James Longstreet: A Controversial Warrior

General James Longstreet is the most controversial figure of the American Civil War. He was a tough, determined fighter who suffered in the postwar court of public opinion due to malicious, and often unjustified, criticisms leveled by those who sought to elevate the legacy of Robert E. Lee and entrench the myth of the “Lost Cause” within the consciousness of the South. Longstreet uninten-

Controversial Warrior Controversial Warrior tionally aided his enemies through awkward attempts at self-defense, in which he frequently sounded like a sullen and bitter old man. As historian Glenn W. Lafantasie so accurately stated, Longstreet was “outmaneuvered and outgunned” by the pens and oratory of his political enemies, known collectively as the ‘Lee cult.’1 However, the swirl of controversy surrounding James Longstreet tends to obscure his many excellent qualities as a combat leader and divert attention from his impressive battlefield accomplishments. He was, first and foremost, a fighting general who had a “nose” for combat. His appreciation for the ever-changing conditions of the battlefield allowed him to learn from mistakes and adjust his tactics accordingly. — 7 Kurz and Allison, Art Publishers, Chicago, USA, c. 1890 at Gettysburg was still a close, bitter memory within the Army of Northern Virginia, and Longstreet’s post-war critics usually point to his suggested redeployment to the west as evidence of his disloyalty to Lee and of his rabid ambition for independent command. While a desire for advancement very well could have played apart in his motives, it is equally likely that Longstreet actually believed in what he was advocating. In one of his letters to Lee, Longstreet offered a realistic assessment of the army’s readiness, and he proposed that the Army of Northern Virginia might remain on the defensive along the Rappahannock while reinforcements moved west since “[the] best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee.”2 It was not the first time he had suggested taking advantage of the South’s interior lines to mass against one of the other Union commands, but the recent fall of Vicksburg and Bragg’s inability to gain even the smallest success against the Federals in that strategically vital theater, certainly would have added an increased sense of urgency. Eventually, Longstreet was ordered west with elements of his corps, traveling a circuitous route through the Carolinas and Georgia necessitated by the Federal occupation of Knoxville. Meanwhile, Bragg and his Army of Tennessee had been maneuvered out of Chattanooga by Major General William S. Rosencrans’ Army of the Cumberland, and on 18 September, Bragg opened an engagement with the Federals near Chickamauga Creek in the heavily forested lands on the Georgia-Tennessee border. Longstreet and his staff arrived at Catoosa Station in Georgia at approximately 1500 hours on 19 September, with the battle already underway. To the surprise of the new arrivals, Bragg did not bother to send a guide to meet them, forcing Longstreet and two of his staff officers to spend hours searching for the commanding general in the north Georgia woods. After a close encounter with Federal pickets, Longstreet found Bragg at approximately 2300 hours.3 General Bragg rose from his slumber and directed Longstreet to assume command of the left wing of the army (See Figure 1). The right wing would be under the direction of General Leonidas Polk. The attack would begin the next morning with the advance of D. H. Hill’s corps on the far right of Polk’s line. Bragg’s plan called for each unit to advance in succession, following the one on its right. This would continue across the entire length of the Confederate front as the army swung to the left like a huge door, pivoting on General William Preston’s So successful were attempts to make Longstreet the scapegoat for Confederate defeat in the Civil War that his performance in combat has been savaged unjustifiably by generations of historians who blindly accepted the claims of the Lee cult without considering their barely concealed agenda. What little credit remained for Longstreet’s generalship was confined to a grudging acknowledgment that he was merely a fine defensive fighter who otherwise moved his troops slowly and ineptly into battle. Such notions were born of the self-serving criticisms of those who were not his equal in combat. Longstreet’s skill as a warrior was certainly evident in the defense at places such as Fredericksburg, but his martial prowess was equally evident on other fields when he maneuvered his troops forward to strike crushing blows against the enemy, particularly in September 1863, in the bloody woods along the Tennessee-Georgia border. At the Battle of Chickamauga, James Longstreet showed that he was truly a bulldog who could be relied on to deliver powerful, punishing attacks. Chickamauga was not the first example of this, and it certainly would not be the last. However, modern day combat leaders can look to his performance at Chickamauga for examples of flexibility and shrewd battlefield assessment under extremely difficult conditions. Longstreet Moves West In August of 1863, Longstreet corresponded with his commander, General Robert

E. Lee, regarding a strategic reinforcement of Braxton Bragg’s army in Tennessee. The defeat Credit: H. A. Ogden “In August of 1863, Longstreet corresponded with his commander, General Robert E. Lee, regarding a strategic reinforcement of Braxton Bragg’s army in Tennessee. The defeat at Gettysburg was still a close, bitter memory within the Army of Northern Virginia, and Longstreet’s post-war critics usually point to his suggested redeployment to the west as evidence of his disloyalty to Lee and of his rabid ambition for independent command.” Major General William S. Rosencrans 8 — Major General Braxton Bragg division on the far left of the line. If successful, Bragg’s army would cut off the Federals from Chattanooga and destroy them.4 The plan was simple, but that did little to alleviate the difficulties with which Longstreet would have to contend. He had arrived in darkness with little time to locate and organize his forces for an attack over unfamiliar ground against a confident and well-supplied enemy. Bragg, in keeping with his reputation, had done little to facilitate the integration of his newly arrived reinforcements. The brigades of John B. Hood, however, had arrived from Virginia ahead of Longstreet in time to participate in the fighting on 19 September. Hood’s assessment of Bragg’s command was as dark as Longstreet’s must have been. The atmosphere that Hood and his men found was certainly in shocking contrast to what they had enjoyed in the east. Just as consistent victory had built confidence in the Army of Northern Virginia, consistent defeat had drained the spirit of the Army of Tennessee. Hood found that “not one [of Bragg’s officers] spoke in a sanguine tone regarding the result of the battle in which [they] were then engaged.”5 Hood’s spirits surely rose when Long street arrived on the field. Organizing the Left Wing for Battle After a short rest at Bragg’s headquarters, Longstreet set out in the predawn darkness to locate the units of the left wing. Upon finding them, Longstreet quickly set about making adjustments and organizing his wing for the attack. The difficulty of this task cannot be overstated, especially considering the circumstances in which the newly appointed commander of the left wing found himself. He had arrived in darkness with the battle already underway. Bragg and his staff provided very little assistance with integrating this new and highly important subordinate leader. Most of all, Longstreet received a very difficult assignment, and he would have to operate on completely unfamiliar terrain. Without the communications equipment that commanders on later battlefields would have, all orders would have to go by courier or be personally delivered by Longstreet. Longstreet quickly surveyed the terrain, finding that it “was not afield proper, but a heavy woodland, not adapted to the practice of artillery.”6 Observation was broken by the thick trees, making long range adjustment of artillery impossible. The terrain would have an equal effect on Federal artillery. Throughout the course of the battle, Union forces would expend only 7,320 rounds for their cannon, less than one-quarter of the total fired during the battle of Gettysburg earlier that year.7 It is clear that the Federals suffered under the same limitations as their Confederate opponents. The fighting in those northern Georgia woods would depend on the close combat of determined infantry. In addition to the severe restrictions of the terrain, Longstreet discovered problems with the alignment of his units. These problems were the result of both the rugged landscape and the confusion of the previous day’s combat. Longstreet found that he did not have contact with the right wing; therefore, he ordered A. P. Stewart, commander of his far right division, to locate them. Stewart soon reported that his line was nearly onehalf mile in advance of the units to his right. Longstreet had much work to do before he would advance against the Federal positions to the east. As it turned out, he had more time than anticipated because Polk’s forces failed to advance at the appointed hour. The delay was due to a failure to properly relay orders to subordinate commanders. Longstreet used this time to fashion a plan of attack that suited the dense, compartmentalized terrain of the Chickamauga battlefield. He recognized that the thick woods would make lateral coordination of units virtually impossible since, even in the most open areas, “one’s vision could not reach farther than the length of a brigade.”8 Additionally, he knew from experience that by stringing out his divisions in long lines, he would weaken his striking power by dispersing troops across abroad front. Such a deployment of forces might gain a small penetration of enemy lines, but it would lack the strength to exploit a breakthrough. Major General John B. Hood — 9 Left Wing LTG James Longstreet Division Brigade Regiments and Others Hindman’s Division: MG Thomas C. Hindman BG Patton Anderson Escort: Lenoir’s Company, Alabama Cavalry: CPT T. M. Lenoir Anderson’s Brigade: BG Patton Anderson Col J. H. Sharp 7th Mississippi: COL W. H. Bishop 9th Mississippi: MAJ T. H. Lynam 10th Mississippi: LTC James Barr 41st Mississippi: COL W. F. Tucker 44th Mississippi: COL J. H. Sharp, LTC R. G. Kelsey 9th Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters: MAJ W. C. Richards Garrity’s (Alabama) Battery: CPT James Garrity Deas’ Brigade: BG Zach C. Deas 19th Alabama: COL Samuel K. McSpadden 22nd Alabama: LTC John Weedon, CPT Harry T. Toulmin 25th Alabama: COL George D. Johnston 39th Alabama: COL Whitfield Clark 50th Alabama: COL J. G. Coltart 17th Alabama Battalion Sharpshooters: CPT James F. Nabers Dent’s (Alabama) Battery: CPT S. H. Dent Manigault’s Brigade: BG Arthur M. Manigault 24th Alabama: COL N. N. Davis 28th Alabama: COL John C. Reid 34th Alabama: MAJ John N. Slaughter 10th-19th South Carolina: COL James F. Pressley Waters’ (Alabama) Battery: LT Charles W. Watkins Figure 1

As a consequence of his rapid and highly perceptive assessment, Longstreet formed a powerful assault column under that wily fighter and fellow veteran of the Army of Northern Virginia, John B. Hood. Choosing Hood made sense for many reasons, the most obvious of which was he and his men had already seen fighting during the previous day and he was most familiar with the ground to their front. Longstreet arrayed the left wing’s other divisions in two lines with two brigades forward and the others in support, but he stacked Hood’s brigades in a tight column at intervals of 100 paces.9 The enemy situation before him was unclear and the terrain rough and unfamiliar. He lacked the time to conduct a proper reconnaissance, so Longstreet decided that his best chance for success was to advance in strength sufficient enough to pierce the enemy’s lines and continue to carry the fight to his rear areas. There is little doubt that the pain of the charge against the Union center at Gettysburg still lingered in Longstreet’s mind. Before leaving Virginia, his last words to Lee had been that he would “not give a single man of my command for a fruitless victory.”10 Gettysburg had clearly been a bloody defeat, and he viewed previous triumphs, such as Chancellorsville, as Pyrrhic victories because of the immense and irreplaceable casualties suffered. James Longstreet was preparing to launch an attack that would have the power to do far more than gain a small penetration in enemy lines. He was going to break the line and push into the Federals’ rear areas as part of the Confederate plan to isolate and destroy the Army of the Cumberland. Such a victory would definitely not be “fruitless.” Fortune Intervenes The Army of Tennessee under Braxton Bragg had experienced little good fortune before the Battle of Chickamauga. However, with the arrival of Longstreet’s forces, not only were they gaining some of the best combat formations that the South could offer, they also seemed to be gaining a touch of luck. It was the sort of good fortune that always seems to accompany those who act with confidence and decisiveness during times of turmoil. The 20th day of September 1863 would prove to be the “high watermark” for Bragg’s army. Of course, the opening of the day’s operations did not bode well. Polk’s inability to launch his attack at dawn understandably enraged Bragg. He wanted to hear none of the excuses offered by his subordinates. D. H. Hill, the corps commander who was to advance first, did not receive timely orders due to negligence on his part and also by his superior, Polk. As Longstreet stirred on the left, aligning his forces and strengthening his line for the coming thrust, Bragg’s frustration grew until he began personally ordering individual divisions forward, beginning on the right of the line. It was about 1100 hours when Longstreet finally decided to send the commanding general his recommendation to advance his wing. As he was preparing to send the message, he discovered that Bragg had already ordered A. P. Stewart’s division forward. Fortunately, Longstreet was able to quickly order Hood and the remaining units on his left to hold long enough for the brigades of Joseph Kershaw and newly promoted Brigadier General Benjamin Humphreys to close up on the rear of the assault column, adding additional depth and power to Hood’s formation.11 It was at about this time that fortune intervened on the side of the Confederates. Due to a mistaken report of a gap in the Federal line between the units of Thomas Wood and Joseph Reynolds, General Rosencrans began shifting units across his front. As historian John Bowers put it, “the catastrophe was put in motion” when Wood attempted to close up on Reynolds, but was then redirected by General George Thomas, the corps commander on the Union left, farther along to the left of the line.12 This actually created a gap in the Federal line, rather than closing one up. That gap was now directly opposite from Longstreet’s impending attack. Longstreet Attacks As Longstreet surged forward, his forces experienced both the benefits and difficulties associated with the terrain of the Chickamauga Battlefield. The approach march toward the Federal lines was difficult due to dense woods and undergrowth. Mox-ley Sorrel, Longstreet’s chief of staff, offered an understatement when he noted that, “[t]he ground was, in parts, difficult before us.”13 However, this ground offered advantages to the attackers. A local man, whose family farm was located near the center of where Longstreet now planned to attack, acted as a guide for his forces, showing them the best way through the woods. The foliage hid the 11 Confederate brigades until they suddenly emerged from the trees just east of Lafayette Road. Longstreet’s forces surged forward toward the gap left by Wood’s departure, cresting the small hill at Brotherton Field. Federal units on either side of the gap attempted to reposition in an attempt to stem the gray tide that was now rushing toward 10 — Map 1 them. This slowed the Confederate advance, but the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys that Longstreet had closed up to a better supporting position during the realignment of the morning, gained the enemy’s first lines and allowed for the capture of “a large number” of Federal cannons.14 Even in the face of this success, albeit aided by the serendipitous appearance of a gap in the enemy line, Longstreet’s efforts met with criticism that is colored by the post-war assaults on his military record. Historian Steven Woodworth seems to imply that the only reason for Longstreet’s successes at this stage in the battle was the fortuitous withdrawal of Wood’s troops from their reverse slope defensive positions on the west side of Brotherton Field. Prior to his departure, Wood was positioned so that his troops would be sheltered behind low breastworks below the small hill top where the Confederates would have to “skyline” themselves as they approached. Undoubtedly, the first ranks to advance would have met with a vicious volley from the Federal positions, but as Woodworth himself acknowledges, the Southern troops would have, by that time, been within 50 yards of Wood’s lines.15 The Federal troops would have been unable to fire on the attackers before that point due to the intervisibility line created by the small hill. A determined charge would have covered the 50 yards rather quickly, and given the fact that Longstreet’s troops were fresh and rested, it is likely they would have been able to do so. Additionally, the assault column was several brigades deep by design, providing more than enough combat power to penetrate Wood’s position and hold it against a counterattack. Had Wood remained in position, it is certain that the cost in Confederate lives would have been far greater, but with Kershaw and Humphreys’ units in close support and the commands of Thomas Hindman and William Preston to the rear and left of the assault column, there is little reason to suspect the end result would have been different. A further testament to the strength of Longstreet’s thrust came as Union Colonel John T. Wilder’s Lightning Brigade, armed with Spencer repeating rifles, struck Hindman’s division in the left and rear near Widow Glenn hill. The rapid fire of Wilder’s Spencer rifles and the surprise of this flank attack initially pushed back a brigade of infantry to Lafayette Road, prompting Hindman to send a distressed message to Longstreet. The commander of the left wing was calm and steady in his response, as were the troops that he knew to be moving up in close support of Hindman’s flank.16 The attack continued forward as the follow-on units closed up on those in the lead helping to secure the flanks. Wilder’s Brigade subsequently withdrew to escort fleeing Union staff officers back to the relative safety of Chattanooga. With the attack of the left wing advancing rapidly, Longstreet was quick to realize that a change in the overall battle plan was necessary. He recommended reversing the scheme Bragg had conceived the night prior: instead of the right wing sweeping to the left, the left wing would sweep toward the right, pushing the Federal troops to their soon-to-be famous stand on Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill. This delaying action by Union General George Thomas would allow the Army of the Cumberland to escape disaster on that day. Longstreet’s Tactics Considered There were two basic schools of thought regarding infantry fighting in the 1860s, and understanding each of these is important in assessing Longstreet’s performance at Chickamauga and his combat leadership in general. The most influential school of thought regarding Civil War commanders of both the North and South was termed an “engineer” solution to the problem of infantry combat. This emphasized the natural tendency to shelter behind fieldworks or protective terrain features in a position of strength, forcing the enemy to attack across open ground where they were vulnerable to the firepower of the defenders.17 There could be no better description of Longstreet’sown masterful defense of Mayre’s Heights at the Battle of Fredericksburg or the Union defense of Cemetery Ridge on the third day at Gettysburg. As the war drew to a close, complex defensive entrenchments, such as those at Petersburg, would become more common, foreshadowing the horrors of World War I. Another school of thought regarding infantry tactics in 1863 was prevalent in the European drill manuals of that day. This philosophy emphasized what we today call “shock action,” delivered at the point of a bayonet. It still acknowledged the marked advantage of strong defensive positions, but it advocated launching strong counterattacks from the defense or carrying out violent charges once one’s infantry had marched to within close range of the enemy. This tactic could be accomplished by skillfully using terrain to conceal an approach march until one’s forces emerged unexpectedly at a vulnerable point on the enemy’s line.18 The vulnerable point could be an assailable flank identified through reconnaissance or, if locating such a position was impractical, that point could be “created” by massing a large amount of force against a narrow portion of the enemy’s line to overwhelm him. The accompanying “shock” could be delivered — 11 Credit: J. F. Hillen “The Army of Tennessee under Braxton Bragg had experienced little good fortune before the Battle of Chickamauga. However, with the arrival of Longstreet’s forces, not only were they gaining some of the best combat formations that the South could offer, they also seemed to be gaining a touch of luck. It was the sort of good fortune that always seems to accompany those who act with confidence and decisiveness during times of turmoil. The 20th day of September 1863 would prove to be the “high watermark” for Bragg’s army.”

to the enemy through a bayonet charge, a fierce musket volley, an ear-splitting war cry, or a combination of all three. Considering these two contrasting conceptions of infantry tactics, it seems clear that Longstreet, either by training or through instinct, applied both methods with equal effectiveness. The Battle of Chickamauga is a stark example of his use of shock action to carry the day, just as his performance at Fredericksburg showed his ability to apply an “engineer” solution in battle. The wooded terrain at Chickamauga allowed Longstreet’s forces to execute a concealed approach march at the end of which he massed overwhelming combat power against a small segment of the enemy’s line with the intent of overwhelming whatever Federal unit had the misfortune of being positioned there. Longstreet arrayed his forces in depth to ensure he had the strength to not only penetrate the first line of Federal defenses, but also exploit that success, thereby rupturing the entire Union defensive scheme. Aftermath Although the Battle of Chickamauga forced Union forces to retreat back to Chattanooga, Bragg’s great chance to cut their escape route and destroy them was lost. Internal dissension within the Army of Tennessee was rampant, and Bragg’s subordinates united in an attempt to have him relieved of command. In this depressing drama, Longstreet played a sad part, coming to be seen as the leader of the anti-Bragg faction. As he would realize in the years following the war, he was out of his element in dealing with politics and intrigue. Ultimately, Bragg’s greatest ally, Confederate President Jefferson Davis, ensured that he would remain in command, and Longstreet departed for a difficult and unsuccessful campaign in eastern Tennessee. However, Longstreet’s battlefield performance at Chickamauga was a fine example of highly effective and flexible combat leadership. He stepped into an extremely difficult and confused situation and managed to fashion a sound plan of attack. His analysis of the terrain was quick and perceptive, and he rightly understood the need to adjust his tactics based on preexisting conditions and other considerations. Great commanders build their reputations on battlefields; unfortunately, history attempts to judge James Longstreet based on political and personal biases. There is no doubt that many aspects of his career deserve criticism, but this outstanding commander amassed a formidable record of combat achievement that is little appreciated. He was a fighter who rapidly and accurately assessed a situation and subsequently applied the best solution based on that assessment. Even though he, like many other commanders of that day, preferred to fight from a position of formidable strength that would force his enemy to attack in the open and suffer heavy casualties, he was not chained to any particular tactical dogma. Longstreet adjusted his tactics to the terrain and the enemy in an effort to gain victory while sacrificing as few of his soldiers as possible. Despite post-war assertions that he was merely a capable defensive fighter, James Longstreet was equally effective in the offense. During many other engagements both before and after Chickamauga, he clearly showed his mettle. The observations and comments of his enemies in blue attest to his prowess in the attack. At Gettysburg, as he personally led elements from one of his brigades forward to seize the Peach Orchard, a captured Union soldier who saw Longstreet in action commented admiringly, “[o]ur generals don’t do that sort of thing.”19 At the Battle of the Wilderness, it was Longstreet who fiercely attacked the Federal flank and saved the Army of Northern Virginia from disaster before falling severely wounded. Union General Winfield Scott Hancock, recalling Longstreet’s Wilderness flank attack said that “[he] rolled me up like a wet blanket.”20 However, it was from his own commander, the legendary Robert E. Lee, that Longstreet would receive his highest compliment. No other subordinate, not even Stonewall Jackson, enjoyed Lee’s confidence more. Had he been merely a capable defensive fighter, it is doubtful that Lee would have referred to James Longstreet as “the staff in my right hand.”21 Theses statements are testaments to the bravery and dogged determination of a general whose skills as a commander were not confined to merely one form of warfare. The controversy surrounding his disagreement with Lee at Gettysburg has clouded the judgment of history against James Longstreet. However, a close and impartial examination of his military record exonerates him from the false indictments leveled by his politically motivated and self-serving enemies in the postwar years. He was not perfect, but he could hit the enemy as hard as any leader on either side of the Civil War. The Battle of Chickamauga is just one example of James Longstreet’s talent as an offensive commander, and it is one that future military leaders and historians should remember. Notes 1Glenn W. LaFantasie, “Considering Longstreet’s Legacy,” With My Face to the Enemy: Perspectives on the Civil War, Robert Cowley, ed., Berkley Books, New York, 2001, pp. 332-347. 2James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, Barnes and Noble, New York, 2004, p. 373. 3Moxley G. Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer, Neale Publishing Company, New York, 1905, p. 193. 4Longstreet, p. 376. 5John B. Hood, Advance and Retreat: Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1959, p. 62. 6Longsreet, p. 376. 7Sears W. Cabell, The “Bulldog”: Longstreet at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, Ruralist Press, Inc., Atlanta, 1938, p. 15. 8Longstreet, p. 385. 9Ibid., p. 377. 10Ibid., p. 373. 11Ibid., p. 383. 12John Bowers, Chickamauga and Chattanooga: The Battles that Doomed the Confederacy, Harper Collins, New York, 1994, p. 114. 13Sorrel, p. 195. 14Longstreet, p. 383. 15Steven E. Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns, The University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1998, p. 116. 16Longstreet, p. 384. 17Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1987, p. 140. 18Ibid., p. 141. 19Randall Bedwell, ed., May I Quote You, General Longstreet? Observations and Utterances from the South’s Great Generals, Cumberland House, Nashville, 1997, p. 43. 20Ibid., p. 46. 21Jeffrey D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier— A Biography, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1994, p. 152. Major Chad Foster is currently serving as an instructor, Department of Military Instruction, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received a B. S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, Air Assault School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor (1-66 AR), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division (ID), Taji, Iraq; commander, D Company, 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood, TX; S3 (Air), 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3/7 CAV), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA; and scout platoon leader, A Troop, 3/7 CAV, 3d ID, Fort Stewart. 12 —