Operation Iraqi Freedom Refl ections: What Did or Did Not Happen

Operation Iraqi Freedom Reflections: What Did or Did Not Happen by Nader Elhefnawy It has been over a year since a U.S.-led invasion toppled Saddam Hussein’s government. While the conventional phase of the conflict will be debated for years to come, it is striking how few have noted that Operation Iraqi Freedom did not resemble widespread expectations regarding the United States’ next conventional conflict. Despite a protracted build up, some logistics difficulties, and what was widely seen as an inadequate number of ground troops, U.S. forces achieved a swift and one-sided victory. Rightly, this was credited to an audacious strategy and the peerless combination of technology, train ing, and synchronization U.S. forces brought to bear. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that Iraq did precisely what many analysts said a future U.S. opponent would not do, repeating the course of action it followed so unsuccessfully in 1991 in several important respects. Once again, it permitted U.S. forces to conduct a months-long build up in the region militarily unhindered. Again, Iraq allowed the U.S. to seize the initiative and begin the fighting on its schedule with all the forces it sought to assemble. Again, Iraq fought the war on America’s terms, exposing its forces to the full brunt of the vastly superior mobility and firepower of U.S. forces. And, at the same time, Iraq did not take advantage of what is so often called “asymmetric warfare,” which is basically poorer militaries taking advantage of commercially available dual-use technologies and relatively inexpensive high-tech weapons, while simultaneously capitalizing on the vulnerabilities of more sophisticated warfighting techniques. In short, Iraq was a relatively “static” op ponent in the sense in which Edward Luttwak used the term in his 1987 book Strategy — one incapable of dynamic responses to its military situation.1 Part of this was certainly due to the sheer disparity between the power of U.S. and Iraqi forces, but there were other factors, such as the prolonged sanctions and arguably the nature of the regime. It cannot be assumed that all other opponents the U.S. will face will be as static; in fact, the contrary should be expected. This article, accordingly, is intended to draw attention to three dimensions of what did (or did not) happen during Operation Iraqi Freedom, specifically Iraq’s failure to exploit asymmetric techniques; its decision not to strike U.S. forces during the build-up; and the failure of a major urban battle for Baghdad to materialize. This is not to suggest that earlier concerns about medium-scale conventional warfare against rogue states are implausible — they are very plausible. The object is instead to consider how their inclusion could alter the character (though in all likelihood not the outcome) of the medium-scale conventional conflicts U.S. forces can expect to fight, with an eye to considering how future conflicts may play out. Asymmetric Warfare While the ability of the Iraqi military to acquire services and equipment from abroad was not totally eliminated, it was badly weakened by the sanctions.2 It is also probable that Iraq’s exceptionally poor civil-military relations — dominated by the regime’s extreme mistrust of its troops — created a climate, which stifled not merely innovation, but ordinary job performance. Overcentralization, along with the regime’s likely failure to grasp the real lessons of the 1991 war and subsequent conflicts in the Balkans, also contributed to such an outcome. Few other U.S. opponents will be so severely hampered in their quest to develop more robust forces by international isolation or their regime’s internal character. Moreover, given the proliferation of private military businesses, other countries would 22 — January-February 2005 not need to develop most technologies locally or even through a deal with larger countries, such as Russia or China, because they are available from the international marketplace. Space. The Iraqi military could have leased space services, such as satellite imaging, providing them with timelier intelligence on the movements of U.S. forces. Additionally, given a sufficiently high resolution — which was commercially available at the time of the conflict — space reconnaissance could have aided them in targeting missiles. Iraq could also have purchased off-the-shelf receivers for satellite navigation systems. While the signal from the global positioning system (GPS) can be degraded, even 100- yard accuracy can be useful. Moreover, the United States is not the only GPS provider. Today, Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) offers accuracy equal to military-grade GPS, and soon Europe’s Galileo system will offer a comparable system. Besides exploiting space in support of its own forces, a future opponent could attempt to attack U.S. space power. In 2003, Iraqis attempted to jam GPS signals guiding American bombs with Russian-made transmitters. While the attempt failed, other attempts at jamming and alternative strategies, such as attacks on satellites with laser weapons similar to the mid-infrared chemical laser, could prove successful. Such a scenario, however, is unlikely to materialize for at least a decade and perhaps much longer. Unmanned aircraft. Unmanned aircraft, which are much easier to come by than satellites, can be used as a substitute for satellites in reconnaissance and even communications roles. Pocket-sized versions, under development today by several militaries, could enhance capabilities at the small-unit level. Converted to carry warheads, larger drones can serve as crude cruise missiles. In the run-up to the 2003 conflict, it was in fact claimed that Iraq had attempted to use such a delivery platform for weapons of mass destruction, but they can certainly be used in conventional attacks. Ballistic missiles. Iraq’s missile forces were so badly depleted by war, sanctions, and the inspection regime that not a single scud was fired, but several other states will likely have hundreds of missiles. Moreover, those missiles may be of considerably better quality than what U.S. forces have encountered so far. The North Korean Nodong and Iranian Shahab-series missiles, as well as Pakistani and Chinese missiles, can deliver more powerful warheads over longer ranges than crude scud derivatives such as the Iraqi al-Abbas and al-Hussein. For example, the Shahab-3 can deliver a 2,500-pound warhead over 800 miles, in contrast to the 700-pound payload the unstable al-Hussein delivered to half that distance. They may also do so more accurately, given the proliferation of spin-up technology, such as that demonstrated by North Korea, and new options such as satellite guidance. Cluster warheads can compensate for the relatively poor accuracy of missiles such as the scud, and a number of relatively simple devices can be used to enhance their ability to penetrate a missile-defense shield, such as balloon-type decoys. Special operations units. Iraq has no special operations forces, in the sense that U.S. Navy SEALs or British Special Air Service are special forces. Iraq, nevertheless, pursued strategies for which such forces would have been ideal, with line units reportedly melting away to carry on the fight as guerrillas, and paramili-taries conducting a campaign in the rear of the charge north, most notably against supply convoys. Arguably, Iraq could have developed such forces much more easily than quality armored forces, given their relatively low equipment requirements. While they would lack the expensive vehicles and fire support systems that help make U.S. Special Forces so potent, such as AC-130 Spectre gunships and converted Ohio-class submarines, they may enjoy global reach in the same manner as terrorists, traveling on civilian shipping and airlin-ers. This would enable them to attack not only the rear of an invasion force or facilities in neighboring countries, but also the literal worldwide network of bases that the U.S. relies on for supporting a largescale military effort abroad. North Korea in particular has developed this option: it has long been reported to have 100,000 special operations forces troops whose job would be to infiltrate South Korea and wreak havoc in the event of a conflict on the peninsula. Communications. On 24 March 2003, the AH-64 Apaches of the 11th Aviation A U.S. Army soldier guards an abandoned Iraqi L29 at the East Samarra airfield, Iraq. The L29 is under suspicion of being converted to an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which could be used as a chemical delivery weapon. “Unmanned aircraft, which are much easier to come by than satellites, can be used as a substitute for satellites in reconnaissance and even communications roles. Pocket-sized versions, under development today by several militaries, could enhance capabilities at the small-unit level. Converted to carry warheads, larger drones can serve as crude cruise missiles. In the run-up to the 2003 conflict, it was in fact claimed that Iraq had attempted to use such a delivery platform for weapons of mass destruction, but they can certainly be used in conventional attacks.” January-February 2005 — 23

Brigade staged the first-ever “deep strike” on the Medina division near Kar bala. In the course of the attack, the helicopters encountered devastating small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire, downing one of the Apaches and damaging numerous others.3 One reason the Iraqi unit was able to so effectively concentrate its fire was a warning passed on by an Iraqi commander via cell phone.4 There are presently one-and-a-half billion cell phones in the world, one for every four people. Along with laptop and palm-held computers, these can give poor armies, such as Iraq’s, a relatively cheap way of developing a more robust communications infrastructure, if exploited properly. Assuming the use of commercial space services and unmanned aircraft, this would enable them to distribute much better intelligence to units in the field, as with current or recent satellite images delivered to unit commanders by e-mail. The result may be a much tighter decision cycle, increasing the challenge of outmaneuvering the opponent for U.S. ground forces. Computer Warfare. Last, but not least, is the prospect of computer warfare, the actual risk of which is not fully understood, leading some observers to claim it has been overhyped. While computer users are painfully aware of the vulnerability of their systems to viruses and surveillance, it can be pointed out that hijacking a military computer network is not nearly so simple as defacing a corporate website. It can also be pointed out that as the world’s most advanced nation, the United States would likely have the edge in this area, since its opponents are likely to be less developed, leaving them with relatively fewer computer users and generally older equipment. Nevertheless, given the demonstrated ability of hackers to inflict billions of dollars in damages with a single virus, computer warfare by its nature may be exceptionally open to asymmetrical approaches. An Iraqi Attack During the Build-up Operation Desert Shield, during which allied forces took six months to assemble in the Saudi desert, evoked numerous assertions from observers in and out of uniform that the U.S. military had to arrive more swiftly and with more equipment in the event of future crises. This did not happen during Operation Iraqi Freedom. While the war clouds started gathering in the summer of 2002, coalition forces did not go into action until March 2003, during which time they accumulated the numerical strength that helped make them so effective when the fighting actually began. The obvious, if rarely asked, question is why Iraq did not attack during this period, disrupting the build-up and starting the conflict on more advantageous terms, especially when this was so widely pointed out as a failure in Iraq’s approach to the war in 1991? The conventional wisdom holds that Saddam Hussein was restrained by the belief that he could negotiate a solution, especially given the unpopularity of the action in the Arab world and Europe, as well as with Russia and China. Striking first would have damaged the Iraqi regime’s prospects for such a solution. Nevertheless, it was clear to many observers at the time that Saddam grossly underestimated the political will of the United States, and in the future, a different opponent could come to quite a different conclusion and might well strike first. The other issue requiring consideration is the means Iraq had at its disposal. The country’s shrunken air force was effectively grounded (with many of its aircraft literally buried underground by the time fighting broke out). Its sea-denial capability, which might once have enabled it “...it is conceivable that the Iraqi army could have rolled south to attack staging areas in Kuwait early on in the build-up. Against a much smaller U.S. force, the Iraqis would have inflicted more casualties, captured stocks of equipment, and temporarily disrupted the flow of equipment by cutting off facilities supporting the mobilization.” 24 — January-February 2005 to attack transports, was much diminished from what it displayed in the “tanker war” of the 1980s. Its slender remaining capacity to lay naval mines or fire truck based anti-ship missiles was neutralized early on in the conflict. Even where its missile capability was concerned, all it could manage was the launch of a handful of Silkworms and short-range ballistic missiles to little effect. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the Iraqi army could have rolled south to attack staging areas in Kuwait early on in the build-up. Against a much smaller U.S. force, the Iraqis would have inflicted more casualties, captured stocks of equipment, and temporarily disrupted the flow of equipment by cutting off facilities supporting the mobilization. While a U.S. counterattack would surely have been successful, the Iraqis would have made it more difficult, and possibly exacted a significant propaganda victory. Alternatively, Iraq could have turned to special forces-type operations to disrupt airfields, seaports, and the like. Moreover, just as other opponents in the future may decide to strike preemptively against a U.S. build-up, they may also have more sophisticated capabilities in this area. These could include air, missile, and ground actions, as well as diesel submarines and sea-skimming, supersonic air- and sea-launched anti-ship missiles, such as the Moskit, against which missile defenses today would have little effect. Urban Warfare The Iraqi conflict certainly saw urban warfare, but nothing like what was feared in the run-up to the fight. While pessi-mists were widely derided afterward for anticipating that Baghdad would become a Stalingrad-like battleground, some of the derision may be unwarranted. Certainly, the Iraqi military did not have the resources to attempt a battle so large scale, protracted, or bloody as Stalingrad. Equally certain is that the combination of heavy armor with air power in innovative ways helped in taking the city quickly by letting U.S. units roll swiftly under fire with few losses, outmaneuvering the opposition. The fact remains, however, that Saddam Hussein never strived for a large-scale battle inside the capital, but instead a forward defense of the southern cities. The result was that Baghdad, by far the country’s largest urban center and potentially the toughest nut to crack, was stripped of the units that even an attempt to stage such a battle would have required.5 Out in the open, U.S. air and land forces destroyed these units. Insofar as the forces remaining in the city are concerned, there was little preparation for such a fight in the way of barricades, antitank ditches, ambush positions, concealed heavy weapons, and the like.6 Consequently, even with the depleted resources of the Iraqi army as a whole, it is easy to imagine a battle for the capital, in which far more numerous defenders were waiting for coalition forces behind well-prepared defenses. This likely would not have changed the outcome of the war, and certainly not resulted in a Stalingrad-like bloodbath, but it would have made for a lengthier, costlier fight. The siege of Fallujah by Marine forces in April 2004, in which the fighting at times resembled the house-to-house com bat of World War II, was a reminder that the spectre of urban warfare has not been so thoroughly tamed as some would have it. While Operation Iraqi Freedom was a stunning success, it cannot be assumed that every contingency will play out the same way. A future adversary could throw the first blow, disrupting a regional military build-up, and then when on the defensive, retreat into the cities and put up a far stiffer fight than the one offered in response to the charge on Baghdad. The limits of what such approaches allow, however, ought not to be ignored, least of all where armored warfare is concerned. Even with much improved command, control, communications, and intelligence, it is difficult to picture a head-on confrontation between forces of U.S. M1 tanks and third-world T-72s, ending much differently than it has in recent conflicts. Nevertheless, a more agile opponent able to sink a few supply ships or temporarily shut down a key port, as with more sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles; wreak havoc in the rear with special forces or computer attacks; and offer denser resistance in a carefully fortified urban environment, may make “thunder runs” a riskier proposition in the future.7 Under these alternative circumstances, the audacity that paid off so handsomely in the conventional phase of Iraqi Freedom might not work as well, with combat dragging out and supply lines coming under serious threat. This makes it worthwhile to reflect on one of the war’s better-recognized lessons: the vulnerability of high-tech, but lightly protected, systems and the continuing value of heavily armored forces. Robust tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, such as the Abrams and Bradley, enabled U.S. troops to keep moving rapidly while taking substantial fire. Such robustness, however, is required not only in individual pieces of equipment, but in numbers (as the less suc cessful aftermath of the invasion demonstrates), as well as strategic deployability, and logistics arrangements. The ability to amass forces more quickly, and the depth to absorb losses and disruptions are essential in a fight against a dynamic opponent. Of course, this is easier to say than actually do, and in the real world, resources are finite. Nevertheless, recent talk of cutting the U.S. Army from ten to eight divisions to free up money for more advanced systems, may be the opposite of the direction now called for. U.S. forces presently have a lead that any plausible opponent will find unbridgeable. While research and development are of course essential to preserving that lead, other priorities should now take precedence, such as building a force with sufficient slack to ensure a dearly purchased technological advantage is not squandered through penury in less glamorous logistics matters. Notes 1Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987. 2Even during the conflict, it was widely reported that night-vision equipment and AT-14 Kornet missiles were being smug-gled into the country. 3For a description of the attack, see Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 2004, pp. 147-155. 4Walter J. Boyne, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Forge, New York, 2003, p. 275. 5Wesley Clark, Winning Modern Wars, Public Affairs Books, New York, 2003, p. 61. 6Ibid., p. 81. 7It is also worth remembering that the Iraqi military of 2003 was not what it had been in 1991, either as a fighting force or as a standard by which to judge other conventional threats. Two-fifths its former size, its training, and readiness were diminished by lengthy sanctions, which also prevented a belated modernization. Other forces may be better equipped and trained to begin with. Nader Elhefnawy is currently a graduate student at the University of Miami. He received a B.A. and an M.A. from Florida International University. His article, “Defensive Armor Deployments in Urban Areas,” appeared in the January-February 2003 issue of ARMOR. January-February 2005 — 25