The Premium Tank-5: The Armor Threat of the 1990s

The August international arms exhibition known as Desert Security I1 (DSEC 11) was very well attended and included the normal amount of documented surprises. Like most of the large military showcases of recent years, DSEC I1 provided both the well-known arms purchasing powers, as well as emerging new counm‘es. a marketplace for increasing their military strength. This year’s exhibition, however, was more significant since it finally conjirmed the existence of a threat that various Western intelligence agencies.had been trying to track down for several years. The recently formed tank design consortium hosting DSEC I1 included a previously unseen tank as the centerpiece of its armored vehicle display. Called the Premium Tank-5 (PT-5) by its designers, the new tank‘sfirepower, mobility, and protection characteristics demonstrated anew and significant threat to U. S. armor. The real possibility that this truly innovative and advanced tank could be provided to potential adversaries sent shock waves through the US. armor community. The PT-5’s designers had managed to continue what had once been a dramatic Soviet capability, with the result being anew tank that was clearly superior to its competition. As one senior US. Army observer attending the exhibition put it, “with the 120-nun guns of DESERT STORM now long silent, history may have once again repeated itselfin the shape of an innovative new tank superior to our own. Perhaps the most frightening point to consider is that the PT-5 is here and it‘s for sale...” According to The Military Balance 1991-1992, in June 1991 the Soviets could have fielded a tank force of approximately 54,400 tanks. Unlike the total mnk strength of a Western m y, these Soviet totals embodied the results of a unique Soviet concept. The concept concerned the fielding of a tank force consisting of two different tank types in a high-low mix. The Soviet Main Battle Tank (MBT) was designed as a lowcost tank that was intended to be fielded in lower priority Soviet divisions, as well as being made available to Soviet allied countries. These tanks had the necessary capabilities to be competitive on the battlefield, while being inexpensive and simple enough to be produced in very large numbers. MBTs constituted the bulk and the low-end of the Soviet tank fleet’s high-low mix. The Soviet tank type that made up the high-end remainder of the fleet was the Premium Tank 0.

A premium tank is defmed as a very high value and innovative tank that incorporates the highest technology available at a given time. According to the premium tank concept, both the less sophisticated MBTs and the premium tanks were fielded concurrently, with the reserve forces employing the same h4BT as the bulk of the active foke. Since its debut in July 1941 with the Russian T-34 Model 1940 and Model 1941, the premium tank has heralded the use of innovation and high technology in tank design. When compared to the contemporary tanks ARMOR - January-February 7993 fielded by its competition, the innovation and high technology incorporated into each of the Soviet premiums resulted in a crisis being impressed upon its opponents. The success of the premium tank did not go unnoticed by the Western armies that were forced to react to its capabilities. The short-lived American T-95 premium tank project of the 1950s, and the successful American and German programs to field high technology MBTs in the 1980s. are examples of the Western response to the Soviet premium tank experience. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western intelligence agencies were very concerned about Soviet innovations that were projected to appear in the near future. While the threat imposed by a future premium tank b m Russia or the Ukraine has been downgraded signifi-The PT-5, at figures 1 and 2, will be the first tank of unconventional design to appear since World War 11. After the M48LEOPARD 1 and Ml/LEOPARD 2 generations, the appearance of the PT-5 will mark the start of the third postwar generation of tank development. The PT-5 will go into limited production in the early 1990s. with the push to full d e production between 1994 and 1996. Due to its cost, complexity, and revolutionary design, the numbers of FT-5s eventually produced will be somewhat lower than past premium tanks. The PT-5 will reach its Initial Operational Capability (IOC) during the same time frame it reaches large scale production.

Improved Firepower cantly, the threat of the premium tank. The FT-5 will mount either the new employed by anew adversary demands attention. The task at hand is to identify this threat and respond to it, prior to the imposition of a dangerous crisis in tank and antitank warfare.

The Premium Tank-5 The identification of the future premium tank could take place in a wide variety of different scenarios. These possibilities range from the tank being identified during operational testing by U. S. national assets, to it being openly displayed as an export candidate, or for the purpose of proving a given country’s military prowess. In whatever scenario the future premium tank eventually appears, it will most likely be based on the product and process of the Soviet experience. Following the established line of Soviet premium tank developments -the T-34, postwar heavy tanks, the T-64 series, and the T-80 series -the examination of the future premium tank will be based on the projected Premium Tank-5 (PT-5). The PT-5 is the result of a combination of the available open-source information and the analysis of this author. third-generation 125-mm main gun or the new “Rapira-4” 135-mm main gun. The third-generation 125-mm gun will have a maximum effective range of 2,500 meters, and will fire anew family of HVAPFSDS, HEAT-FS, and RAG-HE ammunition. For any engagements beyond 2,500 meters, the PT-5 will be able to fm an improved laser beam-riding ATGM through the gun tube. A key characteristic of this gun will be an improved bml-life over that of currently fielded 125-mm tank guns. The PT-5 may also mount the new Rapira-4 135-mm main gun, which will increase the maximum effective engagement range of the PT-5 to approximately 3,200 meters. The Rapira-4 will not only fire a completely new family of ammunition, including anew Depleted Uranium (DU) HVAPFSDS round, it will also fire a more powerful laser beam-riding ATGM out to a maximum effective range of 6,000 meters. The secondary armament will consist of a coaxial 7.63-mm PKT machine gun and a 12.7-mm NSVT antiaircraft machine gun. Both machine guns will be crrpa-ble of being fired while the PT-5 is fully buttoned-up.

While the main gun carried by the PT-5 represents a huge incmse in capability, the heart of the tank’s improved firepower will be the new “hunter-killer” fm control system. Incorporating the most advanced capabilities available, the hunter-killer system will include a laser rangefinder (LRF), a thermal night fighting capability for both the tank commander and gunner, and an advanced shoot-on-the-move capability.

Like the very similar systems used on the MlAl and Leopard 2 MBTs, the PT-5’s hunter-killer fire control system will allow the tank to accurately engage multiple long-range targets, while stationary or on the move. One important advantage of the PT-5’s hunter-killer system will be the employment of both active and passive defensive countermeasures. Actlve and Passive Countermeasures The active countermeasure system will be based on the Soviet Drozd (Thrush) system. The Drozd system, which was first seen on the T-55AD MBT in the late 1980s or early 199Os, consists of a radar sensor that detects incoming ATGMs, and then fires a volley of pellets from modified turret-mounted grenade launchers to destroy an attacking missile before it hits the targeted tank.’ The passive countermeasure system will consist of two different elements: a Laser Waning Receiver (LWR) network and the “Shadow” infrared “projector.” The LWR network consists of three sensors, one mounted on the turret roof and one mounted on the left and right side of the hull. The purpose of the sensor network is to warn the PT-5’s three-man crew that they are being illuminated by a laser rangefinder or laser designator, and to identify the direction of the threat. Once given that information, the crew can conduct the necessary evasive maneuvers to avoid the incoming antitank projectile or missile. ARMOR - January-February 7993 The truly innovative Shadow infrared projector is designed to project a duplicate infrared and radar image of the PT-5 ten meters to the right of the projecting tank. The intent of the Shadow is to confuse Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) or smart-bombs into locking onto and attacking the projected image and not the actual PT-5. As discussed by the Soviets in the late 1980s. and confiied by Operation DESERT STORM, combat in the future will include the large scale employment of PGMs. The PT-5 will be the first tank in the world fully capable of operating in the intense PGM environment expected to characterize battlefields of the fuhrre. Mobility of the PT-5 The mobility characteristics of the PT-5 will also be given a high priority. Unlike its Soviet predecessors, the PT-5 will not have the initial mechanical problems historically associated with premium tanks. The PT-5 will be powered by the new Smerch (Tornado) diesel engine, providing between 1.200 and 1,500 hp. This new engine will combine the power and reliability of European tank engines, with the innovation-and light weight normally associated with premium tank designs.

The PT-5’s engine and fully automatic transmission will give the tank a maximum speed of 85 kph, and a range of operation of approximately 700 kilometers. This very impressive performance is possible because the low-profdellow-volume turret and lightweight engine allow the PT-S’s combat weight to be only 50 tons. In addition to the new engine and trrins-mission, the PT-5 will also incorporate a hydro-pneumatic suspension system. This type of suspension will allow the height of the PT-5 to be raised or lowered by adjusting the tank’s ground clearance to best suit the available terrain. Although already in use by the Japanese Type 74 MBT and fully tested in the American T-95 premium tank project, the PT-5 will be the first fielded premium tank to use this type of suspension. The Innovative Protection of the PT-5 Like the fmpower and mobility design areas discussed above, the protection provided to the PT-5 will be very impressive and represent a huge increase in capability. The turret used on the PT-5 will be entirely new, and truly revolutionary. The PT-5’s unconventional turret will be of a low-profile/low-volume design: that will not only reduce the tank’s weight, but will also give the PT-5 a very low overall profile. The tank commander will be seated on the right, and the gunner seated on the left, both low inside the turret. When occupying a hulldown fighting position, the target presented by the exposed turret will be almost impossible to detect. If the turret was hit, however, the armor would certainly provide the level of protection necessary to defeat currently fielded antitank weapons. The PT-5 will be fitted with two different types of armor protection, advanced composite armor on the turret and new “active” armor on the tank‘s front slope. The turret armor of the PT-5, like earlier premium tanks, will consist of a combination of both ceramic material and cast steel. In the PT-5’s turret, however, the ceramic material will not be limited to the turret front. Since the PT-5’s turret is much smaller than that fitted to other tanks, there is no restriction to limit the use of composite armor to save weight. Therefore, the composite armor fitted to the PT-5 will protect all sides of the turret through 360 degrees. Instead of the filled internal cavities incorporated into the turret fronts of other premiums? the n - 5 will employ an innovative “ceramic shell” placed between the outer and inner layers of cast steel armor. This ceramic shell will ensure complete coverage of the turret from all angles of attack. While the exact ceramic material used in this composite is not known, it will certainly be more advanced than that employed by the T-64 and T-80 premium tanks. The most revolutionary aspect of the PT-5’s armor protection is the active armor fitted to the tank‘s glacis. Open sources have claimed that the Soviet tank originally known as the FST-2 included “proactive armor” that would intercept an attacking projectile before it actually hit the armor? According to retired General Donn Starry, the FST-2 could also have incorporated electromagnetic armor. The intent of electromagnetic armor is to destroy an attacking projectile with an extremely powerful electric charge. When an incoming round hits the tank armor it completes an electric circuit and basically destroys itself? While these possibilities still may appear in the future, they are not part of the active armor fitted to the PT-5.

Known as “snaplock armor,” the revolutionary laminate consists of a six-layer array incorporating two outer layers of steel, two middle layers or plates of advanced ceramic “active“ armor, and two inner layers of steel. The two active plates are mounted on top and bottom guides, in a concept very similar to that used with household sliding glass doors. When in motion, the top and bottom guides ensue that the plates travel and return in the correct manner. The intent of the new armor is to defeat the long dart-like DU penetrators in APFSDS ammunition. When the front slope of the FT-5 is hit, the penetrator is slowed by the two outer layers of steel. As it reaches the two middle active plates of the snaplock armor, the plates slide to the left and right simultaneously; and then slide back to their original positions. Both of these actions occur in the smallest fraction of a second, with both active plates moving in unison. The result of this snap-lock action is the penetrator being neatly cut into three separate pieces. The kinetic energy of the severed penetrator would be drastically reduced, leaving the remaining energy and undirected parts of the penetrator to move laterally and ARMOR - be absorbed within the laminate. The two inner layers of steel would provide more than enough protection to protect the PT-5’screw from the remnants of the DU penetrator. The advanced composite and snaplock laminate armor carried by the PT-5 could potentially provide complete protection against conventional antitank weapons.

The appearance of the PT-5 could be a primary force behind the decision to fully develop and field the next generation of battlefield weapons. The PT-5 Scenarlo As previously mentioned, the identification of the PT-5 could occur in a wide variety of different scenarios. Any problems associated with identifying this new threat, however, will be magnified if the potential adversary follows the Soviet premium tank example. The defense-related press, as well as a variety of open somes, could help keep any new tank developments secret by denying that any other country has the capability to develop high technology weapons. Several sources will argue that a given country is simply not capable of producing a tank with the very sophisticated characteristics of the PT-5. It should be remembered, however, that these same sources once believed the combination of a large caliber smoothbore main gun, an innovative engine, and the use of composite armor was too sophisticated for the U. S. Army to field (with the T-95 Premium Tank), at virtually the same time the Soviets fielded the T-64. Since the Soviets have historically been able to develop and field high technology premium tanks, there is no reason to assume that other nations are incapable of the same achievement. According to Soviet Military Power 1989. Soviet tank technology was not only equivalent to that of the U. S., the relative technology level was in fact changing significantly in favor of the Soviet Union. “We discovered that things we had predicted they would have ten years from now, they already had.”’ It would clearly be an example of assuming away enemy capabilities if the U. S. Army allows itself to be caught off-guard by the deployment of the PT-5.

Apparently, the potential impact of a future premium tank like the PT-5 may have already been identified. Open sources reported in 1988 that the U. S. Army had developed anew innovative type of armor using depleted uranium. While the program to field as many of the American MlAl “heavy metal” tanks to the deployed forces prior to the start of Operation DESERT STORM confirms the capabilities of Soviet MBTs, it only tells part of the depleted uranium armor story. Apparently, the program to put DU armor on the MlAl began in 1983, and was upgraded to a “program of national priority” in 1985.6 Perhaps the U. S. Army identified the threat presented by the PT-5 and its 135-mm main gun prior to August 1990. If the Soviet experience with the T-64 is used as an example by the developers of the PT-5, the lack of information concerning the PT-5 c i be understood. When the T-64 was fmt deployed to the Western Group of Forces (WGF) in East Germany it was already 11 years old. Like the T-64, the first public appemnce of the PT-5 may only confm the that it imposed on the U. S. Army long before its projected IOC of 1994-1996. The New Crisis In Tank and An tltank Warfare In the near future, the desire to sell the MlAl and M1A2 MBTs to U. S. allies may provide a valuable opportunity for potential adversaries to observe these American MBTs during demonstrations and vehicle displays. Given the increasing capabilities of weapons producing countries, and the previously unheard-of availability of weapon design teams and production know-how, it is very possible that certain military delegations may view the MlAl and M1A2 and not be im- ARMOR - pressed. In fact, they might not even believe that these MBTs are the best the U. S. Army has to offer. As with the case of the German Army in the spring of 1941 when it was confronted by the T-34, the logical conclusion to the above scenario would be that a given country could already secretly possess a tank superior to the MlAl and MlA2.

If the U. S. Army of the 1990s and beyond continues the same pattern maintained by the opponents of past premium tanks, anew crisis in tank and antitank warfare may give an opponent a critical advantage. The thmt of a potential adversary applying the process of the Soviet experience to produce a future premium tank in the shape of the PT-5, must be identified and effectively countered prior to the deployment of U. S. forces to the battlefields of the future.