Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations

Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations by Major Mark S. Leslie “Guerrillas never win wars but their adversaries often lose them.”1 — Charles W. Thayer When cultural sensitivity or cultural awareness is mentioned in regards to combat operations, it is often met with rolled eyes or groans from those who execute the orders. Many often think that cultural sensitivity is a weakness and is secondary to actual operations — this is incorrect. Cultural sensitivity incorporated into operations in Iraq is sometimes more valuable than other more conventional weapons in the U.S. Army’s inventory. Soldiers who are culturally aware and know how to apply that cultural awareness on the battlefield are 21st-century warriors. Integrating cultural sensitivity on the battlefield is something we all must do, and we must do it without putting soldiers at risk. Being sensitive to the local populace and respecting their culture is not a weakness. Soldiers should realize that their actions, deeds, and words during operations in Iraq are powerful tools. For example, it makes little difference if weapons are found or anyone is detained during a search operation; your actions could determine whether the residents of the house you are searching stay friendly, remain neutral, or become an enemy. The Army has come a long way on the subject of cultural sensitivity. All units deploying to Iraq are required a certain amount of cultural awareness training; soldiers learn a little of the language and a little about the culture. Units deploying also train traditional combat skills at the individual, squad, section, platoon, and company levels. Prior to my last deployment, I had been in combat several times and assumed the only kind of cultural sensitivity I needed to understand was the rules of engagement (ROE), not to mention giving the enemy as little consideration as legally possible in regards to humanity; after all, he is the enemy, right? It did not take long to realize that I had the wrong idea. I spent the majority of my time in Iraq living, working, eating, and fighting with the Iraq National Guard (ING), 24 hours a day, and quickly came to realize that I had to change my thinking if we were going to be successful. Through daily, often personal interaction, our soldiers saw U.S. units through the eyes of the Iraqis. This perception was not only from Iraqi soldiers, but everyone from the average Iraqi farmer to local “powerbrokers,” such as sheiks, council members, and police chiefs. Our unit leaders spent many hours with local citizens in their homes, on the street, and at our patrol base discussing various issues of concern. As a result of this new-found knowledge, we gradually adopted a more sensitive approach, and were very successful at not only finding and eliminating insurgents and caches, but also fostering and developing a good rapport with the local community. The intelligence we collected because of these relationships was incredible, and often we (the advisors) and our ING counterparts were the only people local informants would trust. What worked for our unit is not a cookie-cutter solution for all situations and all units. However, a few common themes of cultural sensitivity, when integrated into combat operations, can greatly influence the desired outcome. Cultural sensitivity is not something that can be learned and then tucked away in a rucksack for use later — it must be instilled in your soldiers, it must be in your training plan, and it must be used in everything you do on the battlefield in Iraq. I am not advocating treating the enemy with kid gloves; when it is time to be brutal (when engaging the enemy), then it is time to be brutal and eliminate the threat. However, all soldiers must be capable of making a mature decision, at the precise moment, to switch back to nonkinetic or nonlethal force. Integrating training scenarios where soldiers must make these decisions in a January-February 2007 — 35 few seconds will save lives on the streets of Iraq, not just American lives, but Iraqi lives as well. Below are suggested techniques for integrating cultural sensitivity into combat operations:

• Cultural awareness training. Soldiers must know what is culturally acceptable in Iraq.

• Language training. Invaluable skill that serves well throughout your tour. Every unit has its language training challenges, but anything is better than nothing. Knowing some of the language helps break down cultural barriers.

• Leader training. Develop scenario-based vignettes involving issues where force should or should not be used in training exercises.

• Rules of engagement and escalation of force training (EOF). EOF and ROE vignettes are culturally sensitive. Every soldier will have to make a life-or-death decision within seconds. Understanding ROE and EOF enhances soldiers’ chances of making the right decision. Put these scenarios in all levels of training.

• Diversify training events. Combine ROE, EOF, role playing, and civilians on the battlefield into all tactical exercises. Ensure there are consequences for cultural ignorance and rewards for incorporating cultural sensitivity into combat operations, without putting soldiers at risk.

• Draw the line. Emphasize that cultural sensitivity in no way jeopardizes the lives of soldiers. Ensure that soldiers understand that sometimes tactical decisions that are not culturally sensitive must be made; but whenever possible, care toward civilians and treating the populace with dignity and respect is “the culture of our organization.”

• Information operations (IO) training. This training should be conducted at all levels, from private to battalion commander. IO is a powerful tool and grasping the concept of how to integrate it into daily operations is paramount. Knowing IO is the name of the game; incorporate it at all levels of training.

• Every soldier is a sensor. Every soldier is an intelligence collector and must understand that he could observe something important. Verbal engagements on the battlefield happen more than kinetic engagements and must receive the same amount of attention. Debriefings are critical.

• Civil affairs training. Conduct predeployment training on understanding public works and how city governments work — including trash collection, water works, and city council meetings. Columbus, Georgia, or Killeen, Texas, is no where near Mosul, Iraq, but they do provide leaders a working model on which to base their “nation builder” role. Leaders should attend local government meetings and observe how issues are brought up, discussed, and resolved in a small city government.

• Embrace the culture. Difficult, but not impossible. Understanding Iraqis and how they think, operate, and act is a combat multiplier. It also reinforces the idea within your unit that neither the Iraqi people, nor Islam, are the enemy — insurgents are the enemy. The importance of cultural awareness and putting that knowledge to use in the form of cultural sensitivity during combat operations in a counterinsurgency is put into perspective by Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations. FM 3-07.22 defines an insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” The manual goes on to state that a counterinsurgency is, “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”2 This should clearly point out to all commanders and soldiers that our role in Iraq and Afghanistan is far more complicated and challenging than past conflicts, which were clearly high intensity in nature. Our mission in Iraq is defined by more than simple military objectives — every soldier is a warrior statesman; an ambassador of our intent in Iraq to make it a safe and secure environment for all Iraqis. The actions of every soldier during every engagement, verbal or otherwise, are critical in conveying this message. The actions of every soldier at every level during daily dealings with Iraqi citizens are critical. Perception is reality. If Iraqis perceive us as the enemy, with our only goal to eliminate the insurgent threat, we are doomed to failure. A counterinsurgency is a much more complicated war. Success is not defined solely by eliminating insurgents; in fact, it is impossible without the application of a much more complex and difficult approach. FMI 3-07.22 puts the warrior statesman duties into perspective by clearly defining the endstate and criteria of success: protect the population; establish local political institutions; reinforce local governments; eliminate insurgent capabilities; and exploit information from local sources.3 In our unit’s battlespace, it is up to the maneuver commander, with guidance from higher, to determine how to prioritize these goals. However, it is a mistake to think that all are not simultaneous events that must be juggled daily. To correctly fight a counterinsurgency in Iraq, we must change the culture of many of our units. Traditionally, as an Army, we focus on eliminating the insurgent threat, which is the easy part and only one part of the equation. The other prongs of attacking a counterinsurgency are much harder and more difficult to accomplish. We must establish in our subordinates’ “Being sensitive to the local populace and respecting their culture is not a weakness. Soldiers should realize that their actions, deeds, and words during operations in Iraq are powerful tools. For example, it makes little difference if weapons are found or anyone is detained during a search operation; your actions could determine whether the residents of the house you are searching stay friendly, remain neutral, or become an enemy.” 36 — January-February 2007 minds the whole concept of being there to protect the Iraqi people, much like the logo on domestic law enforcement vehicles, “to protect and serve.” Often, soldiers spend entire tours in Iraq with the mindset that all Iraqi citizens are potential threats — which is true — everyone is a potential threat. However, every Iraqi citizen is a potential ally, potential informant, and potential friend. To only consider them a potential threat is a mistake and will severely limit the unit’s capabilities. To best ascertain if an Iraqi citizen is a potential friend or foe, pay close attention to how they behave. Keep in mind that our actions have a huge impact on their decision between friend and foe. A unit that is culturally ignorant and makes no attempt to use cultural awareness training on the battlefield during daily operations is doing more harm than good for the overall picture — regardless of how many insurgents they eliminate. A counterinsurgency is not about eliminating the threat, but more about eliminating support for the threat. If our actions, either knowingly or innocently, produce more insurgents, then we are not accomplishing the goals set forth for defeating an insurgency in FMI 3-07.22.4 Insurgents often create support for their actions by eliciting us to overreact, and we often unwittingly fall into their plans. For example, if an improvised explosive device (IED) attack is initiated on a U.S. patrol or convoy and a residence is located within a few hundred meters, what is the patrol’s first reaction? Based on personal experience and from talking with hundreds of other combat veterans, the normal response is to immediately raid that house. This is tactically sensible; if the IED was within sight of the house, then logically, the occupants of the house must be responsible or know something. To ignore the residence would be irresponsible; however, our actions and how we conduct the search and questioning are more important. If we aggressively approach the house, kick open the door, conduct a search, and question the owner of the house, he will most likely claim to know nothing about the IED. Our overreaction has just humiliated the owner and proved to the local populace that the message the insurgents spread throughout Iraq is correct. One of the most common messages spread by insurgents is that “Americans have no regard for you or your property.” Using the same scenario with a different approach can enhance conditions for successful information gathering. For example, assuming there is no direct fire threat from the house, isolate the objective. Use all the normal precautions when approaching the house, but instead of kicking open the door, simply knock. When the owner comes to the door, greet him and ask to search his house. He will comply because he realizes that there are no real alternatives. Ask him to move his family to one room, and assign security to that room. We cleared houses according to standard operating procedures: we thoroughly searched one room, requested the owner move his family members (children and women) to that room, and placed the room under security. We then began a detailed search of the house and surrounding grounds. During the search, we asked the owner, or a male family member, to accompany us during the search to prevent any accusations of personal property theft. We also took great care not to “trash” the house; the average Iraqi does not have a lot of material wealth, and for us to destroy what little he has is not the way to demonstrate our concern for those we are there to protect. While the search was underway, we would quietly move the owner to an area that his neighbors could not see and asked if he knew anything about the IED incident. The owner may not know exact details, or even be willing to share them with you if he does, but he may give you bits of information that will be useful in finding those responsible. He is much more likely to assist you if you show him dignity and respect. He is very unlikely, in most cases, to be responsible for the attack because he realizes he will automatically be presumed “guilty by proximity.” However, if you find incriminating evidence, you have the option of detaining the individual. This is just one example of integrating cultural sensitivity into combat operations. There are thousands of situations, but no cookie-cutter solution, as the tactical situation is different in every case. There are a few rules of thumb that will apply to many situations in Iraq when conducting operations similar to the one above:

• Assuming there is no direct fire threat, knock on the door, instead of kicking it in.

• Whenever possible, allow the head of household to give instructions to his family.

• Allow the women and children to stay inside in a central location (under security).

• Do not zip tie or question potential informants/suspects in front of family or other males to be questioned.

• If the decision is made to detain an individual, allow him to get personal items, such as medicine, shoes, and glasses (under security) — this serves well during tactical questioning; it shows you have humanity and are concerned for the welfare of the detained individual.

• Depending on the situation, a gift to the family may be appropriate. Maybe a box of clothes for the children or some “Through daily, often personal interaction, our soldiers saw U.S. units through the eyes of the Iraqis. This perception was not only from Iraqi soldiers, but everyone from the average Iraqi farmer to local “powerbrokers,” such as sheiks, council members, and police chiefs. Our unit leaders spent many hours with local citizens in their homes, on the street, and at our patrol base discussing various issues of concern.” January-February 2007 — 37 other type of gift. This may seem very naïve, but the effect on the village and neighbors is surprising. It is important to separate the detainee from his family (remember, he is not the enemy yet). Our actions determine which path they choose. For example, the gesture of good will and the care taken in searching his home demonstrates respect for his property. Respecting the family and preserving the detainee’s dignity has far-reaching benefits in the community. The message that reaches the members of the community will confirm that a “bad guy” was detained, but his family and property were treated with respect and genuine concern was shown for the welfare of the family. This message supports one of the goals in defeating a counterinsurgency by “exploiting information from local sources.” If the people of the community feel you are genuinely concerned for their welfare and interest, they are more likely to approach you with information on potential threats. The fight in Iraq is not only with insurgents, but it is in the hearts and minds of Iraqi citizens. It is not easy to win the hearts and minds of people, but it can be accomplished by demonstrating humanity and compassion in our everyday actions. Every soldier should embrace and understand his role as an ambassador and intelligence collector for his command. Every soldier must understand that we are not just in Iraq to fight against insurgency, but to win over the population, which is where the fight is won or lost. More often than not, when insurgents choose to engage us with direct fire, we are clearly the victor. The enemy chooses to fight as an insurgency because he is incapable of defeating us militarily. He chooses instead to attack using hit-and-run tactics and then disappear into the population. To find such an illusive enemy, we must demonstrate through words, deeds, and actions at all levels that we, not the enemy, have the best interest of the Iraqi people in mind. Our victory in Iraq is not to just eliminate the insurgency threat, but to establish an environment where the Iraqi people can affirm their loyalties to a newly established government and pursue peace. Notes 1Charles W. Thayer, Guerrilla, M. Joseph, c.1963. 2U.S. Army Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., October 2004. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. Major Mark Leslie is currently the deputy chief, Training and Organization, Stryker Transformation Team, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.A. from Troy State University and is currently pursuing an M.B.A from Touro University. His military education includes Infantry Captains Career Course; Ranger School; Long-Range Surveillance Leaders Course; Survival, Escape, Resistance, and Evasion School; and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, observer/controller/trainer, 2d Battalion, 395th Training Support (AC/RC), Fort Hood, TX; task force senior Iraqi National Guard advisor, 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (2-7 CAV), 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), Fort Hood; commander, A Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2-7 CAV, 1CD, Fort Hood; and S4, 2-7 CAV, 1CD, Fort Hood. “…the gesture of good will and the care taken in searching his home, demonstrates respect for his property. Respecting the family and preserving the detainee’s dignity has far-reaching consequences in the community. The message that reaches the members of the community will confirm that a “bad guy” was detained, but his family and property were treated with respect and genuine concern was shown for the welfare of the family. This message supports one of the goals in defeating a counterinsurgency by ‘exploiting information from local sources.’” 38 — January-February 2007