Will the Real Logistics Integrator Please Stand Up? Reflections for the Brigade XO

The brigade executive officer is the most overworked and underappreciated officer in the brigade. No other job in the brigade requires the level of interpersonal communication ability, conflict resolution skill, resource management talent, and leadership via personality force as that of the brigade executive officer. Because he is responsible and accountable for so much and has absolutely nothing in the way of institutional infrastructure to support him, the key to the brigade executive officer’s success is the initiation, development, and maintenance of an interactive and participatory staff-working environment that includes both coordinating staff group and special staff group officers. The executive officer must understand and appreciate the contributions of the nonmaneuver battlefield operating systems (BOS) to the brigade’s success, and possess the intellectual agility to leverage their capabilities to maximum effect in the brigade scheme of maneuver. Our combined 24 rotations as logistics observer controllers at the National Training Center (NTC) show us inductively that logistics BOS integration presents particularly troublesome problems for brigade executive officers, stemming primarily from a misunderstanding or the neglected role of the forward support battalion support operations officer (FSB SPO) as a member of the brigade special staff group. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) FM 3- 90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team, specifies supervising the brigade logistics posture as a specified task for the brigade XO. 1 To fulfill this responsibility, the brigade XO must understand what his own logistics staff officer (the S4) ought to do during the brigade planning process, and how the FSB SPO facilitates the S4’s success via direct planning participation. FM 3- 90.3 outlines the S4’s role as that of “the principal staff officer for coordinating the integration of supply, maintenance, transportation, and services for the command. He is the link between the support unit and his commander plus the rest of the staff.” 2 Among his specific duties are coordinating all classes of supply, less medical services and equipment recovery. The S4 “develops the logistic support plan to support operations” and produces the logistics estimate and service support annex to brigade plans and orders. 3 One might wonder what we need the FSB SPO for if the S4 can do all this. The fact of the matter is the S4 depends on the division G4 for certain logistic products and services and on the FSB SPO for products that directly effect tactical operations. Although FM 3-90.3 calls the FSB commander “the BCT commander’s chief logistician,” he is not a direct participant in brigade planning as is the direct support artillery battalion commander in his role as the brigade fire support coordinator. The support operations officer is the de facto link between the brigade combat team and the echelon above brigade logistics infrastructure that will ensure the brigade is logistically postured for the fight. The best way to illustrate this is to clearly delineate how well a brigade level concept of support will likely satisfy the Army logistics characteristics defined in FM 3-0, Operations, as “responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, attainability, sustainability, survivability, economy, and integration,” with and without the intimate involvement of the FSB SPO at the brigade S4’s side. 4 This article illuminates for the brigade XO what the S4 cannot do for the brigade without the SPO, thereby enhancing the brigade XO’s appreciation for the necessity of initiating and developing a relationship with the SPO as a brigade special staff officer. Because the FSB’sown capstone manual, FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion, does not specify SPO planning responsibilities, by directing the SPO to provide “input to the brigade S4 on the brigade logistics estimate and service support annex,” one cannot entirely blame the brigade XO from seeing him (and the FSB SPO from seeing himself) as an executor, rather than a planner. The SPO and the brigade XO together may share the belief that the SPO should receive a completed plan for future combat operations to help write Annex I. The SPO, more often than not, hesitates to force himself into a brigade planning process in which he feels neither needed nor especially welcome. In most cases, this results in a concept of support that is not synchronized with the maneuver plan and lacks triggers to effectively transition from one phase to the next. The bottom line is that the brigade S4 is not truly the primary combat service support (CSS) integrator for the brigade, no matter what the FM says. Although he can integrate the efforts of CSS operators below the brigade level, he alone cannot integrate the echelons above brigade CSS assets that he does not control, but that are essential components of a successful operation. True, the S4 can identify requirements in the course of planning and pass those requirements to the FSB SPO after the fact; however, passing requirements is not the same as integrating CSS. One might argue that CSS integration happens at the brigade level, whether or not the FSB SPO is involved in the planning process. While it is demonstrably true that the brigade S4 can and often does select tentative ambulance exchange points and brigade support area locations, and might even tentatively determine where and when a forward logistics element from the FSB might deploy to support the operation, the S4 will not truly integrate CSS into the plan. The FSB SPO will finalize the dedication of FSB and higher level CSS assets to satisfy brigade requirements, work with the FSB medical company leaders to finalize the most fruitful distribution of medical assets, and determine the dynamics of resupply to the FSB to posture the brigade for follow on missions. If we accept that CSS must be fully integrated into brigade plans and orders, and if we accept that the brigade S4 is unequipped by virtue of position to be a true CSS integrator (regardless of the technical and tactical expertise of the officer in the position), then we accept that the effectiveness of the brigade S4 will be directly propor- 48 ARMOR — tional to the level of participation of the FSB SPO during the planning process. In a very important sense, the FSB SPO is the true logistics integrator in the brigade, even though the brigade S4 is the staff officer formally charged to make integration happen. The FSB SPO brings to the fight the ability to synchronize the current fight with future operations. Using CSS synchronization matrices, he has the ability to foresee the logistics battlefield and modify current and future operations based on decisions made during the brigade military decisionmaking process — true logistics integration. Not participating in the process will result in the FSB SPO focusing on the next 24 hours, the execution period for the FSB. The FSB SPO is unable to visualize the battlefield 48 to 72 hours in the future, which limits his ability to influence future brigade fights. The FSB SPO cannot reallocate direct support assets within the FSB, and lacks key information to make necessary coordination with echelon above brigade organizations to maximize available time to provide required support. Traditionally, we fail to accomplish these tasks, resulting in the FSB being out of position to effectively support critical brigade events. For example, the FSB attempts to move during a key period in the fight and is unavailable to support the brigade, and the FSB SPO receives an emergency request that he will have to depend on others to execute on short notice. FSB SPOs repeatedly argue with NTC logistics trainers that they are simply too busy managing current operations to spend many hours at the brigade tactical operations center in planning sessions. We think the only way to circumvent the pressures of current operations is for the FSB commander to enable the SPO to build a team within the support operations section that can manage current operations, follow up on key issues, and even issue instructions in the SPO’s name. Doctrine writers in schoolhouses provide the rubric for success. It falls to individuals in the field to translate doctrinal guidance into specific tactics, techniques, and procedures that address recurring concrete practical problems. Sustainment doctrine tells us that brigade plans and orders must satisfy the logistics characteristics — foremost among them integration. Hopefully, this article has served to assist the brigade XO in fulfilling his responsibility to oversee the brigade logistics posture by clarifying the limits of the S4’s role and illuminating the perhaps underappreciated role of the FSB SPO during brigade planning.

Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.3, The Mounted Brigade Combat Team, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1 November 2001, Figure 11-4, p. 11-8. 2Ibid., Figure 11-8, p. 11-13. 3Ibid. 4FM 3-0, Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 14 June 2001.

LTC Jeffrey S. Wilson is an assistant professor of Philosophy, Department of English, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received a B. A. from Western Illinois University and an M. A. from University of Illinois, Urbana. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including forward support battalion XO trainer, Operations Group, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; support operations officer, 302d Forward Support Battalion, Camp Casey, Korea; and maintenance support officer and commander, Heavy Maintenance Company, 724th Main Support Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA.

MAJ Michael W. Snow is a support operations officer observer controller, A Company, Operations Group, National Training Center. He received a B. B. A. from Texas A&M University and an M. S. from Florida Institute of Technology. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, including support operations officer, 302d Forward Support Battalion, Camp Casey, Korea; doctrine developer, U. S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, VA; S3, 725th Main Support Battalion (MSB), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI; and commander, B Company, 725th MSB, 25th ID, Schofield Barracks.

ARMOR — 49

MWSS components will consist of lightweight, modular, mission tailorable, integrated equipment, and command, control, communications, and computers (C4) devices, worn, carried, or used by crewmen when conducting tactical operations with their assigned combat vehicles. Overall design of the MWSS will achieve optimum synergy of components to decrease mission time; increase crewman mission performance, to include dismounted activities; improve comfort and endurance; enhance man-machine interface; and improve safety. Increased organizational effectiveness and improved combat vehicle lethality will be achieved through enhanced man-machine interface. America’s 21st century Army must be powerful, versatile, and able to respond worldwide with overwhelming, technologically superior force that renders any potential adversary impotent while minimizing the cost in soldiers’ lives. Standing still would jeopardize our position as the world’s best Army. Only by enhancing current equipment with advanced technology and providing high-quality soldiers with state-of-the-art weapons systems can the Army build a full spectrum force capable of fulfilling America’s security needs well into the next century.

As you can see from this article, the future will deliver some very exciting systems. The technology that is at our fingertips will change the way soldiers will think, act, and fight. With this all said, I want everyone to remember that even with all of this technology, the individual “SOLDIER” will always be our greatest combat multiplier. I hope all of you had a wonderful holiday season and remember, “PRIDE IS CONTAGIOUS,” so get out and infect other soldiers. I am very interested in receiving concerns, comments, and suggestions from soldiers out in the field. Please send all questions and comments to the following email address: CSM@knox.army.mil

Seat from Page 6 and begin execution of the mission. The modification comes when the enemy is not in templated positions, is on a different timeline, or is using a different direction of attack. For example, a unit finds that the enemy is not in the templated position and must adjust the objective’s location because the commander’s intent was to destroy all enemy vehicles in sector. Also, the unit is defending a battle position and the enemy is attempting to bypass this defense. Now the leader must change posture and move his defense to prevent enemy penetration of the phase line in accordance with the commander’s intent. With these changes, we force the leader to react to a different environment than he had expected. If he possesses a firm understanding of the mission and the commander’s intent, then he will react appropriately and emerge victorious. If not, then an AAR can be conducted and the unit re-cocked with yet another spin on the enemy situation. The idea is to engrain in the leaders that the plan is a good structure for their operations but it must not hinder mission execution. Training is often constrained by land, money, time, and available personnel resources. This may force units to conduct plan-oriented training. However, if the resources are available, then intent-oriented training should be conducted. The amount of land required for this type of training will probably be larger. The boundaries of the lane need to be sufficiently wide to allow a leader and/or the OPFOR to react or maneuver in a rapidly changing environment. The amount of time needed to train a unit will probably increase as well. This is due to both the need for retraining and the amount of time it will take leaders to develop fragmentary orders. The bottom line is the way the lanes are resourced and planned will change slightly. Despite the ease of the transition to this new model, we cannot abandon the old model completely. There is definitely value in the old methodology. Units need the structure of the old lanes when key leaders have turned over or a large period of time has lapsed since the last training event on this mission. Units and leaders need to ramp up to the new level competence before beginning intent-based training — envision the old system as the crawl and walk phases and the intent-based training as the run phase. In conclusion, we want leaders who can react and apply doctrine appropriately in nondoctrinal situations. The only way to realistically prepare leaders for this task is to place them in these situations during training. I believe that if we can get to this intent-based training method, we will more effectively prepare our leaders and units for mission accomplishment.

U. S. Military Academy West Point, NY Books Are Available On Additional Battles

Dear Sir: I wish to make a correction to the book review in the September-October 2002 issue of ARMOR on Battleground Europe: Cambrai - The Right Hook by Major Joseph McLamb. I heartily agree with Major McLamb that these superb, compact books are a “staff ride in a can;” the books, however are not limited to World War I. The Pen and Sword Books of the Leo Cooper Publishing house are available for the Utah Beach and the Airborne Landings, Omaha Beach, the British and Canadian Landings at Gold, Sword, and Juno, Pegasus Bridge/Merville Battery, Nijmegan, Hell’s Highway (the Advance of British XXX Corps in Operation Market-Garden), The Island (the fighting in the Betuwe area between the Rhine and Maas rivers south of Arnhem in October-November ’44), and Arnhem. I can personally recommend them as I used all of the aforementioned titles in a staff ride that I conducted with friends in September 2002. The time and money spent purchasing and reading these books was well-spent and invaluable preparation for my comrades and

I. I would like to add to Major McLamb’s endorsement that the books greatly aid in navigating in European traffic and contain tips about insurance and local laws and customs. The books are also extremely useful as a reference guide to other books as they are well illustrated and contain precise, pertinent maps that so many other histories lack. Another is also available on the destruction of the U. S. 106th Infantry Division in St. Lo that I found useful.

LTC, Infantry Hohenfels, Germany

Dear Sir: For more than 10 years, I have routinely been disgusted with the environmental restrictions placed on units training in federally owned training areas. I have experienced and have heard of some pretty ridiculous constraints that have us injecting our training events with farces such as “DeGama Lakes” at Fort Bliss, and “politically sensitive red-cockaded woodpecker nesting areas” at Fort Stewart. I have been angered that training stops at Pinon Canyon when it rains. I have been incensed that soldiers are not allowed to “neutral steer” armored vehicles at Fort Stewart or Pinon Canyon. So now, the United States has been attacked. The commander in chief says to everyone in uniform, “Get ready.” We are standing on the precipice of certain war. So now what? Well, we will continue to do what we’ve been doing for years… preparing to fight our country’s wars. Everyone I know in uniform who has heard our president’s call has a cold feeling gnawing deep in their gut knowing that we are the ones who are going to have to take the fight to the enemy. We are the ones who will make the enemies of freedom pay for their crimes. We are the ones who will spill our own precious blood if necessary. I am making an impassioned plea for an end to the environmental constraints placed on our preparations for combat executed in our nation’straining areas. I can think of no greater time to end these restrictions that may very well cost the blood of our soldiers in combat. We need to train our soldiers under all conditions without being concerned about causing damage to the ecosystem. I ask you, what is more valuable, the life of the soldier or the ground he trains on? I argue that human blood is infinitely more precious than the fauna, flora, or any species of animal life living on that ground. Anyone who argues otherwise cheapens the value of human life and subverts the cause of liberty and freedom. There are no units in the United States military that are environmental “terrorists.” No units purposely defile their playing field for the sake of thumbing their noses at the environmental establishment. We have exercised good faith in being environmental stewards; we have followed the rules in our supply rooms, arms rooms, motor pools and, yes, training areas, often by the threat of action by our fellow government agencies. We have never once threatened to leave them on their own to defend our country. Instead we have submitted and, as a result, have watered down our training just a little here and there to comply. The time has come in our country’s hour of need to rescind these petty restrictions, which are meaningless when compared with the lives of our country’s sons and daughters. We can no longer afford to sacrifice the quality and demands of realistic training for the sake of the environment — a sacrifice that may equal a sacrifice of men and women in the impending war.

A/1-409th Cav (TS)

The following corrections pertain to the TASS Armor Battalions section of the National Guard Unit listing, November-December 2002 issue, page 51. The commander of Region A, 1st Armor Battalion, 254th Regiment is LTC Huggard. The senior instructor is MSG Beierschmitt. The commander of Region C, 1st Armor Battalion, 218th Regiment is LTC Brooks and the chief instructor is MSG Long.

LETTERS from Page 4 50 ARMOR —