Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor

Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor by Major Jeff Weinhofer Every leader in the U.S. Army is keenly aware of the mission to train Iraqi forces to assume security responsibilities for their country. To accomplish this mission, a military transition team (MiTT) embeds and trains with Iraqi forces, preparing them to be self-sustainable tactically, operationally, and logistically, so that they can assume security responsibilities for Iraq. This article focuses on the inner workings of a MiTT, building relationships with coalition partners, and the nuances associated with training Iraqi soldiers. As a MiTT team leader in Iraq, my team assisted the Iraqis in building a T-72 tank battalion from the ground up, and trained the unit to become operational in less than six months. After reaching transition readiness assessment 2, the unit participated in three out-of-sector deployments in support of coalition force objectives and assumed a small battlespace for the remainder of our tour. Team Dynamics The interpersonal group dynamics are different for every MiTT; some teams gel together as a single unit over time and some do not. Our team came together about three months into the deployment. The nature of group dynamics and team camaraderie have a direct impact on its ability to accomplish the mission. If a team cannot work together effectively, it cannot successfully advise an Iraqi battalion. A MiTT functions much better as a team than a group of individual military advisors. Some teams naturally develop cliques within the team, and team leaders must be aware of this possibility and immediately remedy the situation if it occurs. If the cliques are hindering the mission, then remove the soldiers who cannot work together. Team leaders must also be aware of team morale. As the deployment progresses, the frustration of working with Iraqis and the vast cultural differences take a toll on everyone. Each team will likely have one or two soldiers who do not like working with Iraqis and would much rather be a member of a coalition unit. In this case, team leaders must remember that the mission is training and developing Iraqi forces, but not all of your time and emphasis should be put into the Iraqi unit at the expense of your advisory team. Such a practice will only exacerbate tension that will naturally develop among some advisors toward Iraqis. Team leaders must also find ways to maintain the team’s morale so they stay focused on the mission. A Special Forces officer recommended that we create our own private sanctuary (our living area) which no Iraqi soldiers could enter. In retrospect, this was a great idea that provided our team with a little bit of space to unwind and maintain our sanity. Working with Coalition Forces Part of the responsibility of MiTT soldiers is to educate local coalition forces on the capabilities and limitations of Iraqi units. Many coalition units have a wealth of experience fighting insurgencies in either Iraq or Afghanistan, but that experience does not apply to Iraqi forces. MiTTs embedded within Iraqi army units know more about those units than do local coalition forces. In the near term, military advisors must become subject-matter experts on Iraqi forces. Eventually, there will be enough officers and noncommissioned officers in our Army, who have served on military transition teams, to share their knowledge across the force when they return to home units. Whatever the reason, MiTTs should avoid alienating senior U.S. commanders partnered in coalition units. While there may be decisions that we strongly disagree with made by coalition brethren concerning our Iraqi units, we are still on January-February 2007 — 39 the same team. Mutual understanding is required here. Team leaders must keep in mind that the job of field-grade commanders is complex in Iraq; not only must they fight against deadly insurgencies, but they are simultaneously responsible for developing Iraqi forces, including police and border patrol forces, in their areas of operation. Coalition battalions have hundreds of soldiers, all with the necessary equipment and support assets, as well as a competent staff. A MiTT has ten personnel with three M1114 gun trucks; we must also live on a third-world infrastructure. Building good relationships with coalition units will only benefit advisor teams. For example, coalition units provided our team with a generator (to maintain electricity during daily power outages), medical supplies, daily intelligence updates, and main tenance support. Dealing with Iraqis Dealing with Iraqis can be very frustrating; however, this is the MiTT’s primary mission. Teaching Iraqis requires patience and the ability to establish relationships with counterparts. Such relationship building can be cultivated in a number of ways, such as talking business over dinner and chai, taking your Iraqi counterpart to visit his soldiers on a mission, or a simple exchange of gifts. With every mission or task, each advisor should constantly assess the Iraqi force’s performance and devise a plan to gradually wean them from U.S. support so they can facilitate independent operations. Some military advisors have fallen into the trap of judging their successes by actions on the battlefield, such as the number of patrols conducted, the number of improvised explosive devices found, or the number of combat action badges awarded. This is the wrong yardstick to measure success. It is common knowledge that nearly all U.S. soldiers and officers are competent and quite capable of mission success. MiTT mission success must be viewed through a prism that assesses the growth and effectiveness of the Iraqi unit with which they work. Some advisors and coalition units are too quick to jump in and fix problems without attempting to teach Iraqi units the process, as well as the purpose, for performing certain tasks. The conventional Army can learn a few things from the Special Forces community regarding training indigenous forces to fight in counterinsurgency environments. It is not uncommon for team leaders to serve as the Iraqi battalion commander’s advisor. I quickly noticed the legacy of the Saddam Hussein regime and the old Iraqi army — centralized decisionmaking. Consequently, I focused the majority of my time on advising my counterpart and attempting to influence his decisions. Due to the complexity of working with Iraqis, this was not always successful — working with Iraqis is an art, not a science. Good decisions from the top made everyone’s life easier, especially the Iraqi jundi (soldier) at the bottom of the command structure. For example, if the commander made a decision that passed a common-sense test, despite better available options, I supported his decision because it was an “Iraqi decision.” I challenged decisions during our private meetings that made no common or tactical sense. Since its inception, Iraq has a history of being a warlike society, complete with multiple military coups and wars. Iraqis respond better to direct orders or an authoritative, confident tone, as opposed to passive suggestions. When addressing the battalion commander, always show him respect in public. In private, it is acceptable to be more forceful with him in an effort to get him to follow a preferred course of action. Whenever the need arises to address lower-ranking soldiers, work through the commander or his designated representative. Helpful Hints for Working with Iraqi Forces

• Iraqis will not always take your advice, but there is no need to get upset — “Every leader in the U.S. Army is keenly aware of the mission to train Iraqi forces to assume security responsibilities for their country. To accomplish this mission, a military transition team (MiTT) embeds and trains with Iraqi forces, preparing them to be self-sustainable tactically, operationally, and logistically, so that they can assume security responsibilities for Iraq.” “Teaching Iraqis requires patience and the ability to establish relationships with counterparts. Such relationship building can be cultivated in a number of ways, such as talking business over dinner and chai, taking your Iraqi counterpart to visit his soldiers on a mission, or a simple exchange of gifts. With every mission or task, each advisor should constantly assess the Iraqi force’s performance and devise a plan to gradually wean them from U.S. support so they can facilitate independent operations.” 40 — January-February 2007 that battle is lost. Get over it and prepare for the next one. When this occurred, some of the advisors on my team became a little unnerved; I reminded them I was the battalion commander’s advisor, not the leader of the 2d Tank Battalion.

• Do not be afraid to take an occasional afternoon ejazza (vacation). When not on a mission, Iraqis nap from about 1430 to 1730, give or take 15 minutes, and since they are rested, they work late into the night. A great deal of business takes place after 2000 hours. Most Army leaders, complete with our type-A personalities, would be aghast at such an idea, but it seemed to be effective. Applying American expectations to an Iraqi cultural trait will often result in disappointment. When not participating in this Iraqi tradition, I spent time doing physical training, catching up on paperwork, and conducting team meetings.

• The jundis frequently approach advisors and ask for favors or describe a problem they want addressed. The advisor should immediately take the issue to the soldier’s chain of command and mentor them on how to handle the situation. You will probably have to protect the name of the soldier for fear of command repercussion since such action is still frowned on in the Iraqi military culture. Fixing the problem yourself, although expedient, is a step backward in developing the unit. Our goal is to build Iraqi soldiers’ confidence in their own leaders versus the Americans. In theory, if you do your mission effectively, you will gradually work yourself out of a job as the unit’s leadership matures and becomes more competent.

• Assign every member of your team an Iraqi counterpart. A team may tend to focus on the command group and primary staff of the embedded unit, but all team members need someone to advise. There is no downside to an advisor providing one-on-one counsel to an Iraqi soldier — this can only help with the overall mission.

• Never pass up an opportunity to train the Iraqis. In our battalion, personnel shortages, leave cycles, and mission requirements practically wiped out the chance of additional training, minus a few staff elements. Our S3 advisor started teaching officer professional development sessions on various military subjects. Admittedly, there were only about five leaders present, but it was progress. In theory, Iraqi forces present for the training can share what they learn with their peers and subordinates. The officer professional development sessions were generally conducted in the late evening to maximize participation and accommodate afternoon ejazza.

• Training and mentoring the unit is the MiTT’s primary role, but advisors must be vigilant to prevent the Iraqi unit from becoming too dependent on the team. There were several occasions where support was deliberately withheld because the team assessed the unit as capable of accomplishing a certain task with their own internal assets and institutional knowledge. Although this caused some friction between me and the Iraqi battalion commander, our relationship returned to its normal level in a day or two. In the long run, I am quite certain this was the right decision to facilitate the unit’s independence.

• In preparation for out-of-sector deployments, advisors must be very involved in the logistics planning process. Iraqis tend to only take enough supplies to last a few days, versus planning for a long-term deployment. We learned the hard way not to give the unit a list of the recommended classes of supplies to take; instead, a precombat inspection must be conducted to see what they actually load in their vehicles and connexes. Although there may be flaws in implementing the advisor mission, the transition team’s mission in Iraq is our best hope for securing the country and beginning a gradual drawdown of U.S. forces. Future advisors should embrace the culture and establish good relationships, constantly assess the performance of your embedded unit, and place some emphasis on main taining the morale of your own team. Following these steps is easier said than done, but will certainly assist in enabling mission success in this very important mission and complex environment. My tour of duty as a MiTT was the most challenging, frustrating, and yet rewarding of my Army career. The author welcomes any comments in regards to this article at jeff.weinhofer@ gmail.com. Major Jeff Weinhofer is currently an assistant professor of military science, Department of Military Science, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA. He received a B.S. from Slippery Rock University and an M.A. from Lehigh University. His military education includes Armor Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Ranger School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include team leader, Military Transition Team, 2d Iraqi Tank (T-72) Battalion, Taji, Iraq; commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; and liaison officer, 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. “Since its inception, Iraq has a history of being a warlike society, complete with multiple military coups and wars. Iraqis respond better to direct orders or an authoritative, confident tone, as opposed to passive suggestions. When addressing the battalion commander, always show him respect in public. In private, it is acceptable to be more forceful with him in an effort to get him to follow a preferred course of action. Whenever the need arises to address lower-ranking soldiers, work through the commander or his designated representative.” January-February 2007 — 41