Repairing the Broken Sabre: OveM'ew of L-Series Divisional Cavalry

Repairing the Broken Sabre: Overview of L-Series Divisional Cavalry by Captain George Salerno There are many views on the role and organization of cavalry. These views have caused debates from the Pentagon to Officers’ Clubs around the world. The subject is both controversial and complex. One place where the debate has been raging is in the realm of divisional cavalry, where the organization has changed many times in the past 40 years.

In the September-October 1989 issue of ARMOR Magazine, Major General Robert Wagner wrote an article entitled, “Divisional Cavalry: The Broken Sabre.” He discusses the weaknesses of the J-series divisional cavalry and suggested a possible solution of a “Super Squadron,” which included integrating tanks and scouts in a platoon. The same suggestion was made by MG (then COL) Jarrett Robertson in his article, “Cavalry Missions and Structure,” in the November-December 1988 issue of ARMOR.

In December of 1990, the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division was the first divisional cavalry squadron to transition to the L-series organization in which tanks were reintroduced into platoons. As a whole, the reintroduction proved to be a major step toward “retempering the steel of the divisional cavalry squadron” (Wagner, 39). This article will provide an overview of the L-series structure, successes and failures of the organization, and some proposed changes. These views are not based on force modifications, but taken from comments and ideas from officers and NCOs who operated in this organization - the final objective being to give the division commander a formidable asset to accomplish traditional reconnaissance and security missions, and, in an emergency, economy-of-force roles. (See Figure 1.) Tanks in Divisional Cavalry “The organization and operational concept for divisional armored cavalry squadron envisions reconnaissance and surveillance as the principal missions” (Ghost, 6). The squadron gives the division commander the ability to see many areas of the battlefield so he can fight the division at the right place and time. Reconnaissance is defined by FM 17-95 as “the directed effort in the field to gather information about the enemy.” In order to accomplish this, a cavalry squadron may need to fight at times. The cavalry L-Series Platoon I I I H Q D

@ 1M3A2 2M3AZ

2 M3A2 1 MlAl 1 MlAl 1 MIA1

Figure 1 needs a rapid fire antitank capability to develop situations. This does not mean cavalry wants to fight, but may have to, in order to gain a better reconnaissance for the commander.

With this in mind, one must remember the true weapon of cavalry is the scout. The scout is the eyes and ears for the division commander in the divisional cavalry squadron. The scout’s tools are binoculars and radios, stealth and observation. The staff system (SZS3) is designed to get the information to the commander as soon as possible. The scout needs protection to accomplish this mission. Another reason for the tank in cavalry is to protect the scouts who are the true “information gathering specialists” (Ghost, 2). Tanks provide the best rapid fire antitank capability. Tanks allow the scouts to conduct reconnaissance with an overwatch element of high firepower. Tanks also allow cavalry to conduct an inherent mission; counterreconnaissance. Scouts find the enemy, and the tanks remove them. This fact is especially true when conducting security operations, such as screening. Cavalry units can conduct this mission better when tanks are organic to the organization. Economy of force is a role the cavalry squadron must be able to accomplish, though it is not high in mission priority. Tanks aid the cavalry in accomplishing this role in presenting the enemy a picture of a larger force. Cavalry squadrons are not “pocket armored divisions.” Economy of force takes the cavalry away from its true specialty; gathering information. Only in this role of economy of force is fighting truly expected (Ghost, 1). Tanks organic to the division cavalry aids the squadron in fighting when it needs to fight.

History of the Divisional Cavalry Organization Over the years, the face of divisional cavalry has changed many times. Within the last 15 years, there have been no less than six different structures. The pattern of the change seems to be a continuous circle. In the ’50s and ’Ws, the divisional cavalry had the same structure as a regimental cavalry squadron. The platoon consisted of a scout squad, tank section, an infantry section, and a 4.2-in. mortar, which made this a mini-combined m s team. When an air troop was added, it made the squadron a true combined arms unit. This gave the division commander a cavalry asset with great flexibility (Robertson, 30).

From 1970-73, a “baseline” platoon consisted of five M114s, three M55 Is, one M113, and an M106 mortar track. In 1973-75, the M114s were replaced by M551s. Thus, the platoon had six M551s, one M113, and an M106. In 1975, the platoon dropped the mortar and added four more M113s. It now had five M113 scouts and six M551 light tanks. In 1978, main battle tanks were reinstated, giving a platoon four M60s and five M113s. ITVs were also used within this organization. Finally, the J-series in 1984 took away the tanks and gave the platoon six M3 Bradleys. It’s easy to see how MG Wagner can ask “Have we broken the sabre?” (Wagner, 35-36).

In 1989, USAREUR pushed for putting tanks back into divisional cavalry, and in December 1990, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry was issued its MlAls. The squadron has since gone through two Grafenwoehr rotations and two CMTC rotations in which the squadron was evaluated as a whole. Cavalry Platoon The base for the L-Series is the cavalry platoon (Figure 1). The change from the J-series scout platoon is the addition of three MlAls and the loss of one M3A2 CFV. The personnel would vary, depending on the vehicle

- 19Ds on M3A2s and 19Ks on MlAls. The one exception is the platoon sergeant, a 19D. but operating out of the MlA1. All other ancillary equipment within the platoon remained the same.

The organization of the platoon proved to be outstanding. It allowed leaders to have much more flexibility in the execution of missions. The platoons generally operated in three sections, two consisting of two M3s and an M1 and one with an M1 and an M3. Many other combinations could Division Armored Cavalry Squadron Mission Profile ECHELON

:avalry Squadron P Figure 2 RECON zone A m Routc zone A m SECURITY screen Guard OFFENSE

Movement to contact Hwty Attllck mhvelmm to Contact Hwty Attsdt Movemetlt to contact Hasty Attack MoMmant to contact Hwty Atteck Mowmmlt to contact be used depending on METT-T. The platoon still kept the same mission profile (Figure 2), but the addition of tanks gave more staying power in defense and delay missions. Also, it gave the section another set of eyes forward to find the enemy. One question that ame was whether the platoon was too large for a new lieutenant to command. This did not prove to be a problem, for many reasons. First, many of the lieutenants were graduates of the Scout Platoon Leaders Course (SPLC), which gave them a very good grasp of cavalry operations. During SPLC, lieutenants sometimes operated with 10 HMMWVs under their control. An-DEFENSE

Defend in Sector way DefendaBat-tie Position Defend In Sector Dew Defend a Battle Position Defend in Sector OTHER OPERATIONS

Tactical Combat Facilitate Movement Restore Command and Control AmDamageControl Special Purpose (Raid, Spoiling Attack, Deception, etc.)

F a c i l i i Movement Restore Command and control AnaDamageControl Facilitate Movwnent Restore Command and control Facilitate Movmmt Restore Command and c o n w ArraDamageControl Quarterina Partv Task Quartering Party Task Traffic control AreaDamagcControl other reason command and control was not a problem was that many of the NCOs had a good knowledge of the tactics to be employed by the section. This was especially true of the 19Ks who know their roles during reconnaissance missions. Finally, the organization developed teamwork, which would not be possible in an ad hoc organization. The tanks and scouts could train together and know each other’s capabilities and limitations. The move to make platoon sergeants 19Ks could be a mistake. Reconnaissance is the mission of the platoon, not tanking. The platoon sergeant needs to be a 19D because he not only trains the platoon, but also the platoon leader initially. The platoon sergeant needs the skills of the 19D in order to take over any mission in the absence of the platoon leader. Also, the 19D’s skills vary greatly from that of the 19K.

Troop The organization of the troop did not change at all (Figure 3). The troop does increase it firepower with the addition of nine MlAls, giving it better punch in the countemcon battle and in defensive missions. The mission profile remains the same, as does the frontage, 9-15 km (3-5 km per platoon). Unfortunately, due to the constraints of CMTC Hohenfels, the troop never operated to its full capability.

The troop retained its three mortars. In FKSM 17-95-4 (Test), mortars were to be employed by the platoons, however it was felt that massed fires were more important than chopping single mortars to platoons. The troop had the flexibility to consolidate the tanks at troop level under the executive officer if the situation arose. Though 3-4 Cav never operated in this manner, it was often discussed as a viable option.

Squadron forward to conduct reconnaissance.

This overall structure gives the division commander more assets to conduct reconnaissance and security. The structure also gives him once again the option of having the squadron conduct guard missions and economy-of-foxe roles. Another addition to the squadron is a recon platoon. This consisted of ten HMMWVs and 30 19Ds.

Motorcycles are currently being fielded. The platoon was employed in the same manner as the scout platoon of an armortinfantry battalion me addition of this platoon defied logic when having three troops’ worth of scouts). During most missions at CMTC, they were combat ineffective. The platoon leader found that the terrain was too rough for the HMMWVs to conduct reconnaissance, especially when entangled with the OPFOR.

A better use would be as a security force. Missions would include TOC and MSR guard, M i c control points (which they did very well), and as a command and L-Series Troop I r I I I M3A2

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10 MI02511026 16 M3A2 4 AHlS 9 MlA1 3 M106A2 Figure 4 The biggest change in the squadron is the addition of one ground troop (Figure 4). The extra troop can cover another major avenue of approach and gives depth if the squadron is operat-A g in a guard or an economy-of-force role. Its sheer size -47 M3A2s, 27 MlAls, 12 OH-58s, and 8 AH-1s -can free up more than a battalion in the economy-of-force role, though only in extreme situations. The squadron can present a picture of a much larger force and cause the enemy to move elsewhere, or allow the division commander to use heavy combat forces in other areas where they would be of more value. Another important aspect is that the squadron has more assets to stretch over the division front (The squadron can cover 27-45 km) and there are more assets control asset for the squadron and division commander.

Another use would be to employ them where they could exploit the speed of the HMMWVs, as on the flanks. The recon platoon could screen the flanks, thus freeing up assets to conduct missions forward. The platoon could be employed forward as scouts when the squadron is used in an economy-of-force role. Though this sounds like a “palace guard” platoon, it would free up more personnel to do their given jobs. For example, divisional cavalry is not normally sliced an MP platoon. The recon platoon could fill that role when the mission dictates. At the beginning of the change, the squadron was still under the aviation brigade. In February of 1992, the squadron became a true division asset, reporting directly to the assistant division commander for maneuver (ADC-M). The return to division control was a change long overdue. It allows the squadron to train “under the control of the headquarters under which it will fight” (Wagner, 39). It also eliminated many problems in training and support requirements. The aviation brigade had little concept of the needs of the ground forces.

Combat Service Support Because of its size, the new organization required a large support framework. The new TO&E made provisions for some of the extra equipment and personnel. Besides the major tool sets and mechanics needed to support the MIAl, the only visible change January-February 7994 LSeries Squadron (Modified) @I I 8 M109A6 12 OH 58D

2 M3A2 10 MlOWlO26 3 M113A3 w/GSR

Figure 5 16 M3A2 8AH64 9 MlA1 1 UH 60 2 M2A2 AVUM PLT

3 m m m was to the support platoon. The platoon turned in its M923 5-ton trucks for HEMMTs. The platoon consisted of 12 cargo, 14 fuelers, and five 5-tOn cargo trucks. This was adequate for the squadron; however, the squadron never had the full complement due to TO&E filling problems. The poor use of the issued vehicles made their use impossible for some time. Also, the personnel in the support platoon were changed from 88M, except for two (one being the platoon sergeant). All the rest were 19Ds who had no training or experience in handling of fuel, cargo, or the equipment. A rapid training program ensued, most of it on the job. Through all this, the support platoon kept the squadron fueled and armed through all field exercises. There was little change in the organization of the maintenance assets. The line troops gained mechanics for the MlAls, and squadron received four. Line troops picked up an extra 2Y2-t0n truck for the extra tool set. The biggest change occurred in HHT, which gained its own maintenance unit separate from squadron control. All the wheel mechanics were put in HHT under the controvsupervision of the HHT XO.

The supervision changed in October of 1991 when HHT received a maintenance tech who took over the role of motor officer, even though it was not in the TOLkE. These changes proved to be very effective. First, it relieved the squadron motor officer (SMO) of having to worry about squadron maintenance and controlling HHT. Next, it allowed the HHT XO to give better service to the HHT sections by prioritizing work to the needs of the troop.

It also gave the mechanics a mission focus. Finally, it organized the HHT section as it would operate in war, in the field trains.

A major problem for squadron maintenance was lack of assets.

The SMO had the squadron maintenance tech, squadron motor sergeant, and the recovery section. He had no control over any true maintenance asset, but was still responsible for squadron maintenance. Also, his recovery section only had two M88Als. woefully inadequate to meet the squadron needs.

Communications was a problem both in CPXs and in Southwest Asia. This was especially true with the Multiple Subscriber Equipment (MSE). The squadron needed to have a dedicated node section in order to operate. This need was very evident when the squadron had to operate at doctrinal distances and needed to talk to the division.

A major success in CSS was the introduction of JP8 fuel. It is easier to acquire one type of fuel than to get both diesel and JP 4. The only problem was that the aviation fuel had to be filtered twice. At CMTC, the squadron was able to refuel from one place rather than two.

Area support was a problem. During field problems, there was some time to prepare for these issues, but it would be difficult in war. Going to the division support area was a problem, due to the great distances. The division should create a forward support team (FST) pushed down to the squadron. The FST would work closely with the HHT Commander in the field trains in providing support. A partial fm was developed during the last CMTC rotation with fuel and some ground hauling, and it seemed to work relatively well.

Proposed Changes Though the L-series divisional cavalry squadron is generally an excellent organization, it could use some improvements to mold it into a stronger organization (Figure 5).

Some minor changes at the platoon TO&E should include better radios, the best weapon of the cavalry. The possibility of adding squad radios in order to operate OPs needs to be addressed. Until the SINCGARS or some better system is fully fielded, the cavalry’s current radios are poor. The cavalry also needs more dismounted support, especially in heavily wooded or built-up terrain. Each troop should have an infantry section of two squads. These sections could come from deactivating units. One deactivating infantry company of 12 Infantry Fighting Vehicles could provide the equipment and personnel for two squadrons (six per squadron, two per troop). One deactivating infantry battalion can provide the men and equipment to field all eight mechanized divisional cavalry squadrons in the Army. The infantry would allow a large enough force to permit patrolling between platoons during security missions. The infantry sections would also provide better internal security for the troop TOC and mortars. Additionally, infantry would enhance the troop in an economy-of-force role. A very helpful tool for gathering intelligence is Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR). Almost always, some GSR was attached, but needs to be organic so the squadron will always have this tool available. It would greatly enhance the squadron in gaining information for the division commander, and having GSR organic would also enhance the working relationship between GSR operators and scouts. A suggestion would be one platoon per squadron, which would provide two GSR per troop. Again, these could come from deactivating units, or be taken out of corps assets and pushed down to where they would be more valuable.

Another continuing problem is fire support for the squadron, which has no organic support. With a 155-mm howitzer battery in the TO&E, perhaps from deactivating artillery battalions, the squadron would gain the timely, organic fire support it truly needs.

Little has been said of the aviation assets (since they didn’t change), but some change could be considered. First, the OH 58s should be replaced with OH 58Ds. This goes along with the idea of having more eyes forward. With its enhanced optics, the OH 58Ds can improve the reconnaissance of the air scouts tremendously. Also, AH-64s need to replace the AH 1Ss because Apaches can fight at night, while Cobras cannot. Since so much reconnaissance takes place at night, the air scouts need the protection. Also, this would provide another set of eyes forward. Another alternative is to replace all helicopters, one for one, with the AH 58D when it becomes available.

Many of these equipment changes seem to make an already large beast even larger. However, the result would be a divisional cavalry squadron much more able to accomplish all its missions and tasks.

Equipment is not the only problem with the L-series. Some organizational modifications would also be necessary.

Another change needed is to make the Aviation Unit Maintenance ( A m platoon from HHT a separate troop or consolidate all the air assets under one troop. The AVUM platoon already doubles the size of an air troop. Also, HHT is more ground and admin oriented. This would take a burden off the HHT commander who has little insight into the day-today activities of AVUM.

Service and support also needs to be addressed; this is probably the biggest problem the cavalry faces. First, the support platoon needs more cargo and fuel assets. Perhaps the addition of three of each would lighten the strain on the vehicles which are overworked as it is. Also, 88Ms and ammo specialists need to be returned to the support platoon TO&E. The reason for removal of this MOS is not understood, but their expertise is critically needed. The 19Ds need to be retrained when they come into the squadron. They are taken out of their MOS for a long period of time, which not only wastes the soldier’s time, but in the long run hurts his career. Another change is needed in maintenance. We should train as we fight. Most of the maintenance assets are at the troop level during garrison, but in the field, the troop only controls the six people who ride the M88 and the M113. We need to break the maintenance into combat trains and field trains per doctrine. This move would give the SMO control of the mechanics he would have in war. It would allow him to build a service team and support team. Thus, there would be a true squadron maintenance capability and the SMO would have the assets to control what he is responsible for. The troops would keep the mechanics that ride on their vehicles for basic organizational work. The PLL of the troops would go to the SMO since that’s the way it is now. The troop XOs would have the ability to put items into the PLL they feel needed to be there. This would require a very tight working relationship between the XOs and the SMO. Also, squadron maintenance needs a total of five M88s (total of eight in the squadron) in order to meet all squadron recovery needs. A problem which arose during the trainup and continued was training support. The manual by which the tactics and organization worked from was FKSM 17-95-4 (Test). This seemed to be an ad hoc thrown-together manual. If the L-series is to be used, we need to have a good basic manual with a good feel for divisional cavalry.

A major problem which evolved during the initial tactical training with the NET team, and continued during field problems, was the understanding of cavalry operations. The NET team noted that the XOs and platoon leaders had a better grasp of cavalry tactics than the commanders did, even though the commanders attended the Cavalry Leader’s Course. The commanders all had pure tank backgrounds, and it usually showed during field maneuvers. All the platoon leaders and XOs were scouts and most attended SPLC. A simple change would be to return to the two-track system of cavalry and armor. Cavalry operations are a specialty, and a good background is needed to operate in that environment. One cannot wait for a commander to get adjusted to the system and gain a feel or knowledge for the tactics. Cavalry needs commanders who have the knowledge and experience when they take over, not when they leave.

Directions

Both divisional cavalry squadrons in USAREUR are operating under the L-series TO&E. Most units in CONUS are under the J-series or some variation of the sort. One proposal is to change the platoon into three Bradleys and two tanks, which is absolutely outrageous. This organization not only takes away the punch the cavalry needs, but it decreases reconnaissance assets by almost 40 percent. It also violates the most important principle of reconnaissance - use maximum reconnaissance forward! It also decreases the force needed to fix an enemy. It accomplishes what the enemy wants to do without firing a shot and that is to strip away reconnaissance assets. Also, it is doubtful whether a squadron could conduct a guard mission or economy-of-force role given this change. The squadron’s firepower is almost cut in half.

The L-series has been looked at and is considered by some at the Cavalry Doctrine Branch at Fort Knox to be the best solution. But the L-series squadron is costly, both in materiel and support. A problem is the question of training. The L-series adds another cavalry organization that needs to be trained and supported in that training.

The compromise proposed is to organize the divisional cavalry squadron as a regimental squadron, for the sake of cost and training. The only drawback is that the regimental squadron covers less frontage than the L-series, but covers the same amount of front-