects Historic instances of unintended noncombatant injuries and deaths, as well as structural collateral damage, will occur on the COIN battlefield. These events, often the result of unintended weapons system effects, are routinely published in open-source printed or televised media and require consequence-management actions. Fortunately, proper TTPs, SOPs, and training on weapons system effects and SDZs can mitigate or even eliminate such unintended consequences. As a result of such instances within the COIN environment of Afghanistan, 4-73 CAV developed in-theater sustainment training, modified TTPs and SOPs, and reformulated pre-mission briefs to ensure that unintended weapons system effects, such as noncombatant casualties, collateral damage, and fratricide, were mitigated during combat, logistics, and humanitarian missions. For example, in addition to normal pre-mission operational and safety briefings, the vehicle commander briefed and reiterated the developed SOPs and TTPs associated with potential employment of weapons systems. For instance, the “40- degree rule” for small arms warning shot engagements should be a mandatory briefing for all soldiers, including those who are attached for subsequent missions. By reiterating these principles continuously, Figure 2. Example SDZ for firing small arms, machine guns, and shotguns at a fixed ground target (40-degree SDZ in each direction from gun target line). 2 times 1 time 300 x 2 = 600 mils 125 x 1 = 125 mils TOTAL = 725 mils, or 711 mils Figure 3. Field expedient method to estimate the 711 mils (40°) for a small arms or machine gun. Estimate two open hands and add four fingers, at full arm’s length, for that side of the gun; this will give you 725 mils, which is relatively close to 711 mils. 16 — the unit mitigates risks associated with hazardous fragment escape from the maneuver box (fratricide); noncombatant casualties or collateral damage on the battlefield (negative IO); and inability to close with and destroy the enemy (un-achieved effects). Lessons Learned and Takeaways Soldiers need to understand the SDZ to account for ricochets, bounce/skip, and splash before/after the munition hits its intended target. Through this understanding, soldiers can execute a well-placed warning shot that accounts for the danger areas associated with the munitions. An example SDZ for small-arms munitions is demonstrated in Figure 2. However, in a combat environment, soldiers must often make split-second decisions and cannot figure out the true millimeter/angle measurements associated with SDZs. Therefore, the development of field-expedient TTPs can be used to quickly assess and mitigate the risk. For example, the hasty millimeter/angle estimation demonstrated in Figure 3 for the “40-degree rule,” (which is equivalent to 711 mils) for each side of the gun target line is used to give soldiers an idea of the minimum safe line (MSL) for small-arms or machine guns. The hasty battle drill allows soldiers to quickly assess the risk to both friendly forces and noncombatants on the battlefield. With enough training, the 40-degree rule becomes second nature and soldiers can quickly and mentally define the placement of the warning shot with respect to the target. Figure 3 demonstrates how to calculate the millimeter in this example; similarly, a compass, or even marking the gun truck’s turret with degrees/millimeters, could assist in defining the 40-degree SDZ associated with small-arms munitions. SDZs not only apply to individual and crew-served direct fire weapons, but should be understood and taken into account for all mechanized platforms, to include the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2/M3 Bradley fighting vehicle, launched grenades (M203 and MK19), indirect fires (artillery and mortars), close combat attack helicopters, and close air support. Furthermore, during echelonment of fires planning (suppression using both direct and indirect fires as the unit closes with the enemy), leaders need to plan for all weapons system SDZs and effects. Developing SDZ, risk estimate distances (RED), and minimum safe distance (MSD) “cheat sheets,” based on unit type, mission, and potential weapons system employment, can assist in this process. Finally, incorporating SDZ, echelonment of fires, and weapons system effects into unit operations plans, contingency operations, briefings, and rehearsals, is a necessity. Figure 4 depicts field expedient TTP examples for direct-fire weapons systems. These examples are for combat use and not for peacetime training. For additional information, doctrinal planning requirements, and guidelines associated with weapons system employment and SDZs (to include indirect and aerial delivery systems), refer to Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-63, Range Safety; Training Circular 7-9, Infantry Live-Fire Training; and U. S. Army Field Manual 3-09.32, JFIRE, Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower.1 Clearly, improper or unforeseen weapons system effects will occur on the COIN battlefield and lead to unintended consequences. However, every unit has the ability to mitigate these risks through the development and execution of appropriate training, SOPs, and TTPs related to weapons system effects and SDZs. While the aforementioned insights and observations were learned the “hard way” in Afghanistan’s COIN environment, future units can use these principles to reduce the potential of negative effects on any COIN battlefield. By following these simple principles, units can successfully employ firepower and eliminate the unforeseen, negative consequences associated with a misunderstanding of weapons system effects. As commissioned and noncommissioned leaders, we owe these SOPs and TTPs to our soldiers, and more importantly, to the local populous whose lives we potential-Direct Fire Weapon System Rule of Thumb**** Small arms, machine guns, and shotguns firing at a fixed ground target 40° (711 mils) to each side of the gun target line Ground or vehicle-mounted small arms 15° (267 mils) to each side of the gun target line TOW; Improved TOW; TOW 2A; TOW 2B 47° (836 mils) to each side of the gun target line Javelin 21° (373 mils) to each side of the gun target line; Area “A” = 500m up to 1000m; slopes to 200m between 1000m-4000m Fragmentary or high-explosive grenades 150m danger area CS grenades 10m danger area Smoke grenades 10m danger area White phosphorus grenades 40m danger area M79/M203 40mm grenade 10° (177 mils) to each side of the gun target line; Area “A” and “B” both 165m MK-19 40mm grenade 10° (177 mils) to each side of the gun target line; Area “A” and “B” both 310m M256 120mm tank cannon 40° (711 mils) to each side of the gun target line M242 25mm BFV/CFV chain gun 55° (978 mils) to each side of the gun target line ****All data is referenced from DA PAM 385-63, Range Safety. Based on combat conditions/METT-TC, these rules may change. Figure 4 ly affect by improperly employing direct, indirect, and aerial weapons platforms. Notes 1Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), Pamphlet 385-63, Range Safety, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 10 April 2003; Headquarters, DA, Training Circular 7-9, Infantry Live-Fire Training, GPO, Washington, DC, 30 September 1993; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-09.32, JFIRE, Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower, GPO, Washington, DC, October 2004. Major Ernest Litynski is currently serving as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) liaison officer, Combined Joint Task Force-82, 82d Airborne Division, Afghanistan. During his deployment, he worked extensively with the 4th Brigade Combat Team. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy, and an M. S. and M. B. A. from Marquette University. His military education includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College (ILE). He has served in various cavalry and airborne assignments. His combat service includes deployments to Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. A sincere “thank you” to the soldiers of Task Force (TF) 4th Squadron, 73d (4-73) Cavalry, 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82d Airborne Division for sharing insights, observations, and lessons learned from their experiences during their current tour of duty in Afghanistan. I would especially like to thank LTC David Woods, commander, 4-73 Cavalry, for allowing me to participate in the consequence-management process, to include shuras held with the local tribal leaders and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA) leaders. I would also like to thank MAJ Slade Beaudoin for sharing his time and products related to the squadron’s consequence management and weapons effects processes. Scouts Out! — 17