Training on the Digitized Battlefield

Training on the Digitized Battlefield This article was developed by the Operations Group, NTC; US. Army Armor School; and Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Laboratory Major General Jack Smith sat in front of his Joint Stars computer terminal inside his Battle Command Vehicle. The division G2 was pointing out some minor changes to the enemy’s defensive dispositions. The division G3 quickly noted that nothing of significance had changed that would disrupt the preparatory fires scheduled to commence in ten minutes. The lead brigade would cross the line of departure (LD) ten minutes later at 0200. The corps commander had questioned MG Smith about the ten-minute preparation fire, but with his division being the only completely digitized division in the Army, a ten-minute concentrated and accurate “prep” would guarantee destruction of all enemy vehicle positions at the six breach sites. MG Smith’s only concern at the moment was the endurance of his soldiers.

As part of the current force projection Army, MG Smith’s division had been alerted and closed into theater over the past seven days. The division had been called forward, deployed by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet ( 0 , and offloaded their prepositioned ships in less than 96 hours. Since then, it had been a nonstop 72 hours to prepare the division for the start of offensive operations. He quickly reviewed his timeline.

In a few minutes, the Paladins and MLRs would initiate the preparatory fires. Each enemy location across a 5-km zone had been identified by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and verified by his Comanche helicopters, which then transmitted a current tendigit grid coordinate to the fire direction centers via the Improved Data Modem (IDM). The enemy vehicles would be destroyed systematically at IYRWnrm COMMANDERS

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UNrr Cutaway illustration of improved features on the M1A2 reveals the tanKs extensive suite of digital electronic devices for position locating and reporting, fire control, and target acquisition. the breach sites with first round accuracy. After the enemy vehicles at the breach site were destroyed, his artillery would concentrate on destroying the enemy’s artillery before it could respond. Each vehicle in his maneuver forces, from the MlA2s to the support platoon HEMTTs, had the breach site locations on their computer screens. Following their electronic rehearsal, brigade commanders had informed him yesterday that all combat vehicles had way points on their Position Navigation System (POSNAV). All units had run at least six computer battle scenarios within the past two hours and won on all six. The battle scenarios represented possible sequels to their plan. Smith paused to reflect. The days of units not knowing the location of breach sites or getting lost enroute were past. Indeed, Smith would be placing multispectral smoke on both the enemy and his own forces at every breach. What would normally appear to an opposing commander to be total confusion was, in fact, part of the deception plan. Units were scattered and dispersed over a wide area but, relying on digitization, the division would, within minutes, mass and synchronize combat power. The psychological effect on the entire enemy chain of command would be overwhelming and devastating. Once more, Smith looked at the Joint Star screen as the “prep” began. The enemy reserve had not moved. Smith was pleased as he heard his Apaches and Comanches flying overhead, establishing their battle positions to prevent the enemy from repositioning to the breach sites. Looking at his Battle Command Screen, he had no doubts that the division would be at the objective, 80 km away, before lo00 hours. Over the intercom, he told his January-February 1994 vehicle commander to start maneuvering with the lead brigade. It was time to finally prove the worth of information age technology applied to the modem battlefield.

Futuristic? Hardly! Within the next few years this scenario will not only be possible, it will be reality. The National Training Center (NTC) recently created another milestone in its brief 12-year history by hosting the first digitally-equipped unit.

The Army, lead by TRADOC’s battle laboratories, is moving rapidly toward this 21st century battlefield. What will it look like? What kind of training will be necessary to guarantee continued success on the battlefield? What are the potential and most appropriate directions for training on the digitized battlefield?

Digitization will allow automated tactical reporting, enhanced position location (friendly and enemy), and improved acquisition and surveillance capabilities. Brigade and battalion commanders will gain new combat power through the use of systems like the Intervehicular Information System (MS), Brigade and Battalion Command and Control (Bk2), Joint Stars, and Improved Data Modem (IDM). Commanders and fire supporters will no longer ask for a unit’s front line trace. Each vehicle will automatically update its location every time it moves. A tendigit enemy location will be broadcast when a friendly vehicle lases a target and broadcasts a contact/spot report. Having accurate enemy and friendly locations means we can mass direct and indirect fires with first round accuracy and protect against our greatest nemesis -fratricide. Commanders will also be able to disperse their forces and protect them from indirect fire.

Position navigation will allow vehicle drivers to establish waypoints to direct them. The vehicle commander will be freed to concentrate on other critical leader tasks, such as ensuring the crew’s survivability. The fog of war will be reduced as commanders at all levels have the An lVlS data screen showing presentation for a spot report. same picture of the battlefield, and battle command will become reality. Instead of reports with incorrect grid coordinates or inaccurate numbers of vehicles, accurate data will be immediately available. Near real time intelligence from theater, corps, and division assets can be passed “digitally” to brigades, battalions, companies, and individual fighting vehicles. Situational awareness developed from battle command training will enhance rapid decision-making by commanders. Getting inside the enemy commander’s decision-making cycle will become routine.

Instead of long, drawn-out reports (operational and administrativeflogisti-cal) being transmitted via FM radio, the digitization process will reduce transmissions to short bunts and prevent the enemy from locating friendly positions with their direction finding systems. Commanders also will discover they have a much better idea of their unit’s status.

The automatic dissemination of information will allow leaders more troop leading time. Instead of going to a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) with acetate and alcohol pen in hand and waiting for hours for the operations order (OPORD) to be issued, the order and graphics can be transmitted electronically. Leaders will spend more time leading.

This description of the future does not imply that digitization is a panacea Digitization will not win wars. Well-trained soldiers and leaders will continue to win wars, but digitization will greatly assist in fighting and winning. Early thinking on this revolution in technology focuses on examining the training potential. Digitization represents at least four training challenges: the balance of voice to digital transmissions; our enhanced ability to develop and capture changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures; our ability to integrate digitization into planning, preparation, and consolidation; and finally, the impact of digitization on our use of terrain. We will explore briefly each of these domains.

Until now, with the exceDtion of the artillery community, all maneuver and support arms have used voice as the primary means to communicate. As we enter this new era of the electron, burst transmission, and dynamic computer screens, what balance do we want between voice and “a beep and a rush?” The solution to this challenge will demand the best tactical and training talent we have. There is some degree of comfort, especially during high stress conditions, that comes from hearing a human voice. What data and information do we need to move by digital burst versus human voice? Tactical and braining professionals must consider and decide on these matters. We must begin now to shape this balance and build any needed redundancy into our systems. Our first experiences at NTC indicate that voice must always take priority; however, we may need to build a backup digital capability to transmit the same data. For example, perhaps the contact report should be both voice and digital compatible. The leader can use the tactical situation to determine the most appropriate communication medium.

The advent of digitization promises a dramatic surge in our ability to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures. Historically, we have written these sorts of bread and butter battlefield considerations into bulky manuals (1OOO+ pages in FM 71-123). Training soldiers and leaders to manage and use this bulk of information is difficult. Perhaps digitization will give us the ability to catalog core techniques and build them into an onboard January-February 7994 computer. The ability to develop logic programs and train our bright leaders to use this sophisticated a p proach may magnify our effect and prove to be the next significant enhancement to our combat potential. Possibly it will be as dramatic as the introduction of thermal imagery has been in opening the night to combat operations. These logic- and menu-driven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TIT) will demand tremendous cers and NCOs. We can’t have the weak of heart or the inexperienced performing the critical task of deciding how to include enhanced lTP management into the digitized battlefield. We must have a direct link from software writers to trainers, and finally to operators. We must also listen to our talented crews and leaders. They have the real answers. As observer-controllers at our Combat Training Center examine the parameters of digitization, we begin to see tremendous potential for the technology as a tool to enlarge and enhance our ability to plan and prepare for the battlefield. While we are developing digitization to enhance battle synchronization (lethality, survivability, battlefield tempo), we believe that we may experience more effect from digitization as a tool to get to and from the battlefield. Our ability to control the tempo of battle is limited by our requirement to plan and prepare. Many of us have spent tens of hours preparing for one violent hour of combat. If digitization has the power to reduce the planning time, then we will achieve the ability to cycle faster onto the enemy force and become even more precise in considering when and where we strike. An example might be the ability to electronically construct offensive and defensive engagement areas in a mat-thought by bright offi-ter of minutes, as opposed to the hours we take using today’s techniques.

Perhaps the most dramatic impact of digitization on training will be our ability to use terrain and weather that have historically been unsuitable for mounted operation. Consider intentionally embedding a force in multispectral and artillery-delivered smoke or fog. We could move in this condition as a means to deceive or protect a force. Convention dictates that we not put mechanized forces into broken ground. However, on the digitized battlefield, we will be able to predict the all-important terrain intervisibility lines, mass our combat power, and approach the enemy from the least expected direction -probably over broken ground.

A final observation deserves serious consideration. In order to transition to a digital battlefield, we will need to achieve a new level of discipline. Our initial experiences indicate that, in order to remain “digitally” connected across the battlefield, we must become much more precise. At NTC, the observercontrollers likened this requirement to our experiences with the KY-57 secured device. Remember the challenge we had in the mid-1980s, when we had to learn to discipline our communication system to provide the correct fill for this secure communication system? The digital battlefield, with its associated requirement to ‘remained linked’ (the new term), will demand an even higher level of attention to detail. Our soldiers will once again prove themselves able to meet this challenge. Our first experience with digitization was dramatic. Imagine night live fire in the famous Drinkwater Valley. Instead of the familiar voice fire commands, all one hears is a split-second beep and 14 combat systems erupt in volley fire. We were impressed! Digitization will require new levels of discipline and adjustment. However, we seem to be on the verge of a significant increase in combat potential. We must have the best and brightest shaping this future. Our Combat Training Centers will play an important role in helping to train the force to explore new and innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures. We are on the edge of a new and exciting era.