A Leap of Faith

A Leap of by Colonel Lon E. Maggart T h e real subject of this article is cohesion. Cohesion allowed the leaders of this brigade to attack and destroy substantial Iraqi forces and equipment under the most difficult of conditions decisively and without hesitation. ” “Devil 6, This is Dreadnought 6... I have some concerns about this attack. If I am alive tomorrow morning, I would like to talk to you about this operation!” “Devil 6, This is Demon 6... If I’m alive in the morning, include me in the discussion too!” “Dreadnought 6. Demon 6, This is Devil 6. If I’m alive tomorrow, I will be more than happy to discuss this operation with you both!” This somber radio conversation took place late on the night of 26 February 1991 in eastern Iraq, just before the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division was to conduct a forward passage of lines through the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment to attack and destroy what remained of the Tawakalna Division of the Republican Guards. The events which lead to this moment in time included the deliberate breach and destruction of the 110th Infantry Brigade, 26th Iraqi Division, over the previous two days and an approach march of some 125 kilometers through rain, high winds, and blowing dust that had begun at 0530 that morning. The night attack and subsequent operations described in this article are both important and interesting from a historical viewpoint. However, the real subject of this article is cohesion. Cohesion allowed the leaders of this brigade to attack and destroy substantial Iraqi forces and equipment under the most difficult conditions decisively and without hesitation. What follows is the story of a cohesive unit in combat and what made it that way. Faith .- - - - t . n Figures 1 and 2 graphically depict the operation and can be used to reference specific information found in the text. The morning of 26 February started with the brigade moving in column behind an advance guard provided by the 1-4 Cavalry through a seven-kilometer comdor between the 3d Armored Division on the north and the 1st (UK) Armoured Division to the south. The division mission was to establish a corps directed reserve position 85 kilometers to the northeast by early afternoon. However, as the day wore on, the location of the reserve position began to shift farther eastward. Eventually, the mission changed as well. When the brigade halted at mid-afternoon for refueling, the division commander issued a change of mission over the radio for the 1st and 3d Brigades to attack east to destroy the Tawakalna Division, which the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment had fixed in place 40 kilometers to the east. He set the start point time for 1730 hours, just as night was falling. There was time only to review quickly a three-week-old intelligence overprint of the Tawakalna Division’s location and disposition and to produce a rudimentary operations order. The Battle of Norfolk 26-27 Feb 1991 1-34 It;.’ 31 k3/ /

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“The brigade continued to move relentlessly toward a collision with the Tawakalna Division.“ In reality, the order gave only a mission, a series of way points that defined the direction of attack, three objectives, and a limit of advance called Phase Line Milford. The brigade moved out promptly at 1730 with the first order of business to simplify command and control by closing the two lead battalions together. This action massed the brigade and eliminated the possibility of fratricide between organic units. During the first minutes of the move, lead battalions also had to mark their vehicles with chemlights for identification during the rapidly falling darkness. All of this was no small task because the lead battalions were separated by six to seven kilometers, and all necessary coordination had to be made over the radio while the brigade was moving. To further complicate the operation, the trailing battalion, TF 5-16 Infantry, had closed on the refuel point only moments before the two lead battalions began moving to the east. Navigation in the desert was difficult, even with the Magellan global positioning system. However, the most consistently difficult aspect of this approach march was to keep the two lead battalions aligned. One battalion attacked using a box, while the other used a diamond. ,Considerable cross-talk was necessary to keep everything generally aligned to prevent fratricide. During the course of the move, the division commander provided several additional instructions. The first was a change in the passage of lines through the 2d ACR. In the original concept, the brigade was to pass through the 1- 4 Cavalry, then, approximately ten kilometers farther to the east, pass through the 2d ACR in zone to attack and destroy the Tawakalna Division that was defending from prepared de- I q P m

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70 80 90 CO 10 20 30 40 50 60 I I I PTlOT I I I I I 1 Figure 2 fensive positions. The area between the line of departure and Phase Line Milford, the limit of advance, was Objective Norfolk. As a result, this battle became known as the Battle of Norfolk. As the brigade moved rapidly toward the enemy, the division commander issued a second fragmentary order that required the brigade to conduct the passage through the 2d ACR along a specific ten-kilometer zone identified by two sets of grid coordinates. In addition, he gave a radio frequency and the call sign “Cougar” to enable the brigade to contact the 2d ACR to coordinate the passage. This frago necessitated a complete change in direction for the brigade. It is difficult to describe how complicated it was to redefine the direction of attack and to change formations while bouncing across the desert in the dead of night at high speed using a 1:250,000 scale map. Even with the Magellan, this was an incredibly difficult undertaking. Notwithstanding the problems of changing the plan enroute, the brigade modified the zone of action and continued toward the passage point. The brigade continued to move relentlessly toward a collision with the Tawhlna Division when the division commander called once again to direct that a brigade representative make physical contact with the 2d ACR to coordinate the passage. I decided that this meeting would occur only after the brigade was closer to the regiment. As the brigade closed on the 2d ACR, it was apparent that a pitched battle was in progress. Green and red tracers filled the air along with bursts of light from tank cannon fire, MLRS, and conventional tube artillery. Fires from destroyed enemy vehicles were burning fiercely on the horizon. It was ARMOR - January-February 1992 25 like a scene from an old war movie. The members of the brigade knew they were about to become part of a great battle. Just short of the line defended by the 2d ACR, the brigade halted long enough to permit the S3 to move forward and coordinate the passage of 26 lines. The halt allowed the brigade to The meeting between the brigade S3 reposition artillery, to define fire sup-and the 2d ACR yielded little infor-port relationships, to do fire planning, mation that would help in the passage. and perhaps, most important, to reor-We did find out that the brigade ganize after a long and difficult ap-would pass through two different proach march. Further, this short lull squadrons. Therefore, each of the two allowed TF 5-16 to close on the main lead battalions, TF 2-34 in the north MY-and 1-34 Armor in the south, would ARMOR - January-February 1992 have to coordinate with a different squadron at the point of passage. This was to cause some difficulty in controlling the fight later. At 2230 hours, the brigade began the passage of lines through the 2d ACR. Coordination bctween 1-34 Armor and the squadron through which it was to pass occurred quickly and efficiently. Enemy locations and, more important, the specific locations of the squadron, were available to the commander of 1-34 Armor before the passage. Unfortunately, the situation was less clear in the north. The exact location of the squadron through which “The passage into enemy held territory was an eerie, almost surreal experience. The night sky was filled with catastrophic explosions and raging fires the likes of which I had never seen before. . . . Horrible fires roared from the turrets of Iraqi tanks with flames shooting high into the night air. ” ~~~ ~~ TF 2-34 had to pass was never clear, and no information on the enemy was available in the zone. The commander of TF 2-34 was in a difficult position with respect to where he would be clear of friendly units and when he could initiate engagements against the enemy. In the absence of further information, the commander of TF 2-34 and I jointly agreed that the 71 grid line would, by all accounts, place his battalion east of all 2d ACR units. Given the unclear picture in the north, I moved into the northern sector from my initial position centered between the two lead battalions. This was to be a wise decision as the battle unfolded. The passage into enemy held temtory was an eerie, almost surreal experience. The night sky was filled with catastrophic explosions and raging fues the likes of which I had never seen before. Even the destruction of four T-55 tanks during the breach was nothing compared to the sight that joined our eyes during the transition from friendly to enemy ground. Hom-ble fires roared from the turrets of Iraqi tanks with flames shooting high into the night air. At the exact point of passage through the 2d ACR in the TF 2-34 zone, a T-72 tank that the regiment had destroyed earlier that evening still burned brightly, filling the air with the pungent smell of burning oil, rubber, and flesh. There was also present a peculiar smell we all came to associate with burning Soviet combat equipment. It was a smell that no one could identify from previous experience, but one than none ARMOR - January-February 7992 27 of us would ever forget. The burning T-72 signaled the end of combat as we had known it - against dismounted infantry - and the beginning of what was to be absolute mounted armored warfare at its most basic level - tank against tank. Across the division, the 3d Brigade adjacent to the south was engaging T-55 tanks just east of the 70 grid. The 1-4 Cavalry was engaging T-72 tanks about six kilometers north of TF 2-34. The 2d Brigade was trailing the 1st Brigade as division reserve. TF 5- 16 had now closed on the main body and was trailing some three kilometers behind TF 2-34. Now 1-34 Armor was heavily engaged with BMPs and T-55 tanks just east of the 70 grid, while TF 2-34 remained in weapons hold until it could cross the 71 grid line. The fires of burning Iraqi vehicles punctuated the darkness. The most important function for the brigade commander at this juncture was to promote calmness and to ensure that there was absolutely no possibility of fratricide between the two lead battalions or with the brigade to the south. This was accomplished primarily by cross-talk between the commanders involved. As 1-34 Armor moved quickly beyond the line defended by elements of the 2d ACR, enemy forces engaged it, resulting in the destruction of two Bradley Fighting Vehicles, five wounded and one soldier killed. Shortly afterward, TF 2-34 became engaged by Iraqi forces occupying a bunker complex. The 3d Brigade to the south continued to destroy enemy tanks as it moved rapidly toward Phase Line Milford. The 1st Brigade was halted on the battlefield in a major fight. A substantial gap developed between the two attacking brigades of the division, and it appeared that it would take considerable time to get the 1st Brigade on the move again. This was a time for calm, collected leadership if ever such a time existed. Predictably, both lead battalion commanders expertly maneuvered their companies to destroy the enemy defenders, evacuate the wounded and dead, then reorganize. It had seemed like hours, but these two battalion commanders restored order on the battlefield in a short 40 minutes. More important, they did not lose momentum during this very difficult and confusing action. The brigade was on the move again and closing the gap between the 1st and 3d Brigades. As the attack continued through the night, 1-34 Armor was able to move quickly through a mixture of units equipped with T-72 and T-55 tanks, BMPs, MTLBs, and a considerable number of trucks and other thin-skinned vehicles. By 0315 on 27 February, 1-34 Armor had penetrated the Iraqi defenses in Objective Norfolk and was defending from positions in the vicinity of Phase Line Milford. Following the destruction of the enemy forces in the bunker complex, TF 2-34 immediately slammed into the first of what proved to be the T- 72s of the Tawakalna Division. Because I was with TF 2-34 because of the problems associated with the passage, and the action appeared to be more intense in the north, I remained with it for the remainder of the attack. In fact, because TF 5-16 was following TF 2-34, this axis became the main effort, notwithstanding the intense fighting. This was the appropriate place for the brigade cornmandcr. Using volley fire and movement by bounds. TF 2-34 destroyed each successive Iraqi defcnsive position in short order. BFV crews used thermals to identify targets bchind bcrmed fighting positions. MlAls provided the range factor. Then, depending on the target, crews used main gun or 25- mm cannon fie to destroy Iraqi vehicles in each successive position. Reports that came to light days after the fighting described intense tank fire coming from the defending T-72s. however, none of this was apparent to the attacking force. I suspect that the Iraqi tank crews were firing blindly in the direction of the brigade. But because we had the advantage of thermal sights and the substantial range differential provided by the M829A1 120-mm sabot round, “The Silver Bullet,” there was not one instance of either an MIA1 or a BFV in the TF 2-34 zone of action being struck by a T-72 - or anything else other than small arms fire. Moving through the battlefield in the dead of night was much like watching a vintage black and white movie. Everything seemed to move in slow motion. There was no noticeable sound that anyone could recall even though scores of tanks and heavily laden ammunition vehicles were exploding with great regularity across the eniire brigade front. As clouds floated across the moon, the battlefield was intermittently lit from above, forming a backdrop against which enemy fighting positions stood out on the horizon. In the area where tanks were burning, strange shadows flickered in the light. It was an eerie collage of tanks moving at what seemed half speed into positions from which they would send long, red shafts of light racing to their targets. Each tracer exploded from its gun tube oi launcher in an immense burst of white light, and like a visiblc laser beam, smashed into its target an instant latcr. This was like nothing I had evcr secn or read about in any account of armored warfare. For virlunlly evcry main gun round ficd, one of thrcc consequcnccs would result. In most cascs, the target would explodc in a huge fucball of flame and dcbris. Thcsc explosions were much likc thosc sccn on tclcvi-sion shows, where space vehicles are vaporized by phasers or photon torpc- 28 ARMOR - January-February 7992 does. Metal particles were blown two to three hundred yards into the air. Often, each massive initial explosion was followed by two or three subsequent, but equally violent, secondary explosions as fuel and remaining ammunition detonated. In many cases, burning vehicles, previously destroyed, continued to explode as we passed through each subsequent position, showering fragments down on the battalion. While engaging the second Iraqi defensive position encountered, the battalion commander of TF 2-34 asked for permission to stop destroying ammunition trucks. They were becoming hazardous to the attacking force because their contents continued to explode for hours. The second phenomenon noted with main gun engagements was an ever expanding orange glow with a darker orange center that engulfed the target tank, often terminating seconds later in a catastrophic explosion of the sort described above. Finally, there were instances in which the bright orange glow expanded out, then contracted back to darkness. Tank crews reported seeing Iraqis rapidly dismounting their vehicles when this occurred. In the case of the subsiding orange glow, I suspect that a sabot round had completely passed through the turret, generating intense heat and light, but striking nothing vulnerable. Smoke and haze from burning vehicles drifted over the battlefield, marking the movement of vehicles and men as silent shadows. Tanks moving through an already destroyed position were illuminated momentarily as they passed by the lies that continued to rage until morning. The illusion of watching a movie was complete. TF 5-16 had the onerous task of follow and support and thus was left the job of cleaning up remnants of bypassed Iraqi units. This was a most difficult task due to the proximity of the lead battalions. It was impossible for them to shoot main gun or TOW missiles, even though there were sev-cral occasions when they should have. Extreme care and close coordination by cross-talking was necessary to prevent fratricide inside of the brigade formation. TF 5-16 continued to trail TF 2-34 until 1-34 Armor bypassed a large bunker complex. Because 1-34 Armor was a tank pure unit, I directed TF 5-16 to slide south across the brigade sector to engage and destroy this Iraqi position. Movement on the battlefield at night was no easy task for following units. There were enough bypassed enemy positions to make movement hazardous, and the explosions and resulting debris made the selection of routes extremely complex. TF 5-16 continued to attack in this manner until 0900 on the following morning. As the attack continued until the early morning hours of 27 February, tank and Bradley crews became more proficient at identifying and destroying enemy targets at longer ranges. Engagements occurred between 700 and 3000+ meters, with the average approximately 1700 meters. Crews destroyed targets with first round hits in most cases, requiring few subsequent engagements. Battalion commanders managed fire distribution, with volley fie from platoons the norm. The result was the slow but very methodical destruction of the 9th Brigade of the Tawakalna Division. By 0630 on 27 February, TF 2-34 arrived at Phase Line Milford and, along with 1-34 Armor, began refueling at approximately 0830. TF 5-16 continued to engage pockets of resistance until approximately 0900. In order to protect the logistical elements of the brigade, unit trains remained on the friendly side of the line of departure until fist light. The problem now was to move them rapidly to close with their respective battalions for refueling. This was no easy task: some Iraqi fighting positions were still intact, and many Iraqi soldiers were moving about the battlefield, requiring us to determine if they were hostile or surrendering. In addition, Objective Norfolk remained a vast wasteland of burning and exploding tanks. At 0700 on 27 February, the division commander ordered 2d and 3d Brigades to push on to a location in Kuwait approximately 30 kilometers to the east and defend in sector. At 0945 hours, division directed the 1st Brigade to continue the attack east to pass through 2d and 3d Brigades to secure a line some ten kilometers farther east. The division plan then was to move 2d Brigade on line to our left, 3d Brigade on line to our right, then attack in a division wedge to Objective Denver. Objective Denver was located about 95 kilometers to the east, half the distance between Kuwait City and Basra, Iraq, and its seizure would cut the highway linking the two. For the second time in as many days, the brigade was to conduct an operation with virtually no preparation time, no intelligence, and with vague information on the friendly situation. The fist order of business was to refuel the force. If everything worked exceedingly well, a battalion task force could refuel in 45 minutes, given that the BFVs did not need to be topped off. Forty-five minutes represented all the preparation time available before the designated start point time of this phase of the operation, so there was no margin for error. The initial brigade plan was to lead with 1-34 Armor, which had been in position since around 0315, and with TF 5-16, the follow and support force. Presumably TF 5-16 was less exhausted than TF 2-34, which had been fighting the entire night. This plan changed quickly, based on the capability of battalions to refuel. Upon receipt of the division order, I directed the battalion commanders to report to the brigade TOC to receive instructions. The commander of TF 2- 34 got the order personally because he was collocated with the brigade TOC. However, after talking with the other two commanders, it was apparent that only the commander of 1-34 m o r could reach the TOC before we would have to move. The S3 was to give him the order when he arrived. ARMOR - January-February 1992 29

. I left in my BFV to link up with the commander of TF 5-16 half-way between our two locations to save time. Enroute to the link-up point, I determined that TF 5-16 had not completed refueling and would be unable to meet the start point time. So there we were. Time was running out, the order could not be executed as planned, and the brigade commander was ten kilometers away from the TOC in the middle of the desert. A radio call to the commander of TF 2-34 confirmed that he could be ready to move in ten minutes. 1-34 Armor was ready. A quick net call put the brigade in motion with TF 2-34 in the north, 1-34 Armor on the south and TF 5-16 tniling once again. The brigade converged from three directions on a point in the desert specified in the order. Approximately seven kilometers beyond Phase Line Milford, I linked up with TF 2-34 and moments later, 1-34 Armor roared up on the right flank In a matter of minutes, the leaders of the brigade turned a potentially serious delay into a routine operation with only a few short radio calls. The next three hours saw the brigade racing against time to join the 2d and 3d Brigades, which were in light contact 30 kilometers to the east. The immediate problem was where to effect the passage of lines through the 2d and 3d Brigades. I was unable to talk to anyone at division or in the 3d Brigade, so I planned the passage enroute, over the radio, with the 2d Brigade commander. The plan was to move to a burning tank near the center of the 2d Brigade formation and pass. The passage occurred in stride with TF 2-34 on the left and 1-34 Armor on the right. In the meantime, TF 5-16, achieving speeds of 45 miles per hour, caught up at the passage point. The brigade had just cleared the passage point when a sharp tank battle erupted between T-55 tanks of the 12th Armored Division and 1-34 Armor. These enemy vehicles were destroyed from the march. The brigade then made a wide turn north to reach the 30 grid line, where it was to halt and await the closure of the other two brigades. Moments after the turn, the lead battalions ran into a berm that required a deliberate breach drill to reduce. In 30 minutes, the brigade was pouring through several gaps, directly into the face of another Iraqi defensive position. As with the earlier engagement, this one ended quickly and unpleasantly for the Iraqi tankers. However, unlike any of the previous tank fights, this engagement was at very short nnge and within an area now jointly occupied by 2d Brigade. There was a new dimension to this fight because the entire division was now on line and in danger of becoming intermingled. In fact, the area became so congested, with friendly forces all converging on what appeared to be a single GPS way point, that I ordered the brigade to hold in place until the 2d and 3d Brigades had cleared farther east. This proved to be a wise choice in maintaining the integrity of the brigade and .avoiding an exchange of fires with adjacent brigades. When the other two brigades had cleared sufficiently to permit safe movement east, we pressed on toward Objective Denver. As daylight turned to darkness, the brigade found itself confined to a trail that was one tank wide in what was discovered later to be an enormous mining operation some 20 kilometers square. This was the last place any of us wanted to be deep in enemy-held territory. The lead battalion, 1-34, spent most of the early evening engaging dismounted Iraqi soldiers with coax machine guns and small m s . But that is another story. The Gulf War was over for all intents and purposes. There was still the mop-up action to complete the following morning. We still had to clear and secure our sector of Kuwait, but the hard part was over. The operation had been unbelievably successful from stat to finish. In the days following the war, I reflected on what we could have done to prepare ourselves better for war and what we could have done better during the war. My conclusion was, nothing! Every single aspect of prepantion and execution was textbook perfect. There was in my mind however, one thing that made the difference between a good performance and a great one. That one thing was cohesion. I chose the title, “A Leap of Faith” for a very good reason. Some days after the war. the commander of TF 2-34 said to me, “The Battle of Norfolk was in many ways a leap of faith.” In reflecting on the entire operation, I decided that he was absolutely correct. We were able to execute incredibly difficult operations with little or no information, planning time, and intelligence because all of the leaders in the brigade had faith in the ability of each other to do what was right when things got tough. When the brigade approached the Tawakalna Division in the dead of night, there was no panic, no superfluous questions about the mission, no reluctance among the leaders. Everyone did what needed to be done - professionally, calmly, and with great precision. Cohesion made dealing with fear, uncertainty, and ambiguity not only possible, but enabled us to fight with the same aggressive spirit demonstrated during the breach. What follows are some thoughts on what made this cohesion possible. Perhaps most important is the recognition that cohesion is singularly the most important aspect of being prepared for combat. While being well trained clearly is important, a cohesive unit can overcome many training deficiencies because everyone in the organization will strive, at the pain of death and injury, to do what is right, given only minimum leadership. Someone in every cohesive unit will rise to the occasion to lead other less trained soldiers to greatness. From my perspective as a brigade commander, cohesion is built primarily by allowing battalion commanders the latitude to run their respective organizations as they see fit, within a very broad 30 ARMOR - January-February 1992

~~ framework of expected standards. There is one‘other very important aspect to the latitude issue. The brigade commander must establish an atmosphere in which subordinates have the freedom to speak their minds, without fear of reprisal or public embarrassment. This can be, and often is, a very painful way to operate. However, things seem to work better if all of the facts, fears, and opinions of subordinates are in the open. Cohesion in the U.S. Army today is a direct result of its investment in leader development programs over the past decade. The restructuring of branch basic and career courses to focus on warfghting skills was the fmt step toward excellence. This was followed by improvements both in noncommissioned officer programs and in the Command and General Staff College. The School for Advanced Military Studies established the baseline standard for intermediate level officers. Almost simultaneously, the National Training Center concept became a reality, and the first steps were made toward building the Combat Maneuver Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center. Finally, the Army spent considerable resources to build the Battle Command Training Program to train division and higher commanders and staffs, and the Tactical Commanders Development Course for battalion and brigade commanders. All of these programs have a common goal: to develop creative. adaptive people into professional leaders who are trained to fight. These leader development programs made the difference in Operations URGENT FURY, JUST CAUSE, and certainly in DESERT STORM. An evaluation of these operations shows that success was made possible by competent individual soldiers and leaders who were able to adapt rapidly to changing, ambiguous situations. The message is clear: in a time when the U.S. Army must reshape itself to conform to congressional mandates, we cannot afford to lose the tools that gave us the edge over our opponents in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq. If we do nothing else, we must maintain the platform instruction and associated leader development programs that made us successful. And we must strive to constantly improve them, even in an era of diminishing resources. Second, leaders must know their business. Part of cohesion comes from the confidence subordinates have in their leaders. Similarly, peers and superiors need to sense the competence of leaders around them as well. High speed, mounted operations at night are no place for the timid or ill-prepared leader. Even if there is no time or space to train units larger than company level in ganison, routine “brain sessions” conducted throughout the year considerably reduce the necessity for full-scale operations in the field. As a point of fact, much of what leaders do is mental anyway. So command post exercises, simulations, and participation in seminars provide excellent training if such exercises are directed by tough, uncompromising commanders who demand adherence to high standards. This war confirmed for me that preparation for the National Training Center also is great prepm-tion for combat. Periodic maintenance training at the brigade and battalion level is essential for proper leader professional development. This brigade runs monthly terrain walks that focus on some specific aspect of maintenance, such as services, PLL, parts flow, or AOAP. The brigade publishes a list of subjects at the beginning of the training year to ensure adequate preparation time is available to those responsible for maintenance instruction. In the case of the brigade’s leader training program, I personally select the subjects, provide guidance to the instructor, and review his lesson plan and supporting VGTs. Third, rehearsals are key to training leaders for combat. Rehearsals that rigorously tax company commanders and platoon leaders are among the very best of techniques to train for war, their value as part of the orders process notwithstanding. A competent battalion or brigade commander can jam days of professional development into a single four-hour rehearsal. And rehearsals contribute to cohesion because every leader in the organization soon gets to know how every other leader thinks in a tactical setting. There is tremendous power in an organization in which everyone knows what the plan is and how it will be executed to the smallest detail. In the 1st Brigade, rehmals am an integral part of every CPX, orders drill, and tactical simulation. I run the brigade-level rehearsals. personally and demand specific, very detailed information from the primary presenters, the company commanders. I do not allow battalion commanders, executive officers, and S3s to coach the company commanders during the rehearsal. Company commanders may cross-talk among themselves, but because they must execute the plan in actual combat as a group if the battalion commander is killed, they must train that way during the rehearsal. The fourth point is to integrate diligently combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units into the brigade battle team. The goal is to make these slice elements feel more a part of the brigade than their own parent unit. This integration must be a routine function in garrison if trust and confidence are to exist on the battlefield. Including them in unit social functions is a first step toward building a combat team. However, to build a cohesive battle team, slice elements must feel in their bones that they are an integral, important part of the brigade. Including them in the decisionmaking functions of the brigade will quickly promote this feeling. CS and CSS leaders play an important part in the decision processes of the brigade during combat, so why not train them that way during peace? CS and CSS leaders should be included in rehearsals at all levels of command. This quickly reinforces their importance, and ensures that ev-ARMOR - January-February 1992 31 eryone on the team is familiar with the organization and thought processes of each slice, and vice versa. It is entirely possible that other units will be attached to the brigade in the theater of operations. This is not a problem if the climate of command in the brigade is one of taking attachments “under wing.” If the brigade commander makes sure that every unit associated with the brigade is treated the same as an organic unit, cohesion quickly follows. During the Gulf War, it was not unusual to have as many as Seven battalions at a time in some sort of command relationship with the brigade. The attitude of the entire! battle team was “if they belong to us, we will take care -of them just like our own.” As a result of the way we treated attachments, the brigade was known by its members as the “Battleship America” - a self contained fighting machine that sailed effortlessly across the desert. Closely related to the concept of taking care of the slice is the fifth point - humor. To be successful in building a cohesive team, the commander must have and foster a sense of humor in the organization. A little bit of humor goes a long way to speed up the integration process and provides the lubrication necessary to reduce the friction of interpersonal relations. Humor helps the younger leaders see their commander as a normal human being who not only is approachable, but also one who keeps life in perspective. Finally and perhaps most important, humor relieves tension. Although the opening quote in this article was deadly serious, there was an element of humor in it that helped to relieve the tension and stress associated with the difficult task at hand. The fifth and final point is to recognize the importance of decentralization. Decentralization is a necessary but often overlooked component of team building that contributes directly to cohesion. In addition to the notion that it promotes self-actualization, a key ingredient for a high performing organization, decentralization has some very practical applications as well. While centralization and decentralization both produce results, a centralized unit can operate only at the speed of one brain - the boss’s. However, in a decentralized outfit, operations occur at the speed of every brain in the unit. Independent and creative thinking is the hallmark of decentralized units. Initiative is rewarded, and the result is a soldier or leader who quickly develops self-confidence, tactical competence, and expertise on the battlefield. The price of learning is an occasional mistake that is corrected in training so it doesn’t recur on the battlefield. Daily life in the brigade is executed in a decentralized manner. Leaders have the authority to operate as required of their job. While I charge every staff officer with the responsibility of keeping me informed, I do not exercise control over every facet of brigade operations. That is the executive officer’s job. I see my role as keeping the organization headed toward the goals jointly established by the leaders of the brigade. Some view this way of operating as fraught with danger; however, in 25 years of service, I never have been seriously let down due to inattention or failure to perform. Quite the contrary. I saw the dividends of this style of leadership every day on the battlefield in Iraq. We defeated the Iraqis under the worst of conditions precisely because leaders could act independently according to the situation. The motivation for the leaders of the brigade to cross into the blazing inferno that was Objective Norfolk, with little information on either the friendly or the enemy situation, at the conclusion of an 18-hour approach march that was supposed to end much earlier in a nice safe corps reserve position, then attack throughout the night against a prepared defender, and then continue the attack on a few minutes notice for another 12 hours, was indeed a leap of faith. But it was a leap of faith based on the common knowledge that everyone present on the battlefield would die before they let the team down. This notion is summarized in the contents of a letter from General Grant to General Sherman after the Civil War. Grant said, “Throughout the war you were always on my mind. I knew that if I were in trouble and you were still alive, you would come to my assistance!” Colonel Lon E. Maggart graduated from Kansas State University with a BA in Political Science. He received his Armor commission through the ROTC program at Kansas State. A graduate of the U.S. Army Armor School, Airborne School, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, CGSC, and the Army War College, he initially was assigned to the 3d AD, Germany, upon completion of the Armor Officer Basic Course. He has held a wide variety of important command and staff positions, culminating in his selection to command 1st Brigade, 1st ID (Mech) at Ft. Riley. His other key assignments include duty as chief of staff, 1st ID (Mech), Ft. Riley: commander, 2-69th Armor, Ft. Benning, Ga.; and inspector general, V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany. He also has served as S3, S4, and company commander, 1 st Battalion, 32d Armor, 3d AD, FRG; advisor, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; instructor, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan.; doctrine development staff officer, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, Va.; S3 and executive officer, 1st Brigade, 3d AD; and G5,3d AD. 32 ARMOR - January-February 7992