Planning for a Future Tank Must Consider Technology Leaps, Robotic ‘Crews’

Planning for a Future Tank Must Consider Technology Leaps, Robotic ‘Crews’ by H. H. Dobbs ‘The time has m e : the Walrus said.

a0 talk of many lhings:

Of shoes -and ships -and sealing wax -Of cabbages -and kings . . .* Lewis Carroll.

Through the Looking Glass With apologies to Lewis Carroll and his Walrus, whose Wonderland is scarcely stranger, and certainly less threatening, than ours, perhaps the time has come to talk of kings -of who, or what, may be ‘King of the Killing Zone” a decade or more hence, when the Army can hope to get its next main battle tank, the replacement for the M1 series. The Armored Systems Modernization program has been greatly reduced in scope, a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet threat and the Army’s successes. The logic of its rational schedule to keep the Armored Force in step with improvements in technology has been enveloped and bypassed by the larger question of the mission to be served by making the investment required to accomplish this. Despite imminent sales of the production-ready, vastly superior M1A2 to foreign armies, the cost effectiveness of upgrading the U.S. Army’s M1-series tanks to the M1A2 configuration is questioned. Even this logically unassailable proposal may not be fully implemented. Even arguments for maintaining the unique production base for armored combat vehicles are met with skepticism in some quarters. The schedule for an M1 replacement, the Future Main Battle Tank, is hazy and ill-defined. The only certainty is that this proposed principal armored combat vehicle will not be in the Armored Force much before 2010, at best.

Obviously, this is not a very satisfactory situation from the Army’s point of view, but there are aspects of it which can be turned to advantage. It eliminates the need to focus on a near-term replacement of the M1 series, and permits -in fact, demands -an unconstrained long-term look at where technology is going over the next two decades. It is possible that we need a major redirection in both hardware and combat development objectives. The purpose of this article is to discuss briefly why that may be the case, suggest the direction it might take, and initiate further discussion on the subject.

It is not difficult to see why, in the public view, the Army’s concerns with further improving our combat vehicles should be something less than a major concern to the country at large. Obviously, even after the reductions now underway, the Army’s force-in-being will be unmatched by any other on the planet. Given that training and morale are maintained, it will remain that way -unless, of course, some of its numerous potential adversaries improve their capabilities significantly. Unfortunately for the complacent, some of those potential adversaries will make such improvements. New threats are inevitable in a world culture made up of a multitude of highly competitive nationalistic states existing in a capitalistic world economy based on international mde whose key drivers are high technology and technological innovation. This is the basic ‘engine’ described by Kennedy? O’Neil? and others as that which carried European civilization to world domination. It now has become global, and generates change far more rapidly than in the past. To ignore it is to risk unpleasant surprises. The purpose of our R&D programs over the past 50 years has been to prevent such surprises, and they largely have been successful in that regard. This has been a continuous process and it has been possible to meet projected threats by modifying our equipment and forces in relatively small steps. When projections must be made farther ahead, however, a thorough grasp of the implications implicit in ongoing improvements in the relevant technology is likely to indicate the need for a discontinuous change in equipment and tactics. The time involved need be no longer than the roughly two decades between the present and 2010, when a new U.S. MBT‘reasonably may be possible. This is comparable to the time between the two world wars. Then, as now, existing technology at the beginning of the period promised further developments which could drastically change the way armies fought. Writers such as Fuller, Hart, and Mitchell, among others, discussed the potential of tanks and airplanes, but, “Despite this, the evidence of the initial battles of WWII from 1939 to 1941 would indicate that only the Germans paid serious attention to the analyses of how the technology best could be em ployed. However, here too this may be giving too much credit for intelligent military innovation with regard to technology. As the historian Tuchman has stated with respect to a much earlier war. ‘...most military innovations,’ (evolve) ‘..from defeat, igno-miny, and paucity of means.’4 Certainly all these factors influenced the German situation prior to WWII.” ’At the stat of that conflict, the Allied armies paid a heavy price for their lack of, “..intelligent military innovation..” Their losses confirmed the wisdom of the U.S.

Army Armor Branch’s founders, whose battles within the Army to overcome conservative opposition to creation of the Armor Force have become an often told story out of the Corps’ history.

It appears to me, as I have stated in previous articles, that we again are at a major turning point in the tactics of ground warfare, the first since WWII!*’

The course taken by the Corps’ founders 60 yean ago should be the model for that to be followed today. A critical examination of the implications of the developing technology is needed to determine the best path to follow. The two basic questions are:

1. What technological developments could threaten current armor forces?

2. How could these offer an opportunity to a potential adversary? The current focus for a FMBT is on development of a ‘super M1’ in which all of the characteristics of the outstanding current tank are improved. This is a conservative approach. However, its apparent virtues may be mer-etricious, giving a false assmce of battlefield success 20 years hence. An alternate approach to a future principal armored combat vehicle may offer much more. We need to keep in mind that, “Armor is a state of mind -an instinctive sense of mobility.”8 not a specific type of hardware. Much still can be done to improve the MBT in its current form. The separation of forces in “close combat” in DESERT STORM stretched out to over 3,000 meters in many cases, five-tmix times that in WWII tank battles. This overmatch can be increased with improved ammunition, such as X-ROD or the XM943 STAFF? Longer range vision systems and fire control systems also will increase vehicle lethality. Cross<ountry speed also can be significantly increased.

Improved communications such as M S will improve organizational effectiveness greatly, but of come will do this regardless of the specific vehicle systems used.

Ultimately, however, when the needs of h o r are reviewed’ there are limitations inherent in the current MBT type which currently for which foreseeable technology has no good answers. Strategic (air) deployability and high survivability obviously axe contradictory requirements. Passive armor is heavy, reactive armor of limited effectiveness, and close-in, vehicle-mounted active systems are an unproven concept. The kill ranges in DESERT STORM already exceed continuous intervisibility distances in many potential combat areas. And, as DESERT STORM demonstrated, the ability to kill at longer range provides the greatest improvement in survivability.

This also allows a lower force density, which can further improve survivability.

Improvements in weaponry have dictated trends toward greater sepm-tion of forces and lower force density on the battlefield since warfare began. The technology now evolving will accelerate those trends. That technology, encompassing communications, artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and related fields, is well recognized by the military, but is largely independent of military budgets. It has applicability in a multitude of areas, and will be implemented ubiquitously. Ultimately it will dominate military activities as well. It promises to greatly extend “close combat” ranges, greatly reduce the density of soldiers (but not necessarily machines!) on the battlefield, and greatly improve the survivability of those who remain.

The many military robotics programs now underway implicitly m-ognize this potential!’

Concept of Employment Evaluation (COEE) exercises already have been conducted.” The review of emerging technologies in the March-April 1992 issue of ARMOR discusses the application of AI and robotics to the armor mission. and indicates the eventual use of unmanned systems.13 Unmanned aerial vehicles were used successfully in DESERT STORM for both intelligence gathering and naval fm direction.

The development of AI and robotics is going to progress much faster than is generally realized. Moravec pre-. dicts human equivalence at the supercomputer level by 2010. and at the PC level within 20 more years.14 The trends support that projection. This is much more capability than will be needed for very effective semi-autonomous, teledirected, robotic fighting vehicles. Current concepts for a FMBT effectively are going to be overrun by the advancing technology if it is going to take us till 2010 to field it. The logical response to this is a concept of an FMBT fully exploiting those technologies.

I would propose that the best choice for a FMBT for the 2010 time frame is a vehicle system consisting of a manned control vehicle “armed” with a variable number of semi-autonomous teledirected robotic surrogates as its main weapon. The control vehicle would have approximately the protection levels and armament of the Bradley, and greater mobility, but at no more than 20 tons weight. This should be an achievable goal within the time frame. The robotic surrogates would be configured for the mission at hand. Their primary function, however, would be to engage and destroy the enemy. They would be fighting vehicles, probably armed with missiles, and directed by the soldiers in the control vehicle. Nominally, a complete FMBT system would consist of a control vehicle and six robotic surrogates. Both functionally and in configuration it compares to a current MBT in much the same way an aircraft carrier compares to a battleship, an equivalent change in naval systems which occurred in approximately the same length of time involved here. This approach appears (to me) to retain the mobility of current systems while having the following advantages over the conventional MBT configuration: .Better strategic deployability, due to the system’s lighter, smaller component vehicles: .Much longer striking range, due to the ability of the robotic fighting units to attack 10 kilometers or more ahead of the control vehicle in almost all terrain conditions: .Higher survivability (of the control vehicle), due to being out of range of many enemy wapons: .Higher lethality, due to the difficulty a conventional MBT will have coping with a simultaneous attack from several directions by a number of small, fast units uninhibited by risks; .Much greater intelligence gathering power, due to the larger number of sensing units involved and the potential for direct input into an IVIS system: .Quick repair of battle damage by replacement of the robotic units: .System flexibility through choice of robotic units to fit specific missions: .Reduced chance of fntricide for the manned units of the system. There are, of course, unsolved technical problems with this concept too. It is not a conservative approach. The most challenging of these appears to be in the communication links between the control unit and the robotic units. Some of these are: .Bandwidth requirement, which may be resolved by new compression techniques: .Transmission security, which may be improved by techniques and algorithms based on so called “fuzzy logic,” and will become less critical as the robotic units become more autonomous: Line-of-sight transmission requirements, which could be met through use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), albeit with the limitations inherent in that approach.

I have no particular expertise in that area of technology, and it is one which should be addressed by an author who does have that expertise as part of a thorough critique of the proposed concept. The basic question here, as with all of the technologies involved, is not what can be done now, but what can we reasonably expect to be able to do in 20 years. A broader critique of the concept than any single person can bring to the discussion obviously is critical to determining whether there is any merit in this proposed change in focus. The technology is only one aspect of the question. All aspects of employing such systems in combat should be explored. What effect would they have on tactics? How could they be employed most effectively? Would they really have the advantage over conventional systems it appears they might? What are their tems fight others of their own kind? What are the logistic impacts? Certainly more knowledgeable readers will recognize other topics which also should be included. weakneses? HOW would Such SYS-This is, I believe, a topic worth serious discussion within the Armor community. It appears to me there is reason to believe that relatively simple and inexpensive robotic vehicle systems in the hands of our potential adversaries will be a far more dangerous future threat to our forces than any number of obsolescent Russian battle tanks. Long before 2010 such sys- . tems, probably using optical cable guidance and operated by infantry, almost certainly will become available in quantity to almost any country that wants them.

Superior equipment based on the same advances in technology should be the most effective counter. A super MBT, like the battleship in WWII, may prove to be only a more expensive target.

If what has been proposed above is wrong, the reasons why it is wrong should be clearly established. If thorough discussion and analysis indicates it is right, our course should be adjusted appropriately. In that discussion, however, it should be kept clearly in mind that "Armor is a state of mind -an instinctive sense of mobility," a corps of fighting men imbued with that spirit, not a particular type of fighting machine. Notes 'Kelly. On; King cf rhe Killing Zone, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New Yotic, 1989. 'Kennedy. Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Random House, New York. 1987. Chapters 1-3.

3McNeill. William H., Tlw Pursuir of Power, The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1982.

9uchman. Barbara W.. A Disranr Mirror. Alfred A. Knopf. New York, 1978. p. 187. 'Dobbs. Hehert H., 'The Changing Envinm-ment -Combat Vehicle Technology in a Historical Perspective." The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). May 1984. Paper #840852. p.

4. COL 1.

61bid.. p. 2. col. 2. 'Dobbs. Herbert H.. 'Key ? ~ N S ~ S in the Combat Vehicle Technology Base," U.S. Army TACOM, Warren. Mich.. Sept. 1983. Presented at the ADPA Combat Vehicle Systems Meeting. 20-21 Sept. 1983. Fort Knox. Ky. Paper 1840852. p. 4. col. 1. 'Foley. Thomas C.. Viewgraph (VG) on 'Essence of Armor,"."Report to the Total Armor Force 1992." The Chief of Armor's report. 1992 Armor Conference. May 1992. Fort Knox. K . 'Naylor, Sean D.. 'Silver Streak." Defense News, The Army Ties Publishing Co.. Springfield. Va., 14 Sept 1992. p. 33. "Foley, various VG's throughout presentation.

"Unmanned System, The Magazine of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems, Spring 1992. Vol. 10. No. 2. Issue devoted to unmanned ground vehicle systems. ''Hennebeck. L. M.. and Powell Johnson, 'Lessons for Tomorrow's Battlefield." Unmanned Sysrem, Spring 1992, Vol. 10, No. 2, Payne. Edward W.. "The Army's Key Emerging Technologies." ARMOR, March-April 1992.Vd.CI. No. 2,pp. 6-12, Figure 10. 14Moravec. Hans, Mind Children. The Future of Robor and Human Inielligence, Haward University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988. p. 64. pp. 31-33.

13 ARMOR - January-February 7993 Colonel Herbert H. Dobbs, U.S.A., Ret., has intermixed a remarkable 18-year career managing the research and development of military systems with over 10 additional years as a hands-on engineer and scientist. He holds a masters and doctorate in mechanical engineering from the University of Michigan, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and the C&GSC, among others.

He has worked on such diverse projects as the B-58 bomber, the Polaris missile system, the Copperhead guided artillery projectile, Hellfire missile guidance, and air filtration on the M1 tank engine. He organized and ran the 'Red Ball Express' office in Saigon in the mid-l960s, developing a quick response supply network to keep weapon systems repaired. From 1978 to 1985, he served as director of the TACOM laboratory at Warren, Mich., chief of the Systems and Technology Planning Office of TACOM's R&D center, and the command's Technical Director. He holds the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, two awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, and the Joint Services Commendation Medal. A private consultant since 1986, he was a principal in a new company formed to exploit high technology. He also holds several patents - for improved breech-sealing systems, wind sensors, and methods for reducing bore erosion in cannons.