Combat Service Support in the Task Force Scout Platoon

Combat Service Support I in the l Task Force Scout Platoon I 1. by Captain Timothy Flanagan "All Yankee eletitertts, this is Yankee 25, erecute phase CMRL.IEl oiit." Tlte scout platoon leader looked down at itis map. Tlte jive Bradleys lefr woiild soon head toward the battalion's flank. It itad been a long night and art evert longer two weeks, but his platoort had per-fonited well. Tlte battalion coiii-iitartder was pleased with the intelligence gathering of the platoon. Now it was time to observe the ortlyprob-able ritecltanized cotiitterattack route onto the task force's newly acquired position. Once again, the radio crackled to life. Tliis time it was tlte Bravo sectioit leader. His wingritan had no fiiel, arid he was nirutirig on fiimes. llte lieiitertartt shook Itis head arid swore, "Wty is this Itappeitirtg?" Yesterday, one of his inert "died became of poor iitedical evacuation procedures. Todayl tlte problem centered on a lack of fiiel. Resupply of Class IX parts also seemed to be a constant rtigittritare. Altltoiigli aiccessfiil so far, the scout was filled with ail empty feeling inside. "We accoritplislt tire mission, but we lose liten and eqri@iteitt for stripid reasons," lie muttered. He tltoiigltt back to tlte itiiitteroris training aercises tltroiiglt wlticlt lie itad taken Itis platoon. In the siitall area in wlticlt tltq trained at Itorire station, tite platoon sergeant itever had problems acquiring their supplies. Finally, the vehicle Itircited to a halt on tite new screen line. Uitfomiitate-ly, itis vehicle was not the first one there. bitmediately tite platoort leader realized that tite platooit of T-64s rolling rip his flank itad come tltroiiglt tite sector that Bravo section sltoiild have been covering. Tlte last littering oiit of Itis ritoiith was the battalion coiiiiiiartder's call sign sliorited into a itarid mike. The lieutenant reached over and hit the snooze button on his alarm clock. "Damn, why can't I dream about girls like everybody else,'' he thought. As he rolled out of bed and stumbled into the bathroom, he began to think about his nightmare. Maybe his platoon sergeant was right. Although certainly not as glamorous as planning patrols, providing for combat service support operations for the platoon is vital if they are to survive in a combat environment. FMs 17-98 and 71-2 combined with a little common sense, offer several solutions to our nightmare-plagued platoon leader. Whether or not the task force scout platoon contains Bradleys, an M113/901 mix, or the new HMMWV configuration, its mission and organization usually cause headaches for the task force's logistics planners. The scout platoon has no organic CSS assets. It usually operates to the front of the task force along a screen line instead of occupying part of the task force assembly area. Scouts live by the motto, "First out, last in." Additionally, for security reasons, most units conduct their resupply operations during hours of darkness; this is when the scout platoon does the majority of its work. All of these conditions and obligations make it extremely difficult to conduct normal LOGPAC operations. Notice, I said difficult. I did not use the word impossible. The first method of CSS to the scout platoon is to make the scouts responsible for their own supply functions. The platoon sergeant would coordinate for the platoon's needs, and be responsible to ensure that the LOGPAC is met, distributed, and returned to the Logistics Release Point (LRP). The disadvantages to this method are obvious. The platoon sergeant is so involved in the resupply process that the platoon would have to operate one vehicle short for extended periods of time (FM 17-98, p. 7-2). The second method involves pig-gybacking on one of the company/team CSS assets in the task force. Naturally, the LOGPAC that the company/team picks up must have been coordinated in advance. Adequate supplies of all classes must be assured. The scout platoon must have priority when it arrives at the LOGPAC location. This way it can continue its mission without delay. The main advantages of this method are that the scout platoon sergeant does not have to act like a unit first sergeant and accompany the LOGPAC, and the support platoon does not have to prepare a separate supply package. The main disadvantage to this plan is that the 42 ARMOR - January-February 7997 ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ scouts must conduct resupply operations at the same time as the rest of the task force. This may not be feasible during some missions (Fh4 71-2, p. 7-17). The last method I will examine, and one that was extremely successful for a unit from Fort Polk during a 1988 National Training Center rotation, is to dedicate a LOGPAC to the scout platoon. The HHC first sergeant controls this element. This is a time-consuming process for the HHC first sergeant. However, the alternatives leave much to be desired. By establishing a dedicated LOGPAC with the HHC first sergeant in charge, the scouts will have every opportunity to conduct resupply operations (Fh4 17-98, p. 7-2). The first step in this process is a habitual working relationship with the battalion’s S2 section. The distance that the scout platoon normally operates from the rest of the task force makes reporting to the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) via the admidog net virtually impossible. It is much easier and practical for the scout platoon sergeant to report the platoon’s supply needs to the S2 section. The S2 section then relays that information to the CTCP. If the S2, after conferring with the S3, realizes the scouts may need additional supplies for future operations (i.e. smokepots, chemlights, breaching assets, etc.) he can order those materials sent with the next scout LOGPAC. The platoon leader and the platoon sergeant must decide when is the best time to resupply. Naturally, the S2, and particularly the S3, will have to approve that decision. It is not the S4 who decides when and where the scouts will be resupplied. If the battalion is in a transition to an offensive operation, it is imperative that the scouts get resupplied as quickly as possible. This requires that the LOGPAC is ready to go as soon as the area in which the scouts are operating is secure. The scout’s LOGPAC cannot sit in the field trains with the rest of the task force’s CSS assets. It must be as far forward as is safely possible. One location that works well is the CTCP. When the tactical situation permits, the first sergeant can go forward and conduct resupply operations. Resupply during the defense presents several challenges. Positions may be compromised as vehicles pull off the screen line to resupply during daylight hours. Dismounted observation posts can help alleviate this concern. If CSS operations are attempted during hours of darkness, the platoon reduces its readiness at the exact time enemy reconnaissance elements are most likely to operate. By shifting position forward of the task force’s defenses during periods of limited visibility, the platoon increases the chance of becoming the victim of fratricide. Unless the vehicles become low on class 111, avoid resupply during dedicated defensive operations. Before the arrival of the first sergeant to the LOGPAC location, the scout platoon sergeant must ensure that the area is secure. An area for class I11 operations must also be identified. The conduct of the LOGPAC is similar to that run by company/teams, but there are several areas that should receive special emphasis. In addition to topping off all vehicles as frequently as possible, the scouts should also carry additional class 111. .A.iimunition requirements may also pose problems. If the first sergeant has a HMMWV instead of a truck, the resupply of TOW missiles, large amounts of machine gun ammunition, and replacement Stinger missiles may be hampered due to lack of space. To obtain the proper balance between the extra water cans, spare ammunition, replacement parts, and food, is difficult. Allocate additional assets for large loads or schedule a second resupply. Do not forget to plan for personal demand items and medical material. The distance between the scout platoon and the UMCP precludes scout vehicles from returning to the UMCP for minor repairs. This coupled with the absence of maintenance personnel in the platoon requires the vehicle crew to be proficient in vehicle preventive maintenance. If possible, attach a mechanic to the platoon to fur and diagnose problems. Another solution is to have a mechanic come forward with the first sergeant at LOGPAC time. Once PMCS is complete, the LOGPAC can carry the 2404s to the BMO. The implementation of the HMMWV scout platoon should ease the mechanical burden on the scouts. HMMWVs are generally more reliable than tracked vehicles. The most difficult aspect of CSS for the scout platoon is medical treatment and evacuation of wounded soldiers. The first step in this process is disease prevention. Each squad leader ensures that his ARMOR - January-February 7997 43 soldiers eat properly and drink enough fluids. Soldiers must bathe and change clothes regularly. Pay particular care to those soldiers who patrol frequently. Trench foot, immersion foot, and frostbite can neutralize soldiers as quickly as an AK-47. The second step in medical CSS is to train combat lifesavers. Each vehicle should have a scout trained as a combat lifesaver. With the equipment and supplies available in his medical bag, he can begin to stabilize the soldier and treat initial injuries. Hopefully, he can prevent the wounded soldier from going into shock. The next level is the attachment of a medic to the platoon sergeant’s track. The distance between the scout platoon and nearest aid station necessitates the assignment of a 94B to the platoon. This attachment should be habitual to inspire the confidence of the scouts in “their” medic. The medic’s extensive training is a necessity and not a luxury in a task force scout platoon. In addition to conducting routine sick call and administering first aid, he is the advisor to the platoon leader and platoon sergeant on evacuation of a wounded soldier. A plan for evacuation must exist before mission execution. The logistical planners in the battalion must be aware not only of the main maneuver unit’s portion of the operation, but also of the scouts’ operations. They must pay close attention to the times the scouts will conduct missions so they can have medical personnel standing by if needed. Given the distance a scout platoon can operate in front of the task force, it is’ unreasonable to expect an ambulance to come completely forward to evacuate a scout casualty. The actual conduct of the evacuation varies, depending on what the task and the scout platoon are doing. If possible, the platoon sergeant, with a medic on his vehicle, should extract the wounded soldier and move toward friendly lines. If conducting an offensive operation, and the rest of the task force has already crossed the LD/LC, the platoon sergeant has two options. The first one is to head to the nearest ambulance exchange point or pre-designated point to drop off his casualty. The second option is to head to the nearest aid station. This situation requires an on-the-spot decision by the platoon sergeant. If this is an attack, but the task force has not crossed the LD/LC, or the task force is defending, evacuate the casualty to a predetermined point at which an ambulance is waiting. All of this requires rehearsals by the medical ambulance crews and the scout platoon. Once again, the task force S2 must inform the rest of the task force that friendly elements are reentering the lines. This is not a glamorous subject. We seldom discuss it. To figure out the best way to gather the info+rmation the battalion commander needs is, and should be, the number one priority of any scout platoon leader. However, if the assets to accomplish that mission are not available because of a failure to plan proper combat service support, all the training and wargaming in the world will not have any effect. Captain Timothy Flanagan is a 1986 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. He has served as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and company XO in the 5th ID (Mech). A graduate of AOB, AOAC, and JOMC, he is currently assigned to the 2d ID in Korea. I I 44 ARMOR - January-February 1991