The Challenge of Leadership during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations

The Challenge of Leadership during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations by Major Jon Dunn To the credit of our profession in general, and the Armor branch specifically, much has been written over the past couple of years on the subject of lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the literature focuses on proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), or adjustments made to TTP in response to counteraction by the enemy. For obvious reasons, this is sensible and contributes to preparedness as units train to deploy in support of the Global War on Terror. Conspicuously absent, however, is any discussion on how conducting counterinsurgency operations affects the nature of leadership, or conversely, how leadership can, for better or for worse, impact the counterinsurgency fight. As leaders, how do we train to kill insurgents, yet at the same time win the support of the local population? How can we reconcile the apparent contradiction of the need to have a plan to kill everyone we meet while simultaneously planning to win the support of everyone we meet? While far from professing to have the answers to all of the questions, this article intends to generate discourse among professionals, which will help better prepare our soldiers for the current fight and for future counterinsurgency fights we are certain to encounter. The U.S. Army exists to win our nation’s wars. This fact has not changed since the inception of the Army in 1775. There has been, however, a significant change in the nature of the wars the Army is called on to win and the demands these wars place on junior leaders. Despite one’s personal or professional opinion about the relevance of the peacekeeping missions over the past 15 years, there is no doubt that the missions conducted in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Macedonia (to name but a few), have strengthened the competence and confidence of today’s junior officers and noncommissioned officers to operate with minimal guidance and even less direct supervision. Today’s modern battlefield is most often nonlinear and noncontiguous, and as such, junior leaders are often required to operate independently during the conduct of combat operations. The young sergeants, squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders who led missions in the Balkans and beyond are today’s senior scouts, platoon sergeants, first sergeants, senior platoon leaders, and company and troop commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. Collectively, they are extremely successful, adaptable, flexible, and operate with minimal guidance, but we must do better — we must prepare our leaders and soldiers to handle the unique complexities required when conducting counterinsurgency operations. Chance favors the prepared man — the better we train (the more realistic, stressful, and difficult the training), the more lives we save on the battlefield. Moreover, the complicated nature of the counterinsurgency fight demands a better trained army. Counterinsurgency operations require the successful and simultaneous accomplishment of two distinct objectives: to kill the enemy (insurgents) and win the 18 — January-February 2007 support of the local population. It is critical to conduct the former without compromising the latter. Although the cliché is trite and worn-out, winning ‘hearts and minds’ is precisely what we must accomplish. Winning the support of the local population contributes to the defeat of the insurgency in two ways: a lack of popular support will eventually destroy the insurgency; and if the local population supports our mission and not the insurgency, it can provide actionable intelligence. Killing insurgents is certainly the 25- meter target and most tend to equate winning the hearts and minds to a 300-meter target. However, it is probably better defined as 25, 50, 100, 200, and 300-meter targets — winning hearts and minds is a continuous objective. More to the point, it is the most important objective, because it ultimately brings success. Contrary to what many junior soldiers think, winning hearts and minds actually enhances our ability to kill insurgents. Working toward an objective to increase cooperation of the local population, or at a minimum, cultivate a neutral stance that develops a less active opposition toward us, is definitely a combat multiplier. Admittedly, it may not always lead to an enhanced ability to kill insurgents, but losing the hearts-and-minds fight will assuredly impede our efforts. Killing and winning hearts and minds simultaneously requires two seemingly contradictory mentali-ties. On one hand, soldiers must be the steely-eyed killers they train to be — able to identify an enemy insurgent and drop him (or her, as the case could be) with a single, well-aimed rifle shot. Yet, at the same time, we expect the same soldiers to be smiling at the ‘friendly’ locals, particularly children, sometimes even handing out candy or school supplies. In an environment such as the one we face in Iraq, soldiers need to shift gears rapidly, often in a split second. Soldiers must constantly be on alert for enemy activity — we have been taught that complacency kills. More importantly, an alert and ready posture does have a deterrent effect. Not only must soldiers essentially wear two ‘fac-es’ simultaneously, often times they must conduct two fundamentally different missions with little or no time to ‘reset’ between the two. For example, after several weeks of high-intensity combat, the mission may require an operation with a civil affairs or psychological operations unit less than 24 hours after an intense combat. This is not easy to do and becomes even more difficult if the ‘soft’ civil affairs mission occurs in the same vicinity as the preceding high-intensity fight. This is a leader challenge and responsibility — ensuring units remain aggressive to destroy the enemy, but have the ability to refocus when the mission changes from high-intensity to stability operations. Leaders cannot mentally stay in the high-intensity combat fight of yesterday or even three days ago. A leader must refocus himself and his subordinate leaders — this is paramount to successful mission accomplishment. If leaders are not flexible enough to refocus, it is certain that no progress will be made at the neighborhood (grassroots) level in improving quality of life. Grassroots progress is essential to obtaining actionable intelligence from the local population on enemy activity. Such intelligence from the local population often directly leads to offensive operations and is the only way of maintaining the initiative against an elusive enemy. In fighting an insurgency, we often will not be the one who strikes first. The enemy has the advantage of the initiative and gets to dictate when an engagement occurs, if at all. Even more frustrating, the enemy frequently will not show himself and thus there is nothing to fight back against. This frustration adds to the already difficult challenge, and necessity, of wearing ‘two faces.’ Unfortunately, it can get even worse — nothing boils the blood of a soldier more than seeing a fellow soldier wounded or killed, particularly if by an unseen enemy. Not surprisingly, one’s first reaction to such an incident is the desire to kill anyone who might remotely be the enemy. In an unlimited, high-intensity fight against a conventional foe, such reactionary aggression is, more often than not, quite useful. However, in a counterinsurgency fight, it is not difficult to see how such aggression could prove quite detrimental to accomplishing the mission, particularly in the long term. Is it possible to ‘wear two faces,’ deterring possible enemy contact, yet simultaneously win hearts and minds? The answer is simple, it can be done; it must be done, especially if we want to claim victory in the fight against insurgents. This is much easier said than done; how do we train leaders and soldiers to kill the enemy while simultaneously winning the hearts and minds of the local Iraqi people? First and foremost, we need to provide tough, realistic training with scenarios that replicate going from ‘hot’ (high-intensity) scenarios to ‘cold’ (stability) operations. This training is currently being accomplished at the combat training centers as they prepare units for deployment. The training addresses the tactical problem and can be trained extensively, both at home station and at combat training centers. However, it only addresses half of the problem, and quite bluntly, the easier half of the problem. The more difficult aspect, and much more difficult to train, is the emotional side. At the end of the day, the ability to wear two faces depends on the ability to control emotions. We can never truly replicate a battle buddy being wounded or killed, nor would we want to. “Counterinsurgency operations require the successful and simultaneous accomplishment of two distinct objectives: to kill the enemy (insurgents) and win the support of the local population. It is critical to conduct the former without compromising the latter. Although the cliché is trite and worn-out, winning ‘hearts and minds’ is precisely what we must accomplish.” Continued on Page 44 January-February 2007 — 19

Leadership continued from Page 19 44 — January-February 2007 sensitive situations. We trained on everything from cordon and searches with real Jordanians, not just soldiers in MILES gear, to after-hours language classes. This opportunity proved invaluable; I developed a baseline understanding of the culture, which enabled me to immediately immerse in theater. While not every unit has the time, money, or energy for this type of training, it is imperative that time and resources are devoted to developing a baseline cultural understanding at the non commissioned officer (NCO) level and below. Overall, staff sergeants and sergeants will represent the unit on a daily basis. If units are afforded the opportunity to send soldiers to some type of cultural training, they should seize the opportunity to develop their own “subject-matter experts.” For example, by sending an NCO to the training, the unit will have someone capable of educating its soldiers; not only will the NCO teach professional development classes to peers, but also to subordinates. Overall, by educating junior NCOs, we have the capability to infuse cultural understanding at the lowest levels within our ranks. Once again, due to the reduced likelihood of high-intensity firefights in the current operating environment, a happy medium can be found between training for combat and teaching soldiers about the people with whom they will spend the next year of their lives. A good example, which has been somewhat effective, is using Kurdish-Americans at training centers. Some may think there is not enough training time to effectively interact with these “role players.” Always remember, every little piece of training that exposes soldiers to other cultures pays dividends in the long run. Overall, there are officers and soldiers who resist the idea of learning about and understanding other cultures. A resistance to learning goes against the grain of a well-educated and professional army. It is imperative to train U.S. Army units on the culture and history of the Iraqi people. Furthermore, it is by immersion that soldiers will gain an understanding of Arab culture, which will increase chances of success throughout Iraq’s communities and villages. Notes 1Walter C. Rodgers, Sleeping With Custer and the 7th Cavalry, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2005, p. 198. 2Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, 2004, p. xix. Captain Ralph Elder is currently assigned to the Materiel Requirements Directorate, Future Force Integration Directorate, Fort Bliss, TX. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captain Career Course, Scout Leaders Course, and Air Defense Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, troop commander, B Troop, 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq and Fort Stewart, GA; and platoon leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq, Kuwait, and Fort Stewart.