Achieving Mass at the Decisive Point The Role of the Planning Staff

One of the primary challenges that units face at the tactical level is the ability to achieve mass at the decisive time and place. While there are many reasons why units struggle to mass, this article focuses on the role of the planning staff and the effect they have on their units’ ability to achieve mass. “Mass” is defined by FM 3-0, Operations, as the ability to “concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.”1 The concept of massing combat power is fundamental to doctrine. In addition to being listed among the principles of war, it is the only characteristic common to both offensive and defensive operations. To be successful on the battlefield, units must increase the disparity between friendly and enemy forces by reducing enemy combat power. This is accomplished by synchronizing elements of friendly combat power to create overwhelming effects at the decisive time and place.2 Through synchronization, commanders arrange battlefield operating systems to mass effects so that they can overwhelm an enemy or dominate a situation. In essence, mass is a critical ingredient to success on the battlefield, and synchronization is the means to that end. As a battle staff trainer, I have observed 15 different staffs conduct more than 75 iterations of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). The most prevalent observed trend is their collective struggle to achieve synchronization across multiple battlefield operating systems (BOS). This lack of synchronization during planning has a direct impact on their unit’s inability to mass effects during execution; “Without synchronization, there is no massing of effects.”3 Some might argue that this shortcoming results from a faulty planning process, that the MDMP is too cumbersome and time-consuming to be effective — particularly when constrained by uncertainty and time. While developing and comparing multiple courses of action (COA) in a time-constrained environment is arguably counterproductive, our current process does not limit our ability to develop effective plans timely. Our doctrine identifies that tactical planning horizons are short and that comprehensive planning may not be feasible for continuous operations. Subsequently, it gives the commander and staff the flexibility to manipulate the process through timesaving techniques. The most timesaving technique is for the commander to limit the number of COA developed; the specific technique we most often see at the National Training Center is the commander elects to have his staff develop, refine, and wargame a single COA. Unfortunately, this technique typically leads to a plan that is no more synchronized than those developed from choosing one of many multiple COAs. This happens because the staff accepts the commander’s directed COA as if it was complete and moves directly into the wargaming process. Without developing the COA before entering the wargame, the staff lacks the tools necessary to reach the level of detail required to synchronize the plan. Despite the ability to manipulate the process and use timesaving techniques, staffs still struggle to produce synchronized plans because they do not understand what they are trying to achieve at the conclusion of each MDMP step, or at the end of the entire process. For staffs to understand how to synchronize, they must first understand synchronization. According to FM 3-0, synchronization is “arranging activities in time, space, and purpose to mass maximum relative combat power at the decisive place and time.”4 Since we have already identified that synchronization is the means to achieving mass, we can deduce that the fundamental elements of synchronization are arranging activities in purpose, space, and time. The conceptual link then for the staff is to determine when during the planning process it is most efficient and “To be successful on the battlefield, units must increase the disparity between friendly and enemy forces by reducing enemy combat power. This is accomplished by synchronizing elements of friendly combat power to create overwhelming effects at the decisive time and place. Through synchronization, commanders arrange battlefield operating systems to mass effects so that they can overwhelm an enemy or dominate a situation. In essence, mass is a critical ingredient to success on the battlefield, and synchronization is the means to that end.” 36 ARMOR — effective to arrange activities in purpose, space, and time. During COA development, the commander seeks to integrate the elements of his combat power with other potential combat multipliers, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS), against the enemy. This integration culminates in developing a scheme of maneuver. According to FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations (soon to be replaced by FM 5-0), the scheme of maneuver includes much more than just how to incorporate maneuver forces, it also includes reconnaissance and security operations, concept of fires, integration of obstacle effects, and priorities for each CS and CSS element.5 This fully developed scheme of maneuver coordinates the operation to show the relationship of friendly forces to one another, the enemy, and terrain. Through this integration, we achieve two of the three elements of synchronization — we arrange the activities of our assets in terms of space and purpose. Timing the operation is not incorporated into the scheme of maneuver because we do not yet have the tools to achieve this level of detail. This becomes apparent when we consider the tools used to portray the enemy during COA development. Typically the S2 prepares one or more situational templates (SITTEMP) as part of the initial intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) conducted during mission analysis. It is these SITTEMP that drive our COA development process. A SITTEMP is a graphical depiction of expected threat dispositions in a likely enemy COA, at the most critical point in the operation, as determined by the S2 and S3.6 A SITTEMP is essentially a snapshot of what we expect the enemy to look like at a given point in the operation. Since we are using a static template to depict the enemy during COA development, we gain little from attempting to apply timing to our actions in the form of triggers. Thus, it makes sense and provides a more manageable process to first focus solely on integration — the space and purpose elements of synchronization. The final step of COA development is preparing a COA statement and sketch, which together describe who, what, when, where, how, and why for each subordinate element. By portraying friendly maneuver units, pertinent targets, target groups, mobility/countermobility assets, locations for CSS assets, and other applicable combat multipliers in the form of a sketch, we can fully visualize the entire scheme of maneuver. If used efficiently, these tools assist the staff in confirming that they have fully integrated all available resources — the elements of combat power, including maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and information with CS and CSS assets. This allows the staff to verbally describe the scheme of maneuver (purpose), and visualize the spatial relationship of friendly forces to one another, the enemy and terrain (space). What we lack at this point, however, is timing the operation. This final element of synchronization allows us to apply the appropriate sequence and triggers to our actions to create an overwhelming dilemma that limits the enemy’s ability to react. The wargame is the next step in the MDMP and the final step of a single COA scenario prior to the commander’s approval and producing the operations order. Because this is the final analytical task in the planning process, it is critical that timing, the final element of synchronization, be accounted for during this step. While the purpose of the wargame is not simply to apply timing to the friendly COA, it should be one of the principal results we look to achieve from the process, given the importance of synchronization on our ability to mass. FM 34-130 tells us that during the wargaming session the staff “fights” the set of threat courses of action.7 We use the tools of the IPB, give them a doctrinally sound, purpose-based commander (S2) and allow him to fight the enemy COA against ours. The doctrinal method we use to do this is an iterative action-reaction-counteraction process, focused on a series of critical events. Since this process attempts to visualize the flow of the battle and combines friendly and enemy force interaction, it is the logical step in which to incorporate timing with our actions. As the staff wargames each critical event, they evaluate each friendly-enemy interaction to determine that they have allocated adequate resources and identified appropriate actions for that scenario. If they determine an action to be time-sensitive (either in sequence or desired effect), they must then establish the appropriate trigger and capture in it whatever tool they have chosen to record the results of the wargame. For example, an armor task force is planning to breach during a deliberate attack. They are establishing a company-sized support by fire (SBF) to provide direct fire suppression of the objective in conjunction with indirect fire suppression and obscuration. To maximize force protection and retain combat power, they do not want to occupy the SBF, which is in direct fire range of the enemy, without the complementary effect of indirect fire. To ensure they maintain momentum, however, they do not want to unnecessarily stop the company short of the SBF to wait on the indirect fire. To achieve this effect, they establish a trigger for the indirect fires that takes into account the company’s rate of movement and any time associated with the call-for-fire, such as radio transmis-

ARMOR — 37 “Executing the MDMP correctly and achieving synchronization in the plan does not necessarily lead to battlefield success. It does, however, give subordinate units a greater probability of success.” Continued on Page 42 team trainer, battle staff trainer, and senior analyst. Achieving Mass from Page 37 42 ARMOR — and produce an order for another group to execute in the company lanes. The commander should issue WARNOs and start the TLP as the platoons finish their lanes, which support the TLP master task. This involves more captains in the gauntlet by making the TOC functional and allows a commander more time to be with a company and conduct operations such as assembly area operations to standard at the end of the day. The SGI will also be able to continue to develop the staff skills of the officers executing the MDMP. The same methodology can be followed for CCTT and SIMNET exercises and allow the CABCC students to execute the MDMP, perhaps in a time-constrained environment as described in U. S. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations.10 Several groups can simultaneously execute the MDMP for the next day’s missions. Three missions can be run daily with these simulators (with current time constraints), which allow drivers and gunners from two groups to support the third group. After each module taught in the ACCC, an after action review is written to provide feedback on course improvement. This keeps the course relevant and useful to the students. As pointed out at the beginning of this article, change is still needed and will happen. Our duty is to ensure that we can build flexibility and relevancy into the new course. Cutting the instructor staff while increasing the number of classes taught per year, focusing on product or execution-based evaluation exclusively, and wasting the time students have to interact with instructors in a face-to-face environment will do little to accomplish this. As the pilot course is implemented, hard evaluation of its effectiveness must take place. Can students pass the write-for-life after receiving only distance learning instruction? Can students understand which material from a higher headquarters’ OPORD is essential to theirs? Can students execute the MDMP without guidance from an instructor present in the classroom? If not, a wide variety of issues must be addressed before full implementation.

Notes 1Lieutenant General William M. Steele and Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Walters Jr., “Training and Developing Army Leaders,” Military Review, July-August 2001, p. 2. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5ACCC Weekly Training Calendar 02-003, 16 August, 2002. 6CPT Jason Slider, Point Paper on OES Transformation and the Combined Arms Battle Command Course, 12 February 2002, p. 1. 7LTC Steven Carmichael, CPT OES Significant Activities Update, July 2002, p. 2. 8Ibid. 9Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 September 2001, p. 36. 10U. S. Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 31 May 1997.

CPT Thomas Nagle is currently a student at the Combined Arms Services Staff School. A recent graduate of the Armor Captains Career Course, he received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy, West Point. He has served in various command and staff positions, including S4, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and S4, support platoon leader, and tank platoon leader, 2-12 Cav, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.