Future of Armor

48 — January-February 2007 Editor’s Note: Although the author’s view of full-spectrum operations clearly places this article in a mid-1960s context, he nevertheless argues for a broadly based approach to training. Given the current threat we are facing and the potential threats we may face, Captain Brian Brady reminds us that the issues we are struggling with today are neither new nor unique. In view of the present world situation, this article is an attempt to stimulate the armor leaders of today so that there will be armor leaders of tomorrow. “Armor is still fighting World War II on the European battlefields.” This statement was made by a guest lecturer to a group of Armor officers at the Armor School at Fort Knox. Since the Second World War and the development of the atomic bomb, armor has placed its entire emphasis on the develop ment of equipment and tactics for the nuclear battlefield. The train ing of its officers is also almost entirely oriented toward this type of warfare. Armor must be prepared to fight not only on the nuclear bat tlefield of Europe, but it must be able to participate anywhere in the world in counterinsurgency operations. It must not only de velop vehicles for these types of operations, but armor must train its officers to fight and survive in a counterinsurgency operation. The future of armor lies in its officers and noncommissioned officers, developing new concepts for its employment in limited war and counterguerrilla operations. If armor is not able to be em ployed in this type of role, it will find itself becoming less and less “THE COMBAT ARM OF

DE CISION.”

The development of ideas requires that an individual become exposed to the problem, its be ginnings, development, and the lessons that were learned from operations against it. To be more explicit, I mean that in order to fully understand these “wars of liberation,” an individual must have an understanding of the theory and meaning of com munism, of how an insurgency begins and sustains itself through its various stages of development. Of prime importance are the his torical examples of combating an insurgency to draw upon the lessons that can be learned from them. A study of the use of ar mor by the French in Indochina provides valuable information on how not to employ armor in guerrilla warfare. The old adage, “if someone wants to learn it, they can do it on their own time,” does not seem appropriate to a subject such as this. The primary reason is that many posts do not have sufficient research facilities to permit a detailed study of guerrilla warfare and its associated subjects. The second reason is that of adequate time to pursue the subject while performing another primary job. A service school, not a spe cialized school, must include in struction in counterinsurgency operations. This is needed not only to stimulate the thinking of officers toward new concepts, but for the survival of the individual acting in the role of an advisor or commander of a rifle company in counterinsurgency operations. The instruction should start when the officer attends the Ar mor Officer Basic Course. This instruction should then be con tinued at all levels of his military education. By doing this, the officer is kept abreast of current doctrine and technological changes as he progresses in his career. To cite what I believe is the unbalanced thinking of armor and its preoccupation with fight ing a nuclear war in Europe, I will use my schooling and training as an example. In 1962, when I attended the Armor Officer Basic Course, counterinsurgency operations were in their infancy. Nothing was included in the course of in struction concerning this type of operation. The course was entirely oriented toward fight a con ventional war. After spending three years in Europe, I returned to CONUS to attend the Armor Officers Career Course. The course lasts nine months. Of these nine months, about forty hours are devoted to all the aspects of insurgency and counterinsur gency operations. The remaining eight months and three weeks are spent teaching the traditional con cepts of employment of armor and its associated weapons and communications systems. A nuclear weapons program, leading to a prefix five, is also included in the curriculum. Is this enough to stimulate thinking and to learn how to fight in counterinsurgency opera tion. I do not think it is. The career officer must have a thorough knowledge of the current concepts of armor employment and Pages from the Past: Future of Armor by Captain Brian William Brady (Reprinted from the November-December 1966 issue of ARMOR) If armor is to have a predominant role in the army of the future, it must train its officers to fight and survive in any type operation, ... nuclear or non-nuclear wars . . . against “wars of liberation.” Captain Brian William Brady was commissioned in 1961 from The University of Notre Dame. He graduated from the Armor Officer Basic Course in

1962. He was then assigned to the 3rd Battalion 37th Armor, Germany, where he served as a tank platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, support platoon leader, battalion S4, and company commander.

January-February 2007 — 49 the utilization of the combined arms team in all types of conventional operations. The majority of in struction is rightly concerned with these concepts for they provide the foundation that the officer needs as he progresses in his military career. But, a properly trained ar mored officer needs a detailed un derstanding of the employment and capabilities of infantry weap ons. This training should not be limited to classroom instruction, but should include firing and field training. Then, using the basic concepts of employment of the combined arms team along with an understanding of the capabilities of ar mor and infantry weapons, a detailed program of instruction on the history of communism and an analysis of past insurgent and counterinsurgent operations should be conducted. In the final phase, seminars or round table discussions between students and qualified instructors should take place. These forums would allow an exchange of new ideas on both tactics and vehicles between of ficers, which would serve as a sounding board for badly needed ideas for the employment of Ar mor in guerrilla warfare. Besides tying itself to a con ventional war in the training of its officers, the tanks of the future are being developed on the premise that the next war will be fought in Europe. The Sheridan and the U.S./FRG Main Battle Tank are being developed for such a war. Security restrictions prevent a detailed analysis of these vehicles. However, their weight alone pre cludes their employment in an area such as Vietnam. Before proceeding with the type of vehicle armor needs to develop in conjunction with the Sheridan and U.S./ FRG Main Battle Tank, I will make some generalizations that will apply to most areas where the United States may be called upon to fight in a counterinsurgency operation. A country that is most vulner able to an insurgency is an “underdeveloped nation.” It is basically an agrarian society. Industrializa tion is very limited. Because of its poor economic structure, the land remains untouched once outside the large cities. The major road network is very poor and sometimes nonexistent. The majority of these countries lie in a climate that is either hot and rainy or cold and snowy. And within most of these areas, there is a combination of rolling plains, mountains, and swampy areas. The point of this general ana lysis is to point out the flexibility that armor must attain to carry out its mission under varying con ditions. These areas are entirely different from Europe. Roads which are essential for armor to attain its maximum effects from its firepower and shock effect would not support fifty-ton vehicles for sustained periods of time. Bridges are not built to sustain the weight of an M60 tank. Once off the roads, armor can expect to encounter terrain varying from jungles and swamps to snow-covered mountains. To accomplish its mission in counterinsurgency operations, armor must develop an entirely new tank or tank-like vehicle. This vehicle should be light weight, weighing less than thirty-five tons and have an immediate deep-water fording capability. Its ground pressure must be small in relation to its weight to enable it to traverse swampy areas. Armor protection would have to be sacrificed to gain this weight reduction. However, since it can be assumed that the insurgent will not present a tank threat, this is possible. Mobility must predominate over armor protection. The French in Indochina found that armor protection was not of prime importance. In an ambush when the first and last vehicles had a track shot-off, mobility was of paramount importance. The French tanks did not have suffi cient mobility to break out, and they were literally killed at leisure by the communists. This increased mobility is also necessary for the tank to be able to support the infantry mounted in M113s. Because of the trafficability of the M113 and future infantry carriers, the present-day tank could not support them in many operations in which armor could strike the decisive blow. Because of the lack of an armor threat, the caliber of the main gun could be 90mm or smaller. This would also assist in weight reduc tion of the vehicle. The tank must include two highly reliable ma chine guns with a high rate of fire. Both the number of rounds and types of rounds can be reduced. The tank should carry a HEAT round, for material-type targets, and a canister round for use against mass attacks by infantry and in ambushes where the exact locations of enemy troops are un known. A more effective canister round must be developed. It should be effective at ranges up to fifteen-hundred yards and have a large dispersion pattern. The space that is gained by re ducing the basic load of main gun ammunition should be used to store additional ammunition for the machine guns. This will enable the tank to conduct frequent reconnaissance by fire missions to avoid an ambush. Traditional concepts of em ployment of armored divisions and brigades in huge armored operations must give way to con cepts of employment of battalion- and company-sized task forces. The nature of the terrain and the enemy armor can expect to fight dictate this change. A closer working relationship with the in fantry involving close mutual support of offensive operations and for security must be developed. Security has always been a problem for tank units, and it is compounded in a guerrilla war. New ideas, both physical and electronic, need to be found. The possible employment of mounted surveillance devices, which would accompany the column as it moved, needs to be explored. To provide not only security, but to facilitate combined operations, the feasibility of a combined arms battalion should be investigated. There is no doubt that armor will be a dominant force on the nuclear battlefields of Europe. But it must not place its entire em phasis on a war that may never be fought. If armor is to have a predominant role in the army of the future, it must train its of ficers to fight and survive in any type of operation. It must de velop equipment for employment against “wars of liberation.” It must be able to fight a nuclear and non-nuclear war in areas that are untrafficable to today’s tank. The development of new tactical con cepts is vital. Armor must be able to fight not only in a war in Eu rope, but it must be able to fight effectively in an area such as Viet nam, if it is to remain the “COM BAT ARM OF DECISION.”