Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Laboratory Together Into the Breach

(This article is reprinted from the December 1992 issue of Z?ze Royal Engineer Jouml) “Armor is more than a branch. It is a state of mind whereby a balanced team of a m and services works together in a climate of e q d importance and equal prestige. ’” Anributed to General Adna Chaffee Such was the combat philosophy of the great armor innovator, as cited by Lewis Sorley in Z’%underbolt, his biography of General Creighton Abrams. Sorley further states that his philosophy was internalized by the 4th Armored Division’s “P” Wood, by Bruce Clarke, and by Abrams himself during and after World War II. But what happens if one of the team members lacks versatility and other characteristics needed in combat?

The June 1993 version of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states that success during operations depends on the ability to operate in accordance with five basic tenets: Agility: The ability of friendly forces to act faster than the enemy. Initiative: The ability to set or change the terms of battle by action. Depth: The extension of operations in space, time, purpose, and resources. SynchronizatiOn: The ability to arrange battlefield resources and activities in time and space to produce mass and combat power at the decisive point.

Versatility: The ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements? US. Army heavy divisions, with only one organic engineer battalion, had problems meeting the demands of these tenets, particularly the newly added tenet of versatility. Their limited numbers meant engineer squads and platoons quickly became over-tasked when trying to meet the mobility, countermobility, and survivability needs of their maneuver counterparts. The divisional battalion (see Figure 1) consisted of four line companies, abridge company, and a headquarters company. One line company generally supported each of the three maneuver brigades normally found in a division (Figure 2). The fourth line company often supported the divisional cavalry squadron. An engineer battalion commander was both the commander of his unit and the primary engineer advisor to the division commanding general.

During World War II, the demands of combat typically required augmentation of this single engineer battalion. A corps would then provide one or more additional battalions from its assets. An engineer brigade-level headquarters sometimes accompanied these additional units to manage the resultant large number of engineers. Often, however, the additional battalions came without this higher headquarters; the divisional battalion commander’s span of control became rather unwieldy.

Engineer units on General ChafTee’s combined arms team were not optimally designed for combat operations.

Post-war studies of engineer support concluded that the divisional engineer structure was inadequate. The organic complement of engineer troops was seldom sufficient to ensure mission accomplishment; continuous augmentation was necessary?

Unfortunately, the resulting recommendation for creation of a divisional engineer regiment of three battalions was discarded during post-war force reductions and in the development of doctrine for a nuclear weaponsdomi-nated battlefield.

WW”s engineer problems became apparent once again on the exercise plains of Germany and during mock combat in the desert of the National Training Center (NTC). Engineers were not keeping pace with mechanized infantrymen and tankers. They were well trained, but their low numbers and overstretched command structure precluded successful support of maneuver forces. Something needed to change; maneuver commanders had to quickly have sufficient engineers at Figure 2. Engineer Support to armored and mechanized divisions before restructuring. Maneuver Brigade receives one divisional and one corps company in suppod a c o r p s Figure 3. corps Maneuver Battalion receives one divisional and one corps engineer platoon in support corps the critical location on the battlefield if they were to be both agile and versatile enough to gain and maintain the initiative critical to victory. Changes in the engineer structure were necessary to ensure effective battlefield support. The shortcomings which precluded the engineer force from matching its infantry and armor counterparts in combat agility and versatility fell into the categories of quantity, command and control, and synchronization.

Quantity: There simply were insufficient divisional engineer units to provide the support needed. For example, a brigade conducting breach operations should have a minimum of one lane per task force through any minefield encountered during an attack. Much preferred are two or more per task force. Thus, a brigade attacking with two task forces forward requires at least two lanes, and preferably has four. Even when the division has corps engineer battalion augmentation, only two engineer platoons support each task force (see Figure 3). These platoons suffer attrition and their speed of execution is degraded as they encounter obstacles in depth. The division or brigade commander can compensate by task organizing to provide greater support where it is needed. The resultant cost of weighting the main effort is loss of engineer support elsewhere. If engineers are forward supporting a breaching effort, the combined arms force subsequently assaulting through these breaches is short or devoid of engineers. Assault force commanders are subsequently handicapped when encountering further obstacles in depth or are otherwise in need of engineer support. The apparent solution is that they pick up engineers as they move through the breach (“task organizing on the move”). The experienced leader cringes at the thought. Engineer units attempting such a reorganization must consolidate (perhaps under fire), link up with the assault element and execute all coordination and reorganization necessary to provide effective support to their new unit while attacking. Engineers quickly become exhausted as they are passed from unit to unit in support of continuous operations. Reorganization also takes time, again degrading the agility of the maneuver commander and impacting on his efforts to seize and retain the initiative as he conducts offensive operations. American commanders found that reorganization on the move was not effective in demanding training environments. The engineer structure simply lacked the versatility needed in combat.

Command and Control: Compounding the problem of an insufficient number of units was the related issue of engineer leadership at each level. Platoon leaders were engineer advisors to task force commanders. These second lieutenants frequently lacked the experience necessary to maximize the potential of their asset on the combined arms team. The second lieutenant also suffered the same dual demands on his time as did his battalion commander. Both were leaders of their units and primary engineer advisors to a maneuver headquarters. Their command structures were barely versatile enough for these two tasks. They quickly became overburdened with any addition of augmenting engineer units. A divisional battalion commander could be commanding his battalion, advising the division commander, and coordinating the assets of one or more augmenting engineer units. Synchronizing the engineer effort with other combined arms team operations became very difficult. Synchronization: This ability to fully synchronize the engineer force with other elements of the combined arms team was not due simply to an inadequate command and control structure. A post-war investigating board reviewing World War II divisional engineer support concluded that: ’ “Organic battalions provided better teamwork with other elements of the division than strange supporting battalions. One of the greatest assets of any team of combined arms in a joint action... is confidence in one another, a familiarity with the limitations and capabilities of one another. With the organic engineers in the division, this necessary teamwork, confidence and knowledge of personalities was soon developed; with the everchanging, strange supporting engineers, it was not. ”4 This comment applied to post-war operations as well. Combined arms operations with divisional engineers generally were well synchronized. The same could not always be said for operations with augmenting engineer units. These units were of the same quality as their divisional counterparts, so why did they not perform as well on the field of battle? The reason was habitual relationships. Divisional engineer companies supported the same brigade whenever possible. Their platoons were assigned to the same task force when feasible. Each trained with the same unit they would accompany in war. Engineer leaders, radiomen, and equipment operators knew the standing operating procedures of the unit supported. They knew their maneuver counterparts’ personalities and therefore better understood their intentions. Often, the augmenting corps engineer units could not achieve this relationship. They were frequently at garrison locations remote from the division or suffered demands which precluded their supporting divisional exercises. Maneuver commanders found them slow I m & I I Figure 4. Corps Engineer Bn Before Restructuring to respond at critical times; corps engineers simply could not know the intentions of these commanders as well as those who always trained with them.

Balancing the Team Anew engineer structure was needed to enhance agility and versatility. Maneuver commanders needed a potent engineer capability available on short notice. Equally as important, they needed an engineer command structure which could plan for future operations to ensure engineers were in the right place when needed. This combination of versatility and enhanced control would provide the means to synchronize engineer operations with the rest of the combined arms team. The solution had been proposed 40 years before. Mechanized and armored divisions needed not one engineer battalion, but rather an engineer command with three battalions and a commander and staff to manage this vital battlefield asset. The result is the Engineer Restructure Initiative (ERI). Neither the dollars nor the manpower are available to simply add more engineer battalions to the army, but a solution is available by remodelling the "normal" support a division would receive in combat (its organic battalion plus one additional battalion from corps). Corps and divisional battalions are structurally very similar; the major difference is that corps battalions lack abridge company (see Figure 4). By reorganizing these two battalions of four line companies each and creating three battalions of three line companies Division Engineer Corps Engineer Battalion Bath I ion -ERI Engineer @ @Brigade Figure 5. each, a division has an organic engineer battalion to support each of its three maneuver brigades. The companies are smaller so as to provide the manpower for a brigade headquarters, an additional battalion headquarters, and the ninth engineer company (two battalions of four companies each gives only eight of the nine companies needed for three battalions of three companies each. See Figure 5). The ERI brigade is achieved without an increase in the number of engineer personnel supporting a division. The combined strength of the pre-restructuring divisional and corps battalions was 1,719 men. The ERI brigade total strength is 1,354 personnel. The triangular nature of the ERI structure makes sense as most U. S. divisions have three brigades. Thus the one-to-one habitual relationship that aids agility and synchronization on the field of battle is achievable in training and war. Looking at the ERI structure with regard to the shortcomings of the previous (one divisional engineer battalion) structure: Quantity: It was not the number of personnel so much as it was the number of units that precluded versatility. ERI divisional engineer battalions are much smaller (433 versus 899 men), but the task force commander who previously had to breach an obstacle system with a platoon of 30 engineers now has a company of 103 men. Sustained operations are feasible without excessive reorganization on the move. The engineer company also comes with greater equipment capability. Whereas the platoon of old had only two Armored Combat Earthmovers (ACE, similar to an armored bulldozer) for breaching, the ERI company includes four AVLBs, four Mine Clearing Line Charges (MICLIC), two Combat Engineer Vehicles (CEVs) and seven ACES. Responsiveness has been significantly upgraded with this positioning of more engineer assets closer to the line of contact. Engineer versatility is greatly enhanced due to the reduced need for frequent movements of engineer units from one maneuver unit to another.

Command and Control: Not only are more engineers forward, maneuver commanders have the additional benefit of more experienced commanders as their primary advisors. The task force commander has a captain supporting his headquarters, the brigade commander a lieutenant colonel battalion commander. The division commander is better served as he is now advised by a colonel and his staff. The division has an engineer command and control structure responsive to its needs as it seizes the initiative and operates throughout the depth of the battlefield.

Synchronization: Maneuver commanders still have the units training with them in peace that will accompany them to war, but now maneuver commanders have a larger unit habitually supporting them. The brigade commander deploying to war will be supported by the same engineer battalion that supported him during the months of training before deployment. These habitual relationships are disrupted as missions demand, but are maintained when possible. The payoff in synchronization, and thus increased 42