The Armored Reconnaissance Squadron and the Mechanized Cavalry Group

Captain Forrest knew he had a problem. His troop of the 1st Squadron, 26th (1-26) Cavalry, the armored reconnaissance squadron (ARS) for 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 23d Armored Division, had been deployed to the mountainous, forested border of Krasnovia in early January to prevent enemy forces from crossing into friendly territory. Severe winter weather was delaying the bulk of the division from arriving, so 1st BCT moved forward to guard the aerial port of debarkation (APOD) and seaport of debarkation (SPOD). The BCT commander tasked 1-26 Cavalry to block a large mountain valley along the BCT’s flank, while the two combined arms battalions (CABs) occupied battle positions to the east, where joint surveillance and target attack radar system (JSTARS) had picked up several large moving target indicators (MTIs). The BCT commander reasoned that the squadron with its sensors and mobility could easily block the valley, and allow him to concentrate his forces on the more likely enemy avenues of approach. Now, with heavy snow falling across the entire front, grounding Army aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the mountainous terrain creating huge holes in JSTARS coverage, it was left to CPT Forrest’s soldiers in their observation posts (OPs) to detect any enemy forces coming through the Lostham Valley. As he stepped out of his command post (CP), CPT Forrest could feel a growing sense of disquiet, as the weather continued to worsen. Lieutenant Saunders, the troop XO moved up quietly behind him, “Sir, X-Ray reports that OPs 4 and 5 are 10 minutes late for their radio checks. All attempts to raise them by wire and FM haven’t worked.” This was indeed bad news, as these two OPs covered the eastern portion of the entrance into the valley from Krasnovia. CPT Forrest stated flatly, “Have White send amounted patrol up to the OPs to check things out. Better get everyone else to REDCON 1.5 until we know what’s going on.” Several minutes passed, and CPT Forrest spent the time by his vehicle’s radio trying to drink his now-cold coffee. Suddenly, the radio exploded, “X-Ray, White 1!! Contact!! Multiple armored vehicles moving south toward the troop; cannot get a good count, attempting to move back now….” As suddenly as he came on, White 1’s voice broke off the net, replaced with static and X- Ray’s increasingly desperate attempts to reach him. CPT Forrest grabbed his hand mike, “Guidons, this is Aggressor 6; White has reported multiple armored vehicles moving toward our positions. Everyone go to REDCON 1 and prepare to defend.” He grabbed the squadron net, “Sabre X-Ray, Aggressor 6, multiple armored vehicles moving south toward my position, request fires on AB 1001 and AB 1002.” “Negative Aggressor 6, guns are busy, the entire squadron is under attack. Bandit Troop reported an entire armored regiment attacking in the west before going off the net; Crusader is in trouble as well. Brigade is try- — 7 ing to move us some help from Eagle, but the weather is slowing their move.” CPT Forrest dropped his hand mike, then looked at his gunner grimly, “looks like we’re doing this the hard way.” He knew that his troop of M3 Bradleys and HMMWV-mounted antitank (AT) systems could slow the enemy, but to stop them would cost him the better part of his troop. With this realization behind him, CPT Forrest again picked up his troop net and began to issue the orders that would start along bloody night. This narrative is a modernized version of the beginning of the battle at Losheim Gap, during the initial German offensive in the Battle of the Bulge. There, as in this story, a unit built entirely for reconnaissance was placed in a role outside of its capabilities and the result was the near destruction of the 14th Mechanized Cavalry Group, as well as a major German penetration into allied lines. This article demonstrates how units built exclusively for reconnaissance have performed when used both doctrinally and nondoctrinally. The past year has seen the U. S. Army completely revamp its brigades into brigade combat teams (BCTs), with the heavy BCT consisting of two CABs and an ARS. With the introduction of the ARS, the Army is seeing the rebirth of a pure reconnaissance organization in an echelon higher than a troop (the old brigade reconnaissance troop). The armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) and divisional cavalry squadrons were built more for security operations than purely reconnaissance due to the fact that they were built for high-intensity conflict against the Soviets in Western Europe. The ACRs and division cavalry squadrons could be used for reconnaissance, but were organized to fight and survive in mechanized sustained direct fire contact, as the Army expected them to fight for information on the German battlefields. Many times, commanders used these organizations as small combined arms battle groups, as seen by the frequent use of the 3d ACR as a mini division in III Corps exercises.1 The ACRs and divisional cavalry squadrons succeeded in these roles more often than not, due to the fact that they had the firepower and survivability to do so. Although they may have been intended as reconnaissance organizations, these units are more closely akin to heavy cavalry with a combat maneuver mission due to their organization and how they have been used, rather than light cavalry with a purely reconnaissance mission. This gap is where the ARS neatly fits; it is built around the core missions of zone, route, area reconnaissance, and area security, and is not intended for prolonged direct fire contact. It is interesting to note that the U. S. Army has been here before. During World War II, the Army reorganized its old cavalry regiments into mechanized cavalry groups, with an organization and doctrine very similar to that which is emerging for the ARS. The mechanized cavalry groups were established in the late 1930s as part of the cavalry branch’s reaction to the increased mechanization of the Army. However, the mechanized cavalry was not given much weight in the branch, due to the fact that it still saw horse cavalry as a significant combat player on the battlefield. Even as late as 1941, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 stated: “Cavalry is capable of offensive combat; exploitation and pursuit; seizing and holding important terrain…; ground reconnaissance; screening; security for the front, flanks, and rear of other forces on the march, at the halt, and in battle; delaying action; covering the retrograde action of other forces; combat liaison between large units; acting as a mobile reserve for other forces; harassing action; and surprise action against designated objectives deep in hostile rear areas.”2 Notice that reconnaissance is mentioned in this task list; however, it is not the dominant mission of the horse cavalry. In 1942, with the dissolution of the branch chiefs, cavalry become subordinated to Army ground forces, under General Leslie McNair, who believed that the new armor force could perform most, if not all, of the cavalry missions listed above.3 By 1943, reconnaissance remained the only mission for mechanized cavalry, while horse cavalry had almost completely disappeared. Training Circular 107, published in 1943, specified that mechanized cavalry units “are organized, equipped, and trained to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.”4 Moreover, the mechanized cavalry units were trained to “employ infiltration tactics rather than combat to gain information.”5 Training Circular 107 became the primary basis for American mechanized cavalry doctrine for the remainder of the war, with its statements reappearing, almost verbatim in the 1944 edition of FM 100-5.6 The mechanized cavalry group belonged to afield army that could then choose to attach it to a specific corps or even a division. A group consisted of no more than two mechanized cavalry reconnaissance squadrons with a headquarters element. This organization basically set up a headquarters that could take care of the administration for the two attached squadrons.7 Moreover, these squadrons were not organic to the group, allowing for rapid detachment to other units or missions, including independent assignments. Each squadron consisted of three reconnaissance troops, alight tank company, and an assault gun company. 8 — “The mechanized cavalry groups (MCGs) were established in the late 1930s as part of the cavalry branch’s reaction to the increased mechanization of the Army. However, the mechanized cavalry was not given much weight in the branch, due to the fact that it still saw horse cavalry as a significant combat player on the battlefield.”

The reconnaissance troops were made up of three platoons of three M8 greyhounds and six quarter-ton jeeps each. Each reconnaissance troop also had 27 riflemen for use as dismounts.8 The reconnaissance troops were also heavily armed with machine guns and mortars, with each troop possessing nine 60mm mortars and multiple.30-caliber machine guns. In fact, the cavalry squadron possessed more machine guns than a regular American infantry battalion.9 The light tank company consisted of seventeen M5s equipped with 37mm cannons.10 The assault gun troop had six 75mm HMC M8 Scott self-propelled guns organized into two platoons. Each squadron consisted of approximately 31 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 721 enlisted men (although the numbers fluctuated constantly due to casualties and the ebb and flow of replacements).11 It is interesting to note that this organization is proportionately stronger than the newer ARS. The above organization indicates that the mechanized cavalry groups were not organized for prolonged heavy combat at all. With only 27 dismounts in a reconnaissance troop, as compared to more than 100 in a rifle company, the cavalry was not very suited to dismounted infantry-type combat where numbers are significant. Moreover, with the heaviest vehicles in the squadron being light tanks and the rest of the force equipped with quarter-ton jeeps and M8 armored cars, the cavalry was not suited for armored combat either. These deficiencies were acceptable to the Army ground forces though, as they saw the cavalry as not directly engaging in prolonged direct fire contact, either mounted or dismounted, as per the doctrine discussed earlier in which reconnaissance is defined as “[identifying] hostile units and [determining] their composition, dispositions, and flanks without becoming involved in combat.”12 The mechanized cavalry groups were most successful when performing doctrinal missions in the European theater of operations. However, it is interesting to note that even when a cavalry group conducted reconnaissance, it often had to engage in some form of combat to achieve its purpose. This was evident by the results of the general board survey at the end of the war, which found that based on the number of days the mechanized cavalry spent in combat, only 3 percent of those days were spent conducting the doctrinal definition of reconnaissance.13 This is not to say that they were not conducting reconnaissance, but they were fighting in order to complete their missions. In large part due to the inherent weaknesses of the cavalry, the groups were rarely sent on missions without reinforcements, with field artillery, medium tanks, and tank destroyers being the most common attachments.14 The first example of cavalry performing a successful doctrinal mission in the European theater of operations occurred on D- Day when 3d Platoon, B Troop, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron landed at Utah Beach and was given the mission to move ashore, clear the roads to Saint Mer Eglise, and provide reconnaissance and liaison to the scattered airborne forces engaged in the area. The platoon partially completed its mission, but was kept from reaching the town by heavy German resistance, which included antitank gun and machine gun fire that prohibited them from bypassing the enemy. “By 1943, reconnaissance remained the only mission for mechanized cavalry, while horse cavalry had almost completely disappeared. Training Circular 107, published in 1943, specified that mechanized cavalry units ‘are organized, equipped, and trained to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.’ ”

This resistance would have proven formidable for any platoon, but especially the lightly armored (quarter-ton jeeps and armored cars) and numerically inferior cavalrymen. However, the platoon continued to provide route reconnaissance and fire support to the paratroopers in the area, clearing crossroads and scouting suspected enemy positions.15 This mission was very close to a pure doctrinal mission for the cavalry, as they conducted reconnaissance of enemy positions without becoming decisively engaged, leaving heavier fighting for the airborne and following infantry. Moreover, the squadron gave the infantry they were supporting a needed edge by delivering precise information on the whereabouts of the enemy, as well as which routes were open for use. They did encounter problems in clearing or scouting routes due to their lack of armor protection, which made them vulnerable to small arms fire, thereby prohibiting the cavalry from forcing its way through constricted terrain.16 Perhaps the best example of mechanized cavalry groups being used successfully in their doctrinal role is in the allied breakout across Northern France. The cavalry groups conducted zone reconnaissance in front of their respective corps and armies, as well as screening the main body from any German rearguard actions. The nature of the battlefield allowed the cavalry to effectively use their mobility to find the enemy, then bypass or fix by fires as the situation warranted and as doctrine advised. For example, the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 113th Mechanized Cavalry Group, conducted a zone reconnaissance in front of XIX Corps, 1st Army, in the attack across Northern France. The squadron discovered several German roadblocks and ambushes, and destroyed them with fires (indirect, direct, and close air support), thereby protecting the main body as it attacked to the east.17 A final example of the cavalry performing well in a doctrinal role involved the 6th Mechanized Cavalry Group during the Battle of the Bulge. The group raced north to help defend the southern shoulder of the Bulge. The group arrived in the battle area on 24 December and immediately began conducting reconnaissance patrols to establish the exact line of the German advance. The group remained in position for over a week, giving the Third Army a clear picture of German defenses along the southern edge of the Bulge, thereby setting the conditions for the successful counterattack to Bastogne.18 Despite their inherent weaknesses as direct combat organizations, the mechanized cavalry groups did succeed at times in sustained direct fire contact. In Northern France, the 113th Mechanized Cavalry Group became involved in a battle to reach crossing sites across the Seine River. At the end of the fight, the cavalry had not reached the crossing sites, but had captured 44 Germans, at the cost of 14 of their own, as well as three armored cars, one half track, and two quarter-ton jeeps.19 In another engagement, the 113th Squadron, reinforced with a platoon of tank destroyers, blocked a German battalion from breaking out of an encirclement. The group killed 50 Germans, captured 80, destroyed one armored car and one 75mm gun at the cost of one dead, ten wounded, two armored cars, two quarter-ton jeeps, and two M10 tank destroyers.20 As seen in these two examples, the mechanized cavalry groups could perform well in nondoctrinal roles, but at a much higher risk of losing equipment and personnel, as they had neither the armored protection of heavier units, nor the numbers of dismounts of infantry units. Additionally, both of these examples include an enemy short on heavy weapons and equipment. The cavalry may not have been as successful if the enemy had actually been in better fighting shape. Some of the most tragic stories in the history of the mechanized cavalry groups come from occasions when commanders used them in roles well outside of their doctrinal boundaries. Perhaps the most notable example of this is the 14th Mechanized Cavalry Group’s fight at the Losheim Gap. The group was screening the gap as the boundary between the VIII and V Corps of the American First Army (the group was habitually associated with VIII Corps).21 The only major problem was that this gap was a natural avenue of attack from the German lines. Additionally, the 106th Infantry Division, which had temporary tactical control of the 14th Group, assigned the group a positional defense of 9,000 yards and the mission of helping to defend the left flank of the division.22 When the Battle of the Bulge commenced, the 14th found itself in the way of an entire Panzer army, including the 3d Parachute Division, the 18th Volksgrenadier Division, and the 1st SS Panzer Division.23 Needless to say, the 14th Group suffered very heavy casualties and was forced to quickly withdraw from the gap. This withdrawal allowed the Germans to surround and capture the American 106th Infantry Division, as well as open up a huge hole in the American lines.24 The 14th Group failed in its mission of protecting the 106th Infantry Division’s flank, but there was really very little that could have been done. Almost any American unit would have been hard pressed to “With only 27 dismounts in a reconnaissance troop, as compared to more than 100 in a rifle company, the cavalry was not very suited to dismounted infantry-type combat where numbers are significant. Moreover, with the heaviest vehicles in the squadron being light tanks and the rest of the force equipped with quarter-ton jeeps and M8 armored cars, the cavalry was not suited for armored combat either.” 10 — hold the weight of an entire Panzer army attack, much less one that was as poorly outfitted in infantry, armor protection, and effective antitank weapons as the 14th Mechanized Cavalry Group. In fact, when viewed in this light, it is surprising that anything was left of the 14th Group after the initial attack. This battle demonstrates the consequences of using light cavalry incorrectly. In defense of the commander of the 106th Infantry Division, the division did have an extremely long front (18 miles) to cover.25 Thus, the commander used the light cavalry to make up for his lack of troops as an economy of force measure. However, the question still remains as to why he put his weakest regimental formation along the most likely avenue of approach in his sector, as the rest of his division occupied the Schnee Eifel, a tremendous natural obstacle.26 Another example of the light cavalry being used outside of its doctrinal roles and suffering for it can be found in Normandy, where the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron participated in a general corps attack in July 1944. The squadron attacked in the center of the corps’ sector against dug-in German paratroopers and was defeated with the loss of over 100 casualties and 13 light tanks, virtually the entire tank company of the squadron.27 While such a failure with casualties of such magnitude was nothing particularly special in the Normandy campaign, this attack demonstrates a spectacular waste of a corps asset. As noted earlier, the light cavalry was not well suited for a frontal assault, even on a small front. Moreover, these units were the corps’ special reconnaissance force. To use up such an important asset in a mere holding attack demonstrates a lack of understanding in how to properly use light cavalry. This situation did not even occur at a desperate time when the corps needed every unit on the line. One of its two divisions (5th Infantry Division) only had one regiment on line, with the others projected to come in as follow-on forces.28 Thus, V Corps had units available that could have done the job, but instead chose to include the cavalry as part of the attack anyway. The mechanized cavalry groups performed admirably when commanders assigned them missions for which they had been designed, or at least missions within their capabilities. When used nondoctrinally, and as a regular combat maneuver formation against a prepared enemy, these units suffered greatly and with little appreciable effect on the battle. More than 60 years after the mechanized cavalry groups helped lead the Army to victory in Europe, we are reaching the same discussion as to the role and size of a reconnaissance force. The mechanized cavalry groups’ children are not the ACRs of today, but rather the BRTs of the Army of Excellence and the ARS of today. The BRT is designed to conduct only zone and area reconnaissance in a nonpermissive environment, just like the mechanized cavalry. Field Manual (FM) 3-20.971, Reconnaissance Troop, states, “it is not organized for decisive operations, [and] must be heavily augmented with combat units to be successful, if tasked to conduct offensive or defensive operations,” again, just like the mechanized cavalry.29 This light cavalry has always had a place in our Army as the eyes and ears of our combat formations, though they have never been found in any great numbers. With the introduction of the ARS, the Army has now devoted one-third the maneuver units of every BCT to reconnaissance. As General Patton said, “You can never have too much reconnaissance.” We must keep in mind however that the ARS is alight cavalry formation akin to the mechanized cavalry of World War II and the BRT from our very recent past — it is not a heavy cavalry formation like that of the ACRs or even the old divisional cavalry squadrons. Even with the addition of a sensor troop and the incorporation of other sensors, such as JSTARS and River Joint, from across the military, the ARS (light cavalry) does not have the combat power to handle missions once assigned to the divisional cavalry and ACRs (heavy cavalry). The case studies above speak directly to the importance of understanding the distinction between heavy and light cavalry. When used properly, the light cavalry is an awesome tool and combat multiplier. When tasked beyond their capabilities and role, the results are often tragic. The vignette at the beginning of this article illustrates how an ARS could be used improperly by commanders who do not make the distinction between heavy and light cavalry. Commanders in World War II often had the same failing — we should not let that happen again. Notes 1Conversation with LTC(R) William T. Nance, former Deputy Commander for Operations, 3d Air Support Operations Group, and AF representative to III Corps plans team, 1996-2001 [primary source]. 2U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 1941, paragraph 38. 3Kent Greenfield, Robert Palmer, and Bell Wiley, United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, Historical Division of the Army, Washington DC, 1947, p. 268. 4War Department, Training Circular 107, Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Units, GPO, Washington, DC, 23 September, 1943, p. 1 5Ibid, p. 3. 6FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, GPO, Washington, DC, 1944, paragraph 38. 7Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The United States Army in World War II: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, Historical Division of the Army, Washington DC, 1948, p. 522. 8U. S. Army, V Corps Operations Memorandum, “Operation of Corps Cavalry on Terrain of Normandy,” [primary source] 25 June 1944, p. 1. 9U. S. Army General Board, “Mechanized Cavalry Units, United States Forces, European Theater,” Study Number 49, 1945, p. 6. (The Armor School Library at Fort Knox has a hard copy of the report used). 10V Corps Operations Memorandum, “Operation of Corps Cavalry on Terrain of Normandy,” p. 1. 11113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron After-Action Review Comments, “History of the 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron,” Reference Group (RG) 407 CAVS-113-.01, National Archives, College Park, MD., 1 January 1944-31 December 1944, p. 1. 12War Department, Training Circular 107, p. 1. 13The General Board, p. 7. 14Ibid., Appendix 3. 15Major Robert R. Tincher, “Reconnaissance in Normandy,” The Cavalry Journal, January-February 1945, p. 17. 16Ibid, pp. 12-14. 17113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron After-Action Review Comments, p. 12. 18CPT Robert Willoughby Williams, “With the Unicorn West of Bastogne,” The Cavalry Journal, March-April 1945, pp. 7-10. 19113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron After-Action Review Comments, p. 11. 20Ibid., pp. 14 and 15. 21Hugh M. Cole, United States Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations: The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 1994, p. 55. 22Ibid., pp. 138-139. 23Ibid., 81. 24Ibid., 151. 25Ibid., 137. 26Ibid. 27U. S. Army, A Short History of the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Prestice, Czechoslovakia, 1945, p. 3. 28Martin Blumenson, The United States Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, Center of Military History, Washington DC, 1989, p. 284. 29FM 3-20.971, Reconnaissance Troop, GPO, Washington, DC, December 2002, paragraph 1- 37. Captain William S. Nance is currently a tasking officer, Current Operations Section, G3, III Corps, Fort Hood, TX. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, and the Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, including platoon leader, D Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, Fort Carson, CO; and assistant S1 and platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 68th (1-68) Armor, both in Iraq and Fort Carson. — 11