The Battle of Aire

the sounds of battle in western Aire. The 1st Bn/DF then secured the canal crossings at Aire, thereby sealing off one of the prongs of the French attack.

[Major General] Hausser had meanwhile judged the main point of effort to be in the Regiment “Der Fuhrer’s” sector. He directed the Regiment “Germania” to send a company to St. Hilaire to assist the 3d Bn/DF halt the enemy advance. The remainder of “Germania” would remain south of the Regiment “Der Fuhrer” to provide depth to the guard operation. The Regiment “Germania” sent its most mobile unit, the 15th (Motorcycle Infantry) Company, north to St. Hilaire to link up with the 3d Bn/DF(-). The company had supporting antitank guns. At 0700 hours, the 15th Company’s lead elements entered St. Hilaire from the south, exactly the same time that a French tank unit entered the town from the east. The two units became hopelessly intermingled and vicious fighting broke out in the town. The commander of the 15th Company reported his predicament to the Regiment “Germa-nia’s” command post, requesting additional antitank support. The company assumed defensive positions in basements, barnyards, and side streets. It positioned antitank guns at critical avenues throughout the town. The antitank guns quickly knocked out three French tanks and several fuel trucks on the main road, creating a bottleneck for the French armored column. Observers from the 15th Company spotted along column of tanks halted along the St. Hilaire-Lillers road and relayed this information to the regimental command post.

At 0800 hours, the 3d Bn/DF(-), under the command of Sturmbannfiihrer [Major] Otto Kumm, entered St. Hilaire from the west and made contact with the 15th CompanyP‘Germania.” The only units Kumm had at his disposal were elements of his 9th and 12th Companies and a platoon from the battalion’s antitank company. This was his unit’s first encounter with tanks and the soldiers were very a p prehensive. Kumm personally led attacks against individual tanks, destroying them by placing satchel charges under their turrets or throwing grenades into their hatches. His dynamic leadership dispelled the myth among his troops that tanks were invincible. In the next hour, 13 French tanks went up in flames to his infantrymen and antitank gunners. The 3d Bn/DF(-) turned the St. Hilaire bottleneck into a road block for the French armored column.

[Major General] Hausser immediately dispatched the division’s antitank battalion to the area south of the St. Hilaire-Lillers road. By noon, the entire French armored column was nothing but bum-ing hulks.

The Germans captured a total of 500 French prisoners in St. Hilaire. The 3d Bn/DF(-) then advanced to Lillers, capturing the town at 1130 hours. The 10th and 11th Companies joined it there, having fought their way south from the Canal d’Aire. The 15th CompanyPGermania” remained behind in St. Hilaire and reconnoitered north to maintain contact with the enemy forces there.

By the afternoon of 23 May, the Regiment “Der Fuhrer” had sealed the first French penetration at Aire and pushed the second one back to the high ground around Isbergues. Mopping up operations began in the recap tured temtory, but the battle was not over yet. * * * The division reconnaissance battalion had recalled all its patrols north of the Canal d‘Aire that morning. Some had not been able to make it back Untersturmfiihrer [Second Lieutenant] Fritz Vogt commanded just such a patrol of motorcycle infantry and armored cars. While moving south towards Mazinghem, he observed a French column crossing the main road in an easterly direction. Vogt frowned, his boyish face concealing combat experience and tactical ability far beyond his years. He estimated its strength to be that of a motorized infantry battalion. He was no longer aware of the overall situation facing his division. He knew, however, that an enemy movement this size threatened the flank of both his division and the corps it guarded. Thoroughly outmatched in terms of firepower and mass, Vogt knew he would have to rely exclusively on maneuverability and surprise.

He positioned his two antitank guns in a concealed position overlooking the column. He then assembled his motorcycle squad and two armored cars. Ordering his antitank guns to open fire on the rear of the column, he jumped onto a motorcycle and sped off. He led his small force around numerous hedges and through depressions until he had outflanked the French column. He waited less than a minute for the head of the column to appear and opened fire at point-blank range. His force adjusted its fire from the front of the column to the rear while the antitank guns he left behind did the opposite. The French column was in complete confusion. The soldiers believed that they were under attack along their entire flank. Several minutes later, white handkerchiefs flapped in the breeze along the entire column. Vogt moved his small group in and quickly disarmed them. By the time the French realized that his force consisted of only 30 men, it was too late. The French commander shook with rage and embarrassment as it dawned upon him that Vogt had tricked him. Vogt grinned so hard he thought his jaw would break. Several weeks later, Untersturmfiihrer Fritz Vogt received the Knight’s Cross for this daring ruse. * * * Prisoner interrogations strongly indicated that another French armor force was moving west from BCthune. Reconnaissance patrols confirmed this. Hausser believed that this was the time to commit the entire Regiment “Germania.” He directed the regiment to deploy north and south of Auchy and prepare to conduct a movement to contact to the east (see Map 5). The regiment began moving at 1400 hours and met the enemy tanks at the heights of St. Hilaire. This was the last of the French armor and the force was too small to overpower a motorized regiment supported by the division’s antitank battalion. The tanks quickly lost their momentum and began to withdraw. The Regiment “Germania” pursued them, pushing the enemy back along the entire front in a great sweeping action. The antitank units destroyed many French tanks. The regiment pushed all enemy forces it did not capture or destroy back to the canal by nightfall. * * *

Although this flank guard operation has never received historical notoriety, its swift success contributed greatly to the smooth conduct of the entire German armored thrust to the English Channel. Outgunned and outnumbered, the division’s regiments (primarily “Der Fuhrer”) fought against a superior foe supported by tanks. The enemy tried to force penetrations into the division and corps flank in three separate areas. The SS V Division halted and repulsed him on each occasion. The Germans destroyed over 60 armored vehicles and captured close to 4,000 enemy soldiers.

Why did the division perform so well? Most of its enlisted soldiers had little or no combat experience and had never fought against tanks. The Regiment “Der Fuhrer” had not even participated in the Polish Campaign. The single key factor that carried the day for the SS V Division was superior individual and small unit training. When confusion reigned in the pre-dawn hours of 23 May and units faced isolation down to platoon and squad level, the lowest level of expertise prevailed. The officers, NCOs, and men acted independently. This enabled the division to recover quickly from the blow it received and turn defeat into victory.

During 1939 and 1940, the SS V Division conducted intensive individual and small unit training programs. The leaders’ first order of business was thoroughly training each soldier to be fully proficient in his military skills. These skills ran the gamut from map reading to destroying tanks with satchel charges. The soldiers thus had all the skills necessary to combat enemy tanks. This meant all soldiers, even the cooks and mechanics. They only needed a slight nudge (such as Sturmbannfiihrer Kumm’s personal leadership) to overcome their natural apprehensions. Thoroughly versed in all manners of drills, their military training took over in the absence of commands from superiors.

The leaders’ second order of business was integrating these individual skiils into squad, platoon, and company maneuvers. These maneuvers did not take place, however, until all soldiers had achieved mastery of their required military skills. The division communication breakdowns. It was assigned missions. Hauptsturmfuhrer leadership recognized that units fre-thus important for isolated squads, Harmel’s company continued to fight quently became isolated in the chaos platoons, and companies to be able to and report even after fragmented into of battle, whether physically or through continue to fight and cany out their isolated, squad-sized elements. January-February 7994 At right, French Hotchkiss H-35 light tanks captured en masse during the German sweep through France in 1940.

The division rarely conducted battalion maneuvers, only one regimental maneuver each, and absolutely no division maneuvers. Gruppenfiihm Hausser saw little value in having a division that maneuvered brilliantly if it fell to pieces upon its first contact with the enemy. This is not to say he ignored operations above the battalion level. Staffs at every level conducted extensive map and command post exercises, as well as logistic exercises. They simulated every possible type of combat operation. These exercises gave the division the requisite skill needed to plan and execute tactical operations without sacrificing the time needed to teach soldiers how to fight and survive.

The commanders’ third order of business was to instill initiative into leaders at all levels, from corporal up. They placed continuous emphasis upon every leader knowing the situations and missions of their two or three higher headquarters. ReCOMaiS-sance unit leaders needed an even greater understanding of the situation. Untersturmfiihrer Vogt’s actions are a sterling example of comprehension of missions and situations four or five levels above his own. Not every leader possessed Vogt’s sawy and initiative, but most of them had a firm grasp of what was going on two levels above them. In conclusion, individual training, fostering initiative, and a 20 clear understanding of the situation two or more levels above their own enabled the soldiers of the SS V Division to carry out a textbook flank guard action for the German armored drive to the English Channel. In the confusion of the initial battle, the lowest level of expertise prevailed and carried the day.

B. H. Friesen was commissioned in Armor in 1983 from USMA. A graduate of Airborne Scgool, AOBC, AOAC, and CAS, he served as an M1 tank platoon leader and company XO with 1-64 Armor in Germany. He then served as S3 air and squadron adjutant with 313 ACR in Fort Bliss, Texas. His final assignment was commander of I Troop, 3d ACR during Operation DESERT STORM. He is currently a computer science graduate student at the University of Texas.