Armor in the 21 st Century

Armor in the 21st Century by Major Harold L. Spurgeon and Stanley C. Crist (Authors’ note: The following article contains statements that some readers may jind controversial, but these ideas are put forth out of a desire to maximize the role and effectiveness of Armor in future operations. The authors are pro-Annor. One is an Annor ofticer with two years of armor and mechanized combat experience in Vietnam; the other is a former tank commander. Consequently, it is not the authors’ intent to break anyone’s “rice bowl,” but rather to show that those bowls have already been broken by the double-edged sword of technological progress and political change; only by acknowledging reality can we hope to deal effectively with it.) The tank is dead. As dead as the horse cavalry that preceded it. Oh, it will remain in service for many years -due to a reluctance to change what has worked so well for so long -just as the horse cavalry was retained for almost three decades after being rendered obsolete by the machine guns of World War I. In a similar manner, the main battle tank (MBT) has become just as outmoded because of the devastating effectiveness of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and ground-attack aircraft like the AH-64 Apache and the A-10 Thunderbolt II. Many will object to the idea that the tank is obsolete, pointing to the performance of the M1 Abrams in Operation DESERT STORM. While the Abrams is probably the best main battle tank in existence, the 1991 live-fire exercise in Southwest Asia did not -contrary to popular opinion -validate the continued use of such a weapon system. Indeed, DESERT STORM offers considerable evidence of the obsolescent nature of the tank in modem warfare.

When the 82d Airborne was deployed in early August, 1990, it was M551 Sheridans -not M1 tanks -that were airlifted to Saudi Arabia. Although the Vietnam-era Sheridan is far from being a state-of-the-art weapon system, its saving grace is that it is air-transportable in usable quantities, while the Abrams must take the much slower sea route. This is not a problem for units equipped with M1 tanks -as long as future opponents are as obliging as was Saddam Hussein. By allowing us the incredible luxury of six months of unopposed buildup, we were able to amass as many armored vehicles as was felt necessary, regardless of the weight per vehicle.

However, had the Iraqi armed forces been determined to expand their conquest beyond the borders of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia could very well have been overrun long before our ship-borne armor units would have arrived. Under such circumstances, the ability to reinforce quickly by air with large numbers of a lightweight, lightly-armored weapon system could make the difference between victory and disaster. This is the raison d’etre for the creation of the armored gun system (AGS), a combat vehicle intended to give the light, rapidly deployable units like the 82d a weapon system capable of engaging and destroying enemy While the AGS is a superior altemative to the Sheridan, it may not be the best possible solution to the problem. It is, in essence, a tank -a light tank (although that term has not been used since the days of the M41 Walker tanks (ARMOR, July-AuguSt 1992).

Bulldog), to be sure -but a tank, nonetheless. As such, it possesses almost all of the drawbacks of the main battle tank, while lacking the MBT’s one big advantage: armor protection. The AGS will not be able to absorb punishment from enemy tanks, due to its light armor, nor can it expect to outrange its opposition with only a 105-mm gun as its main armament. It is supposed to substitute speed and agility for armor protection, but can it do that while simultaneously engaging in combined arms operations with nonmechanized light infantry? (Whether it is a lightweight armored gun system or a heavily-armored main battle tank, a half-century of combat experience dictates that the tank must operate with infantry support.) Another lesson from DESERT STORM: As Iraqi tank crews learned through bitter experience, the tank has no effective defense against attack from the air. Cupola-mounted machine guns like the SO-caliber M2 provide limited, short-range antiaircraft capability, but cannot begin to cope with an attack by a helicopter standing-off at several thousand meters. The attack helicopter, armed with antitank guided weapons (ATGWs), is quite probably a tanker’s worst nightmare; it is also the main reason why the best antitank weapon is no longer another tank.

If the MBT is at a disadvantage in weaponry when compared to the helicopter, it is even more handicapped in its ability to move around the battlefield. Even the most advanced tank design is capable of only a small fraction of the operational speed and tactical mobility that helicopters can achieve. Other ATGWs - some off-the-shelf, some still under development -will make the use of conventional armor exceedingly costly for those on the receiving end. Terminally-guided artillery and mortar rounds give (long-range and non-line-of-sight) antitank capabilities unknown in previous conflicts. Hypervelocity, kinetic energy rockets will further enhance the ability of lightweight, relatively inexpensive combat vehicles to destroy the enemy’s heavy armor.

In addition to the effects of technological progress, there has been a change in the basic philosophy of equipment and employment of U.S. troops. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the focus was on the defense of western Europe; now, our leadership is much more concerned with “force projection.” Actually, the U.S. has practiced force projection repeatedly - and relatively often, at that -during the last 50 years. These excursions were, however, treated as aberrations, sideshows to the main event at the Fulda Gap, instead of being accepted as the norm. As a result, few resources were allocated to preparing for such missions. Except for DESERT STORM, the M1 tank (and its predecessor, the M60) has been conspicuous in its a b sence from these operations. In Grenada, light infantry and helicopters were used. In Panama, it was infantry, helicopters, M551 Sheridans, and U.S. Marine Corps LAV-25s. The Abrams was, of course, deployed to Southwest Asia, along with a vast. number of other weapon systems. With the benefit of 20120 hindsight, it can be argued that the ground phase of DESERT STORM could have proceeded apace without the presence of the M1; missile-firing Apaches and Cobras could have eliminated any Iraqi tanks foolish enough to offer resistance, while Bradley-mounted infantry collected surrendering enemy soldiers. Lastly, there is the humanitarian effort taking place in Somalia, Operation RESTORE HOPE. Such aid missions (there will probably be more in the future) are not primarily combat operations, and would seem unlikely -in most cases -to require the deployment of tanks.

All of the recent operations in which the Army has been involved have util- “Although the Bradley’s 25-mm gun reportedly had good effect on Iraqi T-55s, a 40-mm weapon (similar to what was used on the M42 Duster) would give even greater armor penetration potential.

Increasing the caliber to 40-mm also permits the use of proximity-fuzed, high-explosive, prefragmented ammunition -which, with an effective range of 4000 meters, should give the tank a fighting chance against missile-firing helicopters.” ized helicopters and infantry, while heavy armor -the M1 tank -has been employed only once. Clearly, adoption of the AGS would give Armor the capability to participate in a wider variety of scenarios, but there is another path to the future that would enable armored units to take part in virtually every operation. This course of action would require the adoption of a new armor system and a new organization that would have the flexi-ARMOR -

~ 13 “The attack helicopter, armed with antitank guided weapons (ATGWs), is quite probably a tanker‘s worst nightmare; it is also the main reason why the best antitank weapon is no longer another tank.” bility to be deployed anywhere in the world that Air Force transports could touch down. The new armored vehicle should be: 0 Air-transportable.

0 Amphibious - without preparation. .Capable of defeating enemy armor, helicopters, and infantry.

.Carry

3-4 infantrymen, in addition to the vehicle crew.

This last point will probably be the most controversial, but those who disagree would do well to recall (as was stated earlier) that tanks can rarely o p erate alone on the battlefield -except at undue risk -and that infantry will be needed in any likely scenario. By making infantrymen an integral part of the crew, the tank would have its own infantry support, whenever and wherever it was required. This type of combat vehicle - a Combined Arms Tank (CAT) -will assure cooperation and coordination between tankers and infantry, both in training and warfighting. Proper use of CAT-equipped units should very nearly eliminate the situation described by LTC William Betson in “Tanks and Urban Combat” (ARMOR. July-August 1992). wherein many of today’s infantry company commanders “...were lieutenants at Campbell, Ord, or Bragg, where there are no tanks at all, and many of these infantrymen have never worked with tanks.” He goes on to point out that tanks typically “...cooperate poorly with the infantry...” with disastrous consequences.

Certainly, the Combined Arms Tank should have antiarmor weaponry, but what type? The 105-mm gun planned for the AGS is a potent device, but it is probably the largest caliber gun that can be mounted on a lightweight chassis. If the combat vehicle is designed around this weapon, it would lack the potential for future upgrading to a more powerful gun. Like the Bradley, the CAT would do well to use some type of guided missile to supply antitank capability - this method has the advantage of being relatively easy to upgrade - while IFVs and older model tanks could be neutralized by a small-caliber, rapid-fire cannon. Although the Bradley’s 25-mm gun reportedly had good effect on Iraqi T-55s, a 40-mm weapon (similar to what was used on the M42 Duster) would give even greater armor penetration potential. Increasing the caliber to 40-mm also permits the use of proximity-fuzed, highexplo-sive, prefragmented ammunition -which, with an effective range of 4000 meters, should give the tank a fighting chance against missile-firing helicopters.

Air-transportability is an obvious requirement, one easily met by minimizing the weight factor. A prime example in current use is the USMC LAV-25; eight LAVs can be taken on board a C5A transport, but only a single Abrams. In theater, the LAV can be lifted by the CH53 helicopter, giving the unique capability of an airmobile armor force. The light weight, combined with other design features, enables the LAV to be fully amphibious -a characteristic that would offer significant tactical advantages. Since the Combined Arms Tank is a multi-role combat vehicle, it needs an organization that will make maximum utilization of its many capabilities. Rather than depending on cross-attachment of units to form combined arms teams and task forces, the CAT should be used in conjunction with the attack helicopter at the platoon level. For example, where a heavy armor platoon would have four M1 tanks, the conceptual multi-role platoon might have two CATS and two helicopters, although the actual mix would have to be determined by field testing.

The ability -more importantly, the need - to operate in a combined arms mode on a daily basis ought to foster increased cooperation and enhance the effectiveness of all involved. Combat leaders would be able to experience the capabilities and limitations of combined arms operations by having armor, infantry and aviation assets under their control. Unlike the present method - cross attachment of different types of units -this concept delivers the synergistic effect of combined arms operations without destruction of unit integrity.

The combination of the multi-role combat vehicle and the proposed organizational changes should result in a fighting force that has the combat power and the operational flexibility that will enable it to be rapidly deployed and successfully utilized. Anywhere. Anytime.

Major Harold L. Spurgeon served three tours of combat duty in Southeast Asia, the first being with 1/69 Armor and 2/47 Mechanized Infantry, taking part in the 1970 invasion of Cambodia. In the second tour, he was assigned to 1/77 Armor, participating in the 1971 invasion of Laos. During the third tour he served with the 3/5 Armored Cavalry. Since 1975, he has commanded Armor, Armored Cavalry and Mechanized Infantry units. He is currently the Chief of the Training Division at Camp Roberts, Calif. Stanley Crist is a former tank commander, having served with 311 85 Armor, CAARNG.