Trends in Israeli Tank Development

Israel is a country which is still constantly at war. According to General Israel Tal, there is not a single day when a tank does not fire somewhere in anger, a quite unique situation. In fact, over nearly fifty years of conflict in tank fighting under ultra-modern combat conditions, Israeli tankers have survived to gather combat experience second to none, although most are not professional soldiers. Such knowledge cannot be gained better in any other way, even with the kind of sophisticated computer simulations most armies now use to train under near-realistic conditions. But, as experience shows, nothing can replace real combat. When the chips are down, those who have it under their belts usually survive to live for another day, provided of course, that luck is on their side. According to carefully collected statistics, some 32,000 tanks fought each other in the Arab-Israeli wars. This is an incredible number, surpassing anything in former conflicts. Over the years, some 4,300 tanks were knocked out by fire. In the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, more than 7,000 tanks fought in some of the most vicious combat action since Kursk, in summer

1943. Yet, during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, only 16 obsolete tanks were in action. Thus, although much has changed over a short period of less than fifty years in this region, the arms race goes on relentlessly, with each side aiming to improve not only its arsenal, but also to develop sophistication in soldier training so as to gain superiority on the future battlefield. It is here that Israel is making most of its efforts to retain its edge over its opponents. It begins by carefully selecting tank crew candidates and training the basics in realistic training programs. Gunnery has, over the years, become top priority in Israeli tank crews. Israeli tankers, using their high-tech equipment with top efficiency, perform with superb results on the battlefield and ranges; they are second to none among professional gunners in foreign armies. One must remember that nearly all Israeli tank crewmen are either youngsters under 20 serving three years compulsory service or reservists. But most have at least some combat experience in sustained low-intensity conflicts. Even now, as the Middle East peace process seems to gain momentum, Israel is constantly on full alert to any possible changes that might turn the political tables in this turbulent region. The entire nation is geared to the national security effort, with over 20 percent of the nation involved in security matters in one way or another, be it in active service, industry, or reserves. It is a heavy burden, but a compulsory price that a small nation like Israel — surrounded by hostile elements — must bear to survive. Two main elements still dominate Israel’s deterrence. They are airpower, using highly sophisticated weapon systems, and high alert, fast-moving armored forces, working with a well balanced combined arms combat team. These are still the only viable tools to safeguard Israel’s strategic aims under acceptable conditions and with minimum loss rates, the latter a dominant consideration given Israel’s small population. To conserve human lives in combat is one of Israel’s top priorities, and has been since the creation of the Jewish State in 1948. Following a high loss rate during the first days of tank combat in the 1973 War, Israeli tank designers have invested relentless efforts to improve survival under the most stringent combat conditions. Realistic data gathered by countless battle experiences became invaluable. Top experts carefully examined each battle casualty. Knocked-out tanks, which mostly remained in Israeli territory, were subjected to close scrutiny and rigorous high-tech analysis. The information thus gleaned by thousands of hours of field work was stored into a computerized information bank, which became invaluable during the decision-making process that shaped the Merkava project. It remains one of the most ambitious tank designs ever attempted in terms of crew survivability. The massive amount of ballistic data compiled by the Israeli experts provided, for the first time in military history, a unique opportunity to achieve realistic design parameters for safety and combat efficiency. General Tal and his highly skilled team became leading authorities, their experience in modern tank design going far beyond the borders of their realm. In fact, American experts trying to realistcally assess the results of the 100 hours of ground combat in Kuwait and Iraq in 1991 consulted Israeli tank experts on their assessment methods, which made their own field work much more effective. But while large numbers of tanks were destroyed by highly sophisticated weaponry during the Gulf War, the results gleaned were of mostly limited value. Most of the combat actions were one-sided, and the real effect of hits by the friendly fire that destroyed a number of tanks was insufficient to draw wide-ranging technical conclusions. While the real capability of the ultra-modern Russian 125-mm tank gun can only be estimated, as only single guns fired with effect at tactical range, General Tal’s crew of expert analysts have at their disposal ample information from analysis of countless wrecks destroyed or damaged by a large variety of ATGWs, high-velocity tanks guns of all calibers, and ammunition of all kinds. A lot has been learned since the days of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. One of the first efforts made by Israeli de- 44 ARMOR — January-February 1996 Trends in Israeli Tank Development by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF (Ret’d) signers was to find a way to defeat the lethal chemical energy (HEAT) warheads of shoulder-fired antitank weapons and the notorious Russian SAGGER missiles. At the time, the SAGGERs seemed to dominate the battlefield in the Sinai during the first few days of the war. Later, it was clear that the wire-guided missile was not as deadly as many thought at the time, yet it still represented a considerable threat to conventionally armored tanks of that period. Only a few years later, Israeli technicians found a remarkably simple solution — explosive reactive armor — that was to save the lives of many Israeli tank crewmen in the 1982 Lebanon war. Israeli M-60 tanks received an add-on BLAZER suite of reactive armor that provided highly effective protection against the close-in fired RPG and the SAGGER. Losses dropped dramatically. BLAZER came as a complete surprise and was soon copied by other armies, including the Russians, who used it extensively in Afghanistan to survive their own, hitherto lethal weapons! It was only through ill-luck that Russian experts were able to lay their hands on one of those BLAZER-fitted Pattons, abandoned by its Israeli crew, and learn the secret, which allowed them to copy the system. The Merkava Mark I model also faced its first combat test in the Lebanon War in 1982. It performed with astonishing results under the most stringent combat conditions. Its spaced armor provided excellent survivability, even during close-in urban fighting, where engagements were at near-zero range, and where AT teams fired on tanks from upper floors in buildings along narrow streets. Although some 50 Merkava Mk1s were hit by various weapons at different ranges, only nine crew members were killed, mostly those working with open hatches. Surprisingly, of the 50-odd crewmembers wounded in Merkavas, none were burned! In any other type of tank, far more burn injuries could be expected under the same conditions. No wonder that Merkava battalions became the dream assignment of every tank crew in the Israeli armor corps! Very little detail of ballistical data on Merkava is unclassified, but it is known that not one Merkava was a total loss in Lebanon, and all were restored to active service, including one tank that was hit by no less than 20 rounds of antitank fire. This is a remarkable feat achieved by Tal’s design team, and a real morale booster if ever there was one. Since 1982, the Merkava received two basic modifications and one complete alteration which amounted to a new model of AFV. The Merkava Mk2, the immediate result of the Lebanon experience, included an improved survival kit. But the Merkava Mk3, which currently makes up the majority of tanks in the active service force, is a totally new design. Although quite similar in shape, it embodies a new, ultra-modern, modular armor concept, and integrates a new, powerful 120-mm smooth-bore, high-velocity gun firing a set of indigenous developed ammunition. But the Mk3’s most impressive asset is its new armor suite, a near-revolutionary design of modular cast steel armor designed especially for this model by Tal’s experts. This unique approach to armor protection makes the Merkava highly flexible. Instead of equipping the tank with a fixed set of armor that cannot be exchanged over the life span of the tank, the modular armor can be exchanged for new designs, if and when new armor technologies emerge. Using modular components also makes it easy to replace damaged parts whenever the need arises, even by crews working under field conditions. Since this modular approach uses parts that are bolted on, instead of welded, an entire armored suit can be removed and fitted at will. Aside from being highly cost-effective, this method allows a force to reduce the weight of the vehicle for air transport, an inherent strategic mobility advantage. Currently, following the demise of the Cold War period, most Western armies face the challenge of both rapid strategic and tactical long-range movements. In most cases, future out-of-area engagements will have to cope with contingencies which may well include threats from modern armored forces, even by hostile elements of the Third World. This threat will have to be countered by friendly armored elements. Under present circumstances, it seems highly questionable that heavy or even medium tanks can be transported by existing or even future air assets to provide substantial ARMOR — January-February 1996 45 Above, General Tal, center, with two members of his staff in front of a new Merkava Mk3, with modular armor suite. The bolts that anchor the armor pack can be seen on the front slope. At left, a closeup of the modular armor sections that protect the front and sides of the Merkava turret. Photos by the author Merkava Mk3, with Modular Armor firepower for engaged ground forces in distant areas. While the problem of firepower can be solved by low-caliber high-pressure tank guns or even future ammunition technologies, the problem of armor protection may well persist until a complete breakthrough is made in armor metallurgy. Relatively lightweight tanks with high-powered guns can improve, if not solve, the inter-theater mobility problem, but it is highly doubtful those tanks will be able to survive a close-in battle with enemy medium tanks at acceptable loss rates to their crews. A workable solution could be the addition of modular armor to upgrade lighter tanks AFTER they have landed at their destinations by air, while the add-on armor packs follow separately by air or by pre-positioned sea assets soon after. A near-revolution in superior protection can be achieved with cost effective and logistically flexible means without loss of maneuverability in the field. While current modular armor is entirely passive in its nature, future technologies could envision active armor packs that could well revolutionize armor protection, enhancing the overall protection of the tank from all directions, and solving the problem of TOP ATTACK, which remains one of the greatest vulnerabilities in most modern tanks today. One of the Israeli armored force’s most precious assets is the close cooperation between designers of Tal’s expert team and the men in the field who depend on his solutions for their virtual survival in combat. Most armies live on “Red Tape,” which is a natural part of any bureaucracy, but General Tal, who is a soldier’s general, has managed to circumvent this phenomena by establishing a direct link between his team and the tankers in the field. The result is a unique and remarkable process of decision-making which has already come up with several modifications which are the immediate outcome of tank crews reporting on the performance of their weapon systems in combat. The Merkava project is a constantly changing process. With two major upgradings, a large number of improvisations have been included in older models at low cost and carried out in the field by specialist crews at battalion level. These shortcuts have already resulted in lives saved. Tank crews are highly appreciative as a result, which encourages further cooperation at all levels. Thus, General Tal and his team try to remain one step ahead, a constant challenge which has no equal anywhere. In Lebanon, a savage war of attrition is in process daily. The Shiite fanatics use every conceivable weapon to combat Israeli troops day and night. Tanks, and especially the Merkavas, are the cornerstones of this fighting. Survivability is the order of the day, with Israeli forces facing constant threats from well-placed ambushes and demolition charges cunningly situated on narrow tracks and mountain roads. The Merkava has demonstrated remarkable adaptivity to this type of warfare. Its superior armor protection has withstood most ground attacks from different ranges. Scores of antitank rounds, some of them advanced ATGWs, failed to penetrate, even when fired in salvoes. On the other hand, Israeli gunners have managed to destroy Hezbollah rocket launchers by direct fire as the missiles were still in-flight! Accurate tank gunnery more than once made the difference between life and death. Tal’s expert team has done more than design tanks. The fighting in Lebanon, some of which is done under most difficult conditions, calls for some unique solutions to enhance survival. Older tanks, like the M-60, have been upgraded with modular armor. Armored personnel carriers, such as the M113, have been given advanced armor protection against ATGWs, and now sustain most attacks. Obsolete tanks, such as the Centurion and captured Russian T-55s and T-62s, have been redesigned into a variety of APCs, armored engineer vehicles, and especially up-armored carriers capable of withstanding large demolition charges which would have totally destroyed lighter armored vehicles. These trends in Israeli armored designs will undoubtedly continue, and some future breakthrough in tank design can certainly be expected over the next years, as the need will remain top priority. Israel still very much needs its Armor Corps, and the Corps needs the best tools to do its job. 46 ARMOR — January-February 1996 Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel was born in Dresden, Germany in 1928, and emigrated to Palestine in 1938. After serving for a short spell with the British forces after WWII, he became one of the founding members of the Israeli Armoured Corps in 1948 and served as a career officer with the Israel Defence Forces for 26 years. Educated at the French Cavalry School at Saumur, he later held various command and staff assignments, and fought in all the Arab-Israeli wars up to and including 1973, when he served as Chief of Signals of the Armoured Corps. His last assignment was lecturer on tactics at the IDF Command and Staff College. He studied history at Tel Aviv University and served for 12 years as editor of an Israeli-German based defense journal. He now acts as a freelance journalist and defence analyst for several leading American and European military journals. A heavy armored personnel carrier, based on a captured T-55 chassis. The turret has been removed, the engine compartment has been redesigned, and a hatch has been added to the rear for troop access. Other obsolete tanks have been converted to engineer vehicles.

each column. The support platoon leader and sergeant were responsible for getting the columns to the two mentioned link-up points. After completion of resupply (task force goal of one hour), the process was reversed. Battalion Maintenance Section This section was leader intensive. It included the battalion maintenance officer (BMO), the battalion maintenance technician (BMT), the battalion motor sergeant (BMS), and several of the best mechanics. Vehicles consisted of three M88 recovery vehicles and the direct support (DS) maintenance team M113 vehicle equipped with secure, dual net FM and GPS. Maintenance sections at company and battalion level, were task organized and their equipment and repair parts organized around time lines. The specific items carried were based on the requirement for the mechanics to replace any item within 15 minutes. If the vehicle could not be repaired within that time, it was left with its crew for the BMO traveling behind the trail tank company. Each company formation included its M113 maintenance vehicle and M88 recovery vehicle with several mechanics. Selected line items from the prescribed load lists (PLL) were stored on both vehicles. Battalion maintenance vehicles also carried selected PLL lines. Their timeline for vehicle repair was 45 minutes. If the vehicle still could not be repaired (15 minutes by company and 45 minutes by BMO), it was left with its crew for the HHC commander leading the field trains (part of the brigade support area) approximately three to fours hours behind the task force. Task Force TOC One modification was done to the M577 command post carriers in the TOC and ALOC. Four 5-ton cargo truck driver’s seats were installed in all M577s (Figure 3). This initiative was a lifesaver to all occupants who traveled the 370 kilometers into Iraq. They had comfortable seats, well positioned to post maps and write reports, and in a position to catnap when appropriate. Everyone wore a Combat Vehicle Crewman (CVC) helmet to monitor an assigned net. This minimized noise and confusion inside the vehicle and maximized individual concentration, future planning by the second in command, and battle captain battle monitoring. Summary There is nothing magical about any of the ideas or initiatives performed by Task Force Desert Rogues. Hundreds of innovative techniques were used by many superb units. The successes of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM are attributable to those magnificent units and their leaders and soldiers. All the ideas presented in this brief article worked. They involved training to a standard, a few inexpensive pieces of materiel, and the adherence to established doctrine. ARMOR — January-February 1996 47 Task Force Initiatives (Continued from Page 39) Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Boyd is currently the U.S. Army Exchange Officer at the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College. He served as the XO of 1st Battalion, 64th Armor, 24th ID(M) at Ft. Stewart, Ga., during Operations

DESERT

SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

is accepted into Excellence in Armor, his DA Form 2-1 should be annotated as discussed earlier. Now for the benefits! Incentives for Excellence in Armor soldiers with exceptional performance are as follows:

• OSUT commanders may promote 10% of their class at the completion of Basic to PV2 and those 10% may be promoted to PFC at the completion of the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) specific phase. Statistics show that the greatest number of these promotions go to Excellence in Armor soldiers, primarily because they have proven themselves to be overachievers.

• A sergeant who is a Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course graduate may request to take the SCCT/ TCCT II through his local TCO or

TSO.

It is a comprehensive two-hour test on Skill Level 3 and 4 tasks. If he passes with a score of 70 or higher, he is eligible to receive 50 promotion points in Military Education for his SSG promotion packet. This is in accordance with Army Regulation 600-8-19, Enlisted Promotions and Reductions.

• All senior NCO promotion boards are briefed that Excellence in Armor identifies an Armor soldier as a “cut above.” On the last SFC promotion board, there were more Excellence in Armor soldiers selected for promotion to SFC than any other category in CMF19. Being an Excellence in Armor soldier certainly has its advantages, not only by increasing your chances for promotion, but also in recognizing you as a cut above everyone else. The proof of the program has been seen in CMF19 promotions. During the first year that the original OSUT Excellence in Armor enrollee was eligible for promotion to SSG and SFC, 75% of SSG promotions and 74% of SFC selections were Excellence in Armor. Commanders are selecting, and promotion boards are recognizing, the highest quality soldiers. But the program cannot survive and flourish without command involvement. Leaders have four responsibilities when it comes to Excellence in Armor: first, identify and challenge incoming Excellence in Armor soldiers; second, establish and support a unit Excellence in Armor program; third, accelerate SPC/SGT/SSG promotions and school attendance for Excellence in Armor soldiers; and fourth, maintain quality in the program! If a soldier no longer meets the standards, disenroll him. Finally, if you have any questions about Excellence in Armor, you can direct them to the following address: Commander U.S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARP (SFC Berg/Ms. Graham) Fort Knox, KY 40121-5000 Or call DSN 464-1368/3188 or Commercial (502)624-1368/3188. Keep Charging! Driver’s Seat (Continued from Page 5)

During the Vietnam War, commanders struggled with the role of command and control helicopters. Some battalion commanders flew over their company commanders fighting on the ground, directing their every move, while brigade and division commanders flew above the battalion commander, giving him the benefit of their experience. This environment left very little room for the company commander to apply the latest battlefield information and accomplish the battalion commander’s mission and intent. Similarly, enemy tanks firing sabot rounds look quite different to soldiers on the ground than they do as icons on a SAT terminal. If deliberate control does become the standard for command and control on the digital battlefield, then how will the second lieutenant learn the lessons that will prepare him to be a division commander? There is a great deal of excitement across the Army as it becomes more digital and fields new systems. While the focus presently is to gain seamless conductivity between systems that were seemingly developed in a “stovepipe” fashion, there remains a need for equal emphasis on preparing the doctrine, tactics, and leader training necessary to fight in the information-laden environment of the digital battlefield.

ROSS A. BROWN

CPT, Armor Ft. Hood, Texas Ratings Should Be Tied To Tank Qualification Dear Sir: I think that this letter will start some controversy within the Armor community. This subject has been avoided for a good number of years. I want to ask one very simple question: Should a tank commander’s rating (OER or NCOER) be more closely tied to the qualification of his tank? Twenty or more years ago (before the M1 and master gunners) tank commanders took a great deal of pride in the fact that they knew their weapons, that those weapons worked, and that their crew could shoot. Today, I see tank commanders who blame their tank for their poor performance. There are tanks that require constant “tweaking” to make them work properly. I see units where it is much more important to pull months of red (duty) cycle, than it is for the unit to properly train and conduct gunnery. This all leads to the tank commander’s yearly report card. I wonder, how can a rater honestly give an excellence rating in competence and leadership to a tank commander who cannot qualify his tank. I ask this because I feel that one of the primary duties of the tank commander is to fight his tank and win. One of the traditional measures of that primary duty is Tank Table VIII. I know that there was a conscious effort to de-emphasize Tank Table VIII in the late 1970s. I wonder if that has really served us as well as it should have. I remember in 2-81 Armor in 1973 tank commanders like Platoon Sergeant Cables and Sergeant Hardy, who really knew their tank and crew. They put lots of time and effort into training and preparing their crews to fight the M60 tank and to qualify the first time on Tank Table VIII. These tankers did that in a spirit of friendly competition within the company and battalion. Those few who could not qualify had to suffer through a lot of reminders about “boloing,” on Tank Table VIII. You can surely bet that they did the work required to train their crews up to a fight-and-win standard. Should crews who cannot qualify be allowed to re-fire specific engagements from Table VIII until they can meet the standard? Should a tank commander who consistently fails to qualify his tank be considered for promotion to sergeant first class? I would submit that if he cannot train his crew and fight his tank, he just might not be able to train his crew, fight his tank, and mentor other tank commanders to train their crews and fight their tanks. As I said at the beginning of this letter, this might start some controversy within the Armor community. If it does, good! I really feel that a better tank commander can come out of a discussion of this issue.

CSM HALFORD M. DUDLEY

1-66 Armor Fort Hood, Texas Computers Won’t Solve Combat Development Problems Dear Sir: As usual, your July-August issue was chock-full of fine articles, and what was especially nice to see was the number of articles written by company grade officers, the individuals who, when the fat is in the fire, have to put the fire out. They provided some great observations and experiences based on real day-to-day life as a tanker that I hope are being read, heard, and understood by our current technologists and acquisition czars. A case in point was the fine letter by 1LT Brannon of C/112 Armor, TXARNG, written in response to an earlier article on tank main gun autoloaders. His point was very clear, and that was that four crewmen on a tank have many tasks to perform in order to keep their tank operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for however long it is in combat. It is not just a matter of loading the main gun. More importantly, 1LT Brannon provided us with a most important part of the development process for any new equipment — user input. Unfortunately, it appears that the Army has been caught in the trap, that if we automate and digitize everything, we can win the next war from the CP with four soldiers and a computer. Ah, if this were only true. But, it appears that many in uniform today do believe it to be true. I do not mean to imply that automation and digitization is all bad; but as with every new idea or technology, one must understand how that idea or technology fits into the larger picture as well as many smaller ones. When TRADOC was formed back in July of 1973, its first commander, General William DePuy, understood the need to have the field soldier’s input in the development process. Therefore, he put the responsibility for combat developments (CD) at a level in the chain-of-command where such input would be most visible and effectively applied — at the individual branch level. From that year until Desert Storm, the TRADOC combat developers modernized the U.S. Army. If you do not believe that, walk around any tank park, motor pool, airfield, supply room, or arms room and count the percentage of things that predate 1973. Desert Storm was witness to the success of General DePuy’s decentralized combat development process to the branch level. The ultimate user, the soldier, had direct input to the end product. And those working directly in the CD process at the individual branch centers were green suiters who also had lots of field and hands-on experience. Communication lines hummed in all directions, and coordination from center level to individual action officers within the DA staff took place on a daily basis. The same communication opened between industry and the various Army laboratories. But the lessons of history are soon forgotten, and that appears to be what is happening today within the Army, and particularly TRADOC. Downsizing over the past four-five years has about destroyed the Combat Developments functions at each branch level. It almost seems as if no one at the senior leadership levels understands the development and acquisition process. Our future needs will not be solved with a computer, nor by a half dozen battle labs which are actually doing nothing more than what was done in the past under the combat developer’s charter, the only difference being that the battle labs have more computers and simulation to assist them in their studies. But the acquisition process is still guided by DOD’s 5000-series regulations. Any proposed new program must still comply with these regulations, and the HQ DA, DOD, and Congressional questions, con- 48 ARMOR — January-February 1996 LETTERS (Continued from Page 3) cerns, and biases must be answered before funding will be forthcoming. Likewise, industry still needs to understand the environment of the soldier in the field, and the soldier in the field needs to have a handy conduit to what is being proposed by industry. That proven conduit is, and has been, the branch combat developer, the user’s representative with industry, DA, DOD, and the Congress. Abolishing combat developments, or consolidating all CD functions at a higher level than the individual branch level, is a lose-lose proposition. Lost is the individual branch interface and understanding with industry and the technology being proposed by industry and the laboratories. Lost, too, is the capability of close, routine coordination, interface, and understanding between the ultimate user in the field and his representative, the combat developer, and his boss, the individual branch chief. Lieutenant Brannon’s comments concerning industry and the technologists needing to understand the working environment of the soldier, before trying to solve a problem with technology where a problem may not exist, needs to be raised to the top of the flagpole. We may save a lot of personnel positions on our TO&Es by great technological ideas on paper today, but the real question remains to be answered, and that is: Will it really save us on the next battlefield or cause us to be less effective? The Army and TRADOC under General DePuy’s foresight saw that the Army was not developing the right equipment to win on the next battlefield because the user and his branch chief were not directly involved in the process until the item under development was ready for testing or fielding. Hence, many of those soon-to-be-fielded items never were, because they did not meet the operational needs of the real users in the field. Today, our military museums are filled with many of those great ideas for new military equipment that never made it — because in the end it was not the item that the soldier wanted or needed to accomplish his mission on the battlefield.

CLARK A. BURNETT

COL, Armor, Retired Adding Vehicles Would Deny Light Forces Their Mobility Dear Sir: In “Making the Case for an Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicle” (September-October 1995), Stanley Crist echoes the views of many “heavy” proponents in arguing to “heavy up” the Army’s principal force projection forces — its airborne units. In so doing, he reveals the same overreliance on our experiences in the Gulf War that has captured not only the Army’s mechanized/armor communities but much of our senior leadership as well. We should be very careful about drawing lessons from a desert war — which showcased and highlighted our heavy forces in conditions which optimized their awesome capabilities — and then applying them to the force as a whole in conditions which do not. If Crist is right, then our doctrine and our senior leadership is wrong in stressing heavy-light and light-heavy operations. Light and heavy forces can work well in many kinds of terrain despite the significant mobility differential. The experience of 3- 325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team during its recent CMTC rotation is one example. During the rotation, the ABCT fought a pure tank battalion with attached artillery, motor rifle, antitank, and engineer units. 3- 325 controlled two tank and two Bradley platoons, as well as its organic heavy weapons company (with 20 TOWs) and a mechanized engineer platoon. In rolling terrain interspersed with wooded and built-up areas, 3-325 killed 60% of the opposing force in its movement to contact and 70% (including 24 of 29 tanks) in the defense. In the attack, the ABCT seized all four of its assigned assault objectives. In each engagement, the combat team’s rifle companies or HMMWV-mounted TOWs accounted for more than 75% of its kills. 3- 325 was not supported by any CAS or Army aviation. These results are significant because the OPFOR, in addition to its inherent advantages, fielded a force with vastly greater firepower and mobility. 3-325 offset these advantages by moving infantry on helicopters and trucks when out of contact and by denying the OPFOR freedom of movement with obstacles, pre-planned fires, good use of terrain (including natural choke points), massed fires in pre-selected engagement areas, and extremely aggressive close combat antitank tactics. Crist states that “infantry needs the same degree of mobility as tanks,” and cites COL Donald Elder’s view that “anything less than the mounted combined arms team” provides “by no means the most capable combat force.” These are veiled : and not very thinly veiled — calls for the mechanization of the Army’s force projection forces. Those of us who have made a career in those forces are less enthusiastic, for two reasons. First, we know that we can fight heavy forces successfully in all but the most open kinds of terrain, and that means most of the world. Fighting with our standard task organizations, which includes Apaches, field artillery, engineers, and air defense — all supported by CAS — airborne and air assault forces, which field large numbers of TOWs and Dragons, are formidable tank killers. Second, we know that giving us mechanized vehicles robs us of the very thing that makes us strategically useful, and that is our strategic mobility. I know of no one who thinks that mechanized airborne forces can realistically deploy by air given the current or projected state of our airlift fleet. Few units are more aware of their limitations than the Army’s airborne forces. We require the same approach to combined arms warfare as any other force and the same kind of intelligent application of METT-T as anyone else. But we are more than riflemen with rocket launchers. Come visit us on the German plains and you’ll see what I mean.

MAJ R.D. HOOKER, JR.

Deputy Commander

3-325 ABCT

Key to the Assault: Suppressing AT Weapons Dear Sir: The July-August 1995 edition of ARMOR had an extensive and informative article, “Crisis in Battle” by MAJ David Lemelin, describing techniques for assaulting a platoon position. Many excellent points were brought out in this article, but I think a major one was missed. The “crisis” of an assault is not so much in the actions against the enemy infantry position being assaulted as against enemy AT weapons and tanks around the objective that can engage the assaulting force — they must be destroyed or suppressed to isolate the objective. If this precondition is achieved, the assault can be relatively easy. A competent defender sets up a combined arms defense. Against an armored force, a defense is built around tanks and AT weapons sited in depth to continuously engage the attacker from multiple directions. Obstacles, infantry positions, and artillery support this defense by protecting AT weapons and by driving and holding the attacker in areas where AT fires are effective. AT weapons are the key to this defense, not the dismounted infantry. More attacks fail because of a failure to successfully deal with mutually supporting enemy AT weapons, rather than an inability to deal with the defending enemy infantry and BMPs being assaulted. “Tunnel vision” or “target fixation” is a common problem, where the attention of the attacker is focused inward on the position being attacked and all-around security is not maintained. In the scenario presented in MAJ Leme-lin’s article, a tank-heavy company team was given the mission of assaulting a forward enemy BMP infantry platoon. In such a situation, adjacent elements of the task force could probably suppress adjacent enemy positions that would engage the team as it initially approached the enemy posi-ARMOR — January-February 1996 49 tion. However, as the assaulting team closes with the enemy position, fires from in-depth enemy AT reserve, company, and battalion second-echelon and adjacent company AT weapons, moved to “switch” positions, can catch the attackers in cross fires. Because many of these fires would come from reverse slope, keyhole, and indepth positions, initial support by fire positions become less and less effective in dealing with them, and the assaulting force itself becomes more and more isolated. This aspect of effective protection of the assaulting force from surrounding AT fires is critical, but difficult to achieve. The concept and execution of the operation must focus on this aspect, and it deserves emphasis as the key to successful assault. As a final point, I agree with MAJ Lemelin that better training on assault techniques is needed. Once the attacker is in the enemy position, the fight often breaks down into small, close-range fire fights. These are like “dog fights” and close tank-infantry cooperation, and “quick-draw” type reaction fighting skills in close terrain are needed but can be gained only by focused, frequent practice.

JAMES C. CROWLEY

LTC (Ret.), Armor Peachtree City, Ga. Once a Master Gunner, Always a Master Gunner Dear Sir: I went to Master Gunner School, Class 5- 81, as a young hard-charging SSG. At least that’s what the 1SG told me was the reason I was selected. I graduated and returned to Germany, ready to defeat Graf. Whether I did well or not, two years later, I was a master gunner instructor at Fort Knox, the best job in the world for a master gunner with the ability to share his knowledge. A short three years later, I am on the border in the 2ACR as a SFC platoon sergeant — not a master gunner, a platoon sergeant. We had a young hard-charging SSG master gunner, who felt like I did six years earlier. For the next seven years, I filled those positions talked about in promotion guides, platoon sergeant, first sergeant, and operations sergeant — and yes, the promotions came. Because I worked hard at being good at those jobs, I didn’t have time to be a master gunner also. Then came the surprise. After seven+ years of letting those hard chargers do their jobs as master gunners, while I did mine, I arrived at Ft. Hood at USASMA, class 43 graduate, MSG, and was told I was going to be a battalion master gunner! When I went to see the division CSM for my interview, I told him the last tank I was a master gunner on was an M1, and I wasn’t prepared to be a master gunner again. I wasn’t snivelling, I was being honest. Needless to say, I was talked to like a private, and told if I didn’t want to be a master gunner, I should have dropped my ASI years ago! Get your #!@ down to that unit and do your job! So I became a master gunner again. That was a year ago. Now I am the division master gunner (new division CSM). Thanks to some young hard-charging NCOs, I am almost current again. The meaning of this story: After three years as a drill sergeant or a recruiter, both of which get you extra money and a badge (for life), nobody expects you to do that job again unless you want to. As a master gunner (no money, no badge), you have a lifetime commitment, no matter where your career takes you! Attempt to stay current, or you can try to have your ASI removed. The choice is yours — think about it.

SGM JAMES S. SPURLING

Division Master Gunner Author Seeks Information On Tank Qualification Patches Dear Sir: I am writing in the hope you may help me. I am seeking information on initial use of armor pocket qualification patches. I am trying to determine when early TCQC patches were worn, and hope some Armor Association members might be able to help me. I am researching the history of qualification badges and awards so I might use the information in a book I am writing on these prizes. While most of the awards I am researching concern individual marksmanship badges and prizes from 1880 to the present, I would like to include some information above the TCQC and similar pocket patches. During World War II, the 10th Armored Division had a pocket patch to show tank crew proficiency, and in 1951, then Major General Bruce C. Clarke introduced a green and yellow TANKER diamond for wear on the HBT’s in the 1st Armored Division. I have seen photos of 3d Armored Division members wearing green, black, and yellow pocket patches in about 1961. I know of no other awards for tank crew proficiency being worn on fatigue uniforms until these 3d Armored Division patches. I am seeking information on when, why, and how the pocket patches commonly worn in the 1960s and 1970s came into use. Any information you might provide me would be greatly appreciated. I hasten to assure you that I am a serious writer and researcher. My book on the history of U.S. Army chevrons was published by the Smithsonian Institution Press in 1982, and my current book on U.S. Army branch insignia will be published by the University of Oklahoma Press in the spring of 1996. I have published over 60 articles on U.S. Army uniforms and insignia in various magazines over the past 25 years, and have been a Fellow in the Company of Military Historians since 1972. Any assistance ARMOR readers might give me concerning the early wear of TCQC patches would be greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time.

WILLIAM K. EMERSON

LTC, Armor, Retired 124 Kensington Drive Madison, Alabama 35758 PH: (205) 461-8782 Dashes and Slashes... Dear Sir: I was a bit disappointed that the back cover of the September-October 1995 issue contains the glaring error in ‘military grammar’ of listing our cavalry units as if they were companies in battalions or brigades in divisions instead of the proud squadrons of storied regiments as they should be. Separating the squadron from its parent regiment by a ‘-’ vice the ‘/’ is, of course, the correct way to designate units which are affiliated under the Combat Arms Regimental System, according to FM 101- 5-1.

GREG GARDNER

LTC, GS

ACofS, G3

25 ID(L)

LTC Gardner is correct as far as non-regimental cavalry goes. However, a careful reading of the bottom paragraph on page 2-73 of FM 101-5-1 indicates that cavalry squadrons of a regiment are designated with the “/,” e.g., 3/3 ACR indicates 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. 1-4 Cav is the proper notation for the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, which is a divisional cavalry unit, and 1-8 Cav is the proper designation for the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, a tank battalion assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division. We regret the errors on the September/October 1995 back cover. - Ed. Dutch Author Seeks Info on Marmon-Herrington Light Tanks A Dutch author seeks to correspond with former U.S. Army personnel who had experience during World War II with Marmon-Herrington light tanks. The series included the CTLS-UTAY (T14) and UTAC (T16), CTMS, and MTLS, some of which were used by the Dutch. He’s interested in former crewmen, testing and arsenal personnel, and shipping personnel. Anyone wishing to share information may get in touch with Hans Heesakkers at Akkerstraat 2, NL-5061 DE Oisterwijk, The Netherlands. 50 ARMOR — January-February 1996