Making Light Forces More Flexible and Responsive

by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Roman I MARINE LAVs IN PANAMA Introduction "A leaner, meaner force, but smaller," means the smaller force has to cover more bases. If a sizeable portion of that force will be alight force, how can this light force compete effectively with heavy or motorized forces on the possible battlefields of the future? The answer may be a system of tailored augmentation with light armored vehicles (LAVs). Background What is the threat, and more important, what is the ground force the nation must sustain to meet it? National-level planners are strug-glig with threat assessment, force design, and force levels that make sense in an environment that seems to change by the minute. The more reflective concerned citizen probably prays for resulting policy that will be sensible and prudent. But what might be characterized as the "Post Cold War Policy Maelstrom'' has produced interests calling for afar more radical approach. Some of these interests, having already drawn their own conclusions on the threat picture, are pressuring for very rapid and significant reductions of ground forces. Whatever the results of the developing contest between prudent sensibility and radical revision, some policy factors are obtaining increasingly clear definition. For example, we are learning that the threat can be anything from a highly sophisticated, massive force that can effectively field the full spectrum of military capabilities and sustain them, to small forces of varying levels of military capability and organization, such as the regular army of a small Third World nation, to a body controlled by opposition political or criminal interests. Depending on infrastructure, commitment and tactical and operational skill, even smaller forces have demonstrated a disturbing ability to tie up large quantities of ground force when national policy has dictated a response with U. S. troops. Additionally, the immediate conventional wisdom seems to say that the likelihood of the more extensive military situation is remote, therefore, current military force levels are not necessary. Consequently, planners can probably count on less force to respond to this potentially wide range of threat environments. There is an implication that this force may be less standard in its components than any standing force maintained by the United States in the past. In such an emerging environment, several obvious questions about force structure are worth asking. If ground force must respond more frequently to threats at the median or lower end of the conflict spectrum, e.g., organizations that have limited capabilities, is an Army oriented on heavy force imperatives valid? Conversely, can the nation afford to swing its emphasis to a cheaper light force orientation? Is a more prudent policy to continue to maintain a force that can reasonably respond to threats across the spectrum? If the answer to the last question is yes, how can such a 18 ARMOR - January-February 7991

If, with this smaller total Army force structure we find the Army committed against a more intense threat, how do we quickly and efficiently augment the heavy component from existing force structure? force be managed on reduced resources? The assumption of this article is that the Army will have to be organized and equipped to respond across the entire war and threat spectrum well into the 21st century. The article will focus on an organizational and equipment approach for light force that offers a means to create an integrated, flexible, sustainable, and deadly Army on any battlefield against any threat and on relatively economical terms. It discusses the augmentation of light forces with Light Armored Vehicles (LAYS). An Approach to a Flexible and Responsive Ground Force In describing a force approach, I propose to do so from the perspective of an adaptation from the basic force components of ground force as we know it today. Essentially, the Army organizes three types of ground force elements; heavy, light, and Special Operations Forces (SOF). Integrated into these elements in greater (traditional maneuver such as heavy and light) to lesser and aviation) degrees are combat, combat sup port, and combat service support. Additionally, the trend toward developing warfighting concepts that package these components into integrated combined arms forces of heavy, light, SOF, and aviation is well advanced. As previously noted, the Army must probably respond to an array of threats. This requirement has challenged Army planners and developers to produce effective systems of organization, command and control, equipment and training that assure a smooth meshing of the apparently disparate force elements of heavy and light into force teams that can work efficiently toward mission accomplishment. Light forces are the most flexible, strategically mobile and economical of the force elements when substantial and sustained ground holding forces are required. However, numerous studies of the military establishments of many developing nations indicate the capability to field, among other things, armored forces of multi-battalion size with at least 105-mm main-gun equivalents and modern fire control. When this aspect is combined with the continued need to maintain some credible level of heavy force to meet alliance obligations in the more intense battle environments but, within a smaller force structure, an indication of possible force solutions begins to emerge. The solution takes shape through two questions. First, if.a significant portion of a smaller Army will be of alight configuration that may require "heavying up," based on necessary tailoring to the type threat to be encountered, what is the mechanism that allows responsive adjustment? And, if with this smaller total Army force structure we find the Army committed against a more intense threat, how do we quickly and efficiently augment the heavy component from existing force structure? In proposing a solution, we must keep in mind that the heavy force is the most challenging type of ground force to train, sustain, and continually modernize. With a reduced force structure, there may be significant lag time in generating heavy force individual and unit replacements. Therefore, existing light forces may have to fill the void. Light forces, as organized, can certainly fill some force needs on the high-intensity battlefield, such as terrain denial and rear area security. However, if a nonlinear battlefield predominates, the light force contribution will be limited by its inherent weaknesses in protection, organic mobility, and heavy direct and indirect weapons. To examine another situation, what if the light force component is committed to a Third World contingency? As the most strategically deployable part of the Iorce against lesser threat capabilities, this deployment is valid. But, what if the force must face a threat that has substantial heavy force elements? As noted, this is a real possibility. Our reduced heavy force structure, and most probably reduced strategic deployment assets, will make existing heavy force elements unresponsive, and rapidly deployable light forces vulnerable on introduction into the theater of operations. Because the Army can reasonably expect either of these situations to occur, how does it solve the problem? Light forces are the most responsive type of force structure for contingency operations, but they lack both tactical and operational mobility and the firepower critical for some missions. How could they gain needed mobility and the survivable, mobile, heavy support and assault weapons they need? A start at a solution is to attack the mobility and lethality dimensions. We would need to add suffi-ARMOR - 19 cient ground mobility to the light force so that it could augment a heavy force or compete with threat heavy forces. This mobility would have to be controlled by the light force element and be integrated with its tactical organization and methods. Giving the force its own means of mobility would not add to the burden of existing aviation and ground transportation units and would not become unavailable when extremes of weather denied flight or road movement. Another requirement is that the added mobility and firepower would have to lend itself to rapid movement on existing air and sealift. Several alternatives come to mind. One might be to pre-position sets of vehicles, while providing a company set for training at the home stations of light units scheduled to reinforce. When scheduled to deploy to locations without pre-positioned equipment, alight force would keep its vehicle sets ready to deploy and use training sets for necessary sustainment and refresher training. Certainly, other options - such as permanent motorized organization - could be considered, but my choice in this article is to emphasize light force orientation with the option of augmenting its capabilities when the mission requires. Even if the light force were augmented with wheeled carriers and weapon systems, its employment would still orient on terrain suited to light force strengths - broken terrain or built-up areas. This force would not be employed properly if used as amounted assault arm. This approach, which assumes that the Army will retain a mobile heavy force component, uses wheeled systems as a means of bridging the compatibility gaps - tactical and operational - of light forces, first in the mobility area, second, in the lethality and other system areas. The concept still views light force as light force. Finally, we have to add this mobility and firepower without compromising the essential character of the light force. A reasonable solution may be available, one that has been developing and improving over the years. There is now available a whole array of wheeled armored chassis, ranging from nine to 15 tons, that are capable of providing crews and infantry some level of protection against fragmentation and small arms and, with proper use of covered or concealed routes, heavier weapons. Though such vehicles are not designed for heavy assault, they could provide responsive and effective tactical and operational mobility that allows the light force movement to terrain where it can best use its capabilities. Newer systems, such as the eight-wheeled light armored vehicle (LAV), can provide excellent tactical mobility and superior operational mobility on road nets, yet cost far less than light tracked systems..ganizational ild alight IUIGG gain LIUS upaudity without compromising its nature? Wheeled armor can also provide expanded fuepower in the heavy environment. Vehicles are available to carry automatic cannons, heavy mortars, assault guns (currently up to 105mm), and enhanced command and control equipment, as deemed fiscally supportable and operationally necessary. It is important to note, however, that more sophisticated systems need permanently organized and trained soldiers to employ these systems. This impacts on the force structure equation and threatens to compromise the streamlined organization of the light force. Simply to add a wheeled, light armored carrier for the light force would provide a relatively economical solution to tactical and operational mobility in the heavy environment. The wheeled systems are somewhat easier to train and maintain than tracked systems. Tactical training, too, would be simplified if light forces used these vehicles primarily to "beat" threat into position or to quickly withdraw from position. Light forces would continue to stress their "stock in traden - holding ground. Given these limitations, the training burden should be manageable. LTC Tom Rozman is currently assigned as chief, Concepts and Strategies Division, Collective Training Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Previously, he served on the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force, Department of the Army; as chief, G- 3 Training Resources, 1st Armored Division, U. S. Army Europe; executive officer, 1 st Battalion (Mech), 46th Infantry, and 2d Battalion (Mech), 6th Infantry; and commander, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mech), 58th Infantry. He has also served as infantry platoon leader in Korea, and S- 3 Air of an infantry battalion at Fort Benning. LTC Rozman is a 1970 graduate of USMA, and holds an MBA from the University of Massachusetts. He is a 1983 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College. 20 ARMOR -