Bring Back the Blues

An armor lieutenant clutched his MI6 as he watched the landscape rush past below. He and his platoon prepared to dismount the helicopters that brought them to the enemy’s doorstep, and the beginning of another mission in support of the division cavalry squadron. Wait, this does not make sense! An armor lieutenant with an M16?.., DISMOUNT?..., Helicopters???...: is this some kind of a joke? Actually, it is not a joke. Rather, it describes what was formerly the air-mobile reconnaissance platoon of the DIVCAV squadron. The organization dates back to the beginning of aircav with the blues platoons of the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam. Unfortunately, it has been ignored and allowed to die in the quickly reorganizing cavalry. The disappearance of recon platoons with the new J-series in 1986 left a gap in DIVCAV recon and security capabilities. DIVCAV squadrons must recapture this asset and it’s abilities -medium-range reconnaissance, rapid response to rear area threats, and the conduct of raids in the enemy’s m. The recon platoon provides the squadron with intelligence, security, and flexibility that no other unit can match.

The framework is already present in the DIVCAV to add the needed personnel and equipment Fsily. The organic aviation unit maintenance platoon and IIIN platoon can easily handle the small number of UH-IH or UH-60 helicopters needed to lift a platoon of 31 men.

Medium-range reconnaissance is the primary mission of the recon platoon. Twelve to 24 hours before the squadron zone reconnaissance begins, helicopters insert the platoon forward of the forward line of own troops (FLOT). They then move by foot to set up a screen line five to 20 kilometers in front of the squadron. Current information received from the platoon on the enemy situation allows the commander to improve his plan, and employ artillery, and CAS effectively. By inserting early, the recon platoon can confii or deny the accuracy of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), allowing the commander time to alter his plan. Because the DIVCAV squadron is the frst unit to move into an area, the IPB is key to their success. The commander’s revised plan, based on up-to-date information, focuses squadron assets and increases their chances of success and survival.

Good enemy intelligence allows the line of troops to move rapidly and with confidence. The result is more ARMOR - 35 time spent on reconnaissance, not wasted hiding from an enemy that is not there.

Without a recon platoon, the squadron relies on the division long-range surveillance unit (LRSU) for intelligence. Though an effective intelligence-gathering tool, they report to the division and are concerned with the division deep battle. They do not provide information that can immediately help the squadron, even if communications were rapid enough to get the intelligence to the squadron in a timely manner.

Through detailed planning of enemy air defense suppression (SEAD), no-fm areas, landing zones w), and false U s, the helicopters of the lift platoon can safely and quickly move across the FLOT to insert the recon platoon.

Working in team-sized elements, the platoon moves by foot the remaining distance to observation posts (OP). Chances of success are greatly increased by conducting these missions under the cover of darkness. Stealthy movement in limited visibility situations allows the teams to penetrate enemy reconnaissance. From these positions, they provide information, control friendly indirect fire, and employ close air support, to hams or destroy the enemy.

For effective communication with the squadron, teams carry radios with a green net capability. A vehicle placed just behind the FLOT, or one team located to the rear of the screen can act as a relay station for reports. To sustain operations, teams carry sufficient rations, small camouflage nets, and institute sleep plans immediately.

Recovery of the teams is accomplished by aerial extraction, exfilm-tion, or the movement of the squadron or other friendly troops past their positions. This is the most difficult of the missions to accomplish for the squadron. Once again, detailed planning is needed to protect the recon soldiers from friendly fire and enemy detection. Downed Pilot Pickup Points are already pat of the squadron plan and can be used to extract the soldiers.

Another mission of the recon platoon is that of m area reaction force. The platoon can rapidly move by helicopter to delay or destroy a level II threat. A trained combat platoon Will be effective against the light enemy forces expected to disrupt our rear area operations.

Also, as a reaction force, the platoon can destroy or maintain contact with light enemy forces bypassed by a squadron zone reconnaissance. Line troops maintain flexibility of maneuver, by not becoming decisively engaged or having to lave a platoon back to maintain contact with the enemy. This powerful resowce allows the squadron to keep maximum reconnaissance forward and oriented on the objective.

An additional mission of the recon platoon is that of deep operations. In the case where an enemy command post or other soft, high value target is identified, the recon platoon can be tasked with its destruction. Inserted in the same way as for a screen line, the platoon moves in squads or as a platoon to maintain its full combat power consolidated. Making the most of limited visibility and surprise, the platoon attacks violently with massed small arms fire and grenades to destroy the enemy position, deceive them as to the size of the attacking force, and create as much confusion as possible. It is important that the raid and aerial extraction are swiftly executed to take advantage of enemy disorganization and avoid a coordinated pursuit. A disjointed recon and counterrecon effort by the enemy, which could result from such an operation, would substantially increase the effectiveness of the DIVCAV squadron.

The platoon’s mobility and dismounted operation also make it ideal for numerous other missions. Their ability to bypass obstacles that delay mounted forces make them valuable as far-side security for obstacle-breaching and river-crossing operations. The platoon operates well in difficult terrain, where mounted scouts lose their mobility. When this condition necessitates the use of air troops independent of ground troops, the mon platoon can fill the ground role of reconnaissance and security. The DIVCAV squadron must regain the airmobile reconnaissance platoon, a cavalry unit whose capabilities and benefits are enormous compared to its size. Without it, the squadron is operating in a degraded mode, making plans that cannot compensate for recent enemy shifts, counting on division for information that may or may not help, using valuable assets to maintain contact with bypassed enemy, and risking enemy success in our rear area.

Author’s Note: Blues phtoons did not disappear in 1986, I was the platoon leader of the 1/9 Cav “Head Hunters” recon platoon until its inactivation in 1990. At first, I was observer/controIIer for the platoon when it received praise for its success at the NTC in 1989. Later, I led the platoon through training in both desert and forested environments. As an armor officer, I never expected to be clutching that M16, but, since I have, I am convinced that this asset is invaluable to DIVCAV squadrons.

Captain Brace E. Barber is a 1987 graduate of the United States Military Academy. A graduate of AOB, AOAC, Ranger and Airborne Schools, he served as a tank platoon leader and XO with 1/72 Armor, Camp Casey, Korea; scout platoon leader, reconnaissance platoon leader, and HHT XO with 1/9 Cavalry; and aide-de-camp for First Corps Chief of Staff, Ft. Lewis, Wash. He is currently the commander, B Troop, 5-12 Cavalry.

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