Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success

“I am not an Arabist, and history doesn’t matter here. We are rewriting history.” — Unnamed staff member for the Coalition Provisional Authority1 In military and political realms, the possibility exists that some of us do not appreciate the rich history and culture of not only the Arab people as a whole, but more specifically Iraqis. This deficiency cannot be allowed to continue, given the current battle in Iraq that we are waging to “win hearts and minds.” Think about that concept for a moment — how do you win hearts and minds? Overall, it takes a knowledge base of the culture and people with whom you will be interacting before you can begin to achieve success. Soldiers deploying to Iraq deserve, and need, training and education on the complex history and rich culture they will be facing once they arrive. The current emphasis on marksmanship training for units deploying to Iraq is necessary; however, you reach a point of diminishing returns. Long, drawn-out gun-fights are not the norm in Iraq these days; much time is spent interacting with civic and military leaders in an effort to rebuild infrastructure and establish the Iraqi army (IA). Additionally, the majority of the intelligence reporting that takes place does so at the local level. On a daily basis, company-level leaders need to be armed with cultural understanding, not just awareness, to be successful in Iraq. The Role of History Many Americans are not keenly aware of the history of the United States or its founding fathers; the opposite is true in the Arab world. With a complex history starting in the age of the Caliphs and progressing through the Ottoman Empire to the current era in the Middle East, Arabs are extremely knowledgeable of what has brought them to this point.2 Moreover, this history is primarily based on Islamic teachings and reflects their beliefs in the will of God. Since the majority of the Arab world is Muslim, this tie between history, culture, and religion is extremely important — nothing exists without religion. For Iraqis, they have seen the results of working with the United States in the past. All too often, Arab nations and people have been supported by the U. S. Government, only to be cast aside when no longer needed. Simultaneously, we have supported authoritarian regimes that have at times committed crimes against their own people. Bottom line, the Arab world views us with a jaundiced eye and is suspicious of our intentions. The onus is on the Americans to make a good first im- 42 — pression and show that we truly are there to help them. We do this by taking part in their culture, and by understanding, rather than simply dismissing, their perspective on history. Cultural Immersion While many units deploying to the Middle East do not have the time or inclination to study the culture or history of the people with whom they will be working, a quick fix is “cultural immersion.” This term is loosely used to relay the fact that personal risk has to be taken daily to begin to understand the complexities of not only the culture you are thrown into, but the people and tribes with which you will interact for a year. Without putting that foot forward and extending the proverbial “olive branch,” we cannot truly hope to win hearts and minds. The best opportunity for U. S. Army soldiers to become immersed in Arab culture is by serving on a military transition team (MiTT). During Operation Iraqi Freedom III, our troop was tasked to provide a MiTT to an IA company. We trained and mentored IA soldiers until they could take over responsibility for the area we controlled — we put an “Iraqi face” on the counterinsurgency fight. To accomplish this, our troop moved to the Iraqi compound. For the foreseeable future, we would share the same sleeping arrangements, toilets, and occasionally food, with our counterparts. This commitment showed the IA soldiers that we truly were there to support them — they knew that if things got bad, we were not going to run and hide on our forward operating base (FOB) and eat ice cream. It also introduced our soldiers to Arab culture and Iraqis up close and personal. No longer were they yelling incessantly at the impatient Iraqi at the checkpoint; they had to learn to communicate across languages and cultures to achieve a common goal. Moving our troop to the Iraqi compound gave us the opportunity to frequently get out in the community. This was essential; vital human intelligence was developed because local citizens were confident that we would protect them. Over time, more locals provided us with tips and leads that were previously unheard of in our area. Not only did improvised explosive device attacks decrease, but the number of caches discovered increased. Being present and playing a role in the community, while showing respect for the local culture, pays dividends. Ultimately, accepting great tactical risk and immersing ourselves in the culture and community, our troop enabled our IA brethren to become the first company in its battalion capable of independent operations; they planned and conducted operations with minimal oversight. The simple fact is that during the period we lived in the IA compound, bonds were built that lasted throughout the deployment and all but guaranteed our success. Overall, immersing ourselves in Iraqi culture paid great dividends. Training and Teaching I was the fortunate one in my troop; the U. S. Army sent me to the Peace Operations Center in Zarqa, Jordan. This training afforded me the opportunity to immerse myself in Arab culture, as well as providing me the added benefit of consulting other Arabs on how to best handle “While many units deploying to the Middle East do not have the time or inclination to study the culture or history of the people with whom they will be working, a quick fix is “cultural immersion.” This term is loosely used to relay the fact that personal risk has to be taken daily to begin to understand the complexities of not only the culture you are thrown into, but the people and tribes with which you will interact for a year. Without putting that foot forward and extending the proverbial “olive branch,” we cannot truly hope to win hearts and minds.” “The current emphasis on marksmanship training for units deploying to Iraq is necessary; however, you reach a point of diminishing returns. Long, drawn-out gunfights are not the norm in Iraq these days; much time is spent interacting with civic and military leaders in an effort to rebuild infrastructure and establish the Iraqi army (IA).” — 43

However, we need to throw emotional challenges at leaders and soldiers — the limit truly is our own imagination. For example, the Ranger School approach deprives soldiers of sleep and food to increase their level of stress while conducting hot and cold training scenarios. Leaders can think of many other ways to get inside soldiers’ heads and toy with their “Killing and winning hearts and minds simultaneously requires two seemingly contradictory men-talities. On one hand, soldiers must be the steely-eyed killers they train to be — able to identify an enemy insurgent and drop him (or her, as the case could be) with a single, well-aimed rifle shot. Yet, at the same time, we expect these same soldiers to be smiling at the ‘friendly’ locals, particularly children, sometimes even handing out candy or school supplies.” emotions. Hopefully, this article will stimulate some good discussion on this specific subject. Despite all of our best efforts to train leaders and soldiers for the rigors of fighting a counterinsurgency, it will not make us experts on emotional control — that is physiological. However, we need to accomplish at least two things: gain experience at simultaneously dealing with emotional stress and tactical stress (by rapidly changing between diverse missions); and leaders should know when they have reached the point of being unable to control their own emotions. Equally important, leaders should know when subordinates have reached their inability to control emotions. Armed with this knowledge, we will be better postured to accomplish the two difficult objectives of the counterinsurgency fight — kill the enemy and win hearts and minds. Major Jonathan Dunn is currently assigned as an instructor of International Relations, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. A. from John Hopkins University. His military education includes the Armor Captains Career Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Killer Troop, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/2 ACR), Operation Iraqi Freedom; regimental S4/assistant S4, 2d ACR, Fort Polk, LA; support platoon leader, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry (2-8 CAV), 1st Cavalry Division (CD), Fort Hood, TX; and tank company executive officer and platoon leader, C Company, 2-8 CAV, 1st CD, Fort Hood. Leadership continued from Page 19 44 — sensitive situations. We trained on everything from cordon and searches with real Jordanians, not just soldiers in MILES gear, to after-hours language classes. This opportunity proved invaluable; I developed a baseline understanding of the culture, which enabled me to immediately immerse in theater. While not every unit has the time, money, or energy for this type of training, it is imperative that time and resources are devoted to developing a baseline cultural understanding at the non commissioned officer (NCO) level and below. Overall, staff sergeants and sergeants will represent the unit on a daily basis. If units are afforded the opportunity to send soldiers to some type of cultural training, they should seize the opportunity to develop their own “subject-matter experts.” For example, by sending an NCO to the training, the unit will have someone capable of educating its soldiers; not only will the NCO teach professional development classes to peers, but also to subordinates. Overall, by educating junior NCOs, we have the capability to infuse cultural understanding at the lowest levels within our ranks. Once again, due to the reduced likelihood of high-intensity firefights in the current operating environment, a happy medium can be found between training for combat and teaching soldiers about the people with whom they will spend the next year of their lives. A good example, which has been somewhat effective, is using Kurdish-Americans at training centers. Some may think there is not enough training time to effectively interact with these “role players.” Always remember, every little piece of training that exposes soldiers to other cultures pays dividends in the long run. Overall, there are officers and soldiers who resist the idea of learning about and understanding other cultures. A resistance to learning goes against the grain of a well-educated and professional army. It is imperative to train U. S. Army units on the culture and history of the Iraqi people. Furthermore, it is by immersion that soldiers will gain an understanding of Arab culture, which will increase chances of success throughout Iraq’s communities and villages. Notes 1Walter C. Rodgers, Sleeping With Custer and the 7th Cavalry, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2005, p. 198. 2Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, 2004, p. xix. Captain Ralph Elder is currently assigned to the Materiel Requirements Directorate, Future Force Integration Directorate, Fort Bliss, TX. He received a B. S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captain Career Course, Scout Leaders Course, and Air Defense Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, troop commander, B Troop, 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq and Fort Stewart, GA; and platoon leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq, Kuwait, and Fort Stewart.