Back Cover Flamethrower Tanks on Okinawa

During World War 11, the flamethrower distinguished itself as an indispensable weapon for jungle conditions. The main armament flamethrowing tank was the most advanced, effective, and survivable development of this weapon system. The flame tank became a symbol of American ingenuity and technology on the battlefield, although the development of an effective American flame tank was slow. They were fielded and tested in various configurations throughout the war in the Pacific. An adequate design was not employed in great numbers until the fielding of the 713th Battalion (Provisional Flame Thrower) during the fight for Okinawa. The United States Army identified the need for a mechanized main armament armored flamethrower as early as May 1940, but even by V-J Day one had not entered large-scale production. This weapon, which would be regarded as one of the most important weapons of the Okinawa Campaign, was tested in limited numbers during operations on Saipan, Peleliu, the Philippines, and Iwo Jima. But it was not until the Ryukyus Campaign that it was fielded on a survivable platform in sizable numbers. Prior to the employment of flamethrowers mounted on the M4 Sherman medium tank, they had been mounted on light tanks or amphibious tractors. These turned out to be too lightly armored to fight at close quarters with a dug-in, determined enemy armed with satchel charges and antitank guns of 37mm and greater caliber. The Marines fielded eight Sherman medium tank main armament flamethrowers on Flamethrowing M4 Sherman clears the jungle ahead for accompanying infantry. Iwo Jima (Kleber and Birdsell, 579) where they had great success in killing or driving underground large numbers of Japanese infantry. During an operation marked by the numerous American casualties, these eight tanks, where employed, enabled the Marines to advance with minimal casualties. While they were successful, eight tanks were just too few to have a substantial impact on the battle. Flame Tanks in Europe Other nations were also experimenting with this weapon. By 1944, the British had designed and used their Crocodile (flamethrowing) Churchill tank against forts and dug-in infantry in the European Theater. American observers recorded the successes of these main armament flamethrower tanks against the Germans and sent reports to the chief of the Chemical Warfm Service.

Colonel F. W. Wilkinson was a combat observer with the British 29th Division at Brest on 14-18 September 1944. He recorded how flame tanks, in conjunction with gun tanks, infantry, engineers, and field artillery, reduced a German occupied French casemented fort on the outskirts of Brest. His most telling observation was that “prisoner of war interrogation indicated that flamethrowing tanks materially reduced the will of the garrison to hold out - several cases of Germans being burned alive were reported (Wilkinson, 2). The principles described in Wilkin-son’s report were later grasped by the Marines and Army in the Pacific. The tanks themselves must be survivable, they required support by main gun tanks, and they had to operate as part of the combined tank-infantry team. The demoralizing effect of flame was seen as a great benefit of the weapon (Pacific War Board Report #74, 35). Flame attacks forced holed-up infantry to surrender, move to open ground where they could be readily engaged, or retreat deep into their fortifications. Suppression by flame ensured that enemy troops were unable to bring effective fire against assaulting infantry and armor.

Auxiliary Flame Throwers Early efforts to mount flamethrowers on American tanks resulted in two auxiliary weapons. The first was a 6 The British Churchill model fitted for flamethrowing was called the ‘Crocodile.” It carried its fuel in an armored trailer and could project a jet of flame over 150 yards. These Crocodiles are seen fighting in France in August 1944. small flamethrower mounted in the place of.3O-caliber bow machine gun on the Sherman medium tank. The second development was a periscope-mounted flame gun which could be employed through either the periscope in the turret roof or the assistant driver’s hatch (Hunnicutt, 402-406). These two types, while welcome by the Army as stopgap measures, were not entirely popular with the tank crews. Their short range and small fuel capacity greatly limited their utility (Pacific War Board Report #52, 1-2).

These auxiliary flame guns were severely hampered by having a maximum range of only 60 yards and a 24-gallon fuel tank (Hunnicutt, 404). This resulted in approximately 20-30 seconds of flame time before the fuel tank would run dry. If the tactical situation called for flaming to be the primary mission, this often forced the tank to retire to resupply before completing the mission.

The 7 1 lth Tank Battalion, which operated with the 7th Infantry Division on Okinawa, had particularly bad luck with its auxiliary flame guns. This unit’s after-action report from the Okinawa Campaign describes three tanks destroyed and five tankers killed when the auxiliary flame thrower unit exploded after receiving battlefield damage. Two tanks of Company B were completely destroyed after direct artillery hits detonated their flame units. One Company C tank was destroyed after a mine set off the flame gun. Secondary explosions accounted for more than 80 percent of the combat deaths incurred by the 711th The main armament flamethrowers had significant advantages over their auxiliary cousins. The 300-gallon fuel capacity was 12 times greater then the bow or periscope weapons and had a range of 100-150 yards, depending on nozzle width and fuel mixture. Although these tanks did not carry a traditional main gun, they were med with one SO-caliber and two.30-caliber machine guns. These figures were obtained from the April 16, 1945 pamphlet entitled “Flamethrower, Mechanized, E12-7R1 (Installed in Medium Tank, M4A1)” which describes the same capabilities as the weapons used by the 713th Tank Battalion (Provisional Flamethrower) on Okinawa.

(71 lth AAR, 29-32).

The 713th Armor Battalion (Provisional Flamethrower) In early November 1944, the 713th was pulling outpost duty in the Hawaiian Islands. On the tenth of that month, LTC Thomas McCrary, the battalion commander, received orders to reorganize his unit as a provisional battalion of flamethrowing tanks (Morschauser, 31). The transition was going to be a local one. McCrary was given the job of determining the battalion’stable of organization and equipment (TO&E). He was directed to convert his 54 M4 Sherman medium tanks to flamethrowers using a shop which had been set up at Schofield Barracks, Oahu. The battalion supplied three officers and 60 enlisted men to assist the Naval Construction Battalion that supervised the installation (713th AAR, 1-1). Local production of these weapons was hampered by difficulty securing many of the necessary components through local suppliers. It became necessary to ship 42,911 pounds of material by air from the continental U. S. during the 56 days the tanks were undergoing the conversion (Richardson, 63). Training had to be conducted for personnel who would be required to tactically employ, operate, and maintain these systems. The U. S. Army Pacific Area of Operations Chemical Section coordinated and directed an intensive period of training for the personnel of the 713th (Richardson, 64). The training consisted of classes for officers and NCOs, one for maintenance, another for personnel of the flamethrower companies, and another for all members of the 713th regardless of position. This training covered all operational aspects of the gun, including first and second echelon maintenance (713th AAR, 3-1). After its notification on 10 November 1944, the 713th Tank Battalion required less than four months to make the conversion to flame tanks and embark for the invasion of Okinawa. Prior to sailing from Pearl Harbor on 4 March 1945, the 713th had developed a unique TO&E, physically modified their equipment, developed a doctrine for its use and, most importantly, trained their people to effectively employ this new killing system. The 713th Tank Battalion (Provisional Flamethrower) was to be attached to the XXIV Corps as part of the 20th Armored Group for the Ryukyus Campaign. The XXIV Corps SOP did not include a section on how to employ the main armament flamethrowers.

Consequently, the battalion staff put together their own doctrine. This is quite important, considering that the bulk of the battalion would be attached as platoons or sections to other tank companies or infantry units. These gaining units would be unfamiliar with the capabilities of the weapon unless the 713th published some guidelines before the campaign. 'The paper was distributed to infantry divisions, tank battalions, and other interested troops in Tenth Army in order that they might become familiar with the principle of organization and tactical employment which were included" (713th AAR, 2-1). Although problems were bound to occur in combat, the unit's success in the operation attested to the value of having disseminated this information.

The Okinawa Campaign Loading the ships for transport to the objective began on 22 February 1945 and was completed on the first of March. As the battalion had been given no specific mission in the Tenth Army operations order for Operation On New Caledonia in 1943. M3A1 light tanks were an earlier attempt to mate flamethrowers with tanks. Their flame nozzles replace the bow machine guns on the right front glacis. Inadequate fuel capacity and poor survivability limited their usefulness. Limited range of the fllamethrower can be inferred from bottom photo. ICEBERG (the code name for the invasion), the battalion staff attempted to load the ships to meet any possible contingency. The basic unit for loading the landing ships was aflame tank platoon with its supply and maintenance complement of vehicles aboard one ship. This would enable the piecemeal, but effective, introduction of the battalion into the fray, one platoon at a time. Crucial items of ammunition, fuel, rations. and supply were divided up among the ten ships. This loading technique gave the command great flexibility in committing the flame tanks, no matter how the battalion was unloaded. It also ensured that each subunit could operate effectively by itself (713th AAR, 2-1 and 4-1). Although the battalion arrived off Okinawa on the second of April, it did not begin unloading until the seventh. Almost the entire battalion came across the Hagushi beaches -Orange #1 and Purple #1 and #2 - on the 7th, where they were placed in an assembly area. They were given time to perform maintenance, remove waterproofing, and distribute necessary supplies while also serving as the protection for the corps supply and unloading sector. One C Company tank was lost when it drove into a hole on the reef and was deemed unrecoverable. The battalion would begin the battle a I ‘ One of the 713th Tank Battalion Shermans attacks Japanese defenders along Coral Ridge, Okinawa. with only 53 flamethrower tanks (713th AAR, 6-1).

The first action for the flame tanks occurred on April 19th, when the 7th Infantry Division faced the Japanese 1 lth Independent Infantry Battalion among the Rocky Crags and along Skyline Ridge (Appleman, Bums, et al., 196). The 71 lth Tank Battalion, in support of 7th Infantry Division, had A Company of the 713th attached on the tenth day of the fight. The flame tanks were attached to the assault companies as platoons (711th AAR, 10). The Japanese were using underground tombs as pillboxes in the vicinity of Skyline Ridge, and could not be suppressed or overrun by unsupported infantry. The flame tanks moved up with standard tanks to bring the pillboxes under fire. “Their mission was to follow the standard tanks and fire when called on. The infantry followed the flamethrowers (7 13th AAR, 6-3). The force of tanks and infantry “quickly moved into position at the tip of Skyline Ridge. They poured shot and flame into a cluster of enemy-occupied tombs and emplacements at the lower extremity of the ridge... This was anew spectacle for the waiting infantry, who watched fascinated. For the enemy who died in the searing flame inside their strongpoints, there was hardly time to become terror-stricken. This phase of the attack lasted 15 minutes, and then... the infantry moved up” (Appleman, Bums, et al., 196). The infantry were able to move forward and complete the destruction of these emplacements without taking the horrendous casualties that would have been suffered without the use of the flame tanks. “From this day on [the flame tanks] were used whenever conditions permitted. The infantry took to them immediately (Appleman, XXN COTS, 183).

The tactical employment of tanks, both flamethrower and standard, reflected the guidance of the XXTV Corps SOP. It advised that tanks must be protected by infantry to prevent the enemy from executing antiarmor ambushes. Although the SOP does not mention flame tanks, this infantry-tank cooperation was essential to successful operations involving these weapons. The flame tanks were usually attached as a section (3 tanks) to a standard medium tank platoon. The flame tanks would remain in a forward assembly area until called forward by the tank platoon leader. They would join with the standard tanks and the infantry to accomplish the assigned mission (713th AAR, 9-2). The 7 1 lth Tank Battalion’s after-action report also reflects this, “Flame tanks in operation must always be covered by at least two other tanks as well as infantry” (10). It was important for the infantry to remain close in support of the tanks because the Japanese employed suicide squads with satchel charges as a key to their antitank tactics. The Japanese attempted “to drive the U. S. infantry away from the tank using small arms and mortars. This left the tanks “blind”... The attackers tried to remain concealed until the first volley of small arms had driven off American infantry, then they assaulted the tank” (Huber, 69).

The tank-infantry team proved almost unbeatable if the tanks, both flame and standard, were covered by infantry in close support. “There can be little question that the tanks were the most important single weapon in the American attack on Okinawa The tank-infantry team made the battle and won the island... The tank-infantry team was devastating to the Japanese” (Appleman, XXN Corps, 633). The first engagement typified the effect that the flame tanks had on friendly and enemy morale throughout the campaign. “After the first use of. flame tanks on 19 April, a general cry went up and down the front for the ‘Zippos”’ (Morschauser, 32). They were in such favor with American troops that “the commanding officer of one tank battalion reported that the infantry in many cases preferred to advance behind aflame tank rather than behind a standard one” weber and Birdsell, 586).

The flame tank had pat psychological impact on the battlefield. According to the men on Okinawa, the armored flamethrower’s “value lies in its ability to drive the Jap out of his prepared positions into the open to be killed by supporting troops. Experience has proven that the Jap, regardless of his fanatical intentions to hold his ground and die for the Emperor, will not remain in his hole when flame is brought to bear on him, but will make every effort to get out and away from the flame” (713th AAR, 8-3). The results that the 713th Tank Battalion achieved on Okinawa during the period 7 April to 30 June 1945 were incredible. The battalion was credited with killing 4,788 and capturing 49 of the enemy, not including Japanese soldiers killed by escorting infantry or estimates of those trapped and sealed in caves or fortifications. These figures, when balanced against the battalion’s losses of only seven men killed and one reported missing, speak to the flame tank’s destructive power as well as its survivability. Of the 54 tanks which began the operation, 41 were knocked out of action. Twenty-six of these were returned to duty (713th AAR, 8-1). On the last day of the operation, 30 June 1945, the battalion had 37 operational tanks and two others in maintenance (713th AAR, 6-38). The ingenuity and hard work of the mechanics had kept the battalion at over 70 percent strength after almost three months of combat. No mechanized flamethrowers could have been replaced considering that there were no others in the theater. The main armament flamethrower proved itself as a great force multiplier during the Iceberg operation, and it was directly responsible for keeping American casualties to a minimum. It had a devastating effect on the Japanese and was a great morale booster for the American troops who relied on it.

The key to the flame tank‘s success was the mounting of the weapon in the sturdy M4 Sherman medium tank, which was survivable enough to take the fight directly to the enemy’s positions. Also, the inclusion of the armored fhmethrower as an intrinsic part of the tank-infantry combined arms team was instrumental to its use. Had the main armament flamethrower been perfected earlier in the war, American casualties could have been reduced and the tank-infantry team could have been more effective in the Pacific war.

Works Cited Appleman. Roy E. Maj. The XXN Cops in the Battle of Okinawa United Sates Amy, 1st Inf. & Historical Service, December 1945. Appleman, Roy E.. Bums, James M., et al., United States Army in World War 11, The War in the Pacijic, Okinawa: The h t Battle.

Washington, D. C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1984. Huber, Thomas M. kavenworth Papers #I& Japan’s Battle of Okinawa. April-June 1945. Ft. Lzavenworth, Kan.; Combat Studies Institute, U. S. Army Command And General Staff College, 1990.

Hunnicutt, R. P. Shemn, A History of the American Medium Tank Novato, Calif.; Presidio Press, 1978.

Kleber, Brooks E. and Birdsell, Dale. United States Army in World War 11. The Technical Services. The Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in Combat. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966.

Morschauser, Joseph. “Blowtorch Battalion.” Armor, 69.2 (1960): 30-33. Richardson, Robert C. LTG. Particiption in the okinawa Operation. United States Amy, U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area. 1945.

United States Army, 706th Tank Battalion. After Action: Ryukyu Operation Report. 30 June 1945.

United States Army, 711th Tank Battalion. Action Agaimt the Enemy Report: 711th Tank Battalion Attached to 7th Infantry Division I April to 30 June 1945. 1945. United States Army. 713th Tank Battalion, Ro-visional Flamethrower. Afrer-Action Report. 18 July 1945.

United States Army, Flamethrower. Mechanized, E12-7RI (Installed in Medium Tank, M4AI). 16 April 1945.

United States Army, Pacific Warfare Board Report No. 52.3 September 1945. United States Army. Pacific Warfare Board Report No. 74. 26 October 1945. United States Army, XXIV Corps. XXN Corps Standard Operating Procedures. February 1944.

Wilkinson, F. W. Appoinhnent of Crocodile Tank Flamethrowers. United States Army. European Theater of Operations, Chemical Warfare Service. 17 October 1944. First Lieutenant Patrick J. Donahoe was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Regular Army from Villanova University in 1989. He has served as a tank and support platoon leader in 2/72 Armor at Camp Casey, Korea, and as the executive officer of D Troop, 5/12 Cavalry at Ft. Knox. He has recently served as the aide-de-camp of the deputy commanding general of the Recruiting Command. He is currently attending the Armor Advanced Course.

January-February 7994 Letters (Continued from Page 4) capacity of 193,624 liters (Jane’s, p. 424). The empty weight of the C-5 is 167,965 kg. Add to that a max fuel weight of 150,815 kg. and the max permissible take-off weight is 362,870 kg. The implication of this is that the C-5 must take off light when towing a loaded glider and be refueled shortly after takeoff and frequently in flight. Fourth, let‘s look at landing this glider. Do not assume that landings will occur at a nice 75 knots. Rather assume that the landings will be hard and fast. The glider will require more than skids with 300 mm of ground clearance. One hard, fast landing and your glider is expensive scrap. Many composites do not break gracefully. Fifth, let’stalk about the recovery of an empty glider. How many people are required to lift a 19-meter wing segment? Or did I miss something about a crane being flown in with the Ml? Would someone explain how the airborne glider grabs the tow cable from the orbiting C-5? Or how does the C-5 pick up the cable from the airborne glider? By the way, do you have any idea how long and thick this cable must be? MARK SCHWALENBERG

Brooksfield, Wis.

More Reliable Powerplant Needed for Future MBT Dear Sir: I am writing to disagree with several points G. K. Hower made in response to my letter on the suitability of the gas turbine engine for MBTs. I am a civilian with no connections to the defense industry. My comments are strictly those of a former M1 A1 tanker.

Mr. Hower states that the Leopard 2’s diesel engine weighs 1,455 kg more than the Ml’s turbine engine. On a vehicle that weighs 54,545 kg (Ml). that is marginal. Engine weight should only be considered after reliability and fuel consumption are compared. The Germans have an MBT that weighs nearly the same, has an equivalent weapons system, top speed, power to weight ratio, and has much better fuel consumption. This makes it much easier to support logistically. The importance of this should not be underestimated. During the ground phase of DESERT STORM, my unit (A Co, 2-70 Armor, 2d Bde, 1st AD) was on the verge of running out of fuel several times. It slowed our advance considerably. And this in a logistical environment uncontested by enemy air and ground forces.

Mr. Hower also states that the M1/M1A1 had a readiness rate of 90 percent in Desert SHIELDISTORM. This is not surprising considering that the tanks were parked in the desert with their engines off for over 90 percent of the time. What is perhaps more instructive is what happened when the tanks ran in the desert environment for a sustained period of time. My company crossed the Saudillraq border at the beginning of the ground war with 14 out of 14 tanks operational. Within 24 hours we had lost k e tanks, four due to engine failures (and this after a rain, with no blowing sand). My battalion commander was forced to order at one point that tank engines were to be be kept running when we halted for long periods of time, to avoid engine failures during start up. Equally disturbing is what happened to my brigade on its redeployment from Iraq to KKMC in Saudi Arabia after the war was over. In a three-day move, my company lost six tanks due to engine failures, my battalion lost 16 tanks, and my brigade (with three tank battalions) lost 60. This type of combat reliability is simply unacceptable. It also suggests that the Army should track engine failures by the hours of engine run time. The only thing a ”readiness rate” of 90 percent does is look good on your OER. I would urge those responsible for choosing a powerplant for the Future MBT, either turbine or diesel, to require drastically improved reliability and fuel consumption over those displayed by the AGT 1500. I would also urge that the chosen powerplant be extensively tested by real tankers and mechanics before introduction in production vehicles. This could be easily done in modified M1 hulls.

WILLIAM J. MCCANNA, JR.

Hoover, Ala.

Highly Recommends Two “Off the Beaten Path” Museums Dear Sir: Next year, as you know full well, is the 50th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, and the beginning of our drive across Europe. Many of you will be visiting the Continent in 1994195. To those who are going, I would like to share something which I believe is most significant. I fought across Europe with the 4th Armored Division, including the Battle of the Bulge. Recently my daughter lived in Belgium for three years (her husband was with NATO). When I visited her, I used her home as a base of operations and retraced the locations of many of my battlefield experiences. While doing so, I happened across two absolutely fabulous museums. I say “happened,” because I had not seen them listed in travel guides, or included in any of the formal, organized tours. I found these museums to be fascinating, absorbing, highly educational, and absolutely unique - a real “must.” Since they are off the “beaten path” of the tours, most American visitors, unfortunately, will miss them. I was so impressed with my visits that I have taken it upon myself to call your attention to them. If not on your planned itinerary, I urge you to make aside trip to them - it will be more than well worth your effort. I feel assured that these experiences will be as meaningful as any on your trip.

The two museums are:

BASTOGNE HISTORICAL CENTER (includes AMERICAN MEMORIAL). On outskirts of City of Bastogne. Account of Battle of the Bulge in MULTIVISION. Authentic uniforms, weapons and materiel of belligerents. For the first time in the world, a museum is dedicated to a single, great battle created with the help and advice of opposing generals. Presentation and portrayals so unique are now copied by other muse-urns especially in many foreign countries. VICTORY MEMORIAL MUSEUM. Near

Arlon. Easy access motorway E25lE411; 5 km from Belgiumfluxembourg border. Most significant of all WWll museums. Immense, unprecedented displays. Commemorates Allied achievements from Africa to Berlin. 200 military vehicles; 300 uniforms on wax figures with weapons and equipment; 5 huge dioramas. Largest, most important, most specialized Wll collection - unequalled in level of quality and variety. Cafeteria - especially enjoyed by Americans. Ample parking; new overnight accommodations directly across the road. I sincerely hope that you will find it possible to visit these two outstanding museums.

BG, USA (Ret.)

8th Tank Bn, 4th AD January-February 7994